



# In Defense of the Nation

## DIA at Forty Years







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# In Defense of



# the Nation



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**DIA at Forty Years**  
by Charles Francis Scanlon

*“Let us never forget that good intelligence saves American lives and protects our freedom.”*

*President Ronald Reagan, 1981*

# Dedication

*This book is faithfully dedicated to those thousands of unsung heroes over the years at the Defense Intelligence Agency who have tirelessly served day in and day out in a multitude of roles contributing to the defense of our great nation . . . and especially to those who gave their all.*



## The DIA Seal

The dark blue background of the seal signifies the unknown or the threats and challenges of the world around us. The flaming torch and its gold color which represents knowledge or intelligence is lighting our way to a known world, symbolized by the blue-green planet. The eternal search for knowledge and truth is the worldwide mission of the Defense Intelligence Agency. The two red ellipses symbolize the technical aspects of intelligence today and in the future. The 13 stars and the wreath identify the Agency as a Department of Defense organization.

# Foreword

On 1 October 2001, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) commemorated its 40th Anniversary. It is a great personal privilege and honor for me to be the Director of DIA during this special time in DIA's history.

I believe it is important to thank and congratulate those presently serving at DIA on their many accomplishments, and also recognize the thousands of men and women, military and civilian, for their many years of dedicated effort. To do this, I asked Major General Charles Scanlon, USA (Ret.), to author a book detailing DIA's origins, evolution, missions, and at the same time, highlight the contributions of our people.

*In Defense of the Nation—DIA at Forty Years* starts with DIA in crisis response with the 1998 embassy bombings, moves to the Cuban Missile Crisis, reviews the Cold War, discusses DESERT STORM and the current situation in the Balkans, and concludes with the recent EP-3 China incident. The book records some of DIA's successes over the years and the selfless sacrifices of the dedicated, professional, and innovative men and women who made them happen. The pages reflect challenges and crises, and how our workforce responded with support and a degree of involvement beyond the call of duty.

The book traces DIA's history, first at Arlington Hall Station as the Defense Department's one source of strategic defense analysis, and ends with a thorough discussion of DIA as the combat support agency it is today—a force multiplier supporting combatant commanders facing real world crises. It also gives special attention to DIA's evolving technology, its facilities, and methods of operation.

This narrative makes it clear that DIA's contributions have been instrumental and far-reaching in our Nation's history. These achievements are cited in the words of Presidents, Secretaries of Defense, Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and warfighters—all highlighted with selected photographs.

To those serving now, and those who served previously, I salute you. You have my profound gratitude. I envision that all who read *In Defense of the Nation—DIA at Forty Years* will share my pride in being part of DIA history.

—Thomas R. Wilson  
Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy  
Director, Defense Intelligence Agency  
Washington, DC  
September 2001

# Preface

At the beginning of the year, I was interested in doing a nonfiction book about defense intelligence. My idea was to write about the contributions of individuals involved in this work whose deeds were little known to the public because of security considerations. I approached Admiral Wilson with a request for access to DIA files and people. He countered with a suggestion that I write a story about the Agency that would be appropriate for DIA's 40th birthday, on 1 October 2001. In March, we agreed upon a book to be called *In Defense of the Nation—DIA at Forty Years*.

In this book about the Agency, the Director asked me to write about its roots, its people, and its role in the Defense Department and in the Intelligence Community—its changing missions over the years and its contributions to some of the national security crises faced by the United States.

It is not my intention to duplicate or compete with the good work of the professional historians at DIA. They have dutifully recorded its history over the years producing both unclassified and classified coverage of DIA's evolution which I utilized extensively. Rather, it is my purpose to offer DIA members, present and past, and interested others a fast-moving overview, illustrated with photographs, crossing the landscape of Agency leaders, people, events, and crises that have contributed to the success of DIA over the past four decades.

As I developed a tour for the reader, my search took me back in time and in people to DIA origins. My search took me down the roads of the Agency's role in strategic, current, basic, estimative, scientific and technical, crisis and tactical intelligence, and into the halls and compartments of collection, systems, technology, infrastructure, support, attaché activities, and defense intelligence education.

I explored the Agency's evolution, tracing it through strategic intelligence and policy support to operational intelligence and warfighter support. I recounted its transformation from predominantly military leadership to a more balanced blend of military and civilian leadership. My efforts took me through many files and personal interviews. I spoke with Secretaries of Defense; Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs; former Directors; as well as Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and civilian intelligence professionals, including a number of those currently serving at DIA.

As I tell what I believe is an exciting story, I do so in three voices. One is as the story and reader's narrator. This voice takes you from Joe Carroll's Cuban Missile Crisis in 1961 to Tom Wilson's new millennium in 2001. The second voice covers DIA as seen through the eyes of others. They tell their stories as they lived them. And the third voice is based on my personal experience and observations as someone proud of his DIA service who has known firsthand many of the people and events of the period.

My journey back in time through the writings and through the reflections and words of others, particularly those patriots charged with the weighty responsibilities of national security, reaffirmed my long-held belief that DIA—now and in the past—and its multitalented and dedicated people have served the United States remarkably well in both peace and war during a fascinating period of American history. When DIA was needed, it was always there and continues to serve after 40 years.

All who read these DIA stories will recognize that an undertaking of this magnitude could not have been accomplished without the help of many others. I hope the reader will turn to the acknowledgments section at the end of this book, wherein I express my sincere gratitude to all those who contributed.

I will be successful in my endeavor if anyone who has ever served at DIA picks up this book and after reading it says, “Yes, that’s my DIA; that’s my story. I am proud to have served.”

—Charles Francis Scanlon



# Introduction

The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) is a major producer and manager of intelligence for the Department of Defense (DoD). Established in 1961, and designated a combat support agency in 1986, DIA's mission is to provide timely, objective, all-source military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force planners to meet a variety of challenges across the spectrum of conflict. The Director, DIA, is the primary adviser to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on military intelligence matters. Under the auspices of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB), DIA unites the defense intelligence community on major issues dealing with support to deployed forces, assessments, policy, and resources. In addition, to assist weapon systems planners and the Defense acquisition community, DIA plays a key role in providing foreign weapon systems intelligence.

Directed by a three-star military officer, DIA is staffed by highly skilled military and civilian personnel. Headquartered at the Pentagon, Agency personnel are located throughout the National Capital Region. Major locations include the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base, the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center in Frederick, Maryland, and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Huntsville, Alabama. A major component of DIA is the Defense HUMINT Intelligence Service with military attachés in more than 125 embassies and other field elements worldwide.

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
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# PART 1



The National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is located in the Pentagon.

# DIA IN CRISIS RESPONSE

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DIA's Alert Center in the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) is a 24-hour, all-source, multidisciplined, intelligence fusion center. It provides current/crisis intelligence, indications and warning, and crisis management intelligence for U.S. decisionmakers and warfighters. Direct support is provided to the National Command Authorities and senior military and civilian officials within the Department of Defense. The NMJIC's customers are:

*Secretary of Defense*

*The Offices of the Secretary of Defense (OSD)*

*Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff*

*The Joint Staff*

*National Military Command Center (NMCC)*

*CINCs/Unified Commands/J2s/JICs*

*Joint Force Commanders*

*Military Services*

*Other Intelligence Consumers*

*The U.S. Intelligence Community*

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The exterior and interior of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, following the terrorist bombing on 7 August 1998.

# TERRORIST BOMBINGS OF THE U.S. EMBASSIES IN KENYA AND TANZANIA—AUGUST 1998

It was 10:31 on Tuesday, on 7 August 1998, at the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya. The weekly country team meeting had just begun. The meeting, as always, was in the secure, windowless, conference room on the top floor of the Embassy.

Chief Warrant Officer (CW2) Timothy Teske, who served in the U.S. Army, was the Operations Coordinator for the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) and the acting Defense Attaché (DATT) that morning. Defense Attaché Colonel Daniel Pike and the air crew of the DAO's C-12 aircraft were in the Azores Islands with an aircraft maintenance problem and not expected to return for a few days.

The meeting had been underway for only 9 minutes when a thunderous noise was heard and felt, throwing people from their chairs onto the floor. The lights went off and the conference room immediately began to fill with dust. CW2 Teske and the others quickly recovered their bearings and began struggling to open the heavy, blast-proof door to the conference room. Once outside the conference room, CW2 Teske immediately knew that the Embassy had sustained a horrific blast. All around him were collapsing walls, sparking electrical circuits, smoke, flames, and debris. His first thought was for the DAO, which was one floor below. He had left Staff Sergeant (SSG) Kenneth Hobson, the Operations NCO, there along with a visitor just a few minutes ago. On his way to the DAO spaces in the midst of shattered glass, twisted metal, asbestos, and dust, CW2 Teske circumnavigated many physical hazards to uncover an embassy employee, pull him from the wreckage, and get him down the smoke- and dust-filled stairwell to safety.

By the time Teske reached the DAO, SSG Hobson was dead, having been killed instantly by the explosion. It was later determined that the blast took place almost directly under the DAO office. The visitor was also found dead. CW2 Teske moved Sergeant Hobson's body, and others, to the ground floor where medical help was forming. Then he returned to what was left of the DAO office area to check the security containers where classified materials were kept. Within 20 minutes of the blast, numerous looters were roaming the Embassy. CW2 Teske, the Embassy security officer, and the Marine guards turned the looters back—ignoring their own safety—they continued to search for and evacuate other injured or deceased embassy staff. The looters were contained on the first and second floors of the DAO building until perimeter security could be established approximately 4 to 6 hours after what now was believed to be a bomb attack.

Unknown to Chief Teske, another member of the DAO family, Colonel Pike's 15-year-old son, was working a summer job in the Embassy basement. He was not injured, and, in making his way up from the basement, he assisted a number of other people.

As soon as CW2 Teske could leave the devastated U.S. Embassy, he moved to the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) building several miles from the Embassy to assist the Chief of the Kenyan U.S. Liaison Office Colonel Roughhead to reconstitute the U.S. Embassy. Soon after, CW2 Teske located the only functioning satellite communications link and contacted the country officer at DH-6 at Defense Attaché System headquarters. He provided a situation report for all concerned about what apparently

had been a car bomb attack. Teske said that, "The DAO has been completely destroyed and the Operations NCO, SSG Kenneth Hobson, has been killed." He also requested immediate assistance with communications and security support. His call was received at 1:00 p.m. Washington time. Following his contact with DH-6, Teske contacted the DIA Director, Lieutenant General Patrick Hughes, and informed him of the bombing details and SSG Hobson's death.

At almost the same time, Mrs. Pike, the spouse of the Defense Attaché and also the Embassy Community Liaison Officer notified DH-6 that all the dependents were safe. She asked that information be passed to the stranded attachés and air crew in the Azores. She added that the other spouses were looking after Mrs. Hobson, who knew her husband was dead.

DIA had first learned of the Embassy bombing in Nairobi from the media and other government

agencies. They also found that the U.S. Embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, had sustained a bomb attack at almost the same time.

The country officer, Mike Brown, established a crisis action team to include members of DIA's internal counterintelligence and security activity. Special Agents Mark Pearce, Robert Barrow, and Howard MacDonald were on their way to Nairobi at 5:00 p.m. that same night after coordination with the State Department and the FBI. The country officer contacted the Acting Defense Attaché in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Colonel Michael Mensch, and tasked him to catch the next flight into Nairobi to assist CW2 Teske until Colonel Pike and his crew could arrive from the Azores. He arrived late on the morning of 8 August. Concurrently, the counterintelligence team (SRT), equipped with secure satellite telephones, portable computers, and cameras, were in Nairobi just before Colonel Mensch. Once in Nairobi, the team rapidly moved to assist the

LTG Patrick Hughes awards CW2 Timothy Teske the Soldier's Medal for bravery in peacetime for his actions in Kenya at the time of the embassy bombing.



regional security officer and FBI personnel. They also assisted in the security of the ruined Chancery and helped set up an interim DAO operation in the USAID building to coordinate the ever increasing USAF air flights into Kenya.

To help Mrs. Hobson and her 18-month-old daughter in returning to the United States, DHS deployed Major Victor Bird as Family Assistance Officer to Nairobi on 8 August. He departed with them that evening for the United States.

Colonel Pike and the C-12 crew arrived in Nairobi from the Azores on 9 August, and Colonel Mensch returned to his duties in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, the following day. The SRT returned home on 14 August, mission complete.

The United States had no DAO in Tanzania. The non-resident, accredited attaché, Lieutenant Colonel James Cobb, was stationed in Harare, Zimbabwe. On 10 August, he arrived in Dar es Salaam, where he assisted in the arrival of a company-sized U.S. Marine unit from Europe to protect the embassy site.

Elsewhere in the region, information surfaced of threats to other U.S. embassies, specifically those in Kampala, Uganda; and Kinshasa, Democratic Republic of the Congo. DH-6 moved attachés and administrative personnel to support urgent needs in those countries and the reconstitution of the DAO in Nairobi.

Five embassies suspended operations in the face of threats—Kampala; Pretoria, South Africa; Harare; Maputo, Mozambique; and Kinshasa.

Earlier on 7 August, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen made the following announcement:

*“I would like to express my condolences to the victims and families of those who perished or were injured in the bombings of U.S. Embassy buildings in Nairobi, Kenya; and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These bombings are a stark reminder of the threat to U.S. personnel posed by terrorists*

*whose only means of attacking America is through such cowardly acts. In recent years, the Department of Defense has taken dramatic steps to improve the security of its forces deployed overseas. But, as the bombings show, we will never be able to eliminate all the risks that our troops and diplomats face when they serve our country overseas. The loss of one American serviceman or diplomat to such acts is one too many. Our men and women in uniform serve proudly and selflessly around the globe with the full knowledge that they face additional dangers abroad because they wear the uniform.”*

On 7 August, when the word arrived about the explosions at the two U.S. embassies, the DIA JCS J2 Rear Admiral Tom Wilson quickly stood up a round-the-clock terrorism working group within the Office of Counterterrorism, Terrorism Warning Division at the Pentagon. Several analysts and managers from the Terrorism Analysis Division at the DIAC immediately shifted to the Pentagon to provide a full-service integrated effort. The working group focused on three primary issues: identifying the perpetrators, monitoring indications and warning of follow-on attacks, and supporting operational planners.

In the initial hours and days that followed the two simultaneous terrorist attacks, the U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies focused on quickly identifying who orchestrated the attacks. DIA's JCS/J2 working group was the focal point for DoD's effort. The working group immediately sent analysts to other government agencies to act as liaison officers coordinating the flow of information back to the Pentagon and to senior DoD policymakers. The working group prepared multiple daily briefings for Admiral Wilson to apprise OSD, CJCS, and others of the rapid-paced information flow from Kenya and Tanzania. Within days of the bombings, the U.S. Intelligence Community and law enforcement agencies were confident Usama bin Laden's al-Qaida network was responsible for both. In the weeks before the bombings, he had issued a Fatwa (religious decree) and

held a news conference to publicize his intention to attack U.S. interests in the near future.

While the FBI had the lead in the law enforcement role in obtaining evidence of who committed the attacks and bringing them to justice, the key question for DoD senior leaders and force protection decisionmakers was the possibility of follow-on attacks. That question drove much of the activity within DIA's working group and the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community in the initial hours and days following the bombings. A recognition of who was behind the attacks was key to assessing the likelihood that follow-on bombings were in the offing. The working group and the rest of the U.S. Intelligence Community decided that follow-on attacks were likely. Those assessments were translated into action by the issuance of Defense Terrorism Warning Reports and U.S. Intelligence Community Threat Advisories that provided commanders with timely information from which to make force protection decisions.

The DIA Working Group provided intelligence support to JCS and other operational planners involved in preparing for strikes in response to the terrorist attack.

Target write-ups on terrorist facilities were based on all-source analysis. The working group provided that information to the J2 Deputy Director for Targeting (J2T) and other JCS operational planners preparing a plan for the President's approval to strike back at the al-Qaida network.

Planning for the strike under stringent compartmentation and operations security (OPSEC) guidance began with clear and concise National Command Authorities objectives and guidance: strike at the network of radical groups affiliated with, and funded by, Usama bin Laden. The targeting plan was finalized in a nationally vetted and agreed upon approach. Targets in Afghanistan included a network of terrorist compounds that housed supporters of Usama bin Laden and, in Sudan, a facility tied to bin Laden.

With the targeting plan developed, the DIA JCS/J2 worked closely with the Chairman's legal counsel and JCS/J3 to ensure all targets complied with the Law of Armed Conflict, national objectives, and additional planning guidance. Once all issues were resolved, J2 and J3 advocated the targeting and employment plan to the Chairman and NCA, gaining approval for the strike.

On 20 August 1998, while the rubble was still being cleared from the car bombings of the embassies in Africa 13 days prior, U.S. Navy ships in the Red Sea and the Arabian Sea launched attacks against terrorist targets in Afghanistan and Sudan. This rapid U.S. response was a fusion of calculated intelligence planning with precision operations.

During the poststrike phase, J2T and other national agencies conducted preliminary battle damage assessment (BDA) in support of the Joint Staff and senior decisionmakers. The Pentagon efforts were incorporated into the Unified Command's BDA evaluation of each target. Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, using available BDA imagery, requested development of imagery derived products for public disclosure. This was approved and the news media carried the imagery of the U.S. military response strikes.

President Clinton announced on the day of the strikes:

***“Let our actions today send this message loud and clear. There are no expendable American targets. There will be no sanctuary for terrorists. We will defend our people, our interests, and our values.”***

Shortly thereafter, at the Pentagon, Secretary Cohen said:

***“As you’ve already heard from President Clinton, we have today conducted military strikes at several facilities that have supported international terrorist groups. The United States and the rest of the community of civilized***

The widow of SSG Hobson (left) with LTG and Mrs. Hughes at the DIAC when her husband's plaque was added to the Patriots' Memorial.




**nations have made clear time and time again that the violence and the bloodshed and the murderous acts of international terrorists will not be tolerated. Today's military strikes against those terrorist camps and facilities are a part of a continuing effort to defend U.S. citizens and interests abroad against the very real threat posed by international terrorists. In the wake of the tragic and treacherous attacks on our embassies in East Africa and in light of the continuing patterns of specific threats against U.S. citizens and facilities, we've taken these actions to reduce the ability of these terrorist organizations to train and equip their misguided followers or to acquire weapons of mass destruction for their use in campaigns of terror. We recognize that these strikes will not eliminate the problem, but our message is clear. There will be no sanctuary for terrorists and no limit to our resolve to defend American citizens and our interests, our ideals of democracy, and law against these cowardly attacks. Those who attack our people will find no safe place, no refuge from the long arm of justice."**

The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, General Shelton, added:

**"First, let me underscore what Secretary Cohen has said. This is not simply a response to some specific act, but a concerted effort to defend U.S. citizens and our interests around the globe against a very real and a very deadly terrorist threat. As many of you are aware, our Intelligence Community has provided us with convincing information based on a variety of intelligence sources that Usama bin Laden's network of terrorists was involved in Kenya and Tanzania. Attacks that killed over 300 people, including 12 Americans, and wounded thousands more."**

On 29 May 2001, almost 3 years later, after months of trial and 10 days of deliberations by a jury, four suspects of the twin bombings were found guilty, two of them of murder, and the other two of conspiracy to kill Americans.

SSG Hobson was subsequently honored at a memorial ceremony at DIA, and his name was added to the list of 13 other Agency members killed in the service of the United States. CW2 Teske was cited by the U.S. Ambassador to Kenya for heroism and awarded the Soldiers Medal. He is still serving DIA in the Defense Attaché System.



DIA personnel—military and civilian—man the National Military Joint Intelligence Center in the Pentagon around the clock.

## SUPPORT TO THE CRISIS/CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS

The terrorist bombings of the U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania were chosen by the author as examples of how DIA becomes involved in crisis support when an incident involving national security takes place. Such situations are not new to DIA. Since its inception in 1961, DIA has participated in scores of crises and support to contingency operations. Some were over in a few days, and others, like the Vietnam war, lasted for years.

DIA's role in crisis support has been evolutionary. Following the Vietnam era in the 1970s, DIA was subjected to severe personnel reductions. Accordingly, the Agency, in responding to more than 16 crises, formed intelligence task forces (ITFs) to support a wide range of national emergencies—from the *Mayaguez* seizure in 1975 to the Iran-Iraq war in 1980 to the Grenada URGENT FURY operation in 1983. DIA's crisis management procedures then called for activating an ITF when a crisis evolved to where it required dedicated 24-hour monitoring. ITFs operated out of what was then the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC) at the Pentagon. The NMIC was the forerunner of today's NMJIC.

DIA also formed other more specialized intelligence operations in this period. In 1983, DIA established the Central American Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) as an interagency analytical organization focused on insurgency in El Salvador. CAJIT produced all-source tailored tactical intelligence for the U.S. Southern Command (Panama), U.S. embassy country teams, and allies in counterinsurgency efforts in Central America. DIA later used CAJIT as a model for national-level joint intelligence centers (JICs) created to handle crisis intelligence support.

The real surge in DIA's prominence as a combat support agency came after the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was the driving force behind many of the changes and improvements in defense intelligence support to operational commanders beginning in 1987. The lessons learned providing intelligence support during the preceding 10 years, combined with the changes resulting from Goldwater-Nichols, positioned DIA to meet the challenges of the Gulf War.

Goldwater-Nichols tasked the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with developing a joint doctrine that governed the distinct, but related, activities of the services and combatant commanders. Henceforth, the military services recruited, organized, trained, equipped, and provided forces for assignment to the combatant commands and administered and supported these forces. Commanders of the Unified and Specified Commands exercised command authority over these assigned forces. This was a significant change in the roles of the services and commands.

DIA immediately began planning and implementing the intelligence component of the new joint doctrine, which involved enhancing DIA-command cooperation. The Goldwater-Nichols legislation identified DIA as a national-level intelligence and combat support agency, with the National Security Agency, Central Intelligence Agency, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency (formerly the Defense Mapping Agency), National Reconnaissance Office, Central Imagery Office, and the intelligence divisions of the Department of State and the military services. Several DIA initiatives fostered cooperation and strengthened the ties already forged with the U&S Commands.



The National Military Intelligence Center in the Pentagon during the 1980s.

The first of these initiatives was the creation of the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC), which significantly enhanced DIA's capabilities to respond to crisis situations. DIA designed the OICC, located at the DIAC, to assemble resources quickly to surge on a problem and then convert analysis to operationally relevant products and support. DIA staffed the OICC as a fully automated intelligence center, connected by secure communications with the NMIC at the Pentagon and the U&S Commands around the world. DIA staffed the OICC during normal duty hours and added personnel for 24-hour operations during crises.

Also in 1987, DIA formed the Command Support and Plans (CSP) organization as a means to involve the commands in the defense intelligence planning, programming, and budgeting process.

The Agency charged CSP with enhancing intelligence support to the CINCs in an environment of increasing requirements and high-risk conflict. This meant satisfying commands' intelligence requirements, integrating master plans and architectures, and developing a joint intelligence doctrine—including joint intelligence interoperability and standardization.

One of CSP's major missions was to promote and upgrade intelligence support to operational commanders through the Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program (TENCAP) and the Intelligence Communications (INCA) Project. TENCAP aimed at defining interfaces between intelligence and strike planning systems, and it fostered efforts to respond to command requests for expanded national system support to the tacti-

cal commander. INCA played an integral role in strengthening DIA-command relationships.

In an effort to strengthen intelligence support to deployed commands, DIA introduced the National Military Intelligence Support Team (NMIST) in 1987. DIA activated NMISTs to augment intelligence support worldwide to the various U&S Commands during crisis operations. An NMIST was a small mobile support unit (four to five people), with secure communications and intelligence equipment, that deployed to the command to provide a link to DIA's all-source intelligence network. These teams regularly deployed on training exercises with the commands in addition to actual operations.

In an additional move to improve command support in 1987, the DIA Director, announced his intention to assign one senior DIA civilian to each U&S Command. This DIA representative served as the key link in the DIA command chain. DIA held this representative responsible—backed by one military or civilian coordinator at DIA—for coordinating the best possible intelligence support to the command.

DIA took steps in 1987 that contributed to coverage of the Iran-Iraq War and the tensions in the Persian Gulf. One of these was DIA's activation of a special intelligence task force called the Persian Gulf Working Group (PGWG) in the NMIC. The Agency set up the PGWG in response to intelligence support requirements from the CJCS. DIA



Members of the J2's Yugoslavia Intelligence Task Force participate in a video teleconference in 1996.

charged the PGWG with tracking, on a 24-hour basis, the tanker war, the Iran-Iraq ground war, the air threat, the SILKWORM missile threat, and other military developments in the Gulf.

In 1988, DIA's intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf Operation EARNEST WILL intensified as the Iran-Iraq War expanded in a renewed "War of the Cities," and spilled into the Gulf. The United States implemented Operation EARNEST WILL to deal with the Iranian mine threat to U.S. and allied shipping in the Gulf. On 18 July 1988, Iran accepted UN Security Council Resolution 598, leading to the 20 August cease-fire that ended the bloody 8-year war with Iraq.

To improve its ability to support the National Command Authorities, DIA upgraded the NMIC in 1988 and 1989 in the first major renovation of the center since the 1970s. The Agency updated and renovated the NMIC, including its component Alert Center, Collection Control Facility, and intelligence task force areas, as an integrated, state-of-the-art intelligence facility. The JCS designed and built a combined intelligence and operations facility, called the Crisis Management Room, next to the Alert Center. Collocating the NMIC with the JCS's National Military Command Center (NMCC) allowed for the fusion at the national-level of operations and intelligence during crises.



The Alert Center at the NMJIC, 2001.

These crisis support facilities in the Pentagon had evolved significantly since 1987 and Operation EARNEST WILL. At that time, a thick wall separated the JCS operations and intelligence crisis support spaces. Three successive DIA Deputy Directors for JCS Support (J2), Rear Admirals Thomas A. Brooks, Edward D. Sheaffer, and J.M. McConnell, worked hard to tear down those walls, physically and psychologically. The result was valuable experience gained during routine operations and minor flareups, as well as improvements in the “jointness” of operations and intelligence support.

The DIA Deputy Director for JCS Support, or J2, was the most prominent Agency official in crisis support operations. He ran the NMIC at the Pentagon, which provided routine and crisis intelligence support to the NCA, policymakers, and the U&S Commands. The J2 had two masters. As a member of the Agency, he worked for the DIA Director, but as the primary intelligence staff officer on the JCS, he also answered to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In a crisis, the J2 could take advantage of the resources of DIA and wield the hammer of the Chairman.

Between October 1989 and Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, DIA responded to eight crises involving JCS alert and warning orders. These included Panama Operation JUST CAUSE, Philippines warning of coup attempt, SOUTHCOM counternarcotics activity, and India-Pakistan border tensions. DIA handled these without diverting resources, and it uncovered problems with organization and tasking that led to improvements. One of the important lessons learned was the need for JCS operations and intelligence crisis support analysts to read each

other’s messages in order to eliminate contention and duplication. They also found it essential to have a small, quiet room where they could brief the CJCS or the SECDEF without disrupting operations.

In 1989, DIA split the CAJIT so one-half could continue to support the El Salvador mission while the other half transferred to the counternarcotics effort in support of the President’s Andean strategy. DIA named the new structure the Joint Technical Intelligence Center (JTIC). Through the JTIC, DIA devoted substantial analytic resources to establish a 24-hour watch, expanded the basic intelligence production effort, increased imagery exploitation resources, produced high-impact studies, and dedicated current intelligence support for the Andean strategy. The lessons learned running the CAJIT and JTIC provided valuable experience for the Gulf War.

DIA’s profile as a crisis support and combat support organization grew incrementally during the two decades prior to the Gulf War. The growth was especially pronounced after the mid-1980s when DIA implemented structural and doctrinal changes aimed at providing better intelligence support to the warfighter.

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM would prove to be DIA’s most challenging crisis response. The Gulf War and DIA’s role will be covered in this book under the decade of the 1990s, as well as the EP-3 China incident in Part 6, and a number of other crises that DIA faced during its 40 years.

Next, we will turn to DIA’s origins.

# PART 2



President Dwight D. Eisenhower and President-elect John F. Kennedy consult at the White House. Both Presidents were interested in improving defense intelligence.

## ORIGINS — THE 1960s

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*“In the work of intelligence, heroes are undecorated and unsung .... their inspiration is patriotism; their reward can be little except the conviction that they are performing a unique and indispensable service for their country and the knowledge that America needs and appreciates their efforts.”*

—Dwight D. Eisenhower  
3 November 1959

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President Kennedy's Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, ordered the establishment of DIA on 1 August 1961.

## IN THE BEGINNING—ROBERT McNAMARA

In May 1960, President Eisenhower commissioned a Joint Study Group chaired by Lyman Kirkpatrick to review the “Foreign Intelligence Activities of the United States.” Kirkpatrick was a World War II OSS (Office of Strategic Services) veteran and a former CIA Executive Director. The group was tasked to look closely at military intelligence organizations and procedures of the military services. The group found a great deal of duplication and multiplicity of views and interpretations in the Pentagon. These were the years of intense interservice rivalry for military procurement funds. The Air Force’s new strategic bomber plans were competing with the Navy plans for a new generation of carriers. These were the years of the missile gap and years of differing estimates by the service intelligence components on the severity of the Soviet Union’s strategic and conventional challenge.

Late in 1960, the group submitted its recommendations. One of its most important proposals was to establish a central DoD intelligence authority. President Eisenhower left office before this recommendation and others could be acted upon. The inauguration of John F. Kennedy in 1961, however, quickly introduced an era of expansion and change for the United States and the Defense Department. Under the Kennedy administration, a renewed emphasis on defense was accompanied by an activist foreign policy. The new Secretary of Defense, Robert S. McNamara, was a strong believer in rationalizing and centralizing the operations of the Defense Department and the armed forces. One of the major defense issues on which President Kennedy was elected in 1960 was the question of the missile gap between the United States and the Soviet Union. That issue was one of the first matters that Secretary McNamara and his deputy, Roswell Gilpatric, investigated after taking office on 20 January. According to McNamara, “We spent more than 25-percent of our time in the first weeks reviewing the estimates of

the five agencies involved—the CIA, the State Department, and the three military services. We found no acceptable consensus.” Accordingly, Secretary McNamara was convinced that it was “absolutely essential in the Defense Department to have one objective source for strategic defense analysis.”

On 8 February 1961, in a memorandum to the JCS, he directed that they submit within 30 days a concept for a Defense Intelligence Agency which embodied the extensive integration of the military intelligence efforts of all DoD elements. The proposed concept was to include a five-phased implementation schedule and a draft DoD Directive for the organization’s authorization. The Secretary cited several guidelines to be accomplished in establishing the agency. These included eliminating duplication in intelligence collection, processing, production, estimating, and publication; limiting service intelligence functions to training, personnel, and support responsibilities; restricting service headquarters levels to no more than a small intelligence staff; and precluding the policy and planning staff of the joint staff from assuming any intelligence function which could be handled by DIA.

On 5 July 1961, the Secretary of Defense approved the concept of the DIA and, on 1 August 1961, the Department of Defense made a public announcement that the Defense Intelligence Agency had been established. Upon approval of the new agency’s activation plan by the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Defense Intelligence Agency became operational on 1 October 1961. Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF, who had been selected by Secretary McNamara on 12 August 1961, was officially appointed Director, DIA, and in this capacity, the principal staff advisor to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense for substantive intelligence matters.



The initial home for some DIA elements was Arlington Hall Station. Building "A," occupied by DIA in 1963, housed the Agency's first intelligence production center.

## JOE CARROLL AND THE EARLY DIA ORGANIZATION



Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, USAF

Lieutenant General Joseph F. Carroll, the father of five sons, was a lanky six-footer with light blue eyes and dark blond hair. He grew up in the Canaryville section of Chicago, home to the stockyards. He received a law degree from Loyola University. He was a new and different kind of Air Force leader. General Carroll did not fly fighters or bombers in World War II. During the war he was an FBI agent in charge of bank robbery and kidnapping matters. He was so good at investigations he became a special assistant to FBI Director J. Edgar Hoover. At the request of the Air Force to Hoover, he went into uniform in 1948 as

a Brigadier General and became the first Director of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. He was Inspector General of the Air Force when selected by Secretary McNamara in August 1961 to be the first Director of DIA. General Carroll served in this position for more than 8 years during one of the most dynamic eras in military history, repeatedly extended until his retirement in September 1969.

During summer 1961, Cold War tensions were high over the wall built by the Soviets in Berlin to partition East from West Germany, aggravated by memories of the Soviet shootdown of a U.S. U-2 reconnaissance aircraft and the aborted Bay of Pigs invasion of Cuba. In this setting, General Carroll planned and organized the DIA which became operational with approximately 25 people located in less than 2,000 square feet of borrowed space in the Pentagon, and in 1963 at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. Specifically, DIA was assigned the mission of collecting, processing, evaluating, analyzing, integrating, producing, and disseminating military intelligence for the DoD.

Coinciding with its activation on 1 October, Secretary McNamara transferred to DIA from the services' 500 manpower authorizations—250 military and 250 civilians. The actual transfer of people was phased in order to minimize the disruption of ongoing operations. Within 3 months, General Carroll had modified his manpower documents to DoD, asking for 319 officers, 113 enlisted, and 278 civilians split evenly among the services for a total of 710. Prior to DIA's activation, he submitted to JCS and DoD an overall "Plan for the Activation of the Defense Intelligence Agency" outlining the phased assumption by DIA of the assigned functions and responsibilities. In the preparation of the Activation

Plan, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatric established a Military Intelligence Board (MIB) consisting of the military services intelligence chiefs to act as an advisory body to the DIA Director and planning staff. When the DIA Activation Plan was formally approved on 28 September 1961, the MIB, having proved its usefulness, remained in existence as a mechanism for coordinating a defense position on intelligence issues among the DIA Director, the Joint Staff J2, and the service intelligence chiefs. The MIB, now expanded to include most of the U.S. Intelligence Community, continues today.

In late 1962, DIA established the Defense Intelligence School, and on 1 January 1963, it activated a new Production Center. Several Service elements were merged to form this production facility, which occupied the "A" and "B" buildings at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia.

The Agency also added an Automated Data Processing Center on 19 February, a Dissemination Center on 31 March, and a Scientific and Technical Intelligence Directorate on 30 April 1963. DIA assumed the staff support functions of the Joint Staff J2 on 1 July 1963.



Cold War tensions were high at the time of DIA's establishment. East German officers monitor the construction of the Berlin Wall, which first went up in August 1961.

An Intelligence Civilian Career Development Program was started in 1963. DIA was also to manage the Consolidated Intelligence Program, which later became the General Defense Intelligence Program, for the budgeting review of defense intelligence resources and funds.

The facilities assigned to DIA outside the Pentagon were in substandard buildings. They were overcrowded, unsafe, and unattractive. DIA facilities presented a major obstacle to General Carroll and the DIA people in establishing organizational integrity during the early years of the Agency. In his testimony in 1964, General Carroll told Congress, "Collocation of intelligence production

activities in a suitably engineered building would offer an opportunity to achieve management improvements and improve the utilization of critical personnel." Secretary McNamara underscored this message in his own testimony to Congress. The first submission to Congress for a new DIA facility came in the FY 1964 budget. It was denied. DIA resubmitted the request periodically until FY 1981 when it was finally approved. The DIA building would remain a challenge for the next six DIA directors.

Two years later, on 1 July 1965, DIA accepted responsibility for the Defense Attaché System—the last function the services initially transferred



The Cafritz Building in Arlington was home to DIA's imagery production functions. It was also known as "The Brewery" because of the beer production facility located in the far end of the building—a part not rented by DIA.

to DIA. During this same time, several problems surfaced regarding U.S. military attachés fragmented under the services. Each reported separately to the Ambassador and represented the United States separately to the host country military, causing duplication of effort. In December 1964, Secretary McNamara pointed to these problems and the existing incompatibility with the intent of the President in directing the establishment of DIA as a basis for revising the system. On 12 December, he stated:

*"I am today announcing my decision to designate a Senior Defense Attaché in each foreign country to increase the efficiency of our attaché work at the embassies in which they serve. The Joint*

*Chiefs of Staff and I will look to this attaché to supervise and coordinate the work of all U.S. attachés assigned at particular embassies, to make certain that the needs of the ambassadors are filled and to be the senior representative of the Department of Defense at the embassy at which he is stationed. The Senior Defense Attaché in each country will report to me through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In implementing this decision, we will, of course, continue to draw upon the military services for the staffing of our attaché posts."*

Along with his decision to personally designate senior defense attachés, Secretary of Defense McNamara charged DIA to develop a phased



Analysts work on IIR photo processing.

“Outline Plan” for a single Defense Attaché System under DIA in order to improve the management of this important function. As a result, DIA would strengthen its response to the requirements of the Secretary of Defense and the JCS for the collecting and reporting of intelligence information and to “satisfy the overseas representational requirements of all components of the DoD.” These protocol duties included overseeing ship visits, aircraft clearances, and VIP visitors, as well as representing the respective military services at official functions. Secretary of Defense McNamara approved the “Outline Plan” on 20 March 1965.

The Defense Attaché System (DAS) was established by DoD Directive C-5105.32, 12 December 1964. The directive assigned “the DAS as a part of the DIA and it would consist of all military per-

sonnel accredited as attachés or assistant attachés to foreign governments as well as other DoD personnel assigned to attaché posts.”

One other significant organization development took place in 1965 with the forming of the London and Ottawa Liaison Offices for the purpose of coordinating “mutual intelligence interests” between DIA and the British and Canadian Defence intelligence staffs. Both detachments are an important part of the present-day DIA.

During the early formation years of DIA, its untried and incomplete organization was immediately faced with two of the great issues of our times—the prospect of nuclear war over the placement of Soviet missiles in Cuba and the U.S. involvement in Vietnam.



John T. Hughes, special assistant to the Director of DIA, appeared on national television in February 1963 to brief the American public on the Cuban Missile Crisis, which had occurred the previous fall. The deployment of Soviet strategic missiles to Cuba in 1962 was the first major crisis in which DIA participated.

## THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS AND JOHN HUGHES

There's a time of year in Washington when the hot, hazy days of August give way to the cool, clear days of autumn. August 1962 brought record heat to Washington, and those who worked at the Pentagon were anticipating long weekend drives to Virginia's beautiful Shenandoah Valley or perhaps a cooling dip in the Atlantic Ocean at nearby Rehoboth Beach, Delaware.

Colonel John R. Wright, Jr., USA, DIA, may have been planning such a trip during September 1962 while he was examining aerial photographs of the Cuban surface-to-air missile (SAM) sites. Colonel Wright was part of a team at DIA that was monitoring the Soviet military buildup in Cuba. He noticed the missile sites were in a pattern used in the Soviet Union to protect intercontinental ballistic missile bases. That pattern, together with human source reports of missiles in western Cuba, strongly suggested Soviet offensive ballistic weapons were in San Cristobal. Colonel Wright knew in an instant there would be no more lazy Washington weekends for some time. He showed the pictures to his boss, Lieutenant General Carroll, the Director of DIA.

General Carroll and Colonel Wright saw something startling in the Cuban photos. They saw a possible intent by the Soviet Union to place missiles with nuclear weapons within easy range of the continental United States. This must be confirmed—and fast, thought the general. What he did next could make the difference between war and peace. It could also make or break the reputation of his new and small agency.

DIA had been in business for about one year. It had little credibility with either the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the military services. General Carroll was a member of the U.S. Intelligence Board (USIB) and had

direct access to Mr. John A. McCone, Director of the CIA and chairman of the USIB. General Carroll picked up a secure telephone and requested immediate coverage of the Cuban SAM sites by U-2 reconnaissance aircraft operated by the CIA. McCone agreed. On 29 September 1962, additional Soviet missiles were discovered on Cuban soil.

On Sunday, 14 October, U-2 photos revealed three medium-range ballistic missile sites at San Cristobal. U-2 photos taken the following day further confirmed the existence of strategic missile sites at San Cristobal, and the photos showed two intermediate-range ballistic missile sites under construction near Guanajay, where there had been no activity as late as August. This information was immediately passed to Secretary of Defense McNamara. The Cuban Missile Crisis was on! "General Carroll Saw Something," said a missile crisis headline on the front page of the *Washington Star*.

General Carroll and DIA were squarely in the middle of a highly volatile contest between the United States and the U.S.S.R. over Soviet offensive missiles stationed 90 miles from the United States. He quickly came to rely on the photo interpretation and analytical skills of his special assistant, Mr. John T. Hughes, who joined DIA from the Army 4 months after DIA was established in October 1961.

John Hughes studied geography at Clark College in Worcester, Massachusetts, in the early 1950s. He was a slim man of medium height, always neatly dressed in conservative gray or blue business suits with a matching striped necktie. He looked young to most people. He was an exceptionally talented photointerpreter, a specialist in Soviet missiles, and thorough in everything he did. He was also a brilliant intelligence briefer.

Most of the U-2 photos were sent to the National Photographic Interpretation Center (NPIC) in Washington, DC. General Carroll appointed Mr. Hughes as DIA's liaison officer to NPIC, and he quickly became a key member of the team monitoring the crisis. Until 15 October, some doubt still existed whether Soviet medium-range missiles had been confirmed. That evening, Mr. Hughes went to NPIC to talk to the photointerpreters and to make up his own mind. After a quick look at several frames of U-2 photography, Mr. Hughes called General Carroll and told him the film showed ballistic-missile carriers, associated equipment, and support trucks. The U-2 camera even caught a missile-related truck convoy preparing to pull into the cover of a wooded area.

That same evening, General Carroll, John Hughes, and DIA colleague John McLaughlin reported to Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpat-

ric. He asked Mr. Hughes the same question the President would ask NPIC Director Art Lundahl, the following morning. It was the same question that would be asked by each of the top U.S. officials being informed of the discovery as they looked at the tiny objects and patterns on the photos of the Cuban countryside: "Are you sure these are Soviet medium-range ballistic missiles?" Mr. Hughes answered Mr. Gilpatric firmly, "I am convinced they are." The next morning, Mr. Lundahl told the President, he was "as sure of this as a photointerpreter can be sure of anything."

President Kennedy got the news at 11:45 a.m. on 16 October. To many of Kennedy's advisors, the new U-2 photography revealed little. All they could really distinguish were cleared areas that could easily have been intended for farming or the building of houses. Most of them had to take the word of the Intelligence Community that this



A U.S. Air Force U-2 strategic reconnaissance aircraft first photographed Soviet SS-4 missiles being installed in Cuba on 14 October 1962. After this discovery, many more U-2 missions were flown over Cuba.

KASIMOV WITH IL-28 FUSELAGE CRATES ENROUTE TO CUBA

28 SEPTEMBER 1962



The Soviet freighter *Kasimov* photographed by Navy reconnaissance planes en route to Cuba with crated deck cargo. Imagery analysts determined the crates contained Il-28 light bombers, a plane capable of carrying nuclear weapons.

activity near San Cristobal meant the construction of offensive missile bases. But, President Kennedy confidently accepted the word of John Hughes and the other photointerpreters.

On 16 October, the President established the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExComm)—which would meet continuously for the next 12 days and almost daily for some 6 weeks thereafter. Besides the President, his brother Robert (the Attorney General), and Vice President Lyndon Johnson, the ExComm included Secretary of State Dean Rusk; Secretary of Defense McNamara; General Maxwell Taylor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; CIA Director McCone; and several others upon whom the President had come to rely. These people made the key decisions during the crisis.

The atmosphere in the ExComm was one of stunned surprise. Clearly action was required—

perhaps an air strike on the missile sites. President Kennedy's first decision was to order a sharp increase in the number of U-2 flights. His second decision was that the presence of these missiles would not be publicly disclosed until he had decided what to do about them. U-2s from the Strategic Air Command moved to Florida airbases. Between 15 October and 22 October, they flew 20 missions, searching the entire island of Cuba. These flights helped the Intelligence Community develop its best judgment as to whether the missiles were operational. After much urgent and highly classified work, the Intelligence Community determined that the first of the missiles would become operational on 28 October.

On Thursday, 18 October, President Kennedy got more bad news. U-2 photos evaluated by DIA and NPIC confirmed the earlier assessment and identified medium-range missile sites at Saguana la Grande, Cuba. These photos were the ones the



Low-level imagery of the San Cristobal medium-range ballistic missile site taken by Navy pilots on 23 October.

President later referred to the first “hard evidence” of Soviet offensive missile sites in Cuba. Analysis of U-2 photography went on around the clock. General Carroll and John Hughes regularly briefed the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to prepare them for their deliberations on the ExComm.

But within the ExComm the central question, still unanswered, was how to get the missiles out of Cuba without going to war. Late on the 18th, members were still debating whether the best course was an airstrike or a naval blockade. Most favored a U.S. naval blockade of Cuba, in which

all ships approaching the island would be inspected. This approach would leave the President several other options if it proved unsuccessful. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were directed to determine which Latin American nations could assist in a blockade of Cuba and to prepare a list of offensive weapons to include in a blockade.

On the 19th, the United States quietly prepared for military action against Cuba. U.S. naval air stations in Florida and Puerto Rico were crowded with fighter, attack, patrol, and support aircraft. The Chief of Naval Personnel prepared to recall naval reservists. Air Force F-100 fighters were on



An Air Force RF-101 Voodoo over the San Cristobal site. This picture was taken by the wingman.

the way to Air Force bases in Florida to bolster the potential strike force. HAWK antiaircraft missile battalions up and down the U.S. east coast increased their readiness.

More U-2 missions revealed Soviet and Cuban construction crews working rapidly to complete four key missile sites as soon as possible. They were setting up 24 medium-range missile launchers, plus 18 reserves for a total of 42, as well as 3 intermediate-range missile launch sites, each with

4 launchers. If these sites were completed, they would significantly tilt the strategic balance.

In addition to these startling developments, U.S. naval reconnaissance and U-2 photographs revealed disassembled Il-28/BEAGLE bombers in crates on the deck of a merchant ship bound for Cuba. The photos were the first indication of a force of 48 BEAGLE bombers the Soviet Union was planning to deliver to San Julian and Holguin Airfields. DIA analysts participated in a Special

National Intelligence Estimate on the major consequences of certain U.S. courses of action on Cuba. Participants judged that whatever the U.S. action against Cuba, it would not be likely to provoke the Soviets into launching all-out nuclear war.

On the morning of the 20th, the Joint Chiefs of Staff sent an alert message to the Commander-in-Chief of Strategic Air Command (SAC) and to all other commanders-in-chief saying that unspecified tension in Cuba could call for military action before long. That afternoon, when President Kennedy met with the ExComm, the decision was made to begin with the blockade, and move up the ladder of military responses rung by rung.

On the morning of the 22nd, SAC missile crews went on maximum alert. SAC's bombers were dispersed to alternate operating locations or placed in the air continuously. Much of SAC's B-52 force remained in the air continuously for the next 30 days. U.S. Army and Navy forces made similar preparations for nuclear war.

The American people naturally wanted to know what was going on. At 7 p.m. on the 22nd, President Kennedy appeared on television from the Oval Office. Families gathered around their television sets at home. Others watched at work or with strangers at department stores where television sets were sold. Sometimes the small, grainy, black and white image of the President rolled or faded, but his voice was firm and clear:

**“The government, as promised,” he said, “has maintained the closest surveillance of the Soviet military buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the past week, unmistakable evidence has established the fact that a series of offensive missile sites is now in preparation on that imprisoned island. The purpose of these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.” He then outlined the threat posed by the Soviet missiles and jet bombers, and catalogued a long list of Soviet deceptions.**

Making clear that the United States could not accept this “deliberately provocative and unjustified change in the status quo,” the President outlined his intentions: a defensive quarantine in which all ships bound for Cuba with offensive weapons would be turned back, continued close surveillance, an immediate meeting of the Organization of American States to invoke the Rio Treaty, an emergency meeting of the United Nations Security Council, and more. He finally called upon Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev to halt the threat to world peace by removing the weapons from Cuba.

President Kennedy also ordered low-level photo missions by Navy and Air Force reconnaissance squadrons to begin the following morning. John Hughes watched the President’s speech with Navy photointerpreters at their Suitland, Maryland, location. As Mr. Hughes listened to the somber and electrifying words, he thought of the array of MiG-21 fighters, antiaircraft guns, and surface-to-air missiles that would confront the U.S. reconnaissance planes. He knew that tactical intelligence support—the kind that DIA and the military services provide—would be vital to the reconnaissance aircraft success and to the President’s strategy. He felt a profound sense of urgency.

On 23 October, President Kennedy issued Proclamation 3504: *Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba*. It stated that as of 2:00 p.m. on the 24th, U.S. forces had instructions to intercept any vessel or craft proceeding toward Cuba and to interdict the delivery of surface-to-surface missiles, bombers, bombs, air-to-surface rockets and guided missiles, warheads, mechanical and electrical equipment for such weapons, and any other materials later designated by the Secretary of Defense.

Navy reconnaissance planes made careful note of all ships that carried dry cargo to Cuba. The position, speed, and direction of each Soviet ship were carefully plotted. On the afternoon of the 24th, the public information chief of the Department of


Defense gave reporters the CIA and DIA analysis of the threat: 8 to 10 offensive missile bases in Cuba, at least 30 missiles, over 20 bombers, and at least 5,000 Soviet personnel.

Navy and Air Force tactical reconnaissance planes started an intensive low-level campaign across Cuba. The RF-8As and the RF-101s photographed their targets from 500 feet above the ground while at speeds of 500 miles per hour. At this altitude and speed, the Soviets and Cubans rarely knew aircraft were there before the sound of their receding engines showed they had already departed. The goal was to help intelligence analysts keep track of the progress of the missile sites, which were moving quickly toward operational status. And the photography provided U.S. combat mission planners pre-

cisely the detail needed if the President were to order a strike against Cuba.

John Hughes felt the pressure too as he arrived each morning at either the Pentagon or NPIC to review the findings of the photointerpreters and to prepare to brief Secretary McNamara and the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Current intelligence for targeting of SAM sites was quickly passed to military planners and operations. There was a growing consensus the United States would soon have to act.

The latest photos showed that work on the missile sites was proceeding rapidly. The medium-range missiles were seen with cables running from missile-ready tents to nearby power generators. The President ordered even more low-level



An SS-4 missile under thin camouflage netting at one of the Cuban MRBM sites; note that the warhead and reentry vehicle have not been mated to the missile. Air Force pilots flying low-level missions took this image on a 27 October mission.

reconnaissance flights—one every 2 hours. Again, there was talk in the ExComm of initiating airstrikes.

On 26 October, a secret letter from Premier Khrushchev to President Kennedy arrived. It showed some willingness to negotiate removal of Soviet missiles. Khrushchev wanted Kennedy to know that the ships now sailing to Cuba carried no missiles—no weapons at all. If Kennedy were to give a no-invasion pledge and recall the American Navy from the blockade of Cuba, the problem of “the weapons you call offensive” would appear differently. It was a strange, rambling letter without any commitment made by Khrushchev that the Soviets would remove or dismantle the weapons.

At 10:00 p.m., the ExComm reconvened to consider the letter. They decided to treat it as a genuine offer worthy of a serious reply. The State Department’s Soviet affairs experts worked all night analyzing the letter, and another proposal made through an informal channel, to outline an acceptable settlement.

On the 27th, an Air Force RB-47 reconnaissance plane flying surveillance against Soviet shipping, crashed on takeoff from Bermuda, killing all four aboard. That same day, a Soviet surface-to-air missile shot down a U-2 over Cuba. Killed was the pilot, Major Rudolph Anderson, USAF. These losses generated pressure on the President to retaliate against military targets in Cuba.


Later on the 27th, more disappointment. The ExComm was told a ship had detached itself from the others outside the quarantine line and was heading for Cuba. Work on the Cuban missile sites was continuing day and night. And before the ExComm could work on replying to the Khrushchev secret letter of the previous evening, Radio Moscow was broadcasting a second Khrushchev letter addressed to Kennedy. It was very different. It was belligerent, bearing the signs of Soviet-style group effort. It proposed, bluntly, if the United States wanted Soviet missiles out of Cuba, the United States must remove its own mis-

siles from Turkey. The ExComm faced a dilemma. Which letter deserved a serious reply?

The U.S. missiles in Turkey were obsolescent Jupiter models that President Kennedy had planned to remove 2 months earlier. Due to Turkish opposition, it had not been done, although Kennedy assumed it had. President Kennedy knew the U.S. Jupiter missiles were a side issue but now they were on the bargaining table. Robert Kennedy suggested ignoring the belligerent letter read on Radio Moscow and replying to the first as a valid proposal. President Kennedy told him to try drafting a reply and the Attorney General completed it that evening. The gamble was—would Moscow ultimately go along with U.S. acceptance of what Khrushchev never formally offered?

President Kennedy’s reply to Khrushchev welcomed his “desire to seek a prompt solution to the problem.” The President then stressed that if there were to be a solution, work had to cease on the missile bases, and the offensive weapons in Cuba had to be made inoperative and removed, under United Nations supervision. The United States, in turn, would lift the quarantine and would promise not to invade Cuba. The President suggested that removal of the Jupiter missiles from Turkey was possible, but made no promises regarding them. Robert Kennedy presented the letter to Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin, asking for a prompt and substantive reply. The quality of that reply, Robert Kennedy said, would quickly determine whether the crisis would be solved—or war would break out between the superpowers.

Sunday, 28 October, dawned clear and cool in Washington. The political atmosphere in the nation’s capital and throughout the country was grim. War with the Soviet Union, possibly nuclear war, seemed as close as it had ever been. Word came quickly from Moscow. An announcer on Radio Moscow read a new letter from Khrushchev to President Kennedy: “. . . the Soviet government . . . has given a new order to dismantle the arms you describe as offensive, and to crate and return



A nuclear weapon storage bunker at the San Cristobal missile site, photographed during a low-level mission. Note the workers looking up at the aircraft.

them to the Soviet Union.” Khrushchev then repeated and accepted the terms Kennedy had set—in return for an understanding that there would be no invasion of Cuba, Moscow had ordered its officers in Cuba to discontinue construction, dismantle the facilities, and return them to the Soviet Union. United Nations verification could be discussed later.

President Kennedy did not wait for an official text of the letter to arrive. After meeting briefly with the

ExComm, he drafted a quick acceptance statement he released to the American press and broadcast to Moscow on the Voice of America. Word quickly got around the world. War had been averted. There was tremendous exhilaration throughout DIA and the U.S. Intelligence Community.

But the cheers were brief. The Soviet commitments had yet to be made good. The U.S. Intelligence Community and military were still on watch. The mission changed from preparing for

every kind of war with the Soviets to monitoring Soviet dismantlement and withdrawal of offensive weapons from Cuba.

The Soviets proved good to their word this time. As early as 29 October, low-level U.S. reconnaissance flights helped analysts confirm that the medium-range missiles were no longer in the missile-ready firing position. All the Il-28 bombers were disassembled and put back in their ship-

ping crates. The Soviets complied with every order for transparency—even the wooden crates for the bombers were left open, permitting the individual wings and fuselages to be photographed by reconnaissance flights. Soon bulldozers were crushing the concrete launch pads, and all the missile components and support equipment found their way from the missile sites back to Cuban ports. Then all the material was placed on Soviet merchant ships for the long voyage home.



An Air Force RF-101 Voodoo, the shadow of which is seen at the bottom of the image, overflying a Soviet freighter at Casilda Port, Cuba on 6 November 1962. Her deck cargo includes six tarpaulin-covered missiles.

By his 20 November press conference, President Kennedy had received enough intelligence to report that the Soviets had made good on their commitments. He was lifting the quarantine of Cuba, though close surveillance of Cuba would continue.

On November 26th, President Kennedy flew to Florida airbases to salute the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force reconnaissance wings and squadrons who gave the nation conclusive proof of the buildup of offensive weapons in Cuba. "I may say, gentlemen, that you take excellent pictures," the President said, "and I've seen a good many of them . . . ."

On the 27th, when the Il-28 bombers appeared out of Cuba, the Strategic Air Command returned to a

normal state of readiness. The Cuban Missile Crisis was over.

The crisis was over, but a Washington political controversy replaced it. Many Soviet troops, artillery, tanks, fighter aircraft, helicopters, naval craft, and antiaircraft systems remained in Cuba. The Kennedy-Khrushchev agreement provided only for removal of offensive weapons, and the Kennedy administration considered the remaining weapons defensive. Nevertheless, a lively public debate commenced about whether nuclear weapons were hidden in Cuban caves, or whether short-range Soviet MiG-21 fighters or KOMAR Class patrol boats could carry nuclear bombs.

Navy  
photographer's  
mates remove film  
from a RF-8  
Crusader that has  
just returned from a  
mission over Cuba.



President Ronald Reagan decorates John Hughes, the Deputy Director for Intelligence and External Relations, with the National Security Medal in a rare Cabinet Room ceremony at the White House in 1984.



On the morning of 6 February 1963, Secretary McNamara assured the Congress that U.S. intelligence had detected no remaining offensive weapons in Cuba. To reinforce the point, he had John Hughes brief the House Subcommittee on Defense Appropriations on the highly classified reconnaissance photos that were so important during the crisis. The effect on Congress was so constructive that President Kennedy decided the photographic evidence had to be declassified and immediately shared with the American people. All the classification markings were removed and some descriptive annotations added.

Later that day, Secretary McNamara, Lieutenant General Carroll, and John Hughes mounted the stage at the State Department auditorium for a nationally televised presentation by Mr. Hughes. The briefing the President requested included photos, charts, and tables that would document the discovery of the missiles, their assembly and readiness, and their

removal from Cuba. The photos Mr. Hughes selected were among the best available and reflected the superb work of the U-2, the tactical reconnaissance teams, and the Intelligence Community photointerpreters. The viewing screen for the briefing slides—approximately 12 by 8 feet—towered over the stage. This enhanced the power of the photographs and displayed them to maximum effect. Secretary McNamara had asked to see the text of Mr. Hughes' remarks, and he was surprised when Mr. Hughes told him that he had committed the briefing to memory.

A full contingent of Washington reporters was there. The air in the auditorium was as charged at the controversy. At 5:00 p.m., Secretary McNamara took his cue from the television director and got right to the point:

*“Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. In recent days, questions have been raised in the*

*press and elsewhere regarding the presence of offensive weapon systems in Cuba. I believe beyond any reasonable doubt that all such weapons systems have been removed from the island and none have been reintroduced. It is our purpose to show you this afternoon the evidence on which we base that conclusion.*

*“Since July 1st, over 400 reconnaissance flights have been flown over the island of Cuba by US military aircraft. These reconnaissance flights provided the essential basis for the national decision taken with respect to Cuba in October. They provided the basis for the military preparations necessary to support those decisions. They provided the evidence we were able to present to the world to document the rationale for our action.*

*“The reconnaissance flights recorded the removal of offensive weapons from Cuba, and they continued to provide the foundation for our conclusion that such weapons have not been reintroduced into the island.*

*“Mr. John Hughes, the Special Assistant to General Carroll, the Director of DIA, will present you a detailed photographic review of the introduction of Soviet military personnel and equipment into Cuba, with particular emphasis on the introduction and removal of offensive weapons systems.*

*“After Mr. Hughes completes his review, I will summarize very briefly our current estimates of the Soviet military strength in Cuba.*

*“Mr. Hughes.”*

John Hughes began his briefing. He did not miss a beat. He briefed for almost an hour without a single note. When it was over, General Carroll felt a tremendous sense of pride and admiration for John Hughes and the entire DIA. He knew in his heart that the public reputation of the Defense Intelligence Agency was made that day—and in that way.

The following morning the sun rose in Washington to reveal a cold and wintry February sky. John Hughes, summoned from his Pentagon office to the building's River Entrance, met a courier from the White House who handed him a letter.

*Dear Mr. Hughes:*

*I thought you did an excellent job on television in explaining our surveillance in Cuba. I understand it was done on short notice. I want you to know how much I appreciate your efforts. With best wishes.*

*Sincerely,  
John Kennedy*

The Defense Intelligence Agency had passed its first major intelligence test with flying colors!

During his 33-year intelligence career, John T. Hughes served as an exceptional defense intelligence photointerpreter, collection systems manager, and senior executive.

He rose through the ranks to serve as Deputy Director for Intelligence and External Affairs and Senior Intelligence Advisor. Over succeeding decades, his meticulously documented briefings on foreign military forces—in particular those of the Soviet Union—would be recognized by national and international leaders, with letters of tribute, awards, and decorations from Presidents, members of Congress, and leaders of free nations.

Upon his retirement in 1984, he was presented the National Security Medal by President Ronald Reagan in a Cabinet Room ceremony at the White House. John Hughes' talent, expertise, dedication, and continuing contributions of importance to U.S. national security have set a lasting standard of excellence for the personnel of the Defense Intelligence Agency.



U.S. Army UH-1 Hueys, the workhorse of the U.S. Army during the Vietnam War, arrive at a landing zone.

# THE VIETNAM WAR

The era of the Vietnam war confronted the United States with some of the most trying experiences in its history. The unpopular conflict sparked unprecedented antiwar movements and violence in the nation's cities and on university campuses.

American involvement in Vietnam began to grow as early as 1961 when the Viet Cong, an insurgent movement controlled by the Communist North Vietnam, stepped up activities against the South Vietnamese government. In an attempt to preserve a friendly government and avoid the "domino effect" of a Communist victory on the rest of Southeast Asia, the United States committed increasing numbers of military advisors. A succession of unstable military govern-

ments in South Vietnam permitted the security situation to deteriorate even further. More advisors were sent in along with helicopters and other aircraft. South Vietnam became an objective to prove that counterinsurgency techniques and "nation building" could defeat a guerrilla threat.

By 1965, there were intelligence indications that the Viet Cong planned to cut South Vietnam in two. At that point, the United States intervened on a large scale, first with airpower against the North and then with U.S. ground forces in the South. By the end of 1967, almost 500,000 U.S. troops were in place. DIA, like CIA and NSA, quickly turned to supporting JCS planners and the U.S. combatants—the Pacific Com-



An infantry patrol in the rice paddies of South Vietnam.



VIEW NORTH

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JCS 49  
NORTH VIETNAM  
HA NOI POL STORAGE  
21 03 41N 105 53 48E



ON-FOOT PHOTOGRAPHIC SCALE MARKINGS



MSN: UE 901F DATE: 29 JUN 66 FFM: ON 28, FAN 1812



DIA pre- and poststrike imagery analysis of airstrikes on a Hanoi POL facility in June 1966.

mand, the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), and the military services. From the intelligence standpoint, South Vietnam presented difficult problems. The enemy was elusive, the terrain hidden by jungle canopy, and the loyalties of the local populations always uncertain. Nevertheless, intelligence support ensured that U.S. forces fighting there never suffered a single major tactical defeat in a war that would drag on for 8 years.

The Vietnam war severely tested the new DIA's ability to produce accurate, timely intelligence in unprecedented volumes and for unprecedented numbers of consumers. Collection and production requirements exponentially increased. Southeast Asia analytical sections at the Pentagon and at Arlington Hall were

working around the clock. Requirements were not only for North and South Vietnam but for Cambodia and Laos as well. Current, long-term, and estimative intelligence were needed on the strength of the Viet Cong and the North Vietnam military, their air defense capabilities and their wartime logistics.

DIA photointerpreters were also on 24-hour operations. They prepared targets and battle damage assessments for the JCS "Rolling Thunder" bombing program of North Vietnam, as well as a myriad of film processing, photointerpreting, reporting, and database work for the U.S. ground and air forces operating in South Vietnam. Vietnam was not only the first war to be regularly broadcast on America's television sets, it was the first large-scale application of DIA and

other Washington agency imagery assets to support real-time, ongoing combat operations. Imagery from many theater airborne platforms was transmitted to Washington for supplemental analysis and situation reporting of interest to the theater and national authorities. The DIA imagery lab regularly produced multiple copies of photographs for national-level briefings, war planning, and defense presentations.

From the moment the first American personnel were captured by enemy forces in the South or shot down in the North, DIA took on the mission of collecting, analyzing, and providing defense intelligence information on prisoners of war and missing in action (POW-MIA) in Southeast Asia. This mission would take on ever increasing importance in the 1970s and 1980s and continue at DIA until the mid-1990s.

In mid-1968, the DIA POW/MIA database was filling with indications that a major American POW camp known as Son Tay was located near a cross-

roads outside Hanoi. The JCS later became interested in the possibility of a rescue. DIA was contacted and its air defense analysts supported the concept of the raid, known then by code name “Polar Circle.” Planning for this closely held, daring operation, the Son Tay raid, would continue into the 1970s. This special operation was supported throughout its development by DIA, and particularly by Major General Richard Stewart, USAF; Captain Spotswood Harris, USN; his deputy, John Berbrich; and a number of other DIA ground force analysts and military geographers.

By August 1967, Secretary McNamara was at odds with the JCS over the effectiveness and results of the air war. DIA, and later CIA, was tasked to undertake “an appraisal of the bombing of North Vietnam,” and this appraisal calculated that the air campaign was not achieving the desired result. While true and accurate, DIA reports had the effect of contributing to the differences emerging between the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, the White House, and the Congress.

A B-52D cruises high over the open ocean during the Vietnam War. B-52s, operating from Guam, Okinawa, and Thailand delivered over 5,898,000,000 pounds of bombs.



DIA's support to the Vietnam war effort took on many forms. One example occurred when MACV transitioned from an advisory role to a wartime footing. Major General Joseph McChristian, USA, the MACV J2, was almost overwhelmed with the volume of captured enemy documents and the follow-on translations and exploitations. He asked for and received DIA assistance in identifying and training a team of specialists to be assigned to J2, MACV.

At the time of the Tet (the Vietnamese New Year) Offensive of 1968, U.S. intelligence was able to give a general warning of the onset of the attack, tracking the deployment of the enemy forces and even providing the starting day. The suicidal intensity of the attack was not foreseen, nor was the reaction of Washington and the American people. Although the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong forces were militarily defeated everywhere following their initial successes, they won a psychological victory.

The United States declined to press its military advantage and turned to negotiations. However, a peace agreement would not be reached for more than 5 years. Under President Richard Nixon, U.S. troops

were gradually withdrawn, and an attempt was made to make South Vietnam capable of self-defense. A peace agreement was signed in 1973, allowing Communist forces in South Vietnam to remain in place, and all U.S. forces were withdrawn. Two years later, Saigon fell to advancing North Vietnamese forces.

The war in Vietnam greatly impacted all U.S. intelligence agencies as well as the country. For DIA, the heavy workload and processing efforts naturally detracted from its efforts to refine the organization, its management, and internal efficiency. Uncertainty over DIA external management of all of defense intelligence resources persisted and contributed to misperceptions regarding the significant contributions that DIA made toward national decisions. The adverse impact of personnel turbulence was still there, as were the disappointing DIA physical facilities.

Also in 1968—General Carroll's last year as active DIA Director—the Agency faced another challenge that came out of the changes in the new White House administration. Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird was convinced that the Soviets were developing a “first-strike capability” to wipe out the U.S. nuclear arsenal

The A-4E of the commanding officer of VA-23 drops a 1,000-pound bomb on enemy positions in Vietnam in 1965.





*Photo provided by MG McChristian*

Major General Joseph McChristian, Military Assistance Command, Vietnam J-2, examines weapons captured from the Viet Cong.

and, as a result, sought congressional support to fund a U.S. antiballistic missile, the Sentinel. General Carroll and DIA were unable to support Secretary Laird's contention with their intelligence holdings. Nor was the CIA able to confirm such Soviet intentions. According to General Carroll's family and professional colleagues, one of the most difficult times he faced was having to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that he and DIA saw no evidence of a developed first-strike capability. He was pained by the necessity of having to disagree with his superiors, the JCS and the Secretary of Defense. However, his steadfastness and integrity in adhering to the truth in intelligence, regardless of political or other pressures, no matter how well intended, would set a lasting example for future intelligence professionals.

Gordon Negus—one of the promising young DIA Branch Chiefs during that time—in recalling the early

DIA culture, said that, "Above all, DIA's mission was to tell the truth in all that it did." Truth was General Carroll's legacy.

In July 1968, shortly after the congressional hearings on the Sentinel, General Carroll was taken ill with an attack of sciatica requiring surgery and extensive hospitalization. After being disabled for almost a year, he was subsequently retired from active duty without returning to his DIA Pentagon office.

*"The most important attribute of being a successful leader of an intelligence organization is integrity. It is essential that the senior intelligence officer have the courage to express his professional judgment regardless of the consequences."*

*Rear Admiral Roscoe Hillenkoetter  
Director, Central Intelligence, 1947-50*



A meeting of DIA's Production Center leadership in 1963.

The 1960s were tumultuous years for DIA. The answer to the question “Why a DIA?” was codified in 1961 by the new Secretary of Defense, Robert McNamara, when he recognized the parochialism and competitiveness existing between the Service intelligence organizations and other Washington agencies. From the beginning, DIA’s charter and in the minds of many of its first members was the mission of determining the “truth” in foreign military assessments and strategic intelligence analysis.

The early challenges in standing up a new joint organization were difficult ones. The JCS and the Military Services were not convinced that the new DIA could best serve their needs. This perception would continue for several years. When the time came to transfer people to DIA, the Services

selected the people for transfer, not DIA. The result was a workforce with a wide range of intelligence skills, experience, backgrounds, and differing service philosophies, both military and civilian. Add to that the early makeshift facilities at the Pentagon, Arlington Hall Station, Fern Street in Arlington, and Rosslyn, Virginia, that were assigned to DIA to house its people and the challenge was even greater. On top of that was the demanding and intensive intelligence requirements from DIA’s primary customers—the JCS and the new Secretary of Defense and his proactive OSD staff. DIA was indeed fortunate to have a leader with the organizational skills of Lieutenant General Joe Carroll.

Most of the people the author spoke with who served at DIA during the 1960s believed that the Agency made remarkable progress in establishing

A military intelligence officer in Vietnam—DIA remained heavily involved in supporting operations in Southeast Asia, although the Soviet Union remained the Agency’s principal focus.



an early operational capability and an organization that was both functional and customer-oriented. Although DIA's primary focus during the 1960s was on the Soviet Union, it was able to respond and even surge to the always unanticipated but inevitable crisis, such as the Cuban missiles, the Tet offensive in Vietnam, the Six-Day War between the Arab states and Israel, the North Korean seizure of the *USS Pueblo*, the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia, the Chinese detonation of an atomic bomb, China's launching of its Cultural Revolution, and fighting in Malaysia, Cyprus, and Kashmir.

At the close of the 1960s, DIA had firmly in place the five essentials of a successful intelligence organization:

**(1) The Current Intelligence and Indications Center (CIIC).** A 24 hour-a-day, 7-days-a-week alert center in the Pentagon carrying out DIA's intelligence warning, current intelligence, and J2 responsibilities and support to the JCS and OSD. The CIIC was the forerunner to today's National Joint Military Intelligence Center (NJMIC). (At least two DIA professionals who served in this first DIA organization are still with DIA today—Charlotte Thomas and Chris Gunther.)

**(2) The Directorate of Acquisition.** A collection organization that determined the needs and requirements of defense customers and tasked those requirements on defense and other collectors for satisfaction. Collection was all-source and across human, signals, imagery, and other intelligence disciplines. The Acquisition Directorate was the forerunner of today's Collection Control Group and the Directorate for Intelligence Operations.

**(3) The Directorate for Production.** This was DIA's all-source analysis capability responsible for analyzing, assessing, estimating, and producing long-term intelligence and threat information, including scientific and technical data. This was the forerunner of today's DIA Directorate for Analysis and Production and Directorate for Policy Support.

**(4) The Directorate for Support.** A DIA organization that provided support to the intelligence process, such as communications, automation, materials, and production and processing assistance. This was the forerunner for today's Directorates for Information Systems and Services, and Administration.

**(5) A Command Group and Special Staff.** A command and control element and the necessary leaders—military and civilian—to lead the organizations providing direction to the intelligence experts and support staff to accomplish the intelligence professional work (e.g., director, deputy director, directorate heads, comptroller, legal staff). Today's DIA has a civilian deputy director.

DIA made significant strides forward from its inception in 1961. Progress was steady in production quality and the ability to meet the requirements of the Services, the JCS, and OSD. The management of personnel problems that plagued DIA in its first few years, particularly those dealing with the transfer of people, improved. New faces and skills continued to arrive at DIA, and organizational continuity was increasingly evident.

General Carroll and DIA were adequately supported by the Services for people at the senior military grades. Lieutenant Generals William Quinn and Alva Fitch, USA, and Admirals Rufus Taylor and Vernon Lowrance all served tours as DIA Deputy Directors. A number of two and one-star Army, Navy, and Air Force officers served as Directors of Production and as J2s. Perhaps the best known of these officers was the first DIA J2, Major General Grover Cleveland Brown, USAF.

Most of the other senior billets in DIA were filled by Service O-6s with a senior civilian assisting. Early on, the DIA leadership recognized that its organizational structure did not accommodate sufficient senior leadership positions for civilians either by grade or skill. This became the genesis for the DIA action to establish an Intelligence Civilian Career Program. This program would



The first graduation class of the Defense Intelligence School, September 1965, which included Ed Gibson, still an analyst with DIA.

mature over the years to include a Senior Executive Service, which greatly benefited DIA in its need for, and recognition of, high-caliber talent. It would also provide excellent advancement opportunities to deserving career intelligence civilians.

Led by the performance and example of John Hughes, the decade of the 1960s forged many outstanding civilian intelligence professionals, several of whom would make extraordinary contributions to DIA in the years ahead—to name only a few: Paul Labar, Gordon Negus, Dennis Nagy, John Berbrich,

Jeff Langsam, Jay Sloan, Charles Desaulniers, Neil O'Leary, Harry Parnell, and the husband and wife team of Mike and Marge Munson.

General Carroll led DIA through conception. He shepherded it through its evolutionary period, witnessing and actively participating in its growing pains, and in its successes and disappointments. He ultimately shared in the pride of so many DIA people who served tirelessly at finding the “truth” in defense of the nation. DIA was onboard. Many correctly believed that DIA was here to stay!

# PART 3



Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signing the Paris Peace Accords in January 1973, which ended direct U.S. involvement in the war in Vietnam.

## INTELLIGENCE IN TRANSITION—THE 1970s

The early 1970s were transitional years for DIA as the Agency shifted its focus from consolidating internal and external management roles to establishing itself as a credible producer of national intelligence. This proved difficult at first, since sweeping manpower decrements between 1968 and 1975 had reduced Agency manpower by 31-percent and precipitated mission reductions and a broad organizational restructuring.

Challenges facing DIA at this time included the rise of the *Ostpolitik* in Germany, the emergence of the Palestine Liberation Organization in the Mideast, and growing arms control concerns. Riots in Gdansk, Poland, civil wars in Jordan and Nigeria, and the United States' incursion into Cambodia from South Vietnam also drew intelligence interest. Other crises during this period included Idi Amin's takeover in Uganda, the unrest in Pakistan, the formation of Bangladesh, and the continued fighting in southeast Asia.

On 10 June 1970, Major Robert P. Perry, DIA's Assistant Army Attaché to Jordan, was shot and killed by Palestinians in Amman. Major Perry was DIA's first duty-related death.

On 3 November 1970, DoD created a position for an Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) (ASD/I) "to supervise defense intelligence programs . . . and to provide the principal point for management and policy coordination with the Director of Central Intelligence, the CIA, and other intelligence officials outside the DoD." Also in November, President Nixon reorganized the national Intelligence Community and designated DIA's Director as a program manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program. Of signifi-

cance, the Agency established a Directorate for Estimates that same month.

The Agency's reputation grew considerably by the mid-1970s as its products were increasingly perceived throughout the government as valuable to decisionmaking. Meanwhile, the specially convened Williamsburg Conference in 1972 looked closely at the effects of DIA resource reductions. The conference participants made recommendations to place emphasis on technology in the Agency and to upgrade the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC). The General Counsel function was added that year as well.

In 1972, Agency analysts concentrated on Lebanon, support to President Nixon's visit to China, the formation of Sri Lanka, Salvador Allende's regime in Chile, and the prisoners of war (POWs) being held in Southeast Asia. Subsequent challenges involved détente, the development of arms control agreements, the Paris Peace Talks (Vietnam), the Yom Kippur War, global energy concerns, and independence movements in Rhodesia, Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.

In 1974, DIA established a J2 Support Office to better satisfy JCS's intelligence needs. In October of that year, DIA began a comprehensive overhaul of its production functions, organizations, and management. Positions for Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs) were established in December 1975. The DIOs were given the responsibility of acting as the DIA Director's senior staff representatives on substantive intelligence matters.

Intense congressional review during 1975 and 1976 created turbulence in the national Intelligence Community. The Murphy and Rockefeller

Commission investigations of charges of intelligence abuse ultimately led to an Executive Order that modified many of the functions the Community performed. Within DIA, the leadership adopted the “delegated production” concept to offset heavy production requirements.

With American involvement in Vietnam ending by 1975, defense intelligence faced massive resource decrements. During this period, DIA conducted numerous studies on ways of improving its intelligence products. Ultimately, the Agency strengthened its support to consumers in OSD, the JCS, and the U&S Commands, and modernized the NMIC. A Defense Intelligence Board was established, and the President set up a National Foreign Intelligence Board.

During 1976 and 1977, analytical efforts within the Agency centered on the death of Mao Tse-Tung, the aircraft hijackings, the Israeli raid on Entebbe Airport, the unrest in southern Africa, and the continuing Middle East tensions.

Following the promulgation in 1979 of Executive Order 12036, which restructured the Intelligence

Community, DIA was reorganized to five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J2 support. The loss of resources during the 1970s limited the Community’s ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and ultimately contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.

In fact, intelligence requirements were expanding while resources were decreasing. By the late 1970s, Agency analysts were extremely busy focusing on Lebanon, China, South Africa, Southeast Asia POW issues, and terrorism. Special DIA task forces were set up to monitor crises such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, and the taking of U.S. hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979. Other events of serious concern during this period were the Vietnamese takeover in Phnom Penh, the China-Vietnam border war, the war overthrow of Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, troubles in Pakistan, the border clashes between Libya and Egypt, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitations Treaty II.

The Soviet Union maintained a massive military structure, including large armored and mechanized forces in Europe, that remained the focus of DIA's efforts in the 1970s.






The discovery of increased Soviet activity in Cuba in the late 1970s included not only the presence of combat troops, but larger and improved intelligence facilities as shown in this imagery of the Lourdes site.



"B" Building, the second facility occupied by DIA at Arlington Hall Station.

## THE RIGHT BENNETT



Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett, USA

General Donald V. Bennett was born in Lakeside, Ohio, and attended Michigan State College for 2 years before entering the United States Military Academy. He graduated from West Point in June 1940 as a second lieutenant of field artillery. He subsequently participated in the North African and Sicilian campaigns of World War II and, as a battalion commander, took part in the Normandy landing and the rest of the campaigns in Europe until the end of the war.

In the postwar years, General Bennett served in many key positions of the U.S. military, including superintendent of the Military Academy from 1966 to 1968 and as the Commander of the VII

Corps in the U.S. Army, Europe, from 1968 to 1969. He was serving in that capacity when selected by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird to be the second Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency in September 1969. Bennett served as the DIA Director until August 1972, when he was promoted to full general and became the Commander in Chief of the U.S. Forces in Korea. He is the only Director to have obtained four-star rank, although two deputy directors went on to four-star promotions (General John Deane, August 1972 to August 1973, and Admiral Bobby Inman, September 1976 to September 1977).

When General Bennett was called back to the Pentagon in August 1969 to be interviewed by Secretary Laird and Deputy Secretary Packard, he asked them, "Do you have the right Bennett? I have no intelligence experience at any time during my life." He was assured that he was the man they wanted to interview, and, soon thereafter, he was told that he was the man they wanted for the job. General Bennett brought a warrior's perspective to the DIA.

When General Don Bennett arrived at the Pentagon and signed in, he found that the Director's office had not been manned for almost 6 months due to the illnesses of both the previous Director, Lieutenant General Carroll, and the Deputy Director, Vice Admiral Lowrance. His first thought was that DIA needed leadership and care, and he intended to provide just that. In looking at DIA's mission, he reflected on the time before DIA, when the military had a separate, independent intelligence agency in each of the Services. He knew that defense should never return to that time again. He was convinced from the outset of his time at DIA that there was a great need for a

Defense-level agency that could, at the same time, serve the intelligence needs of the Armed Forces, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the “deployed commands.” As a man who had spent most of his military career in the combat forces in the field or deployed to overseas theaters or “deployed commands,” he knew what those needs were as well as anyone. He assessed that DIA was serving the Defense Department and the JCS well. He believed that he could add to DIA’s focus by working closely with the “deployed commands” in satisfying their wartime intelligence requirements.

General Bennett recognized immediately that, to do the best job possible for defense, he needed a strong, well-educated, joint military and civilian team. In short, he needed the very best, and he knew that getting and keeping the best wouldn’t be easy. He was concerned that the uniformed members of DIA were not getting promoted as quickly as their contemporaries serving in their own Service. It was an early issue he took on with the Services. Also, the civilian strength of DIA when General Bennett arrived was approximately 4,500 people, with less than 10 super grades; this compared to 230 super grades for the 5,000-civilian structure at NSA. This was another issue for his early attention.

Soon after General Bennett became Director, DIA, Secretary Laird clarified the relationship of DIA to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS in a memo that stated, “The Director, Defense Intelligence Agency, will report directly to the Secretary of Defense in the conduct and performance of his duties . . . . The Director, DIA, will support the intelligence . . . requirements of the JCS as in the past.” General Bennett would later call this his and DIA’s “several hats” challenge. He and DIA were the principal intelligence advisors to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The challenge was effectively working for two people at the same time. General Bennett would not be the last Director of DIA to face this challenge. General Bennett’s

approach, he told the author, was close to that of General Carroll, “Speak the truth and nothing but the truth all the time.”

In his first few months as director, General Bennett convened a DIA Reorganization Review Panel to identify problems in DIA management and structure. When the results of the review were in, he considered the estimating and attaché functional areas most in need of revamping. Subsequently, a new Deputy Directorate for Estimates (DE) was formed with the mission of developing and producing DIA contributions to National and Special Intelligence Estimates in support of OSD and JCS requirements . . . and to initiate forecasts and projections of foreign military developments, to enable national and DoD decisionmakers to anticipate circumstances likely to affect national military security interests.

In the attaché area, General Bennett sought to enhance the attaché organization, increase the numbers of qualified attaché nominees, expand representational roles, and improve the quality of collection. He shifted the responsibility for attachés from the Director of Collection to a new and separate Deputy Director for Attaché Affairs (AA) headed by a general officer.

The new AA directorate provided a single focal point within DIA and DoD for the coordination, and direction of the policies, and the plans, and programs of the Defense Attaché System (DAS). It provided administrative and logistic support for the DAS and interfaced with the Services and the U&S Commands. It had responsibility for DIA Human Intelligence activities. Its first head was Major General Lawrence J. Fuller, USA.

The establishment of DE would serve DIA well in the 1970s and 1980s. Its first Director, Brigadier General Daniel O. Graham, USA, had served in the Office of National Estimates at CIA. He convinced General Bennett that a focused estimates office reporting directly to the Director of DIA would improve DIA analytic capabilities. This would

enhance DIA's role in national estimates and elevate the Agency's status in the National Intelligence Community. In the years ahead, DE would make significant contributions in three areas:

### ■ People . . .

■ **In Uniform.** Three DE heads would become Directors of DIA—Army Generals Graham, Wilson, and Williams. Two other Army Generals Joseph T. Palastra and J.M. Thompson, returned to their combat arms and gained four stars.

■ **Senior civilians.** Danny Graham started the idea of only senior-grade GS-15 and above serving in DE. One DE graduate, Dennis Nagy, would later become DIA's first civilian deputy and acting director. Another, John Berbrich, would later serve as DIA Chief of Staff. A host of others were to achieve super-grade and SES status and senior positions in DIA. They included Charles DeSaulniers, Jay Sloan, Bill Naughton, Joe Ardinger, Dolores Greene, Walt Barrows, Bill Thom, Jack Nixon, and Kathy Turner.

■ **Status.** DE turned out a wide range of increasingly influential “Defense Intelligence Estimates” that provided sound support to DoD, the JCS, and the Military Services. These showcased the analytic talent in DIA to the rest of the Intelligence Community. Out of that grew direct DIA participation in the drafting of National Estimates, then the premier intelligence publication. To this point, drafting had been the exclusive province of CIA and the occasional State Department analysts.

■ **Analytic Rigor.** DE was not the only place in DIA that had outstanding analysts, but exceptional analysis was encouraged and rewarded. Its senior civilian grade structure gave outstanding analysts in other places in DIA substantive career enhancement positions to which to aspire. In these positions, these “estimators” would further grow by becoming more strategic and future-oriented in their analysis. In this way, many of them developed mentors and substantive of their junior colleagues throughout the defense intelligence community.

Kathy Turner (left) and Dolores Greene, pictured with Major General Frank Horton III, USAF, Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence in the late 1980s. Turner and Greene both rose out of the analytical ranks to key leadership positions in DIA; Turner is currently the Director of the Military Intelligence Staff and Greene is with the Intelligence Community Staff at CIA.



LTG Donald Bennett, USA (left) and Maj Gen Dick Stewart, USAF, DIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence in the Pentagon. General Stewart oversaw DIA's support for the Son Tay raid.



## THE SON TAY RAID

In General Bennett's first year as Director of DIA, the Son Tay raid would prove to be one of DIA's most difficult and, ultimately, heartbreaking intelligence support challenges. The highly compartmented and very closely held planning for the Son Tay raid had been ongoing for some time. DIA had its best people involved providing the necessary intelligence to the J3 operational planners in the JCS, whose objective was a raid to rescue the American POWs held at the POW Camp at Son Tay in North Vietnam. The odds against success were high. Without intelligence, the raid had no chance for success. In spite of the odds, General Bennett was determined to give the JCS planners the best possible intelligence that DIA could provide. Major General Dick Stewart, USAF, DIA's Deputy Director for Intelligence, was overall in charge and assisted ably by Army Colonel Tom Steinhauer and Navy Captain Spotswood Harris, DIA's heads of the Operational Intelligence Division and Production Support. A number of key analysts were involved including John Berbrich and Chris Gunther, the DIA representative in the JCS Operations Intelligence cell. John Hughes, at that time Deputy Director for Collection and Surveillance, was also involved because of the importance of imagery and photo interpretation to the operation. The collection platforms that DIA could call upon included "a reconnaissance satellite and U.S. Air Force's SR-71 reconnaissance plane; Teledyne Ryan's "BUFFALO HUNTER," a low-altitude reconnaissance drone; and the U.S. Air Force RF-4-Cs flying from bases in South Vietnam. Also, information from CIA, NSA, the Military Services, and other sources was available.

DIA estimated that up to 61 POWs were being held at Son Tay and as many as 12,000 North Vietnamese troops were within 10 to 15 minutes

driving time of the POW camp. The concept of the operation was for a joint service helicopter-borne assault by Special Forces troops during darkness to breach the POW compound, rescue the POWs, and be gone before enemy reinforcements could react. The assault would be launched from nearby Thailand and Laos. However, the last 100 flying miles would be over North Vietnamese territory. The highest risk was that the operation would fail and more U.S. soldiers and airmen would be in some North Vietnamese prison. Nevertheless, the operational concept was approved by the JCS in June 1970. The Joint Contingency Task Force was selected and training begun under the code name "Ivory Coast."

Based on the monsoon weather in Vietnam, October looked best for the "Ivory Coast" execution. Ivory Coast had been approved by Admiral Moorer and Secretary Laird. They had obtained President Nixon's approval in principle for a 20-25 October "raid," but later received word from the White House that the President wanted the "raid" postponed so that it would not occur during an important United Nations anniversary celebration. The date then, was set for the latter part of November.

To this point, the operators and the intelligence types all agreed that the intelligence preparation for the operation was everything anyone could expect and all had a feeling of confidence that the "raid," in all its daring, would ultimately be successful. Then, the potential for uncertainty began to rear its ugly head. On the afternoon of 19 November, General Bennett met with the Chairman, Admiral Moorer, and the chief JCS planner for "Ivory Coast," Army Brigadier General Donald Blackburn. "I've got bad

news. It looks like Son Tay is empty," General Bennett reported.

Admiral Moorer was stunned, "Oh my God! Don't tell me that now!"

When Blackburn asked, "Who says so?" General Bennett replied that the information was straight from Hanoi. An unimpeachable source provided information that the POWs had been moved to a new POW camp at Dong Hoi.

A decision for the "raid" to be scrubbed or to go as planned was needed by the next morning. The DIA analysts spent the night going over the latest photography and information from NSA. The new camp, Dong Hoi, was clearly full of activity, but Son Tay also showed activity but, what kind of activity could not be determined.

When General Bennett met the next morning with the Chairman and General Blackburn, he showed them a stack of cables, photos, and messages in

each hand. "I've got this much," showing them one hand, "that says they've been moved," and then showing them the other hand holding a thick folder of information, "and I've got this much that says they're still there."

Admiral Moorer asked, "What do you recommend?"

"I recommend we go," General Bennett said.

Admiral Moorer and General Bennett left the Chairman's office and immediately went to Secretary Laird's office to brief him on the dramatic developments over breakfast. General Bennett told the Secretary of the new information that the prisoners were gone, but that it was his opinion that they might have been reintroduced into Son Tay.

Admiral Moorer told the Secretary that he believed that there was still a 50-50 chance and he wanted to go. Secretary Laird agreed. General Bennett told the author that he thought it was one



A "Firebee" reconnaissance remotely piloted vehicle over Southeast Asia. Operating under the code-name BUFFALO HUNTER, these aircraft took some spectacular imagery, including shots of Son Tay.

of the toughest decisions that Secretary Laird had to make while in office.

Soon after Admiral Moorer and General Bennett left his office, Secretary Laird called President Nixon on a secure phone and updated him on the bad news. He told the President that he had decided to let the raid go. The President agreed.

The Son Tay Raid was launched shortly after 11:25 p.m. on 21 November 1970. The joint assault force expected to be on the ground at Son Tay in three hours. All went as scheduled and the elite assault force led by ground commander Army Colonel Bull Simmons landed inside and outside of the walls of the Son Tay prison less than 24 miles from Hanoi. After a fierce firefight, the Son Tay raiders were again airborne without suffering a single serious casualty. However, they left without a single American POW. Son Tay had

been a dry hole. The latest intelligence, however sad, had proven to be all too accurate.


General Bennett's legacy would be support to the deployed commands or what would later be known in DIA as Support to the Warfighter.

*"For most of my military career, I have been an intelligence-user rather than supplier. I have always known its value to the people who make decisions. Now, after a year and a half as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, I have an even greater appreciation of the vital role that DIA's products play in national policy decisions, and for the dedicated people who produce them.... Good intelligence doesn't just happen."*

*Lieutenant General Donald V. Bennett  
before Congress, 1971*

An image of the Son Tay prison taken by a BUFFALO HUNTER drone in 1968.





An F-102 from the 57th Fighter Interceptor Squadron, Keflavik, Iceland, escorts a Soviet Tu-95/BEAR through the Greenland, Iceland, United Kingdom (GIUK) Gap. Such interceptions occurred almost daily during the height of the Cold War.

## DE POIX AT THE HELM



Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, USN

Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix was born in Los Angeles, California, and attended Lafayette College in Easton, Pennsylvania, before entering the United States Naval Academy in 1939. He graduated with distinction and was commissioned ensign on 1 June 1939. After Naval Aviator training, he served in the South Pacific on the USS *Enterprise* and USS *Saratoga* aircraft carriers. His World War II tours also included Guadalcanal and naval operations in the Solomon Islands.

Following the war, Admiral de Poix was selected to attend the Massachusetts Institute of Technology at Cambridge, from which he received a degree of Master of Science in aeronautical engineering.

In his senior assignments with the U.S. Navy, Admiral de Poix served as the first commanding officer of the USS *Enterprise*—the largest ship in the world in 1961, and the first nuclear-powered aircraft carrier. That duty was followed by stints as Assistant Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Development) in September 1967, and then, in February 1969, Deputy Director of Defense Research and Engineering, OSD. In August 1971, he assumed command of the Second Fleet. Vice Admiral de Poix, like General Bennett before him, was a rising star in his service before coming to DIA. He was one of the youngest admirals in the Navy.

Admiral de Poix served as the third Director of DIA from August 1972 to September 1974, a period of deep cuts in defense spending resulting from the withdrawal of forces in Vietnam—budgets were tight and sweeping personnel decrements in the first half of the 1970s cut Agency manpower by 31 percent. These cuts precipitated mission reduction and broad organizational restructuring. Despite these cutbacks, DIA faced the challenges associated with détente, arms control agreement, and the Paris Peace Accords (Vietnam).



The Soviets built the world's only operational antiballistic missile (ABM) system around Moscow in the 1970s as allowed under the ABM Treaty. Beginning in 1980, they improved and expanded this system, including adding the silo-based, nuclear-tipped GAZELLE interceptor missile, and a new large radar intended to control ABM engagements.

## ARMS CONTROL SUPPORT

In the 1970s, under Admiral de Poix's tenure, defense drawdowns continued and actually picked up steam with Vietnamization and the withdrawal of U.S. forces. Budgets were tight and predetermined, and the regular question became, "What can you do without?" The primary focus was to take advantage of new technology such as satellites and pay for the cost with manpower savings.

During this period, DIA was called upon to verify treaties. The first treaties to deal with nuclear proliferation and nuclear testing issues were negotiated in the late 1960s to the early 1970s. The treaties tended to be very technical and were supported by DIA as required, but primarily by technical experts from the Directorate for Technology (DT). DT was first headed by a brilliant Air Force Colonel named Winn. Two of its earliest analysts, Jack Vorona and David Katz, would, in the years ahead, become two of the true scientific and technical experts in the Intelligence Community.


Also, from its inception, DIA was heavily involved in the U.S. arms control process. The first name to be associated with dedicated arms control support was Colonel James Williams. He was a Division Chief at Arlington Hall Station, with the mission of following the strategic nuclear missile forces of the U.S.S.R. Jim Williams set up a team of military and civilian analysts to provide dedicated support to the Joint Staff and OSD officials engaged in formulating U.S. policy to take to the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). Colonel Williams would later become the Director of Estimates and, when he received his third star, the Director of DIA.

Support for SALT I, and then SALT II, and the ABM Treaty was demanding the attention of DIA

analysts and technological experts concerned with the Soviet Union's strategic forces. Meanwhile, the conventional forces analysts focused on Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces soon found themselves also involved with arms control support. U.S.-Soviet talks in Helsinki in 1973 evolved into two security forums: the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), which was to discuss a wide range of issues—notably human rights, economic ties, and security—and the negotiations on Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR).

As the intelligence advisor to both SECDEF and CJCS, Admiral de Poix and DIA were responsible for support to policy officials from OSD and the Joint Staff and their arms control teams. It was the fact that the U.S. arms control process was an interagency process from its inception that brought DIA into the game and would keep it playing a critical support role for the next 30 years. Administrations in the intervening years have altered the way that arms control policy was formulated, treaties were negotiated, and compliance was verified. However, the process itself has remained an interagency effort, with both OSD and JCS playing critical roles. The DCI and the CIA assumed the leading intelligence role in the U.S. interagency scheme, but both OSD and JCS demanded and received the dedicated and responsive intelligence they could obtain only from DoD intelligence elements, especially from DIA. Oversight for DIA's arms control effort became a key mission area for several of the first Defense Intelligence Officers, with both Jim McCreary and Dr. Wally Magathan becoming senior spokesmen for DIA on arms control issues.

The massive Soviet ground forces in Europe, including the new T-72 tank, were discussed in the MBFR negotiations.



Admiral de Poix, like the two Directors of DIA before him, also took an early shot at a much needed new DIA building. In September 1972, DIA sought inclusion in a defense office building planned since 1967 for construction in FY 1973 at Bolling Air Force Base. In a now familiar story, funding was again denied, but Congress authorized a \$1.6 million project to improve the habitability of the Arlington Hall facility with the stipulation that the effort to obtain a permanent building continue. Leased space and use of other existing government buildings were considered as alternatives to construction involving congressional appropriation. The Secretary of Defense disapproved both considerations since new construction continued to be the most logical and economical solution; however, time was running out. The structurally unsound and beyond repair wooden buildings at Arlington Hall Station offered no protection for over \$23 million worth of highly sophisticated communication and automated data processing equipment; the nonrenewable lease of the expensive Cafritz Building on Fern Street was nearing

expiration, jeopardizing the continuity of DIA operations, particularly the photographic laboratory; and the diffusion of DIA locations continued to impact adversely on timely and high-quality analysis operations—particularly during periods of crisis.

As an officer who spent a considerable part of his military career in the field of research and development, Admiral de Poix was among the first of the military intelligence seniors to recognize the critical importance of intelligence to advances in technology, research and intelligence, and weapon systems development. De Poix had served as the Deputy Director of the Office of the Director for Research and engineering and was a veteran of Admiral Rickover's nuclear Navy. This, coupled with his extensive operational experience, caused him to push technological solutions as a means to better support the intelligence process.

Admiral de Poix's legacy was over-the-horizon intelligence.

SALT I placed limitations on the nuclear triad of both the United States and the Soviet Union, including the weapons carried by the Soviet DELTA II ballistic missile submarines. DIA analysts maintained a close watch on all Soviet strategic systems.



*“The experience of the U.S. Intelligence Community during the past three decades has clearly demonstrated that there is a direct relationship between past R&D efforts and present systems . . . these systems provide much of the ‘hard’ intelligence on which our high-level decisionmakers depend today (and they) are a result of precious (R&D). Similarly, the future intelligence posture of this Nation will largely be a product of the kind of R&D program we maintain.”*

*Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix  
before Congress, 1974*



A DIA photointerpreter examines film from a reconnaissance mission.

## IMAGERY, SYSTEMS, AND TECHNOLOGY

The author spoke with two former DIA senior officials, Paul Labar and Jeff Langsam, regarding technology developments in the Agency in the 1970s. One of the major transitions of intelligence during that time, they told me, was the rapid evolution of imagery collection and exploitation. The transition from the exploitation of imagery collected by high-flying aircraft such as the U-2 or SR-71 to the collection by the first National Technical Means (NTM) or satellites had a profound impact on DIA's imagery exploitation operations and the entire analytical workforce. For example:

### GEOGRAPHIC AREA COVERED:

The U-2, while it had provided outstanding coverage of many key targets in the Soviet Union and Asia, could only cover very limited areas on each individual flight. The limits on these flights were many. They varied from the danger of being shot down to the political risk to our allies who provided essential takeoff and landing sites. The coverage acquired was also bounded by the nature of the camera system and by the altitude of the aircraft.



Continued improvements to the U-2 allowed this older platform to be an effective intelligence collector.

All of the major targets covered were not of the same strategic importance, and a few of the higher priority targets had to be visited more than once. In fact, little was known about vast areas of the Soviet Union.

This lack of contiguous coverage changed with the advent of the overhead collection systems. Now the United States could continuously collect over large land areas, dependent only upon the availability of the collection vehicles, the time of day, the weather, the film load, etc. In time, the Soviet Union was well covered. This had the effect of freezing Order of Battle (OB) information in a specific timeframe and thereby making it far more difficult for the Soviets to fool U.S. intel-

ligence as to the total numbers and distribution of Soviet bombers by the tactic of flying them from one field to another. The same was true of ground and naval OB information.

#### IMAGERY SCALE:

The first satellite systems provided significantly smaller-scale imagery—a function of both the camera focal length and the satellite's altitude. Because the imagery was much smaller in scale, it required different viewing equipment, higher magnification viewing options, different light tables, etc. DIA personnel were instrumental in developing some of this advanced equipment (e.g., new light tables for viewing rolls of 70-mm



The U.S. Air Force's SR-71 Blackbird reconnaissance aircraft provided critical high-altitude imagery during the 1970s.

positive film transparencies and new tube magnifiers with higher magnitude ranges).

## MANPOWER FACTORS:

Because of the broader coverage, small scale and greater volume of film, new techniques of photo interpretation had to be employed. A three-man imagery analyst team concept was developed at NPIC, where large-volume film screening was accomplished using a combination of tube magnifiers, light tables with specially built stereo microscopes, and rear-projection viewing equipment. Scanning these larger volumes of film coverage required more photointerpreters to accomplish the mission read out. A large portion of these personnel had to be provided by DIA military and civilian personnel.

## CHANGING REQUIREMENTS:

As the technical means of imagery collection and exploitation rapidly evolved, and as more information was gained about the Soviet Union's true military capabilities, new intelligence collection/analysis needs began to surface. Up to this point, valid requirements often were not forwarded because the analysts did not believe it was possible to get the answers from imagery. The results from subsequent exploitation of the overhead imagery soon proved that more data extraction was actually possible. Subsequently, these new imagery analysts' demands put strong pressure from the NPIC on DIA to provide additional manpower, despite DIA's already tight budgets and congressionally dictated manpower limits.

DIA imagery analysts progressed from the early days of "photo interpretation" to become true "imagery analysts" who identified patterns, trends, tactics, and activities which could only be derived from visual observation. DIA people assigned to the NPIC began significant participation in the Indications and Warning (I&W) field and moved rapidly into the current intelligence field. They provided direct input to the DIA all-

source analysts who were concluding assessments of strategic threats and forces. At the same time, they continued to provide the basic military installation and equipment database of foreign military infrastructures worldwide.

During the 1970s, the DIA "Imagery Office," located within the Collection Directorate, promoted and coordinated the expanding appreciation and use of imagery sources. Imagery played an increasingly significant role in support of S&T analysis by the Services, and within DIA and the U&S Commands. Imagery became the cornerstone for the development of U.S. military contingency plans and wartime targeting. This was the time that DIA's Photointerpretation/Imagery Division, led first by L.B. Wright, and later, Robert R. Davis, came into prominence throughout the Agency.

## SOME SYSTEM HIGHLIGHTS DURING THE 1970s:

DIA established and led the Defense Steering Group (DSG) for imagery management activities, to include processing, dissemination, exploitation, and reporting matters which were of DoD-wide consequence. The DSG orchestrated coordination of DoD policies, procedures, standards; and formats relevant to airborne and NTM dissemination, utilization, and product distribution. It also provided a unified DoD position for DIA representation and advocacy at intelligence committees and budget activities.

In anticipation of the digital era, the Imagery Office, as functional manager, and the DIA Support Directorate, as technical manager, developed the Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (Aires). The system provided timely and consolidated handling of DoD imagery requirements and formatted reporting when introduced in the late 1970s. It did so by providing unique automated data processing (ADP) capabilities for all-source analysts, imagery analysts, and requirements managers at DIA and many other DoD locations, while also providing compatibility

with like-developed systems at other DoD facilities. All DoD requirements for NTM collection were submitted, validated, and transmitted in a standard format via AIRES. All message and database formatted exploitation reports would be exchanged worldwide and were consolidated within AIRES. Subsequently, all like reports generated by NPIC were sorted within AIRES and then dispatched to DoD elements in accordance with user profiles to ensure that dissemination was limited to targets of interest.

As DIA moved into the 1970s, technology was in the form of three very large mainframe computers. Two Honeywell mainframes provided the primary intelligence processing and storage capability for DIA analysts. Automated Digital Network (AUTODIN) messages were the primary source of intelligence and were input into highly specialized intelligence processing software on the Honeywell mainframes. Software, developed primarily by DIA government employees, scanned every character of each AUTODIN message. An index was created for each word within the message so that queries could be formed based upon single word searches or combinations of words using Boolean logic. A fairly extensive capability to refine searches along with other key capabilities made this system, called the DIA Online System (DIAOLS), a key system in the late 1960s, all through the 1970s, and well into the 1980s. The automated systems at that time were primarily focused on message traffic as the most common source of intelligence. Imagery was not stored in computer databanks because storage was too expensive.

Another mainframe computer, the IBM 360/65, provided a capability for users to run batch programs with the instructions encoded on punched cards. The IBM 360/65 computer was primarily used to run administrative applications, but a few intelligence applications were run on this computer. One of the more significant intelligence applications that ran on the IBM computer was one that inputted, processed, and stored imagery

interpretation reports (IIRs). Any time an intelligence analyst wanted to determine what IIRs were available for a particular region of the world, a program would be prepared on punched data cards, then inputted and executed to determine where, in off-line tape storage, the IIRs which met their criteria existed. The tape(s) would then be mounted and searched for the IIRs. Once the analyst had the IIRs available, another reference number provided the location of a film container in storage where a large roll of film could be retrieved and provided to an analyst for viewing on an imagery light table. This process could take several days, during which time a storage error or an older tape could add more time to the process.

The dissemination of intelligence, a function that is performed today almost exclusively through automated means, was almost 100-percent manual during the 1970s. Even though each AUTODIN message was sent to the Honeywell computers for indexing based upon keywords, each message was also printed. For many years, each message was physically photocopied according to the number of addresses on the distribution and information lines on the message. For each address or organizational symbol, there was a corresponding physical mailbox where someone from each organization could come and retrieve their respective messages. As printed, AUTODIN messages were as important as the computers themselves; the room where messages were picked up was an extremely busy area. Because the copying of AUTODIN messages, and the placement of them in mailboxes was such a repetitive and mechanical process, DIA contracted with Xerox Corporation for a machine that could perform the entire process with little or no intervention. Several models of this machine were built and delivered to DIA, with the last several models performing fairly reliably.

Intelligence applications software was written by DIA government employees during the 1970s.

Although there were no formally recognized computer science or automated data processing specialty codes in the Services, DIA was able to attain fresh technical talent from the Services, primarily from the new officers just out of college and entering the Services. Another source of technical talent came from DIA's very effective college recruitment program, with at least six to eight college graduates with degrees in computer science recruited each year.

The 1970s also witnessed the beginning of DIA responsibilities for the Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems or DoDIIS, as it would be called. At least four DIA individuals—Robert Little, Richard B. Walker, Steve Schanzer, and Dennis Clem—would play key leadership roles for DoDIIS in the years ahead.



Although most U.S. forces withdrew from Vietnam in 1973, DIA still collected against targets in that country, including this critical communications cable shown in this 1973 imagery.



A Soviet Free Rocket Over Ground (FROG) photographed during a Moscow parade. The Soviets remained the primary threat during LTG Graham's tour as Director.

## DANNY GRAHAM AND THE ESTIMATORS



Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA

Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham, USA, served as Director of DIA from September 1974 to December 1975. In 1925, he was born in Portland, Oregon. He received a bachelor of science and engineering degree from the United States Military Academy at West Point in 1946. His first military service was as part of the U.S. occupation troops in Berlin, Germany. He later served with Army airborne and psychological warfare units at Fort Bragg, North Carolina and in Korea. General Graham began his extensive work in the field of intelligence estimating in 1959, when he served in the Army's Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence.

In 1963, he was detailed for duty with the Office of National Estimates, CIA. In 1965, he was given command of the 319th Military Intelligence Battalion located at Fort Bragg and moved it to Fort Shafter, Hawaii. He became the Chief of Current Intelligence, Indications, and Estimates Division of J2, U.S. Military Assistant Command, Vietnam, in 1966, and 2 years later returned to the Office of National Estimates.

In January 1970, General Graham became DIA's Assistant Director for Collection and then, Deputy Director for Estimates through May 1973. He served as Chief of Production Review Group, CIA, followed by appointment as Deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence from May 1973 through September 1974. The President appointed General Graham as the Director, DIA, effective September 1974; he retired on 31 December 1975.

Due to the dramatic resource reductions in defense and in DIA as a result of "Vietnamization" General Graham had no choice at the beginning of his directorship in October 1974, but to begin a comprehensive overhaul of DIA intelligence production functions, organization, and management. His first major action in November 1974 was to change the billet of Special Assistant (DIA) for JCS matters to the JCS Liaison Division or JS to the J2 Support Office (JS). This position's duties were expanded to emphasize DIA's JCS support role of the Director, DIA as the J2 of the Joint Staff. General Graham said, "To place greater emphasis on my role as the J2, OJCS, I have expanded the size of my J2 Support Office which now reports directly to my chief of staff. This office serves as the DIA focal point for all Joint Staff matters and maintains a close relationship with the OJCS to ensure prompt and respon-

sive DIA support.” This action was supported by the then Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, who told Congress in 1974, “**As a defense agency, DIA had a responsibility to provide intelligence support to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Abolishment of the J2 organization, per se, had no effect on DIA’s clearly defined role to support the Joint Chiefs; however, it eventually raised some doubt in regard to DIA’s role within the Joint Staff itself. I am happy to say that this functional uncertainty has been removed, and that the Director, DIA, is so fully involved—personally and organizationally—as the J2 of the Joint Staff.**” The JS organization would remain in being until 1991.

General Graham then established a staff of Defense Intelligence Officers (DIOs) in December 1974 to act as his personal senior staff representatives on substantive intelligence matters. The first official appointment was made on 2 December. Graham immediately put the original six DIO officers to work. Their areas were European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs, General Purpose and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions, Strategic Weapons and Strategic Arms Limitations, Middle East and South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Administratively, the appointments would not be completed until April 1975. At the same time, the manpower reductions in DIA were directed at nearly every function; primary targets were collection, production, scientific and technical intelligence, data automation, and career development activities. For example, DIA production capabilities pertaining to the non-Communist world were decreased or terminated. This, while DIA had to respond to requests for intelligence on coups in Ethiopia and Portugal and independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau. In the Angola Crisis in 1975, DIA provided the entire military intelligence database.

While limited support for the U.S. military commands continued, effective support to high-level decisionmakers in JCS and OSD was severely impacted, along with most S&T intelligence pro-

duction. Moreover, collection—particularly in the nuclear detection program—was strained.

The major difference between the 1960s and the first half of the 1970s was that DIA was tasked with providing an unprecedented level of analytical detail in its products. Tremendous advances in intelligence collection and information processing accompanying DIA’s development perhaps affected the manpower needs required to perform the DIA mission. However, the overall impact was to expand the mission and, consequently the workload. The biggest failing of those on the periphery of the Intelligence Community was that they did not understand that intelligence requirements were dynamic.

In June 1975, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence) Albert C. Hall pressed DIA to prepare a Manpower Reduction Plan for the GDIP which would meet the reduction goals referred to by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 1973. General Graham responded:

*“I believe that, in view of changing world situations and the demands for finished intelligence, further manpower reductions in DIA will degrade national-level intelligence analysis and production to such an extent that there is an inherent risk that our defense posture will suffer. This assessment was not lightly made. It is my belief that in this period of uneasy détente and fundamental reexamination of this nation’s defense needs, intelligence—our assurance against surprise—should not be bound to arbitrary manpower reductions arrived at 2 years ago and driven by the fiscal projections of that time.”*


Graham’s words were of little avail. The downward trend in DIA (and the GDIP) manpower continued until the late 1970s, when it was halted primarily by events in Iran and Afghanistan.

General Graham and DIA looked for ways to offset the heavy intelligence production requirements by using the techniques of “delegated

production." This concept took a longstanding, functional intelligence requirement area such as Soviet Ground Order of Battle and "delegated" the production of intelligence responsibilities to the Army. Similar requirements were delegated to Navy and Air Force components. While this gave some relief to strapped DIA analysts, problems

would arise later in the coordination and completeness of the DIA databases.

The official end of the Vietnam war in 1975, based on the agreements between the United States and Vietnam at the Paris Peace Accords of 1973, created a greater interest in American



DIA had responsibility for POWs and MIAs in Vietnam from very early in the war. The war's end increased interest in those that remained listed as MIA.

POWs and new mission requirements for DIA that would continue into the 1990s.

On 11 September 1975, the House of Representatives directed the formation of a Congressional Select Committee on Missing Persons in Southeast Asia. The Committee immediately went to work holding the first of many hearings on 23 September. In the following months, the efforts by the Defense and State Departments were reviewed, and visits were made to the pertinent offices at DIA and to the Joint Casualty Resolution Center in Thailand. A visit to Hanoi and Vietnam by Congress-

man Montgomery and three other committee members took place in December 1975. This was the first contact between U.S. and Vietnamese officials following the Communist takeover of South Vietnam and the evacuation of the Americans from Saigon earlier in the year. The significance of the visit was that it opened the way for future and more meaningful discussions relating to missing Americans.

On a sad note, the end of the war in Vietnam would give DIA more deaths in service to the Nation. In the spring of 1975, as the advancing

Hanoi's Gia Lam Airport, photographed by a USAF RF-101 in August 1966. Nearly 7 years later, Gia Lam would be the site of the release of American POWs, some of whom had been held prisoner since before this photograph was taken.



North Vietnamese armies began the siege of Saigon, the decision was made to evacuate the U.S. Embassy. Five civilian employees of DIA's U.S. Defense Attaché Office (DAO) were scheduled to leave for Saigon on 4 April 1975 on a C-5 aircraft from the nearby Tan Son Nhut Airport. Celeste Brown, Vivienne Clark, Dorothy Curtiss, Joan Prey, and Doris Watkins were among the 50

U.S. mission workers or dependents and 250 Vietnamese orphans. The C-5 aircraft crashed shortly after takeoff. Eleven of the 29 crew members and 144 passengers died in the crash, including all 5 members of the DAO staff. These five brave women were the first female DIA members to die in service to their country. Saigon surrendered on 30 April 1975.



An HH-53C takes on fuel from an HC-130 tanker over Southeast Asia. The HH-53 wrote the closing chapters in America's involvement in Southeast Asia during the evacuation of Saigon, known as Operation FREQUENT WIND, and the final combat action of the war, the 14-hour battle on Koh Tang Island during the *Mayaguez* incident.

Dr. Wynfred Joshua, the first Defense Intelligence Officer for the Soviet Union, and LTG Danny Graham (Ret) at a reception marking the Agency's 25th anniversary in 1986. Graham appointed Joshua, and she remained in that post well into the 1980s.



## THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS (DIOs)

When Danny Graham and General Bennett established the Directorate for Estimates in 1970, their objective was to create a body of DIA expertise fully capable of producing quality estimative and forecasting intelligence keyed to critical defense policies and planning issues.

DIA's role was also the proactive involvement in the very important and highly visible National Intelligence Estimates (NIEs) managed by the CIA's National Intelligence Council (NIC). General Graham, back at DIA in 1975, was pleased with the progress of DIA and the defense estimation intelligence process but, having just returned from being the Deputy to the Director of CIA, foresaw an additional need. He wanted DIA to have a small group of substantive intelligence experts to counterpart with and act as a counterweight to CIA's National Intelligence Officers (NIOs).

The first individuals selected to be DIA DIOs were:

- Gordon Negus—Strategic Weapons and Strategic Arms Limitations. Negus was serving as a Command and Control Branch Chief in DT, DIA.
- Wynfred Joshua—European and Soviet Political/Military Affairs. Winnie Joshua was a scholar and recognized Soviet expert serving with the Stanford Research Institute.
- Wally Magathan—General Purpose and Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions. Wally Magathan was a retired Army brigadier general.
- Charles Desaulniers—Southeast Asia. Mr. Desaulniers was serving at DIA in DE.
- Waldo Duberstein—Middle East and South Asia. Waldo Duberstein was a retired CIA officer.
- Richard Gisler—Latin America and Sub-Saharan Africa. Dick Gisler was also a retired CIA officer.

Working directly for the DIA Director, the role of the DIOs—assisted by a very small staff of only one or two people—was to serve as DIA's substantive authorities and Agency focal points for designated regions of the world. They were to serve as key links between defense policy officials and DIA analysts, collection managers, and Intelligence Community officials to ensure satisfaction of OSD needs for substantive intelligence. The DIOs, in acting as counterparts to the NIOs, were to oversee and ensure Defense Intelligence Community participation in the NIE process, as well as to provide feedback, focus, and direction to the rest of the Agency regarding the production and collection needs of defense policy officials.

General Graham's DIO concept initially had some mission and roles problems between the various substantive functional managers in DIA, but the utility and influence of the DIOs in the larger Intelligence Community quickly became obvious. The important DIO role begun in 1975, was sustained into the next decade, and continues today within DIA's Directorate for Policy Support. A roster of individuals who have served in DIA as DIOs reads like a list of superstars in the substantive intelligence field.

One former DIO for East Asia and the Pacific, Jay Sloan, who went on to be the Director of Estimates and the Director of Policy Support in a 30-year DIA career, described some DIO duties:

*“Often, DIA was called upon to provide studies focused on critical policy questions and issues. The DIA-completed studies were always best if they contained a discussion of alternative outcomes and then implications for U.S. policy. What did it take to produce such studies? Matrix-managed teams of*

*key analysts working together under the overall leadership of a substantively knowledgeable and respected ‘manager.’ Often, those ‘managers’ turned out to be the Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) because he or she was able to overarch the three or four major disciplines (current, basic, estimative, and S&T) to produce a coherent, balanced, complete, and fully coordinated assessment that was useful to the policy consumer. This was possible because the DIO knew the consumer intimately and had the substantive knowledge, experience, leadership capability, authority, and access necessary to produce such tailored assessments and studies.”*

Jay Sloan continued:

*“The DIO didn’t ‘manage’ every project personally. Often, such management was delegated to a*

*designated project leader in one of the directorates, but he always kept oversight and quality control authority. This mechanism was used only for critical or highly sensitive issues in which the DIA product would have major impact on the policy decision. There often were instances where precise technical military assessments were critical to the decision. DIA usually had the best authoritative expertise available. The challenge was to ensure that the technical assessment was framed in the larger political-military context relevant to the policy issue, without becoming ‘politicized’ or ‘captured’ through the process. Here is where the integrity and strength (courage) of the DIO was important. In this mode, our ‘DIA China Team’ (composed of estimative, basic, current, and S&T analysts operating out of their respective*

***“I think the time is ripe for the military profession to reassert its traditional role in the function of describing military threats to national security. Both the military user and the military producer of strategic intelligence have come a long way since the ‘missile gap’ days. DIA has hit its stride in the production of respectable military estimates.”***

***Daniel O. Graham***

*directorates, but actively collaborating daily with the DIO) ‘captured the market’ on China military issues. We were in high demand for products, briefings, and special projects not only in OSD, but also JCS, State, the NSC, and Congress. It was during this period that I developed my ‘support-to-policy’ skills and formulated my thinking on the subject.’*

Sound analysis was General Graham's legacy to DIA. Disagreement over the years with CIA on certain estimates—particularly those concerned with the scope of Soviet developments—was not uncommon. This often appeared to the media, Congress, and others as rivalry rather than

healthy competition integrally necessary to the estimative process. However, in 1976, after General Graham's departure, a non-CIA group of experts was charged with examining disparities between CIA and defense estimates—the well-publicized A and B Team debate. In the wake of the exercise, DIA emerged as a credible producer of national intelligence.

The Agency served as text manager for an NIE for the first time, and was drafting all, or major, sections of other NIEs. The addition of the Defense Intelligence Officers was further indication of DIA's ascent in this area.



In 1994, the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) dedicated a professorial chair in collection operations in honor of LTG Samuel V. Wilson, USA (Ret.), the fifth Director of DIA. Lt Gen Chuck Cunningham, USAF (Ret.), Commandant of the JMIC (center), presents the plaque to LTG Wilson (right) while MG Jack Leide, USA, the Director of the National Military Intelligence Collection Center, looks on.

## SAM WILSON—THE ATTACHE'S ATTACHE



Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USA

General Sam Wilson, a native of Southside Virginia, served during his 37-year career from infantry private to lieutenant general. A highly decorated combat veteran of World War II, he spent part of that period in the Office of Strategic Services and, subsequently, in the 1944 North Burma Campaign with "Merrill's Marauders." Enrolling in the Army's Foreign Area Specialist Training Program (Russian) in the immediate postwar years, General Wilson attended graduate school at Columbia University's Russian Institute. Afterwards, he was posted as a special student to Europe to continue his language and area studies. Noteworthy extracurricular activities during this latter period included being assigned to the State Department's Diplomatic Pouch and Courier Service—which led to extensive travels throughout the Iron Curtain countries and the Soviet Union, as well as to other countries peripheral to the U.S.S.R.—functioning as an official interpreter to Berlin, Potsdam, and Vienna; and serving in a liaison capacity with elements of the Soviet Armed Forces in East Germany and eastern Austria.

Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., who was the Deputy Director, DIA, from September 1974 to December 1975, served as the Acting Director from January to May 1976. A key event during this period was the issuing of Executive Order 11905 in February 1976. This resulted in the first change since 1964 of the DIA charter, DoD Directive 5105.21. The charter was revised in December 1976 to recognize DIA as the primary military intelligence authority in the production of national-level products. General Tighe served as acting director until the former Defense Attaché to the Soviet Union, Lieutenant General Samuel V. Wilson, USA, assumed the directorship.

General Wilson's assignments varied between duties in the Special Operations arena, in intelligence, and in more conventional command and staff positions. Highlights include service as an intelligence staff officer at the Washington level, a Central Intelligence Agency field case officer, a Special Forces group commander, an assistant commandant of the U.S. Army's Special Warfare School, a deputy assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Special Operations, an assistant division commander (Operations) of the 82nd Airborne Division, a U.S. Defense Attaché to Moscow; a deputy to the Director of Central Intelligence, and Director for the Defense Intelligence Agency. Somewhat outside this pattern was his

assignment of several years to South Vietnam, initially with the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID/Vietnam) as the Associate Director for Field Operations; and, subsequently, in the American Embassy/Saigon as the U.S. Mission Coordinator/Vietnam. In connection with this latter assignment, he received a Presidential appointment to the personal rank of minister.

General Wilson's tenure of 17 months as the fifth Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency was the second shortest to date, after that of his immediate predecessor, Lieutenant General Daniel O. Graham. Coming back to the Pentagon following 2 years as the Deputy Director for the Intelligence Community under then-DCI William E. Colby and briefly under subsequent DCI George Bush, Wilson spent several months as the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence before assuming his new post in May 1975. His decision to retire from the Army on 1 September 1977 with 37 years of active military service was prompted primarily by the declining health of his wife, who had been diagnosed as terminally ill.

The fact that Wilson was a highly decorated, combat-arms paratroop officer, who had majored in Russian and Soviet military history—concentrating on the World War II campaigns on the Soviet-German front and speaking idiomatic Russian—gave him unusual entree into the Soviet military high command. This rare access to the top Soviet military was also significantly aided by the fact that Wilson's earlier Moscow tour as Defense Attaché coincided with a marked warming in Soviet-American relations, the so-called period of “détente.” His elicitations of Soviet military comments on their strategic concepts for waging war, Soviet military doctrine and tactics, views on U.S.-Soviet relations, their concerns about the possibility of a strategic nuclear exchange, and other subjects of high intelligence interest found a ready audience at policy levels in Washington.

During this final tour as DIA Director, Wilson took part in an extensive planning effort to reorganize defense intelligence and worked to mitigate and soften some of the more extreme proposals that were under active consideration; he also endeavored to foster a greater appreciation for collection and production of intelligence pertaining to those Third World countries in the grips of Soviet-sponsored insurgent movements and raised the priority for intelligence in support of the special operations forces. His views continued to actively be sought on Soviet attitudes toward nuclear warfare; indeed, he returned on a number of occasions to Moscow to engage his former high-ranking Soviet military interlocutors on this and related subjects. Each time he returned from such visits, he invariably would be closeted in the “tank” with the Joint Chiefs of Staff for hours of debriefings, where he endeavored to inform the Chiefs about the expressed views and concerns of their opposite numbers in Moscow. Among his innovations within DIA itself, he established the “Analyst Travel Program,” saying that he did not want any analyst writing about a country in which he had never set foot. (This program became quite popular and has continued in existence.) He continued his emphasis on close relations of maximum trust and confidence between DIA and CIA and followed, on a daily basis, the activities of the Joint Indications and Warning Office, a combined CIA-NSA-DIA operation he had set up during his previous job as DDCI/IC.

A walk-around and hands-on manager, he paid particular attention to intelligence training and education, especially to programs and curricula of the then Defense Intelligence College, where he frequently addressed students in class. His strong interest in the Defense Attaché System was reflected in his careful monitoring of selection, training and promotion rates for officers, noncommissioned officers, and civilian personnel assigned to the DAS. General Wilson also expressed a continuing concern for the healthcare, morale, and overall welfare and educational opportunities for attaché wives and dependents in his frequent visits to attachés on station.



Building 158 in the Washington Navy Yard housed some of DIA's intelligence research elements from the 1970s through the 1990s.



The Soviet SS-18 SATAN ICBM was one of the new Soviet strategic systems that DIA had to monitor in the 1970s. A DIA artist painted this rendition of the missile in the 1980s.

## COLD WAR AND SIOP SUPPORT

In 1976 and 1977, DIA's intelligence support missions were representative of the times—internationally and domestically. The United States was committed to supporting NATO against the Warsaw Pact with DIA playing an informal, but demanding J2, NATO role. At the same time, DIA was regularly providing intelligence analysis to defense policymakers on how much military force and weaponry were enough for Soviet deterrence. DIA was right in the middle of the “hawks” versus “doves” debate taking place in the Congress and the country. Soon after Jimmy Carter was sworn in as the President in January 1977, he and his National Security Council (NSC) tasked the Defense Department to construct a new nuclear deterrence strategy. This strategy was later codified in Presidential Directive (PD) 59. DIA's intelligence support played a significant part in the implementation of PD 59 and in the OSD guidance regarding nuclear damage objectives, collateral damage limits, JCS capability guidelines, and joint strategic targeting planning and war planning in the form of the Single Integrated Operational Plan (SIOP).

U.S. nuclear employment doctrine is very consequential in two important aspects. First, the resulting targeting plan needs to invoke sufficient fear so as to actually deter an enemy from attacking the United States. Second, the strategy serves as the rationale for establishing strategic force structures and for selecting weapons of choice.

Leon Sloss is the father of PD 59. Secretary of Defense Harold Brown selected him to lead the study NSC called for on the development of the optimum nuclear weapons employment policy (PD 59). Leon was a very experienced national security expert and researcher. He was given an

office in the Pentagon and a small staff of officers and civil servants. His main force was an advisory and coordination committee made up of senior representatives from all relevant offices in the OSD, JCS, CINCs, Services, and State Department. Gordon Negus, the DIO for Strategic Forces and Arms Control, was the DIA member. (General John Vessey, USA, a chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, would later tell the author that he believed that Gordon Negus was the best intelligence officer that Vessey had ever known.) Sloss also had a number of outside government stringers from industry, nonprofits (like Rand), and academia. He held seminars on the theory of deterrence and traveled appreciably (e.g., SAC, strategic weapon developers, and manufacturers). The coordination committee met frequently, essentially weekly, and served as his principal force. The study lasted 6 to 8 months.

The core issue of the Sloss Study was what nuclear war plan would most deter the Soviets. This issue became what do the Soviets value the most. The resolution of this question hinged on the question of—whether the Soviets actually believed in nuclear war survival and nuclear war victory. Since this latter issue was a core National Intelligence Estimate (NIE 11-3/8) issue on which DIA had strong views, DIA was very prepared for the weekly coordination committee debates. Further, Sloss tasked DIA for an intelligence study on this issue, along with academia studies and papers.

At the outset, Negus and DIA took the position that Soviet military doctrine included nuclear war victory. DIA's study pointed out that their strategic force structure, weapons design, training and exercises, and extensive leadership, defense



Gordon Negus, at a function in the DIAC lobby, was a key player in the NSC study that developed nuclear deterrence strategy set up under PD 59 during the Carter administration.

industry, and national infrastructure survival efforts were all evidence to this fact. DIA recommended that the optimum nuclear deterrence strategy would be one based on denying the Soviet nuclear war victory by targeting their war plans, *per se*.

Sloss did not tip his hand on the direction he was taking regarding the many theories on which he was being advised until he released the first draft of his report to the Advisory Committee for comment—it was totally based on the DIA recommendation. There were no serious challenges to his draft, and the final report to Harold Brown was

based on the theme “Deny War Aims.” This doctrine stressed putting at risk Soviet leadership—both the party and military at many levels—defense industry, and military capability in context with Soviet strategic-operational plans.

It took several months for the Brown endorsement of the finding of the Sloss Study to result in PD 59, and to subsequently result in a new OSD nuclear weapons policy to reach the JCS as guidance for restructuring the nuclear war plan (SIOP). DIA was heavily involved in these developments. The JCS was responsible for writing explicit targeting objective and damage guidance



The U.S. Air Force B-1 bomber was a key new system for delivering air-launched cruise missiles in the late 1970s.

for CINCSAC (as director of the Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff (JSIPS)) to implement. PD 59 radically redefined the theory of deterrence, from countervalue to countervalue (deny Soviet military victory). There was no precedence on how to do this. The course of action the Chiefs took was to turn to DIA, since DIA had been so influential in the development of PD 59. They tasked DIA to conduct the Damage Criteria Study, a study to define targeting guidance of denying Soviet nuclear war victory.

DIA's Research Directorate (DB) had a staff highly qualified for this task. At the time, Colonel James Anderson, former USAF—SAC pilot and very knowledgeable on nuclear policies, planning

and execution practices—was Chief of the Targeting Division (DB-7). Steve Schanzer, a senior analyst, was transferred to become Anderson's deputy and to serve as the director of the Damage Criteria Study. Also assigned to support Schanzer were Bill Lee, Art Zuehlke, Kathy Turner, Frank Dunlap, and several others—a very, very strong Soviet military capability intelligence team.

The analytical approach taken by the team was to reference the Soviets' own views on the correlation of forces required for NATO/Warsaw Pact nuclear war victory. DIA had sufficient intelligence to replicate their doctrine on required capabilities for all segments of their war plans (for strategic exchange, first- and second-echelon the-

ater engagements, reserve forces, logistics, transportation, command and control, and military and political leadership). DIA developed damage criteria based on degrading all of these capabilities to where the correlation of forces was below the Soviets' own criteria for assured victory.

The DIA Damage Criteria Study was approved by the JCS and was adopted as the official criteria for the next reiteration of the SIOP.

A second example of critically important DIA Cold War intelligence analysis during this time was the Cruise Missile Study. As the Carter administration Defense Department debated the relative wartime values of competing weapons systems, a choice needed to be made—whether or not to move ahead with the acquisition of the U.S. Air Force's B-1 penetration bomber or to outfit the then existing B-52 fleet with standoff cruise missiles. The Military Services had major mission interests in the defense/administration decision, as did several important defense contractors.

Some of the defense players, particularly the U.S. Air Force, believed that the B-1 penetration bomber offered the best chance of wartime success against deep Soviet targets. Others gave the standoff cruise missiles a better chance for survivability in a war with the Russians. DIA was asked to provide its assessment. The DIA team was led by the DIO and included senior analysts Peter Scop from DT and John Potter from DE. When completed, the DIA Cruise Missile Study concluded that the cruise missile offered the best chance for success in what would be an intensive Soviet air defense environment. The study results were carefully reviewed by the then Deputy Director for Production (VP), Major General Lincoln Fauser (later Director, NSA), USAF, and passed on to the Defense Department. The Carter

administration approved the cruise missile choice over the B-1 bomber acquisition.

General Sam Wilson, like his predecessor, reemphasized the need for a DIA building and reenergized the earlier unsuccessful efforts. A submission to Congress was made in the FY 1976 Military Construction Program budget with a location at Bolling Air Force Base at a cost of \$86.1 million dollars. And perhaps most important, Vice Admiral Bobby Inman, DIA's Vice Director for Plans, Operations, and Support from September 1976 to September 1977, called the Deputy Director for Resources and Support, Carl Norton, and said, "We are going to resurrect the idea of a building." Norton, would play a key role in the eventual building of a DIAC—the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center.

Earlier in this part, we mentioned that General Wilson took part in an extensive planning and review effort at the OSD level to reorganize defense intelligence. One of the many options under consideration, because of severe resource constraints, was the complete dissolution of DIA. General Wilson actively and persuasively used his considerable national reputation and influence as an outstanding warrior, scholar, foreign area expert, and American to dissuade those who advocated a lesser role or no role for a DIA. He was, of course, successful.

General Wilson was the first foreign area specialist and former Defense Attaché to become the Director of DIA. His diplomatic, linguistic, and intelligence-gathering skills were an inspiration to generations of professional intelligence officers. His legacy was the appreciation of the importance of human intelligence in the overall intelligence process. He was the attachés' attaché.

*“BG Frank D. Merrill and 1st LT Sam Wilson are standing on the near bank of the Mogaung River and gazing across the 80-yard expanse of water and listening to the sounds emanating from a Japanese bivouac area.”*

*“Merrill: ‘I wonder what’s over there?’*

*“<pause>*

*“Wilson: ‘Why don’t I go see?’*

*“<pause>*

*“Merrill turns to look at Wilson and then says, ‘Yes, why don’t you.’*

*“(Wilson was ever the HUMINTER.)”<sup>1</sup>*

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<sup>1</sup>From *The Marauders* by Charles Ogburn, Jr., which tells of 1st Lieutenant Samuel V. Wilson’s exploits with General Frank Merrill in Burma during WWII, for which he received the Silver Star, the Bronze Star, and an Oak Leaf Cluster to the Silver Star.



DIA personnel in front of "A" Building at Arlington Hall Station. By the late 1970s, it and Building "B" needed to be replaced, Lt Gen Tighe worked hard to get a new, larger facility for DIA, an effort which resulted in the start of construction of the DIAC.

## THE TIGHE YEARS



Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF

Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., USAF, was born 19 June 1921 in New Raymer, Colorado. After graduating from high school in Los Angeles, California, he enlisted in the U.S. Army in 1942, serving in Texas, California, and Australia. In 1944, he graduated from Officers' Candidate School with a commission as a second lieutenant. He then served with the 43rd Bombardment Group, 5th Air Force, in New Guinea, the Netherlands, the East Indies, and the Philippines and Ryukyu Islands.

Following World War II, he was released from active duty in 1946 but accepted a reserve com-

mission in the U.S. Army Air Force. He then completed his college education, graduating with distinction from Loyola University.

Shortly after the outbreak of the Korean War, General Tighe reentered active duty in August 1950 as an intelligence officer with the 78th Fighter-Interceptor Group. Following his time in South Korea, he went on to service in several of the U.S. Air Force's key intelligence positions, including Director of Intelligence Estimates at Air Force Headquarters, Director of Intelligence of the Pacific Air Force (PACAF), and J2 of the U.S. Pacific Command (PACOM) at Camp Smith, Hawaii. (The author of this book served as a major on then Brigadier General Tighe's J2 staff.) As previously mentioned, Gene Tighe served as the Deputy Director for DIA from September 1974 to August 1976 and as acting Director, DIA, from December 1975 to May 1976. At that time, in a particularly selfless move, General Tighe, whose loyalty to the Air Force was so great, agreed to take a reduction in rank of one star (lieutenant general to major general) and once again, served his beloved Air Force—first as the Strategic Air Command Deputy Chief of Staff, Intelligence, and then as the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence, U.S. Air Force, in the Pentagon. General Tighe's devotion to duty and exceptional intelligence professional skill was recognized by the President, and he was appointed Director of DIA in September 1977. He served in that capacity until his retirement in 1981.

General Tighe and DIA would have a full plate of activity during his tenure. In spite of the resource reductions of the early and mid-1970s, the Agency's requirements for intelligence production greatly increased. Following the lead of

A REPORT TO THE  
CONGRESS

STUDY TO DETERMINE  
THE OPTIMUM LOCATION  
FOR  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
ACTIVITIES



THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE  
STUDY GROUP  
ON  
ALTERNATE LOCATIONS FOR THE  
DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

NOVEMBER 1980

Lt Gen Tighe pushed for the completion of the study to determine a new permanent location for DIA's activities. This report concluded that Bolling AFB was the best choice for the new Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC).

Executive Order 12036, which structured the Intelligence Community and clarified DIA's national and departmental responsibilities, General Tighe tightened the DIA organization into five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J2 support. DIA analysts then focused on the Soviet Union, Lebanon, China after Mao, South Africa, Vietnam MIA issues, and something relatively new—terrorism. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, and the taking of American hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979 resulted in additional DIA task forces to provide intelligence concerning the crisis. Other world events—such as the China-Vietnam border war, the overthrow of Amin in Uganda, the North-South Yemen dispute, the Camp David Accords between Egypt and Israel, the troubles in Pakistan, the Libya-Egypt border clashes, the Sandinista takeover in Nicaragua, and the Soviet movement of combat troops to Cuba during the signing of the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty II—made this an extremely busy time for DIA.

Under General Tighe's leadership, DIA provided intelligence support to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force during Operation BRIGHT STAR, against a backdrop of Congress-approved budget increases for DoD to support “readiness, sustainability, and modernization.” Analysts, meanwhile, were overloaded with Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), Iraq's attempts to seize Iranian oilfields and the resulting war, the aborted U.S. hostage rescue attempt in Iran, and civil war in El Salvador.

DIA, by 1981, had demonstrated its importance as an integral part of the U.S. Intelligence Community. Publication of the first *Soviet Military Power* was greeted with wide acclaim. Success in getting the new building became a major achievement in DIA's history. Fruition came with the long-awaited groundbreaking for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) in April tremendously boosted the morale of DIA employees.



A meeting of the Senior Military Intelligence Officers' Conference (SMIOC) in 1990 at the DIAC. First started by Lt Gen Tighe in the late 1970s, these meetings have continued to the present.

## THE GDIP AND THE SMIOC

Secretary of Defense Robert S. McNamara, in 1961, brought his “Whiz Kid” World War II-era War Department experiences to the Defense Department. Not only did he take action to create the Defense Intelligence Agency, but he also brought to DoD a system used by the Ford Motor Company. It was called the Planning, Programming, and Budget System or PPBS. It quantified requirements and established milestones in the planning of a structured 5-year cycle. The Defense Department still uses the PPBS system today. The Intelligence Community uses a similar process known as Capability Planning and Budget System. The General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) is managed under this system. The Director of DIA is the GDIP Program Manager, but the day-to-day responsibilities are currently carried out by DIA’s Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) Staff. The GDIP is not DIA, nor vice versa. DIA, today, is about 40 percent of the program. The rest is split up in the Military Services and in the Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs) at the Unified Commands.

When DIA was established in 1961, it was given the responsibility to manage the Consolidated Intelligence Program, which later became the GDIP. DIA kept this mission until 1974, when the responsibility for GDIP management was transferred to the Assistant Secretary for Intelligence. When later DoD reorganizations took place in 1977, the resources management of the GDIP was returned to the Director of DIA. General Tighe established a separate organization, the GDIP Staff that reported to him, to carry out GDIP manager responsibilities. The first GDIP Staff Director was a talented SES, Martin Hurwitz, who ran the GDIP with an iron hand from 1977 to 1991 for the Director of DIA. The GDIP Staff was located on the second floor of the Pentagon on the E Ring. It was the

place to go if your program needed outyear money or if you had a good new idea. There was always a risk that your program was not as good as you thought and you could lose it to a greater need.

Executive Order 12333 made the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) responsible for budget recommendations to the President for activities in the National Foreign Intelligence Program (NFIP) and gave him the authority to recommend program actions. The GDIP manager (Director of DIA) was responsible for recommending GDIP resources that should be included in the President’s budget. The GDIP manager’s authority paralleled the DCI’s program management authority. As the National Foreign Intelligence Council advised the DCI on the NFIP budget, the Military Intelligence Board advised the Program Manager on the GDIP budget.

For the Director of DIA, the GDIP Staff developed guidance, policy, and instructions for GDIP planning, programming, and budgeting. Specifically, they were responsible for:

- Evaluating Service, U&S Command, and agency general intelligence programs.
- Developing the GDIP manager’s priorities and recommended programs.
- Assessing the effectiveness of GDIP programs and activities.
- Justifying the GDIP to Congress.
- Coordinating with OSD, OMB, the IC Staff, the Services, Congressional Intelligence Committees, and other agencies.

Under the DoD Directive 3305.5, the Director of DIA (and the GDIP Staff Director in his stead) had OSD responsibility and authority for:

- Establishing and operating the GDIP Staff.

- Assigning tasks and issuing instructions and guidance to defense components of the GDIP.
- Entering into intra-DoD and interagency agreements.
- Having free and direct access to DoD components, the U.S. Intelligence Community, and other executive departments and agencies.

The mission for the GDIP units and activities was to collect information, process and analyze data, and produce military intelligence for:

## WARFIGHTING

- National military strategy.
- Indications and warning of hostilities and crisis.
- Crisis management and military contingency operations.
- Theater-level battle planning and direction of combat operations.

## EQUIPPING AND TRAINING FORCES

- Weapon and countermeasures acquisition.
- Force structuring.
- Doctrine and tactics development.
- Military training and education.

## NATIONAL-LEVEL PRIORITIES

- Foreign policy.
- Arms control negotiations and treaty monitoring.

When DIA resumed responsibility for the GDIP, it was close to its lowest point in history in terms of resources and dollars. For example, the larger NFIP lost over 33-percent of its manpower between 1970 and 1978. This resulted from two factors:

- First, in 1971-1973, many intelligence units were deactivated as they were withdrawn from Vietnam. Much of the manpower in those units had been diverted from Service and theater intelligence activities that worked on Europe, Africa, Latin America, and South Asia. This manpower was cut in the drawdown, not returned to the analytical activities from which it had been diverted.
- Second, between 1974 and 1978, U.S. intelligence took a 25-percent reduction in manpower. This reduction was driven by a budget decision to sacrifice analytical manpower to protect acquisition of high-technology collection systems. Technocrats

gave high priority to technical systems and almost no priority to the means to use the data that would be collected.

Together, these redirections virtually stopped analysis and production on much of the Third World.

- Even basic intelligence production on the Soviet Union began to slip.
- Human source collection, the key to understanding what an adversary intends for the future, suffered major resource reduction across DoD and the U.S. government.
- Production on some areas stopped altogether.
- Third World databases, badly neglected during the Vietnam War, became inadequate for most of the world.

Basic intelligence and human source collection were critically missed in the post-Vietnam years as the Soviets tested U.S. resolve in many Third World areas. For example, when the Afghanistan and Iran hostage crises began, the Intelligence Community had only a handful of experienced analysts available to cover all economic, political, and military aspects of the six countries that then made up the Southwest Asia region.

While manpower was being reduced, major collection improvements continued. By 1980, complex and high-volume sensors were coming online. Tactics were changing with the fielding of fire-and-forget weapons and near-real-time battlefield surveillance systems. Decisionmakers were asking more detailed questions that required far more sophisticated analysis to answer.

Fortunately, by the end of the 1970s, the Carter administration had encountered a dangerous world and realized that the defense reductions of the past had to be reversed and that the defense budget needed to be increased. President Carter's last budget contained significant increases for the military and for the Intelligence Community. President Reagan got most of the credit, but Carter started it.

By 1980, the GDIP Staff became a busy place. There was money to fund phased radar on Navy

ships, the Army's echelon-above-Corps military intelligence brigades, the Navy's tactical intelligence support network, and the U-2 reconnaissance plane, and many others. The forthcoming Reagan years would be the best of times for the GDIP and defense intelligence.

Hurwitz was well-known in the community, and his stature grew over the years. Only a handful of people really understand program and budget. Fortunately, General Tighe was one of them, and he and Marty Hurwitz made a good team. The GDIP Staff had good people that Marty worked hard. Many of the luminaries of the present intelligence world came up through the GDIP Staff training ground. Probably the best known is the current Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, Joan Dempsey. Then there is Pete Dorn on the Senate Intelligence Staff and Cheryl Roby, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Programs and Evaluation (C3J).

At the end of the 1970s, when the resource fortunes of defense and DIA began ascending, General Tighe, Marty Hurwitz, the GDIP Staff, and the DIA leadership were pleased; they had worked hard to make the case for intelligence requirements. However, they were also painfully aware of the intelligence shortfalls caused by the decade's manpower reductions that had been driven by fiscal concern without regard for intelligence needs. They knew it would take many years to recover the analytical database and human source capabilities that had been lost. They knew that for the future, it would be critically important to protect the GDIP analytical manpower base. They knew that if DIA and the GDIP were able to do that, it would give Defense the necessary expertise to provide indications of hostilities and warning of crisis; provide the necessary scientific and technical analysis for making prudent weapon acquisition decisions; and underpin sound strategic and political decisions to commit military forces.

DIA's leadership knew that recruiting and training new analysts were expensive. True analytical

expertise, the intuitive skills that come only with experience and concentration, takes years to develop. They also realized that it was time to begin to address such complex new analytical areas as space, directed-energy weapons, narcotics, terrorism, low-intensity conflict, targeting for precision weapons technology proliferation, and relocatable targets.

General Tighe, at the end of the 1970s, was concerned about the health of the military intelligence community and believed strongly that a "resurgence" in Defense Intelligence was required. Before his directorship of DIA ended in 1981, he would play a major part in bringing about that resurgence.

General Tighe faithfully used the Military Intelligence Board for advice and assistance in GDIP matters, as its creator, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick, had intended in the 1960s. However, Tighe, having served as a J2 in one of the largest U&S Commands, PACOM, was always concerned that those commands and their requirements be represented in any DIA-led resource or intelligence issue forum. To that end, he established a Senior Military Intelligence Officers Conference (SMIOC) beginning in 1979. The SMIOC would bring together the combatant commands' J2s, the Service intelligence chiefs, and other Defense and Intelligence Community officials for a review of issues and concerns affecting the Defense intelligence community.

The founding concept of the SMIOC was to hold an annual conference for members to freely exchange thoughts and ideas as well as intelligence information on significant issues of mutual interest. General Tighe believed it would be beneficial to our community. His idea was a successful one, and has been carried on by each succeeding DIA Director up to and including today's Director, Vice Admiral Tom Wilson. The first SMIOC was held at Arlington Hall, and, since that time, a SMIOC Conference has been held at least once every year except 1991.

COL Jim Bowman, USA (Ret) (left), and Lt Gen Gene Tighe, USAF (Ret), at a reception discussing the construction of the new building. Tighe was instrumental in securing approval to build the DIAC, and Bowman assisted him throughout the planning.



## THE BUILDING

The need to consolidate all elements of DIA into one location was apparent from the outset in 1961. Overcrowded, unsafe, inconvenient, and unattractive, DIA's facilities presented a major obstacle to establishing organizational integrity during the first 20 years of the Agency.

The first submission to Congress for a new DIA facility came in the FY64 budget. Initially denied, the Agency resubmitted the request repeatedly over the years until it was finally approved in 1981.

A master plan for the Bolling/Anacostia area had been developed as early as 1971 by the Chesapeake Division of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. This plan was revised in 1974, and DIA used it as the basis for planning the present complex at Bolling. In July 1975, Smith, Hinchman & Grylls Associates, Incorporated (SH&G), undertook the architectural and engineering planning for the project. After reviews by the Government, the National Capital Planning Commission, and the Commission of Fine Arts, a design concept was agreed upon. Design concepts incorporated into the building were aimed at increasing productivity and keeping pace with technology.

When the Director of Resources and Support, Carl Norton, received the tasking from LTG Wilson in 1976, to resurrect a building, he knew that to be successful, he needed the right action officer to work the project. The best man for the job, Norton believed, was Army Colonel Jim Bowman, an engineer who had been working the issue for some time, but who had just retired. Norton searched the personnel ranks at DIA but could not find an individual with Bowman's credentials.

Norton awoke one night about 2:00 a.m. worrying about where he was going to find someone for the building project. All of a sudden he said, "Jim Bowman." At 6:00 o'clock that morning, he called Bowman with an offer and said, "Jim, we are going to resurrect the idea of a building, and we would like you to come back onboard." Jim Bowman accepted and, within 3 weeks, the building project resumed.

In the late 1970s, the strength of DIA was approximately 5,000 worldwide, but due to funding limitations set by ASD(I), the proposed building was sized to house 2,739 people.

The location and cost of the building were contentious right up until the time in 1981 of the groundbreaking at Bolling Air Force Base. Some people still wanted the building at Arlington Hall Station, but Congressman Brody from Virginia did not like that idea at all. Some people wanted to put it into the center court of the Pentagon. Others wanted it to go into the Navy Annex. GSA suggested a building at Buzzard's Point. Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri, came up as a candidate location. And the CIA director at the time, Admiral Stansfield Turner, reportedly believed that collocation at Langley would be a good move. The CIA collocation was attractive to some because of the possibilities of savings; for example, one print plant to be shared between both agencies.

The funding for the building was problematical in both Defense and in the Congress. DoD had many uses for \$105 million for weapons systems—airplanes, ships, and tanks. DoD had put the sizing of the building at 2,739 but, it was the architect that said the cost of the building would be \$105 million. Reports at the time said that the Senate

was not about to budget for another headquarters building. DIA clarified this misconception and began a campaign to ensure that the congressional members understood that the budget request was not for a headquarters; DIA headquarters would remain in the Pentagon. Carl Norton sent a note to General Tighe recommending the building be called the “Defense Intelligence Analytical Center” in order to stress defense and day-to-day analysis efforts. General Tighe said, “Okay,” but he marked through the word “analytical” and substituted “analysis.” Hence, the name Defense Intelligence Analysis Center.

To give continuity to its campaign for support for the building in DoD and the Congress, Carl Norton came up with the idea of putting together a booklet that would explain DIA’s need for a building. Jim Bowman put together the roughly 50-page booklet. It highlighted the poor conditions of the facilities that DIA people were in and then showed where they would be in the new building, clearly laying out their missions, functions, and locations. The intended audience was the former DIA directors, OSD, and congressional members and staffers. The central idea of the brochure was to make sure that all the supporters had the same information and could speak with one voice.



On 21 April 1981, Lt. Gen Tighe dug the first spade of turf at the groundbreaking for the DIAC at Bolling Air Force Base.

General Tighe was tireless in his efforts with Congress. By 1980, he was successful in gaining support from the six Congressional committees concerned, in spite of some last-minute opposition from a staffer on the Senate Armed Services Committee who was still holding out for a DIA move to Fort Belvoir, Virginia. The all important vote in the subcommittee was delayed so that DIA could work the issue with other staffers and get the building action before the full committee. When that was done, Senator Henry “Scoop” Jackson of Washington argued, “Hey, this thing has been studied to death. They need it at Bolling.”

DIA’s last action to gain congressional support was a final study to be signed by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown certifying that Bolling Air Force Base was the best and only place to put the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center. The study

was put together by Norton and Bowman and signed by Secretary Brown. The Fiscal Year (FY) 1981 President’s Budget requested full authorization and funding for construction at Bolling Air Force Base. As part of the Administration’s FY 1981 budget, the DIA building decision was reaffirmed by both the Secretary of Defense and the Office of Management and Budget. The House Armed Services Committee and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence approved full authorization of construction at Bolling.

Groundbreaking ceremonies for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center took place on 21 April 1981, just 4 months before General Tighe’s retirement from active duty. The objective of every DIA Director since DIA’s inception was finally on its way to accomplishment.

*“As one who literally sweated “blood and tears” striving to get a new building for DIA . . . my congratulations to you Gene, for succeeding where so many of us failed.”*

*Lt Gen Joseph F. Carroll in a letter to  
Lt Gen Eugene F. Tighe  
2 June 1981*



TRH-53 Sea Stallion helicopters take off from the aircraft carrier USS *Nimitz* at the beginning of Operation EVENING LIGHT, the mission intended to rescue American hostages in Iran, 24 April 1980.

## THE ROOTS OF TERRORISM

At least one present-day DIA employee remembers when it all began. This person is involved in sensitive security work so we will not mention his name. The first Trans World Airways (TWA) hijacking occurred on 11 December 1968 when a TWA Boeing 727 departing Nashville enroute to Miami was hijacked by a lone gunman and forced to fly to Cuba. In 1969, five TWA flights were hijacked, and then, on 6 September 1970, TWA Flight 741 was hijacked by a Palestinian terrorist group and flown to Amman, Jordan. Three other flights were also hijacked. TWA Flight 741 and two others were flown to Dawson Field, near Amman, Jordan, and, using explosives placed onboard by the terrorists, were blown up. The Flight 741 episode provided a wake-up call that eventually led to the Sky Marshal Program in the United States and a continuing requirement for DIA to collect and produce intelligence on terrorism. A series of hostile episodes directed against the United States or its Allies taking place in the mid-to-late 1970s would lead to major changes in the daily life of DIA.

On 3 July 1976, Israeli commandos, led by Jonathon Netanyahu, successfully recaptured an Air France passenger jet that had been diverted by Palestinian terrorists to Entebbe Airport in Uganda. Although supported by the Idi Amin regime, the terrorists were caught by surprise, and most were killed in the Israeli assault. Over a year later, at Mogadishu, Somalia, the West German counterterrorist force conducted a textbook recapture of a hijacked Lufthansa jet with no casualties to the attacking force or the hostages. These operations by one of the world's premier counterterrorist forces emphasized the pressing need for a similar capability in the United States. This resulted in the

formation of the Counterterrorist Joint Task Force (CTJTF).

The CTJTF was, from the beginning, a voracious consumer of information and intelligence. Although its organic intelligence structure was impressive both in size and competence, the range of requirements and operational activity that were included in its mission area required extensive support from the entire Intelligence Community. The CTJTF reported directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which made DIA the next intelligence headquarters responsible for its support.

Supporting an organization with the varied and, often, microscopic information needs of the CTJTF required that DIA develop new processes, products, and organizations. The first major change involved the analytic process of assessing the threats posed by terrorism around the world.

During the post-World War II days of terrorism, most activities of concern to the United States involved leftist-oriented groups like the Baeder-Meinhof group in West Germany or the Red Brigades in Italy. Their actions were usually directed against U.S. military targets and tracking these groups was perceived as part of force protection, a role of counterintelligence organizations at that time. The Middle East groups took terrorism into the global arena. Attacks on Israel and its supporters required that such groups as Abu Nidal and PFLP-GC and the Iranian-sponsored Hezbollah be approached as both a foreign intelligence and counterintelligence challenge. Initially, DIA split this responsibility between two organizations, each approaching the problem from their professional perspective. It soon became obvious that neither analysis nor customer support was being



The Soviets moved six divisions into Afghanistan in December 1979. They would wage war against the Afghan mujahadeen throughout most of the 1980s.

well served by this approach. The Director, DIA, General Tighe, became personally involved due to the high visibility and concern with the plethora of terrorist activities. He directed his Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to recommend the optimum structure for assessing this growing threat. After a lengthy study, the SAB recommended that the Directorate for Research (DB) should consolidate all analytic and customer support and that both CI and foreign intelligence personnel should be housed in a single element.

Across the Agency, other organizations also instituted changes to deal with the threat posed by terrorism. Dedicated collection managers were

added to both technical and human intelligence. The Defense Attaché community was given a set of collection guidelines and, since this same community was one of the prime targets of terror, force protection personnel were added to provide security surveys and advice to deployed and deploying personnel and their families.

The most significant organizational change, however, was the decision to put all terrorism analysis under a single manager. The usual DIA approach to analysis had been to assign analytic elements based on whether they were addressing the issue from a warning, current, basic, or estimative perspective. Since interest in a particular terrorist

group could go from routine monitoring to crisis support based upon a single event, the responsible organization recommended to the Director, DIA, that all analytic efforts against this difficult target should be centrally directed. It allowed the responsible manager to move from situation monitoring into crisis within a few minutes, and to effectively allocate resources to the shifting analytical challenges posed by the difficult terrorist target.

In much the same way as the CTJTF required new organizational, analytical, and collection structures and approaches, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) also had considerable impact on how DIA would develop.

In April 1978, the Prime Minister of Afghanistan, Mohammed Daoud, seen more and more as a potential ally of the United States, was murdered during a takeover of the Afghan government led by a Communist party-dominated Afghan Army. Since nearly all Western intelligence agencies had assessed the Purcham and Khalq factions of the Afghan Communist Party as being too involved in internecine activity to pose a serious challenge to the government in Kabul, this was a truly shocking event. Afghanistan's neighbor, Iran, was also becoming an area of increasing concern. Although the U.S. Intelligence Community estimated in the fall of 1978 that the Shah would prevail over the various Iranian dissident movements on 16 January 1979, the Shah fled Iran and the Ayatollah Khomeini returned from exile. The Ayatollah's hold on power was tenuous until the Iranian radical students seized the U.S. Embassy and its personnel on 4 November 1979. This act ensured the continuation of the theocracy and set the stage for the Iran-United States confrontation that continues today. The reverberations of the embassy takeover were still being felt when the Soviet Union, contemplating the fall of a Communist government in Kabul, sent an initial six-division force (including two elite parachute divisions) into

Afghanistan on 26 December 1979. The United States, reeling from such a dramatic reversal of its position in the region and fearing the hegemonic intentions of both Iran and the Soviet Union, hastened to establish the RDJTF.

The United States initially was concerned that the Soviet move into Afghanistan, coupled with the volatile situation in Iran, would lead to a Soviet invasion of Iran to seize the oil-rich Khuzestan region and secure the long-held dream of both Tsars and commissars, warm-water ports. Early analytic efforts emphasized the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) work that would allow the RDJTF to counter overt Soviet moves into Iran or Pakistan. However, it soon became obvious that the Soviets had bitten into more than they could chew in Afghanistan and that the theocrats in Tehran were more of a threat to the region than the atheists in Moscow. Intelligence and operational efforts shifted to support operations and plans that would deny both Iran and the Soviet Union their goals.

U.S. policy with respect to Afghanistan afforded DIA the opportunity to learn valuable lessons in operational support. These lessons learned later proved essential in creating seamless Intelligence Community support during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

Intelligence developments in response to actions in the Persian Gulf and the Caribbean led to other organizational and product changes. The ill-fated embassy hostage rescue mission, launched in April 1980, provided some painful reminders of intelligence support to close-hold operations. In the aftermath of the disaster at Operation DESERT ONE, DIA examined the process used to support Operation RICE BOWL, the operation to extract the hostages from Tehran. Examination revealed that the planning cell was so restricted in terms of numbers and expertise that critical issues such as weather conditions and site characteristics were not adequately addressed.

As the decade of the 1970s drew to an end, the validity of the DIA concept had been accepted: the need for a DoD-level entity to provide intelligence support to the Secretary of Defense and the JCS, and to serve as principal adviser and assistant to the Secretary of Defense for the management of intelligence resources, programs, and activities. The guiding principles underlying the overall system were sound and remained essentially the same as set forth in 1961. The organizational structure, however, experienced considerable transition during the 1970s.

DIA responded and adapted to external review and policy-level expectations by realigning its organizational structure. In all but one of the major organizational realignments, decisions, pressures, or events directly or indirectly originating from non-DIA sources played a significant role in bringing about reorganization. Only the 1979 reorganization originated totally from within—suggesting the presence of confidence and maturity. This and other significant developments—such as the building of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, the advent of a Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service, emerging concern for looking beyond the near-term in the



When Iranian students seized the U.S. Embassy in Tehran on 4 November 1979, the staff of the DAO became hostages as well. Held for 444 days, this picture shows Colonels David M. Roeder (left) and Thomas E. Sheaffer after their release in 1981.

GDIP, a greater role in tactical as well as national intelligence, and the growing credibility of the Agency's products—signaled the final phase of DIA's development, the institutionalization of the organization.

As the 1970s closed and DIA looked ahead, it did so as an integral part of the U.S. intelligence establishment. Lieutenant General Gene Tighe would lead DIA into the 1980s and play a central role in the resurgence of the defense intelligence community.

## PART 4



Many of the illustrations in *Soviet Military Power* were paintings of Soviet systems prepared by DIA artists and analysts for use in unclassified publications. This depicts a DELTA III firing SS-N-18 missiles.

## THE RISE AND FALL OF AN EVIL EMPIRE—THE 1980s

It began as just another damp, foggy day. On 27 April 1982, in San Francisco, California, the fog lifted around noon, bathing the tops of the orange suspension cables and the twin towers of the Golden Gate Bridge in brilliant sunshine.

But, by early afternoon, the whole huge structure—1.7 miles long, rising nearly 750 feet above San Francisco Bay—had fully emerged from the mist. The warm, rust-colored bridge was a stunning contrast to the cool, green hills of Marin County to the north of San Francisco and the cold, choppy saltwater 220 feet below the bridge deck.

The air was about to clear downtown San Francisco as well. Admiral Bobby Ray Inman, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence, had arrived from Washington, DC, to address a convention of newspaper publishers at the Fairmont Hotel on the U.S. Intelligence Community. The Texas-born admiral had a reputation for plain speaking, so the publishers were looking forward to hearing some.

The admiral was relatively relaxed, feeling reflective. He told the publishers from the podium that he was looking forward to his imminent retirement from the U.S. Navy after 30 years as an intelligence officer. He was one of only a few U.S. military officers to reach the rank of four-star after a career spent mostly in intelligence. This, he said, was a great fluke—a stroke of good luck not likely to happen to anyone else.

As the Vietnam War wound down in the early 1970s, the first question to defense intelligence according to Admiral Inman, who had served as Vice Deputy Director for Plans and Support from 1976 to 1977, was “what can you do without?” The government wanted to use advanced technol-

ogies—including new generations of expensive satellites—to acquire intelligence. But no money had been added to the intelligence budgets. Intelligence manpower had been slashed to pay for the technology.

In October 1973, Admiral Inman continued, the U.S. Intelligence Community failed to predict the Yom Kippur War. The penalty was an additional 25-percent cut in defense intelligence manpower.

From the late 1960s at the height of the Vietnam War, to the low point in the late 1970s U.S. intelligence manpower declined about 40 percent. The people were not going to be needed, said Admiral Inman, with the slightest of smiles, because the world was going to be a more peaceful place. The United States and its principal competitor, the Soviet Union, had agreed on a policy of détente. International tension was going to decrease. The U.S. military could busy itself monitoring arms control agreements with the Soviet Union. There was not going to be much else to do.

Then, in 1975 and 1976, the admiral said, “a lengthy series of televised congressional investigations of the CIA and other U.S. intelligence agencies revealed a number of alleged abuses by the agencies. Many restrictions soon were placed on U.S. foreign and domestic intelligence-gathering activities. The goal was to protect the rights of the U.S. citizens in the process.”

“That is not all bad news,” Inman commented, “because out of that process came some new institutions and some new approaches. In 1976, for the first time, we were provided guidelines. There will be those who argue they were over-restric-

tive. That is not unusual for a first time to apply guidelines. But it was a conscious effort to tell the professionals inside the intelligence organizations the standards to which they would be held accountable 10, 20, 30 years later for the decisions which they would undertake, primarily dealing with the protection of the rights of American citizens.

“We also got out of that period of the congressional investigation two new institutions, the permanent select committees in the Senate and the House, established in peacetime with the mechanisms to fully protect intelligence collection, processing, and reporting secrets, but in a way that would permit the *most thorough* and detailed oversight. They also had another purpose. By becoming knowledgeable in great detail of the country’s intelligence capabilities, they became advocates, as they began to recognize the extent to which we had drawn down our total capabilities.

“By 1980,” he pointed out, “those two congressional committees that had spent a substantial period of time examining the state of U.S. intelligence began to push on the administration the need to rebuild. They were offering manpower and dollar aid well before the Executive Branch was prepared to accept them. The climate already existed in the Congress, among the knowledgeable members of select committees and the appropriation subcommittees, on the long term to rebuild.”

Two years earlier, in Washington, Air Force Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, Jr., DIA’s director since 1977, had similar thoughts. The loss of intelligence resources in the 1970s limited the Intelligence Community’s ability to collect and produce intelligence and contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas. Nevertheless, DIA’s requirements for intelligence production had increased. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the overthrow of the Iranian monarchy, and the taking of Ameri-

can hostages in the American Embassy in Tehran in 1979 resulted in additional DIA task forces to cover the crises. The Soviets and the others had a different view of détente.

The gray-haired, blue-eyed General Tighe had been an intelligence officer since 1950. He was searching for a new way to get more congressional support for intelligence resources. For several years, he gave detailed classified briefings about Soviet military hardware and capabilities to senators and congressmen. The briefings were always full of impressive photos, charts, and graphs. Finally, in 1980, after a particularly interesting briefing, Massachusetts Senator Ted Kennedy approached General Tighe. “Why in heaven’s name,” asked the Senator, “don’t you have a vehicle for telling all these wonderful things you tell us to the American people? Maybe you could get some support for what’s going on.” General Tighe agreed he needed to develop the vehicle right away. The world had changed. Intelligence could no longer be a product solely consumed by customers with security clearances.

General Tighe knew that his own time at DIA was limited; he would be retiring in 1981. With the encouragement of Senators Goldwater and Nunn, he decided upon a course of action to take advantage of the growing concern within the U.S. Congress for the need to rebuild the Intelligence Community. Well before the Presidential election in the fall of 1980, General Tighe conducted a series of informal meetings with Intelligence Community leaders to add their thoughts to his as to what would be required to revitalize the Intelligence Community of the 1980s.

The result was a recommended blueprint highlighting the analytical, human intelligence (HUMINT) and technical collection shortfalls of the late 1970s. While the blueprint represented the views of the leadership of the community, it was presented as Lieutenant General Tighe’s personal views in the event that exceptions would be taken

by officials of the still-in-place Carter administration. General Tighe believed that DIA's role as leader of the military intelligence community allowed DIA and him to act as the honest broker for all the competing Intelligence Community interests.

In that his views were in opposition to many of the administration's positions, his actions, his peers and subordinates felt, took personal courage and integrity. The blueprint was prepared by General Tighe. Because of the programming and out-year budget considerations, he was assisted in drafting the 30-page document by DIA Comptroller Robert Little and his deputy, Lewis Prombain (who is the current DIA Comptroller).

Tighe's blueprint was well received by the Congress, and they, in coordination with the incoming Reagan administration, enacted almost completely General Tighe's recommendations.

A related event that would greatly influence DIA's role in the decade of the 1980s took place in the spring of 1981. President Ronald Reagan was elected in 1980, in part on a promise to the American people that he would rebuild the nation's military strength. In May 1981, President Reagan's Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, presented a series of classified briefings to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) Defense Ministers detailing the great magnitude and speed of the recent Soviet military buildup.

The buildup in both conventional and nuclear forces provided the Soviet Union with much more military capability than it had only a decade before. Much of the data in the briefing came from DIA and was similar to what the Agency had revealed to the Congress for years.

Several NATO ministers were so impressed and alarmed by the briefing that they asked Secretary Weinberger to find a way to declassify the information so it could be released to the general public. If the NATO nations were ever to reclaim their

strength, surely the public in each NATO country had to know much more about the Soviet threat.

Upon his return from Europe, Secretary Weinberger asked General Tighe to produce an authoritative, unclassified document detailing Soviet military developments. What followed was perhaps the largest, longest, and most successful public release of intelligence information in the history of U.S. intelligence. The document was simply named *Soviet Military Power*. It contained the kind of raw facts and figures about Soviet military power that could not be ignored. More on the story of *Soviet Military Power* will follow in this part.

Many of the people who have served at DIA believe that the Agency came of age in the 1980s. During this decade, DIA was able to successfully serve the needs of national-level decisionmakers while, at the same time, fulfilling the requirements of field commanders.

At the start of the decade, the Agency provided valuable intelligence support to the newly established Rapid Deployment Force during Operation BRIGHT STAR. This was done against a backdrop of congressional support for DoD budget increases to enhance "readiness, sustainability, and modernization." Agency analysts were monitoring events in Rhodesia (Zimbabwe), the Iran-Iraq War, and the civil war in El Salvador.

Some early congressional relief from the DIA's loss of analytical talent in the 1970s came in the early 1980s from two congressional staffers, Annette Smiley and Chip Pickett. Selected increases to the DIA staff were protected from any use other than analysis. These billets, called the Smiley-Pickett billets, were protected by statute. Many of today's talented DIA analysts are senior executives who were hired as part of that program.

In April 1981, the Agency broke ground for the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base. World crises continued to



U.S. Navy F-14s from Fighter Squadron (VF) 41, "The Black Aces," similar to the one shown here in 1992, shot down two Libyan Su-22 fighter-bombers over the Gulf of Sidra in August 1981.

flare and included the downing of two Libyan Su-22s by American F-14s over the Gulf of Sidra, an Israeli F-16 raid to destroy an Iranian nuclear reactor, two Iranian hijackings, Iranian air raids on Kuwait, and the release of American hostages in Iran.

As the decade continued, DIA concentrated on enhancing its support to theater and tactical commanders, improving its capabilities to meet major wartime intelligence requirements, and strengthening DoD's indications and warning system.

DIA exercised the authority to shift from the old General Schedule "supergrade" system for senior

civilians to the new Senior Executive Service (SES) model specially legislated for DIA. DIA converted to the SES in 1982. This gave DIA an increased capability to add more senior civilians. Also in 1982, DIA was given legislation that allowed it significant flexibility in the system, to include establishing nonmanaged SES-like positions for substantive and technical expertise at the senior grades.

Two years later, the Central America Joint Intelligence Team (CAJIT) was established as an interagency analytical organization focused on Central American insurgency. DIA also created a standard intelligence communications architecture to

improve DoD's ability to disseminate national-level intelligence to tactical commanders during contingency situations.

The concept of intelligence as a "force multiplier in crises" became a predominant theme as DIA assembled an all-source integrated database to enable the U&S Commands to better assess the threat as it existed in the field. As a followup, the Agency established a Research Crisis Support Center at the DIAC to provide a centralized, operationally secure, all-source, crisis management center to support the NMIC and the U&S Commands.

As events deteriorated in Nicaragua, DIA analysis provided extensive support to the U.S. Southern Command. Other analysis at this time was

focused on the war over the Falkland Islands and Israel's invasion of Lebanon. When 6,000 U.S. troops invaded Grenada during Operation URGENT FURY in 1983, a special DIA task force responded to numerous taskings for briefings, papers, and intelligence information. DIA also distributed a wide variety of intelligence summaries to assist field commanders during the operation.

Closer to home, many of DIA's major functional elements were finally consolidated under one roof when the Agency dedicated the DIAC at Bolling Air Force Base on 23 May 1984. Other DIA analytical efforts during the mid-1980s centered on the attack on the Marine barracks in Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq War, the conflict in Afghanistan, the Soviet shootdown of Korean

DIA provided vital materials to Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (left) and President Ronald Reagan, particularly during the Year of the Terrorist.



The frigate USS *Stark* burns after being struck by an Iraqi Exocet missile in the Persian Gulf in 1987.



Air Lines Flight 007, the civil war in Chad, and unrest in the Philippines.

The significantly large number of hijackings, bombings, kidnappings, murders, and other acts of terrorism led to 1985 being characterized as the “Year of the Terrorist.” Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger presented DIA with the Agency’s first Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1986 for outstanding intelligence support over the previous year during a series of crises—the hijacking of TWA Flight 847 and the cruise ship *Achille Lauro*, unrest in the Philippines, and the counterterrorist operations against Libya.

It was during this period that DIA developed its Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) in the DIAC as the primary vehicle for orchestrating analytic support during volatile situations. In addition, to relieve overcrowding in the DIAC, the Agency moved several elements into a leased office building in the Washington area.

Also during this timeframe, the Agency concentrated on the rapidly shifting national security environment, characterized by key issues such as changes within the Soviet Union, counternarcotics, warfighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict. DoD moved decisively to improve its automated database and applied

additional resources to the monitoring of terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also increased the demand for intelligence support from DIA.

Within the Agency, the NMIC was upgraded, renovated, and collocated with the National Military Command Center—a move that permitted the fusion of operations and intelligence during crises at the national level. Designated as a combat support agency under the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, DIA moved quickly to increase cooperation with the U&S Commands and to begin developing a body of joint intelligence doctrine.

Moving into the 1980s, defense analysts saw the first intelligent workstation arrive at DIA. It was a very advanced version of the previous word processing machines, with user applications for word processing and calendaring. The first word processing applications were very hard to use because of the great number of codes required to use them. Codes were required for tabbing, using underlines, and all basic functions that are taken for granted today. Even so, Agency employees were anxious to get their personal workstations. In the early 1980s, the top-of-the-line workstation still only had 10 or 20 megabytes of disk storage and usually 8K, 16K, or 32K of memory. Dissemination of files across

the Agency was still done by passing physical disks.

In the mid-to-late 1980s, DIA began a very aggressive effort to install local area networks (LANs) for all Agency personnel. The installation of Ethernet LANs was the beginning of the networked infrastructure DIA enjoys today.

Intelligence support to U.S. allies in the Middle East intensified as the Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Gulf. DIA provided significant intelligence support to Operation EARNEST WILL, while closely monitoring incidents such as the Iraqi missile attack on the USS *Stark*, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms, and Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. The “Toyota War” between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to DIA’s heavy production workload, as did unrest in other parts of

Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

Subsequently, DIA oversaw a successful defense intelligence effort in support of U.S. operations in Panama—Operation JUST CAUSE. The Agency also provided threat data on hotspots throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia, while assessing the impact of changes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and, to a lesser degree, Asia. In addition, DIA supported decisionmakers with intelligence concerning the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan; events surrounding the shootdown of several Libyan jets; the civil war in Liberia; the investigation of the downing of Pan Am Flight 103 over Lockerbie, Scotland; and the Tiananmen Square incident in China. Weapons acquisition issues, counternarcotics and counterterrorism also remained high-priority issues.



This illustration of the Soviets' large 280-mm multiple rocket launcher developed in the 1980s appeared in *Soviet Military Power*. This system was capable of laying down a broad field of fire, threatening armored vehicles, infantry, airfields, and rear service areas.

## SOVIET MILITARY POWER

The Soviet Union had a completely different understanding of détente than the one held by the United States. The Soviets agreed to reduce competition with the West at the nuclear-strategic level and thereby reduce the risk of nuclear war. But Moscow's goal in the 1970s and early 1980s remained remarkably consistent with what it had been in the 1950s and 1960s—to attain preeminent influence in world affairs. To achieve this, the Soviets tried vigorously to erode the Western alliance system, split Europe from the United States, accelerate the expansion of Communist societies, and promote instability in the Third World.

By 1980, there was new realism in the White House and the Congress about the Soviet Union, its growing military capability, and its aggressive intentions throughout the world. In contrast to the growing Soviet military forces, the formidable U.S. military of the 1960s had withered in the 1970s.

In early 1981, as mentioned earlier, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, presented a series of classified briefings to his NATO counterparts. While the NATO members did not dispute the content of the Secretary's classified briefings, they stated that they were having difficulties in convincing their publics of the nature and scope of the Soviet threat. In that the United States had the most extensive intelligence capability, they requested that Washington make authoritative information available to the public that would help them make strong arguments for increased defense spending. Upon his return from Europe, Secretary Weinberger asked the Director of DIA, Lieutenant General Eugene F. Tighe, to produce an authoritative unclassified document detailing Soviet military developments.

The requirement to produce an unclassified document derived from classified information presented a number of huge challenges to the Agency—primarily how to be authoritative while protecting sources and methods. While DIA had produced some unclassified material in the past, it was very limited in both content and distribution. To produce an unclassified document that might have a much wider distribution in the United States and European publics was daunting.

To get started, DIA assembled a team of substantive experts overseen by senior leadership. Given the level of importance of the project, the Director asked Dennis Nagy, then Vice Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence (VP), to lead the effort to ensure accuracy and classification, and to get it done fairly quickly. Nagy assembled an analytical support team lead by Dr. David W. Phillips, a Soviet analyst in the Directorate for Research. Under Nagy's leadership, the team produced a pilot document in about 4 months. Upon review of the pilot document, the Director felt that, while it was a good intelligence report, the Secretary of Defense needed a first-class, highly polished document, similar to other publicly available military publications. To this end, General Tighe assigned A. Denis Clift, a senior Defense Intelligence Officer, the task of turning a routine DIA intelligence report into a top-notch publication. Clift had extensive experience with the *Naval Proceedings* magazine as a member of the publication staff, and thus brought the level of expertise needed. Upon his completion of editing, reorganizing, and restructuring, the polished document was ready. The first—and, at the time, what was thought to be a one-time-only edition of *Soviet Military Power* was released in September 1981. A modest 25,000 copies were printed, which



This image appeared in the 1985 edition of *Soviet Military Power* and showed the increasing capabilities of Soviet naval forces to operate worldwide. The Soviet replenishment ship *Ivan Bubnov* refuels (left to right) the aviation cruiser *Leningrad*, a Soviet-built Cuban KONI Class frigate, and an UDALOY Class destroyer.

seemed very large to DIA at the time. Soon, however, an additional 250,000 copies had to be produced to meet the surprisingly heavy demand.

In December 1982, the Secretary of Defense informed the Senate Armed Services Committee that he was in the process of revising and updating his report, *Soviet Military Power*, and would have it available by March 1983. That was news to DIA! With such a short timeline, DIA quickly reassembled the original team under Dennis Nagy, Denis Clift, and David Phillips and committed all necessary resources to meet the deadline. In early March 1983, DIA produced, and the Secretary released, the second edition of *Soviet Military Power*. This time, the initial print run was 250,000 copies.

It was released from the Pentagon by Secretary Weinberger. In addition, President Reagan lent his considerable weight to the effort. He reaffirmed the defensive character of U.S. strategy, explaining that we design our defense programs to counter threats, not to further ambitions. "Today, and for the foreseeable future," he said, "the greatest of these threats comes from the Soviet Union, the only nation with the military power to inflict mortal damage on the United States. This also means," he said, "that if the American people are asked to support our defense program, they must get the straight facts about this threat." The Department of Defense News Release of 9 March 1983 stated that *Soviet Military Power 1983* contained much newly declassified information, that it had been produced by DIA, and that it had been

reviewed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Services, the Department of State, the National Security Council staff, and other U.S. government agencies.

Having been caught offguard by the requirement for the 1983 edition, DIA, in the fall of 1983, sent a plan to the Secretary regarding a proposed 1984 edition of *Soviet Military Power*—which he approved. From then until the last edition in 1991 (called *Military Forces in Transition* to reflect the changes in the Soviet Union), DIA maintained essentially the same core team of project managers and processes, supported by literally hundreds of analysts, editors, administrative personnel, graphics designers, printers, and other members of DIA and the Intelligence Community. No one can accurately calculate the work hours dedicated to the project by all participants!

With each successive edition of *Soviet Military Power*, DIA was able to improve on its sophistication in terms of both content and presentation. It also put into place a routine for its production. Upon approval of an outline by Secretary of Defense Weinberger, DIA analytical teams were formed to draft inputs to flesh it out. When completed, a first draft circulated within DIA for coordination and security review to ensure the content did not exceed a certain level of classification. After that review, a second draft was developed and circulated throughout the Defense Department, Intelligence Community, State Department, and National Security Council. At the request of the Director of Central Intelligence, the intelligence review and coordination process underwent several changes to improve the participation of Intelligence Community members. Next, a third draft circulated. When this review was completed and all problems were resolved, the “SecDef Approval” draft was presented to the Secretary for approval and signature. Throughout the drafting process, close coordination with DIA graphics and layout personnel was essential to ensure photographs, renderings, and graphics were accurate

and in the proper locations. At the same time, DIA solicited from all of the DoD, as well as other organizations, the number of copies of the document required. This enabled DIA to solicit bids from various publishing businesses. Once the document had been printed, numerous copies were pre-positioned worldwide prior to official release to ensure the biggest possible fanfare. When ready, Secretary Weinberger held a press conference officially releasing *Soviet Military Power*.

The impact of *Soviet Military Power* was enormous—far beyond what anyone had foreseen. The editions spanned the Reagan Presidency and continued into the George Bush administration—10 editions that forever set the standard for how to produce authoritative unclassified publications. At the height of its run, the 1987 edition of *Soviet Military Power* was printed in almost 400,000 copies. It was translated into at least eight languages, including Russian. For the publications, DIA artists produced renderings of Soviet weaponry that commanded attention—some are still on display at the DIAC, and they are on display at the Smithsonian Air and Space Museum. For the 1987 edition, DIA published commercial satellite imagery for the first time—a bold move that was initially resisted by some.

The project also opened a new chapter in the debate over the relationship between the use of classified intelligence and public policy. Secretary Weinberger described the overall effort as “singularly effective in producing a public understanding of the Soviet threat to our security and in developing support for the much-needed modernization of our armed forces.”

It was also a victory for the DIA team providing the intelligence that told the world about the Soviet military buildup. The Soviets could never achieve their goals as long as the West could show the world what the Soviets were doing. *Soviet Military Power* made that possible. Read-

ing Soviet Military Power was like having the fog clear in San Francisco and the sun come out. You could see all the way to Moscow.

The author spoke with Dennis Nagy regarding the startup in DIA of *Soviet Military Power*. Nagy had the following recollections:

*"I remember clearly the day in early 1981 that General Tighe came into the office of the Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence Operations (VP) (at that time, Dr. Ed Collins); then directly across the hall in the Pentagon from the Director's office. He said we need to put together an unclassified book on the Soviet threat for the administration to use in support of its nuclear and other force deployment plans in Europe and elsewhere. It was to be factual and releasable. The reality of the threat simply wasn't understood or believed, and we had to make it so. Our first attempt at a concept was a failure . . . we had never done such a thing before. Fortunately, DIA had just hired, on the recommendation of a senior member of the new administration—A. Denis Clift—who, until the change in the administration, had been a senior aide to Vice President Mondale. Denis had extensive NSC Staff experience and had earlier been the editor of the publication, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.*

*"General Tighe kept the pressure on, and we tried to figure out how to do this job. Soon, the right concept emerged as we assembled a good team of people under the policy leadership of General Stillwell, USA (Retired), who had assumed the senior policy position in OSD. That team was comprised of Ed Collins, myself, Denis Clift, and several others drawn from the VP support staff and the Directorate for Research. The DIA printers and graphic artists were vital to the project, as well. Everyone played central roles . . . no one more important than the other.*

*"Four key directions for the book emerged that, in my opinion, went on to serve us well in the years ahead: (1) Keep the document simple and*

*to the point as we saw it . . . avoid making it a committee product; (2) Never fabricate any aspect of the book . . . every word had to be supported by good, classified analysis . . . we might have been wrong here and there, but we didn't make anything up; (3) Use graphics, graphics, graphics . . . and make them as realistic as possible . . . but not necessarily so accurate as to give away sources and methods . . . in other words, show rivets where they could be, not necessarily where they were; (4) Cut it as close to the edge of classification as possible . . . many thought we went too far.*

*"Stillwell was a joy to work with. He was the final arbiter of the text and especially the graphics, (Denis and I would spread the potential graphics, out in his office and we'd go around picking and choosing). He was also our interlocutor with Secretary Weinberger, the White House, the State Department, and others in the Administration. We did the coordination with CIA's lower echelons.*

*"While we worked on the book, Denis emerged as the production manager for two important reasons—he had the experience in slick publications and was a good editor. This was his role until the last edition was published as the Berlin Wall was falling down.*

*"The book was released shortly after General Tighe retired with a coordinated prebrief of the press—in which we took part. And the Secretary of Defense released it with a focus on Europe.*

*"DIA still uses some of the graphics on the DIAC walls."*

In two matters related to *Soviet Military Power*, Dennis Nagy recalled:

The John Hughes Brief. *"John, under direction from Gene Tighe, put together a highly classified threat briefing that he regularly gave on the Hill and to many others showing the nature and*

The 1988 issue of *Soviet Military Power* was the first to use a cover photo. The increasing openness of the Soviet Union meant that more photographs were available to be used in the later volumes of the series.

# SOVIET MILITARY POWER:

AN ASSESSMENT OF THE THREAT  
1988



*extent of the Soviet threat and, most important, the analytic techniques that allow us to reach valid conclusions.*

*“The Reagan administration decided that to support further acceptance of its missile deployment plans, an equally highly classified version of the briefing focused on nuclear forces only had to be given to heads of state in the Far East and to*

*members of the Bundestag Defense Committee in Germany. John, by then, was too frail to make the trips. General Williams asked me to stand in for John in the presentations. I briefed the Prime Ministers of Japan, Australia, and New Zealand, along with other senior politicians and military staffs. I also briefed the Minister of Defense and senior military staff in South Korea, and I briefed the Defense Committee in their commit-*



DoD recognized the superior efforts put forth by DIA in publishing *Soviet Military Power*. Selected members of DIA's 1987 *Soviet Military Power* team and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger (center): from left, Jim Morrison, Dr. David W. Phillips, Dottie Holum, Secretary Weinberger, Susan Mastellone, Mike Zwick, and Dr. Paul Herman.

*tee room in Bonn with the Socialist members present. For many of these people, this was their first exposure to our imagery and our methods. We were told that these pitches did help support U.S. policy acceptance. I made one subsequent trip to the Far East to brief in New Zealand in an attempt to get Prime Minister Lange to abandon his antinuclear stance . . . we failed, of course, though he was very gracious and understood our points. After that, General Perroots took over the briefings at home and abroad.*

President's Book. "Denis Clift initiated this publication. It was designed to get defense intelligence analysis regularly in front of President Reagan himself. It was a success and worked toward putting DIA on a more equal footing with CIA."

"DIA did many things analytically to help establish the impression in Moscow that we understood their warfighting strategy, had adopted that posture ourselves, and intended to


*do it better than they could ever hope to, or could afford . . . the grand strategy, or so it seemed to me. Toward that end, DIA was a strong participant in the well-developed ‘continuity of government program’ that was, along with the ‘Star Wars’ program and others designed, in part, ‘to convince the Soviets that we meant it.’ Little else can be said—other than some senior folks in DIA today were players in that game—Art Zuehlke, Carla Christiansen, and Kathy Turner, for example.”*

**Author’s Note:** In reviewing DIA’s 10-year involvement in the major undertaking that was *Soviet Military Power*, literally hundreds of talented people played roles. The support aspects were monumental. Included here are some representative names and positions of the literally hundreds of people involved. Assisting Project Director David Phillips was Dr. Paul Herman, and

outsiders Jim Morrison and Andy Krepenevich, who helped on substance issues. Analysts who served as points of contact and section managers, such as Jim Murphy, delivered well-written chapters in time for thoughtful review. Gerry Schmidt edited several editions. One major problem was the huge word-processing requirement. Ultimately, Mary Mattson and others in the publications division converted typed versions to composed text. Jeff Dance set the printing specifications for the contract and visited the selected printing plant to ensure it could handle the job. Ted Clark, Dottie Holum, Susan Mastellone, and other visual information specialists juggled the layout numerous times to make the presentation more effective and to accommodate last-minute graphics changes. Artists such as Dick Terry produced illustrations that commanded attention, and there were many others.



An Air Force surveillance operator in the Southern Regional Operations Center looks for drug traffickers flying over the Caribbean. During the early 1980s, DIA became heavily involved in the counternarcotics effort.



Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA

Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA, served as Director of DIA from September 1981 to October 1985. He was born and raised in New Jersey. He graduated from the United States Military Academy with a bachelor of science degree in engineering in 1954 with a commission as a second lieutenant in the air defense artillery. He later received a master of arts degree in Latin American studies from the University of New Mexico in 1964.

After assignments in Panama and Puerto Rico, he attended the Army Command and General Staff College in June 1965. In 1966, Williams attended the Defense Intelligence School, Washington, DC, prior to becoming Assistant Army Attaché, Cara-

cas, Venezuela, from 1966 to 1969. General Williams then served as Commander, 1st Military Intelligence Battalion (Provisional), 525th MI Group, Vietnam, until June 1970, when he was assigned to the Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, Washington, DC. He attended the National War College in 1971-72 and then was named as Director of Political/Military Affairs, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs, State Department.

From December 1974 until July 1976, Williams commanded the 650th Military Intelligence Group (Counterintelligence), Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe. Next, he was appointed Chief, Missile Forces/Strategic Arms Limitation Branch, Soviet/Warsaw Pact Division, DIA, followed by his promotion to brigadier general and his reassignment as the Deputy Director for Estimates, DIA. In July 1979, he was appointed Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Europe, where he received his second star. In September 1981, he was again promoted and appointed as the Director, DIA. He was only the second former military attaché to become Director.

The timing was fortunate for Jim Williams in 1981, when he became Director of DIA, because the Intelligence Community was rebuilding with the full support of the Reagan administration and the Congress. The times ahead, he knew, were going to be good ones for DIA if the Agency made the most of its opportunities. He knew that DIA efforts needed to be toward enhancing its capabilities and ensuring that the results of good intelligence would be available when and where it was needed by defense and national decisionmak-

ers, the military commanders, and forces that relied on defense intelligence.

Jim Williams was the tallest of the DIA Directors and could have been mistaken for a professional basketball player. He was known affectionately by the DIA workforce as “JAWS,” his initials. General Williams and DIA were given a fresh mandate and charter for the work of the Intelligence Community in the form of Executive Order 12333, signed by the President on 4 December 1981. President Reagan’s DCI, William Casey, had already put into motion several actions to enhance intelligence collection, analysis, production, and dissemination. The national estimative

process was revamped to allow for greater community participation and DIA contributions. The focus on the Soviet Union’s military capabilities was expanded at DIA. Emphasis on the Soviet ability to project power abroad through worldwide subversion and insurgency was addressed by CIA, and a center for insurgency and instability was established.

The DCI also intensified work in the field of terrorism through increased contact with intelligence organizations in other nations to better track terrorist organizations and to deal with acts of terrorism wherever they occurred. New attention was also paid by the DCI to the threat to national secu-



LTG Williams with his secretary, Wanda Mikovch, at the DIAC in 1984. LTG Williams hired her during his tenure, and she remains in the same job to this day, having worked for seven Directors.

riety posed by the flow of advanced research and development information and advanced technology to U.S. adversaries—Technology Transfer.

General Williams immediately gave priority to DIA's ongoing work with *Soviet Military Power* and was involved beginning with the second edition, in 1982-83. He also reinforced an ongoing DIA liaison with Congress by continuing the annual briefing to joint sessions. On 4 May 1982, the DIA presentation given by John Hughes, the Deputy Director for Intelligence and External Affairs on Soviet Trends and Capabilities, was the first TOP SECRET CODEWORD briefing that had ever been presented on the House floor.

DIA, at that time, was also involved in other major intelligence briefings to the Congress on topics such as Central America and the Middle East. Subcommittees would often request joint DIA, CIA, and State Department participation in briefings, with the Defense Intelligence Officer (DIO) taking the lead for orchestrating the DIA portion.

When General Williams began his tenure, he committed the Agency to a number of specific goals and objectives. The first ones dealt with enhancing initiative reporting to policymakers in OSD and JCS and to theater and tactical commanders, and to increasing DIA capabilities in counterterrorism and counterintelligence.

Next, he intended to structure a strong civilian career program. In 1982, DIA's supergrade and Public Law 313 positions were converted to the Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service (DISES). A plan was then established to expand the number of senior executive-level positions to create a dual track of advancement for managers and nonsupervisory senior substantive experts. The objective was to put DIA's advancement opportunities more on a par with CIA and NSA.

DIA then had 33 DISES employees: 10 percent from collections; 30 percent from planning liaison

resources and management; and 60 percent from substantive intelligence production. The goal was to add 25 more slots. General Williams' plan also called for rotational assignment, executive training, and a path of requisite experiences designed to retain outstanding people and make DIA more competitive in the community. To strengthen the DIA military and civilian partnership and enhance the civilian role in DIA leadership, Jim Williams created the Office of Executive Director, replacing the Chief of Staff office. His choice for DIA's first Executive Director was an SES, Paul Labar. The Executive Director then became the third-ranking official in DIA. Mr. Labar was one of the first civilians to join DIA in 1960s as a photointerpreter and imagery analyst. He not only served DIA as part of the NPIC for many years, but also, as a senior, he served in several support roles.

Williams' objectives also included continuing to improve DIA capabilities in Indications and Warning (I&W) and to be able to fully meet DIA's major wartime intelligence requirements.

In the important area of analytical expertise, Jim Williams endeavored to improve analyst training and education. The Defense Intelligence College was rechartered to conduct research in support of postgraduate educational programs and to present courses on I&W and scientific and technical intelligence, to include model training teams that offered onsite classes around the United States and in Germany and Japan. The Commandant of the Defense Intelligence College was appointed Chairman of the DCI Committee on Language and Area Studies, permitting DIA to be the impetus for improvements in the defense community's language capabilities.

Jim Williams knew that DIA's priority focus during his watch would be on the Soviet Union. However, he also recognized that crises would continue in Third World countries and DIA would inevitably be called upon to provide Third World analysis and expertise. Accordingly, his early objectives called for expanding Third World analytical capabilities.



DIA received its first set of colors during LTG Williams' tour. The Director is shown with the members of the logistics team who worked on obtaining the colors.

Having served as an attaché in South America, he recognized the early signs of insurgency developing in Central America. DIA was prepared when the requirement came in 1983 and 1984 for the establishment of an analytical task force focused on insurgency in Central America.

General Williams recognized that DIA would have a continuing need for improvement of automatic data processing (ADP) and intelligence communication support systems. He took early action to energize DIA's role as project manager for the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) by providing \$200 million in fiscal year 1983 aimed at ensuring the compatibility of the ADP systems and the flow of information between different parts of the community.

As a former attaché, General Williams, like General Wilson before him, knew the value of having military-trained eyes and ears on the ground, in country, in any part of the world that was of national security interest to the United States. Early in his tour as Director, he initiated enhancing support objectives for both collection management and the reinforcement of 10 new attaché offices opened over the preceding 5 years, to include the still embryonic Defense Attaché Office in Beijing, China.

General Williams also expanded the scope of training at the Defense Intelligence College to keep pace with the ever-expanding intelligence responsibilities. He wanted to ensure that intelligence professionals had the background and necessary skills to provide the quality products

demanded by consumers. He never stopped seeking ways to provide quality education to the analytical and professional workforce.

Jim Williams arrived at DIA in an exciting and important era for defense intelligence. DIA was growing, and its accomplishments over the next 4 years would be many.

During his time as Director, DIA focused on enhancing support to theater and tactical commanders, improving capabilities for indications and warning, and strengthening its posture for meeting wartime intelligence requirements.

The context of intelligence as a force multiplier in crisis became a predominant theme in planning. DIA began structuring an all-source, integrated database to support the Unified and Specified Commands in assessing the threat to their area of operations. General Williams was responsible for the formation of a multidiscipline counterintelligence analysis capability at DIA, and the addition of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center to the DIA organization. DIA's first reporting on drug trafficking began in 1982, and the Defense Intelligence College was accredited by the Middle States Association of Colleges and Schools that same year. General Williams and his J2, Navy Rear Admiral Robert Schmitt, strengthened DIA's interaction with the JCS—and with the JCS Chairman from 1982 to 1985, General John Vessey. The Chairman was a strong backer of DIA's task force support to crises and of rigorous analysis of intelligence.

There was no shortage of intelligence support requirements or crises during Williams' tenure as Director, among them: the Falklands War; U.S. Southern Command crises in El Salvador and Nicaragua; U.S. Atlantic Command support during URGENT FURY in Grenada; U.S. Central Command crises during the Marine barracks attack in Lebanon, the Iran-Iraq War, and the continuing

Soviet conflict in Afghanistan; U.S. European Command support during a civil war in Chad and the murders of DIA's Assistant Army Attaché in Paris, Colonel Charles R. Ray, Chief Warrant Officers Robert Prescott, and Kenneth Welch, and Petty Officer Michael Wagner in DAOs Guatemala and Beirut, and Major Arthur Nicholson of the U.S. Military Liaison Mission in Postdam; U.S. Pacific Command support during unrest in the Philippines, the Soviet shootdown of Korean Airlines flight 007, and the assassination of the South Korea military delegation in Burma; and the study of multiple terrorist hijackings, bombings, murders, and other acts worldwide. It was, indeed, a busy 4 years for DIA and its Director.

*“Throughout my tenure as Director, I have focused my attention on making improvements in the support DIA provides to America’s deployed armed forces. First and foremost, I have altered the Agency’s basic philosophy of whom it exists to serve. DIA has made significant strides in establishing itself as the military intelligence advisor to the National Command Authority. We shall continue to support the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, but now we are expanding the scope of our endeavors to more readily produce and provide intelligence to the Unified and Specified Commands in support of operational planning and execution. The Commands require, and DIA is the only national intelligence organization capable of providing, all-source, cross-Service, detailed defense information.”*

—Lieutenant General  
James A. Williams, 1985

General Williams' legacy at DIA was the refinement of the DIA mission and primary focus from strategic intelligence and policy support to a mission that included operational intelligence and support to the U.S. combatant commands . . . the fighting forces.



The construction of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center in its early stage.

## THE DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE ANALYSIS CENTER (DIAC)

When DIA was first stood up, its leadership, management, current intelligence analysis, security, production support, and imagery and technical service operations were housed in several locations in the Washington area. DIA's top leaders, from the very beginning, were convinced that this situation had to be rectified for the Agency to realize its full potential.

For two decades, many tried unsuccessfully, but the perseverance and hard work finally paid off with the combined efforts of DIA Director, Gene Tighe; Deputy Director for Resources, Carl Norton; and DIAC project officer, Colonel Jim Bowman, who, after retiring from the Army, returned to the Agency as a Special Assistant for Facilities Master Planning. A single integrated facility was needed to house DIA's military and civilian members in order to foster internal cooperation and team effectiveness.

DIA's long-held goal was finally realized when Congress appropriated \$32.7 million in the FY 1981 budget to begin this consolidation. Full funding for the project was contingent upon the submission of a study that examined alternative sites to the one proposed at Bolling Air Force Base. This study evaluated 58 different sites at 36 locations throughout the National Capital Region and settled on the Bolling location. Congress subsequently appropriated additional funding for FY 1982—for a total of \$106.2 million—and plans for construction of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) were set in motion.

Ground was broken for the DIAC on 21 April 1981. Lieutenant General Tighe officiated at the ceremony, attended by Carl Norton, James Bow-

man, and the DIA leadership. Mr. Bowman was DIA's principal engineer and assumed responsibility for the design and construction of the new building. The George Hyman Construction Company was chosen as prime contractor.

Within a year of the start on the seven-story, 847,500-square-foot, modular building, the foundations had been completed, building frames had been erected, and roofs and decks installed. Shortly thereafter, the structure was enclosed, and utilities were switched on in July 1983. A small contingent of DIA personnel occupied the building in October 1983. By April 1984, the DIAC was formally completed—6 months ahead of schedule and \$500,000 under budget, thanks to the work of Chesapeake Division, Naval Facilities, Engineering Command, Washington, DC.

Lieutenant General James A. Williams, USA, who succeeded General Tighe as DIA Director in late 1981, welcomed then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to the DIAC on 23 May 1984, where he officiated at the building's dedication and formal opening. By the fall of that year, DIA's new analysis center was fully operational, with about 3,000 personnel working in the building.

Located on a 48-acre tract at Bolling Air Force Base, against a backdrop of the nation's capital, the DIAC culminated a 21-year effort to consolidate the majority of DIA's facilities and people into one location.

After consolidation at Bolling in 1984, DIA took action to vacate facilities at Arlington Hall Station, the Cafritz Building, Anacostia Annex,

and Pomponio Plaza. The Command Element—the NMIC—with current intelligence and a small support contingent, remained in the Pentagon where it was required to be collocated with the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the National Military Command Center. Photointerpreters were to remain at NPIC at the Navy Yard. Restationing was planned through 1984, permitting release of temporary facilities and high-cost leases in 1985.

The National Capital Region was the hub of the nation's foreign policymaking efforts. Because the military command-and-control function was centered in the Pentagon, it was essential that the nation's top military intelligence agency be collocated near its principal customers. This would permit daily interaction on intelligence support to top policymakers, facilitate coordination of estimates among Intelligence Community members, and enable the Agency to provide quick-reaction briefings and products in crisis situations.



The Defense Intelligence Analysis Center under construction.

The consolidation concept worked! The move to the new facility at Bolling Air Force Base put military and civilian personnel offices together. Intelligence production efficiency was greatly improved because the major analysis elements were all collocated with their essential related technical and support services. For example, the analysts now had proximity to the main DIA intelligence library, and to the print plant, and its attendant graphic arts facilities—which were needed to produce briefing aids and illustrations

for final reports. Communications and final dissemination operations were all close by. The DIAC also provided improved security from terrorist attack and from SIGINT penetration.

More than any other accomplishment, milestone, or significant event, for the vast majority of DIA people, the standing up of the DIAC symbolized the coming of age of DIA. For them, it meant that DIA was here to stay.



The completed DIAC in 1984.



Weapons seized by El Salvadoran forces from Marxist guerrillas during the insurgency of the 1980s.

# CENTRAL AMERICA JOINT INTELLIGENCE TEAM (CAJIT)

The Central America Joint Intelligence Team, or CAJIT as it became known, was created in the 1980s in response to insurgent activities in Central America. In July 1979, the Marxist Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) in Nicaragua overthrew the Samoza regime and took power. The U.S. Ambassador was recalled, DIA's Defense Attaché Office (DAO) was shut down, and a noncombatant evacuation (NEO) of U.S. personnel in Nicaragua took place.

J2 analysts at DIA were soon using all-source collection and analysis to correlate reports that the FSLN was collaborating with Cuba to ship arms to other revolutionary movements in the region.

By the beginning of 1980, El Salvador had moved to a critical period in its own insurgency war. Marxist guerillas were on the verge of overwhelming the fragile government, which Washington was committed to support. The insurgent forces were fighting loyalist troops in the countryside and in terrorism-wracked major urban areas. It was estimated that 40 people were being killed each day. In addition to the war's being waged between the government and the rebels, internal strife within the Armed Forces was also underway. The officer corps was divided into three groups, two of which were demanding the elimination of the U.S.-supported governing junta.

DIA's Defense Attaché (DATT) in San Salvador, Colonel Jim Bosch, USA, reported information that would have a major impact on the policies of the incoming Reagan administration. Colonel Bosch obtained copies of insurgent documents in San Salvador. The documents provided clear evidence that the insurgents had received commitments from Cuba, the Sandinistas, and Vietnam to

support the revolution in El Salvador with arms and equipment. J2, DIA, traced the serial numbers of M-16 rifles intercepted in Honduras en route to El Salvador from Nicaragua and determined that the weapons had been sent to U.S. units in Vietnam in the 1960s.

On 10 January 1981, one of the most significant military events in the war took place. During that evening, the Marxist guerilla army launched a nationwide offensive. A wave of attacks simultaneously took place in the capital and in numerous provincial urban centers. For the 13 days that followed, the DAO dispatched situation reports to DIA on the conduct of this violent escalation of the war. The presence of guerilla weapons fabricated in Marxist countries, which was rapidly reported by telephone to Washington, was the evidence essential to prove that a multinational Communist effort was underway to seize El Salvador by force of arms. Continuous reports on additional weapons and documents, and on the rapid logistical deterioration of the Salvadoran Armed Forces, contributed to the dramatic change in White House policy. On 14 January 1981, the United States announced the resumption of military assistance. Soon after, U.S. helicopters, weapons, and ammunition were sent to aid the Salvadorans in blunting the offensive. Shortly after taking office, the Reagan administration made the Sandinista documents public and moved quickly to provide additional support to the beleaguered Salvadoran government. DAO San Salvador would continue its critically important intelligence reporting across what would be a 12-year war in El Salvador. On 4 February 1983, DAO San Salvador was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the first ever received by any DAO.

The priority for DIA coverage of Central America and support to the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador and to SOUTHCOM coincided with General Williams' arrival at DIA. He quickly set in motion a series of projects to accelerate the new emphasis on Central America. In March 1982, he directed the reopening of DAOs in Nicaragua and in Costa Rica and the creation of a new DAO in the new country of Belize, formerly British Honduras. General Williams liked DIA's task force approach and asked his J2, Rear Admiral Bob Schmitt, to expand the number of analysts in J2 working the Central American project in the basement of the Pentagon. Most of the support at that time was going directly to the DAO

and U.S. Embassy in San Salvador to be passed to the Salvadoran military.

The arrival of General John Vessey in 1982 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff lent further impetus for a CAJIT.

When the author interviewed General Vessey, he told me of the importance he placed on the full integration of intelligence and operations for any military operational undertaking. He had great respect and confidence in DIA's analytical capabilities. He had called upon it often when he was the CINC in Korea. Many contended that the North Korean threat declined to the point that



Imagery of training facilities in Nicaragua collected in 1982.

U.S. forces there could be brought home. He had called upon DIA for more indepth analysis than his small intelligence staff in Seoul could provide. As a CINC, he had needed support from out-of-theater, and he had received that from DIA. The analysis was correct; the Carter administration ultimately agreed that the North Korean threat was greater, and the U.S. forces, less one battalion, ultimately remained in South Korea.

General Vessey wanted to ensure that the SOUTHCOM CINC had the intelligence support he required. He asked General Williams and Admiral Schmitt to increase the size and the all-source fusion capability of the existing small Central America Task Force, which had been acting as a Watch Center. He provided DIA some additional billets and suggested the task force be joint and that the Army, Navy, Air Force, NSA, and CIA contribute some resources. Vessey and Williams approached Director William Casey at CIA, and he agreed to participate with DIA, as did NSA. The Services came onboard, with the Army providing some badly needed Foreign Area Officers (FAOs) and the Air Force, Navy, and Marines also providing some manpower, to include Service reservists. The CAJIT actually began operations in 1982, with its formal organization coming online in 1983. The facilities close to the J2 spaces in the Pentagon were expanded, with JCS providing dollars and equipment.

The key people who organized the CAJIT from a handful of analysts to a strength of more than 100 were a mix of military and civilians. As the CAJIT grew in size and capability, an 06 was put in charge, with a civilian officer from the Intelligence Community acting as Deputy.

The CAJIT responded directly to requirements for intelligence support to SOUTHCOM and the Central America U.S. Embassies through the DAO. In time, SOUTHCOM put Tactical Assistance Teams (TATs) in several of the U.S. Embassies, and the CAJIT supported and augmented these teams.

By 1983, the watch and analytical teams in the CAJIT had gone to 12-hour shifts to satisfy the demands of the theater. At the end of 1983, General Williams said of the CAJIT:

*“One of the things we are doing in the Third World, and I think it’s exciting, is to establish what we called a Central American Joint Intelligence Team. Now, believe it or not, we have 100 folks crammed into a space in the Pentagon, and we’ve produced for the tactical local commander on the ground, in his language, rapidly, the photography and the text to show him where the targets are located. We did this in less than 4 days when the charter was given to us by the President. We hope we can continue to expand this to other parts of the world, so that if we have to send somebody out we can provide a joint agency, all-source, fused target folder to go with what is needed. It’s a tremendous tribute to the people of the various agencies that they got their heads together, brought in the expertise from around the world, got the thing running, and then brought in the linguist. We didn’t go to all the Spanish speakers and say, ‘Okay, how are we going to do this?’ Instead, we asked the functional experts for such areas as collection management and analysis. We figured SOUTHCOM was a nongrowth industry, so we decided we would do it here because it was faster.”*

Earlier in Nicaragua, in May 1982, DAO Managua resumed its operations as part of the U.S. Embassy. In addition to the expected problem of opening communication with the Nicaraguan military, the new Defense Attaché (DATT), Colonel Jim Cognigelo, USA, faced a Sandinista officer corps that highly resented the United States. Consequently, at the outset, normal relations expected between diplomatically accredited military observers and the host government did not exist. These difficulties were compounded when the Sandinistas began a massive buildup of Soviet-made military equipment. By 1985, the DAO was dealing with the largest and



Cuban leader Fidel Castro (left) heavily supported the Nicaraguan government of Daniel Ortega with military training and equipment. DIA closely monitored Cuban involvement in Central America.

most potent armed forces in Central America. The Sandinista order of battle consisted of 340 armored vehicles—among them, 110 T-55 medium tanks and 30 PT-76 light tanks; 70 long-range howitzers and rocket launchers; 30 helicopters, to include the Mi-24; and roughly 3,000 Cuban, 30 to 40 Soviet, and 60 East German military and security personnel who were assigned to Nicaragua as advisors.

The operating environment for the attachés in Nicaragua was difficult from the reopening of the DAO in May 1982. However, on 1 August 1986, the Managua government adopted the new, more hard-line policy of outright harassment. This strident

approach on the part of the Sandinista Army and the security forces ratcheted up the tension between the DAO and the Ministry of Defense and made the reporting mission of the attachés more dangerous. For 3 years, the DAO's personnel met threats and provocations but continued to excel as reporters of critical information. Even though the attachés were forced to function in an increasingly restrictive environment, they were able to dispatch reports in a timely and accurate manner to the CAJIT and DIA and their consumers in Washington and U.S. Southern Command. It was for those reasons that DAO Managua was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award on 7 March 1990, only the second DAO ever to receive such an award.

In a related event in 1982, following DIA support to Exercise BRIGHT STAR, Lieutenant Colonel James Major, DIA's representative to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) (later to become U.S. Central Command), reported a problem to the DIA Director, General Williams. In an office call, Major told Williams:

*"To support RDJTF's Exercise BRIGHT STAR in November-December 1982, I worked 12-hour shifts in the Pentagon's National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC, the predecessor to the NMJIC), reviewing message traffic, briefing visitors, and passing information to deployed commands in the Middle East. During that exercise, I read a highly classified message that suggested U.S. military personnel in an RDJTF Area of Operations were in imminent danger from a planned terrorist action. Regrettably, I had no secure means of transmitting that information in a timely manner to the deployed forces. With considerable difficulty, I finally managed to have a 'sanitized' version of the message relayed via RDJTF's Liaison Officer at the Headquarters U.S. Army Europe. Fortunately, no lives were lost, but valuable time was spent in a frustratingly cumbersome process."*

General Williams was very concerned with the problem of getting intelligence information to deployed forces and asked Lieutenant Colonel Major for his ideas. Major told the Director that he was familiar with NSA's Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility (MCSF). Major believed strongly that DIA needed a similar capability to support deployed forces.

General Williams passed along Major's report and his recommendations to DIA's Military Operations Support Division, where the Chief of the Exercise Branch, Lieutenant Colonel Randall A. Ford, USA, became the lead section officer. International incidents in 1982-1983, including the U.S. operation in Grenada and the bombing of the U.S. Marine Corps barracks in Beirut, added impetus to the need for this capa-

bility. Within months, an ad hoc organization had been created, the National Military Intelligence Support Terminal (NMIST). By May 1985, the NMIST could deploy three 2-man teams for crisis support. Its basic equipment suite included a URC-110 secure UHF radio and a grid laptop computer. Because the concept included both personnel and equipment, the "Terminal" was later changed to "Team"; and, when supporting analysts from other agencies joined the team, the name was changed to National Intelligence Support Team (NIST).

The NMIST would continue on an ad hoc basis until its official approval in 1987, when it became part of the DIA Directorate for Unified and Specified Command Support (CSP). Its manning log at that time included a GS-15, two lieutenant colonels, six GS-14s, one major, and one GS-9. The NMIST/NIST program manager at the time, Mr. Thomas Moslener, still works at DIA/J2.

From its modest beginnings in 1982-1983, NMIST/NIST would prove itself time and again in crisis situations by providing timely intelligence support to deployed commands.

One of the NMIST's first deployments as an extension of the CAJIT was in support of the U.S. Embassy in Honduras. The U.S. Ambassador there, John Negroponte, reportedly was so pleased with the results of the NMIST support that he did not want to relinquish it when its mission was complete.

The CAJIT was organized to provide tactical-level intelligence to a supported command—Southern Command—and U.S. allies in Central America, particularly El Salvador. This concept was the first time DIA provided tactical-level actionable intelligence from Washington, initially in the form of deliverable products and, later, through secure communications and the NMIST. In 1986, the Secretary of Defense awarded a Joint Meritorious Unit Award to the CAJIT.

The author discussed the effectiveness of the CAJIT concept with General Paul Gorman, the CINC, SOUTHCOM, during the mid-1980s. Gorman said, “I liked it! I had more intelligence people working for me in the CAJIT at DIA than I had on my own intelligence staff in the tunnel at Quarry Heights.” The tunnel at Quarry Heights was the secure operations and intelligence facility at SOUTHCOM headquarters in Panama. “I also brought CAJIT people forward to work in the Tactical Assistance Team that I had in the U.S. Embassies and sent my people back to Washington to work in the CAJIT so that the SOUTHCOM and theater requirements were clear.” Gorman also told me that he frequently visited the CAJIT to stay abreast of their work and to personally let the CAJIT know what he needed.

General Gorman recalled an incident in 1985 when several off-duty U.S. Marines from the U.S. Embassy in El Salvador were shot and killed in a drive-by shooting. The CAJIT, working with intelligence and law enforcement agencies in the United States and El Salvador, quickly determined who the perpetrators were and brought them to justice in El Salvador.

This Washington-based task force idea with an in-country connectivity would be built upon for all future conflicts and crises and, in time, would grow into today’s DIA federated intelligence support.

In fact, in 1988, when the CAJIT’s mission was winding down as the situation in Nicaragua reached a conclusion, DIA received a new task stemming from a September 1988 announcement that the Department of Defense would become a major player in the “War on Drugs.”

Until the fall of 1988, DIA’s participation in U.S. counternarcotics efforts had been limited to liaison with the law enforcement agencies.

DIA initially assigned the counterdrug mission to the Global Analysts Division in the Directorate for

Research. Since there were no programs or resources in place to provide Division Chief Tony Nelson the analytic and collection support effort necessary to make counterdrug support a reality, resources were diverted from other ongoing mission areas to support this new, high-priority mission. By 1989, it became apparent that the counterdrug mission would require even more dedicated resources. DIA leaders decided to form a separate counterdrug office reporting directly to the Executive Director of DIA, Gordon Negus. The CAJIT formed the nucleus of the Counterdrug Office. By late 1989, the DIA effort against drug trafficking comprised about 350 personnel.

DIA was involved in both analysis and collection against the drug problem. Although all aspects of drug trafficking were addressed wherever they existed, DIA’s primary emphasis was directed at supporting supply reduction efforts against cocaine from South America. To do this, DIA worked closely with U.S. Southern Command, then located at Quarry Heights, Panama, to establish Tactical Analysis Teams at various locations throughout the region. These teams, manned by SOUTHCOM and DIA personnel, provided actionable intelligence through U.S. country team personnel to local military organizations engaged in supply reduction missions.

Cocaine supply reduction rested on two efforts. The first, already mentioned above, involved attacking the cocaine production process. The second was directed against the transit of cocaine, precursor chemicals, and money to and from locations in Central and South America. In this effort, DIA became a major contributor, since most U.S. military operational activity was directed against cocaine trafficking. Analytic tools were developed to provide more responsive understanding of the transit problem. DIA also provided onsite support to JTF 4, 5, and 6, which had been established to work against illicit drug movement. On the U.S. law enforcement side, U.S. Customs and the U.S. Coast Guard became partners in the transit analysis effort and established liaison teams in DIA spaces.

The heroin target involved a very close relationship with the Counternarcotics Center at CIA. DIA provided both collection and analytical personnel to support specific counter-heroin activities throughout Southeast Asia. These efforts in support of U.S. Customs and DEA resulted in some significant heroin confiscations at various West Coast points of entry.

One of the closest and most productive partnerships developed by DIA was with the FBI. As the Colombian counterdrug effort gained steam

against the Cali and Medellin cartels in the early 1990s, significant amounts of documents were collected. Under overall FBI leadership, a community taskforce, located in the Pentagon, used the captured documents in connection with other materials to establish linkages between elements in Colombia and elsewhere, including the United States and Europe. These linkages proved very valuable in helping U.S. law enforcement agencies engaged in drug supply reduction efforts.



The remnants of the Marine barracks destroyed by terrorists in Beirut, October 1983. While other Marines patrol, a makeshift memorial of a utility cap and flowers has been set up by one corner of the building.

## THE YEAR OF THE TERRORIST

During General Williams' tenure as Director of DIA, the number of terrorist incidents directed against Americans steadily increased until, finally, 1985 became known as "The Year of the Terrorist." That year, the Reagan administration formed a Task Force on Combating Terrorism, under the leadership of then-Vice President George Bush. In reviewing the number of terrorism incidents worldwide, the Task Force noted that incidents had risen from about 500 in 1983 to about 700 in 1985. Of those, more than 200 were perpetrated against the United States, resulting in the deaths of 17 Americans with another 122 injured. And the United States and DIA would not forget the April 1983 Hezbollah bomb attacks against the U.S. Embassy in Beirut that killed 49 and wounded 120; the October 1983 suicide truck bombings against the U.S. Marine Headquarters in Beirut, killing 241 U.S. Marines and 56 French soldiers; or the 1982 murder of DIA's Assistant Army Attaché in Paris, Colonel Charles R. Ray.

The terrorist tactics were judged to be a form of political warfare designed to achieve political ends. The terrorist efforts fell under the rubric of low-intensity conflict—warfare at the lower end of the spectrum of violence, in which political, economic, and psychosocial considerations played a more important role than conventional military power. U.S. government and military representatives abroad had become the prime targets of terrorists, but U.S. businessmen, tourists, students, and even missionaries were not exempt.

Within a particular target country, the terrorists' objective was to undermine confidence in the

ability of the national government to provide basic security. The aim of attacks against Americans was to discourage a U.S. presence abroad, reduce investments in overseas markets, and thereby erode U.S. influence as a global power.

DIA, in 1985, had more than a full platter of intelligence work for defense. Elements of DIA were at work constantly addressing multiple threats from around the world and the Soviet Union: Soviet strategic defense and space warfare programs, international narcotics, modern chemical and biological warfare, and, increasingly, the threat of international terrorism—then defined as "terrorism involving citizens or territory of more than one country." The threat of terrorism to Americans was global; however, the Middle East, the countries of Iran, Libya, Syria, Afghanistan, and South Yemen, and the terrorist organizations of the Abu Nidal Group, the Hezbollah, and the PLO, operating in several countries, were the most active and posed the greatest threat to the United States. The Hezbollah alone, between January and June 1985, carried out 8 kidnappings, several murders, and 2 hijackings—including TWA Flight 847, holding 39 U.S. citizens hostage for 17 days in Beirut, and then killing U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem.

Through 1984, DIA had two elements dealing with international terrorism: DB-6D and the Regional Crisis Support Center (RCSC), for crisis support management. Both of these elements were drawing heavily on other, essentially international areas of analytic competence—geographers, economists, insurgency analysts, and the then-tiny-but-growing- in-importance counternarcotics effort. DIA leadership then determined that

One of the terrorists onboard TWA 847.



consolidating these efforts into a single analytical division would provide more effective and responsive support. The Global Analysis Division was established, and its first head was Mr. Tony Nelson. It would serve as a model for a number of global analytical efforts, including terrorism, that still exist in DIA today.

The Global Analysis Division consisted of about 100 people and 2 branches—1 in the Pentagon and 1 in the DIAC. In addition to Nelson, two other key individuals were working terrorism. The division was responsible for assessing the worldwide terrorism threat, providing Defense-wide terrorist warnings, maintaining the Defense terrorist database, and providing intelligence operations support to the joint counterterrorist combatant forces. Their workload was enormous, and their interagency coordination with counterparts in the FBI, CIA, and NSA was continuous.

As DIA devoted more resources and time to terrorist and counterterrorist analysis, it became abundantly clear that international terrorist groups would increase cooperation and support with each other and increase the threat of future simultaneous and coordinated acts of terror on a global scale. The year of the terrorist, unfortunately, would not be ending in 1985.

When the author spoke with Lieutenant General Williams about “The Year of the Terrorist,” he said the toughest job in DIA during his watch was that of DIA’s Defense Attachés in Beirut, Lebanon. He recalled particularly the outstanding assessments and information reporting accomplished by the Arabic-speaking DATT, Army Colonel Fadlo Masabni. Masabni demonstrated uncommon courage under extremely dangerous, combat-like conditions in the war torn city.

Concern with terrorism grew in DIA during the 1980s, and analysts and others participated in visits to the area. Here, Dr. Max L. Gross (right) of the Defense Intelligence College faculty is shown on a visit to Oman in 1985.





Mike Munson, DIA Deputy Director for Resources, speaks at the opening of DIA's newly leased building in the Washington area in 1988. Lt Gen Perroots, Director, DIA, is seated third from the left, and the author is seated second from the left.

## LENNY PERROOTS AT THE CONTROLS



Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF

Lieutenant General Leonard H. Perroots, USAF, served as Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency from October 1985 until December 1988. Lenny Perroots was born, raised, and educated in West Virginia. He held degrees from West Virginia and George Washington Universities. Commissioned in the Reserve Officers Training Corps program at West Virginia, he began his Air Force career in 1958 as an intelligence officer and specialized in that field his entire career. He served in combat in Vietnam on two separate tours and, over the years, held every possible key intelligence job in the Air Force, to include Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence at Headquarters Air Force and Commander of the Air Force Intelli-

gence Service. From 1980 to 1985, he served as the Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence for the U.S. Air Force in Europe. There, he focused primarily on the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. All of this work made him eminently qualified to be the Director of DIA.

Lenny Perroots was a high-energy, positive-thinking, dynamic leader with a keen sense of humor. He was almost always immediately liked by superiors and subordinates alike. He was an early favorite with his DIA counterparts and, in his tenure, would work hard and successfully at maximizing cooperation, exchanges, and mutual support between the United States and the military intelligence organizations of our allies. General Perroots was a master briefer and presenter of the foreign threats to the national security of the United States, particularly the Soviet threat.

He quickly picked up the main tenets of the DIA threat briefing, superbly presented by John Hughes, added his own personal touches, and would go anywhere, anytime, to brief the threat to America. His younger briefing assistants, who turned slides and graphics for him, would sometimes be wrung-out after his enthusiastic, fast-paced, hour-long presentations, while he anxiously awaited the questions and discussions from his audiences.

General Perroots, like his predecessors, would not want for challenging, demanding, crisis-filled times as the Director of DIA. As Director, he made an effort to convince senior DoD officials that the extraordinary capabilities of DIA should be more fully exploited in direct support of national policy. The result was strong backing by Secretaries Weinberger and Carlucci for a number

of trips to NATO capitals and key Asian countries that afforded General Perroots the opportunity to provide extensive sensitive intelligence briefings to chiefs of state and Ministers of Defense (MODs). These briefings not only helped established a new, positive dimension to DIA's prestige and influence worldwide and in Congress, but also proved to be of critical value in support of U.S. foreign policy. The Perroots briefing program prompted then-DCI William Webster to state, "General Perroots has briefed more chiefs of state than any man alive."

In the 3 years to follow, Defense Secretary Weinberger presented DIA with its first Joint Meritorious Unit Award for intelligence support during the TWA and *Achille Lauro* hijackings and the Philippine cri-

sis situation. Follow-on crises support included the U.S. bombing of Tripoli, the ousting of "Baby Doc" Duvalier in Haiti, and the fire at the Chernobyl nuclear reactor. General Perroots ordered the development of the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center in the DIAC. This Center greatly enhanced DIA's capability to respond to crisis situations. Moreover, to relieve overcrowding in the DIAC, the Agency leased a new building in the Washington area. This building would house DIA's Defense Attaché headquarters and other DIA activities.

During General Perroots' tenure, the Agency focused on the shifting national security environment, sustainability, and low-intensity conflict. Steps were taken to improve DoD-wide automated databases and to apply additional resources monitoring



DIA supported U.S. forces during Operation EARNEST WILL in the Persian Gulf in 1988.

terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking. Arms control monitoring also resulted in increased demands for intelligence support from DIA. The National Military Intelligence Center was upgraded, renovated, and collocated with the JCS National Military Command Center to permit fusion of operations and intelligence during crises at the national level. Designated a “Combat Support Agency,” DIA sought to increase cooperation between it and the U&S Commands and to develop a joint intelligence doctrine, as specified in the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act.

Intelligence support to the U.S. allies in the Persian Gulf intensified as the Iran-Iraq War spilled into the Gulf. DIA provided significant intelligence support to Operation EARNEST WILL and to incidents such as the Iraqi rocket attack on the USS *Stark*, the destruction of Iranian oil platforms, and Iranian attacks on Kuwaiti oil tankers. The “Toyota War” between Libya and Chad and the turmoil in Haiti added to the heavy production workload, as did unrest in Latin America, Somalia, Ethiopia, Burma, Pakistan, and the Philippines.

General Perroots furthered DIA’s already credible intelligence record, as it continued to be the nation’s preeminent military intelligence organization. His time would be spent meeting the growing and more sophisticated needs of the warfighting commanders and the defense and national-level decisionmakers. To that end, he would establish a new Deputy Director for Command Support, headed by a one-star flag officer, to refine DIA’s dedicated U&S command support. As the GDIP Program Manager, he funded theater intelligence architecture plans for the U&S commands. As the situation in the Gulf heated up, he formed a Persian Gulf working group to provide tailored support to U.S. commanders there.

Lenny Perroots approved and fostered a series of initiatives within DIA to strengthen recruiting, selection, training, resources, and operational support for the Defense Attaché System. He approved an action that created a Defense Attaché Hall of Fame and took long-term actions to improve Defense HUMINT capabilities. Finally, he led the communitywide actions to finally resolve the remaining questions of POW/MIAs in Southeast Asia. At the end of his time at DIA, General Perroots reflected:

*“I consider my tour of duty with DIA as the highlight of my career and remain, although retired, exceedingly proud of the professional men and women of the Agency who performed, and continue to perform, in an outstanding fashion, especially in DIA’s role of supporting crisis management and combat operations. It is apparent even to the casual observer that DIA has grown in stature over the years. This growing respect for, and confidence in, DIA has been earned, especially in its outstanding performance during numerous crises.”*

*“The most critical challenge for DIA, in my opinion, is to recruit, train, and retain quality personnel. Despite all the remarkable technical advances being introduced in DIA and within the Intelligence Community, the most important asset of DIA that must be strengthened and supported is its analytical infrastructure. Above all, DIA’s professional analysts and HUMINT field workers must be fully supported with adequate resources, appropriately rewarded, and, perhaps most important, properly insulated from undue external or internal pressure at all levels so as to ensure truly objective analyses and reporting, regardless of any perceived political impact.”*



Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger and Lt Gen Lenny Perroots in front of the DIAC at a ceremony marking DIA's 25th Anniversary and awarding of DIA's first Joint Meritorious Unit Award (JMUA). Part of the citation for the JMUA commended DIA's support during the *Achille Lauro* and TWA 847 hijackings.

## TWA 847 AND ACHILLE LAURO

On 31 October 1986, the Secretary of Defense, Caspar Weinberger, awarded the Defense Intelligence Agency (for the first time) the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for its exceptional service from 1 June 1985 to 1 June 1986. The citation accompanying the award cited DIA support to the TWA Flight 847 and *Achille Lauro* hijackings, the Philippine crisis, and the Libyan counterterrorist operations.

Rear Admiral Tom Brooks, USN, was DIA's J2 for JCS during three of the four crises mentioned in the Joint Meritorious Unit Citation. He shared with the author the following account:

*No sooner had I assumed the J2 responsibility than the Italian cruise ship, Achille Lauro, was hijacked by Arab terrorists. The ship had Americans onboard whom the Arabs were holding hostage. They killed an elderly, wheelchair-bound American Jew and threw his body over the side. They threatened to kill more until their demands were met. We sent ships to intercept Achille Lauro and planes to fly over her. I was tasked to get my hands on plans of the ship so that we would know exactly how she was laid out internally should we have to send SEALS aboard to seize the ship and overpower the terrorists.*



DIA's Joint Support Office—the predecessor of J2—was heavily involved in supporting operations during the hijacking of *Achille Lauro*.

*“So, how do I get my hands on plans of the ship? I knew that all ships are classified by one of three or four classification societies, the main ones being Lloyd’s Register of Shipping and American Bureau of Shipping. We checked and found that she had been classified by the American Bureau of Shipping only a year or two earlier. We had them in less than 12 hours.*

*“Fortunately, we never had to make use of them to storm the ship. Achille Lauro had put into an Egyptian port, and the terrorists got off the ship and asked the Egyptian authorities for sanctuary. We attempted to persuade the Egyptians to turn over the terrorists, either to us or to the Italians, but that was politically impossible for them. They secretly bought them airline tickets on an Egyptian flight heading for, I believe, Tunisia.*

*“Their secret was not secret very long. We learned of the terrorists being put on the airplane.*

*“Using all-source information, the JCS was able to order some U.S. Command troops to pre-position themselves at an Italian airport and then order USS Saratoga’s air wing to intercept the Egyptian flight and force it to divert to Italy. Simultaneously, State Department was working furiously with the Italian government to authorize all of this, but the Italians were very reluctant to get involved, fearing Arab retribution within Italy. We went ahead nonetheless, and the airliner was intercepted by Sara F-14s and forced to land in Italy. Once on the runway, there were American troops poised to get the terrorists off. There were some tense moments with the Carabinieri, but they ultimately got the terrorists off the airplane and in custody, all the while having about a hundred heavily armed American commandos looking over their shoulders. The Italians protested of course, and so did the Egyptians. But the terrorists went to jail.*

Denied overflight rights by the French government, F-111s flying from bases in Britain depended upon six air-to-air refuelings to complete the nearly 13-hour roundtrip to Libya during Operation EL DORADO CANYON. Key to the success of the mission was the U.S. Air Force KC-10 Extenders.



*“My experiences supporting JCS through the Achille Lauro crisis, various attacks on Libya, the Persian Gulf tanker war, and various attacks on Iran, and later the Persian Gulf War all give solid testimony for how well our superb intelligence capability can be made to work. Qadhafi and Saddam Hussein would surely have to agree!*

*“My time as J2 was filled by one crisis after another. No sooner had we completed the Achille Lauro operation than Qadhafi began to act up. On 5 April 1986, La Belle disco, a German disco frequented by American GIs, was blown up by a bomb planted by some of Qadhafi’s agents. Two U.S. soldiers and a Turkish woman were killed. Once the intelligence picture was complete and it was apparent that it had, indeed, been a Libyan plot, the United States decided to retaliate and to do so in a way that Qadhafi would not soon forget. We began*

*to do the planning for an airstrike. The operation was code-named EL DORADO CANYON.*

*“Both U.S. Air Force and Navy assets were readied for the operation. USAF F-111Fs and EP-111s from bases in Britain would strike targets in and around Tripoli and U.S. Navy strike aircraft from Task Force 60 would strike targets in and around Benghazi. Navy A-7s and F/A-18s would provide SAM and air defense artillery suppression for both strike forces, and F-14s would provide combat air patrol for both packages. Because the French government would not allow USAF aircraft to overfly France, the F-111s were forced into an 11-hour roundtrip requiring six airrefuelings from a mixed force of KC-10 Extenders and KC-135 Stratotankers. Their impact was significant. It was an FB-111 that bombed one of Qadhafi’s palaces and put a 500-pounder right*



The F-111Fs, including the aircraft shown here, gained long-lasting fame during strikes on Tripoli, Libya, during Operation EL DORADO CANYON in March 1986. DIA supported the strikes against the Libyan targets in response to Libya’s support to terrorist attacks.

next to a tent on the grounds that Qadhafi was using to sleep in. He apparently was there, and, although uninjured, his ears were ringing for days and he was thoroughly frightened. It chastened him immeasurably. He pulled in his horns as an international terrorist—at least until the Pan Am Lockerbie bomb.

*"It was the job of Intel to assist in the selection of targets, locate and identify air defenses, and assist in the mission planning. It was a lot of work and a lot of long hours for a number of people. We did it so often, however, that we got to be pretty proficient at it.*

*"There were several other run-ins with Mr. Qadhafi over the issue of freedom of navigation in the Gulf of Sidra, bordering Libya. Qadhafi claimed a large chunk of the Gulf as territorial waters and would draw a "line of death" across the Gulf, saying any ship that entered would be sunk. We would immediately announce our plans to transit through the area to exercise freedom of the seas (we only recognized territorial waters of 12 miles from the coast). The stage was set for an*

*incident and, on a couple of occasions, Qadhafi obliged and sent fighters out and, on one occasion, guided-missile patrol boats. We either shot down the fighters or they turned tail and flew away when they saw the F-14s coming. We sent airstrikes against the missile boats and sank a couple of them as well. After that, he continued to claim his version of territorial waters but left us alone to navigate off the Gulf of Sidra as we chose."*

On 1 October 1986, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, in an address at DIA's 25th anniversary celebration, made, in part, the following remarks:

*"General Perroots was kind enough to mention the Achille Lauro incident. The quotation that he mentioned and the way he phrased it illustrates one of the real difficulties of intelligence. We cannot talk very much about the extraordinarily important and effective work that you do, but there have been so many splendid examples of outstanding military intelligence—support to the antiterrorist attacks on Tripoli and Benghazi and all of the things we were able to do in Grenada on very short notice. It is a great credit to the profes-*



The Navy's F/A-18 made her combat debut in Operation EL DORADO CANYON providing carrier-based SAM and air defense suppression support to U.S. Navy A-6 Intruder strikes in and around Benghazi, Libya.

*sional men and women of the Defense Intelligence Agency that we have these results. I hope you take great pride in the contributions you are making, because we know you truly are committed to excellence in defense of the nation. It is a source of frequent disappointment and frustration to me that we cannot always acknowledge with all the details how effective the work is that you do, and how vital it is to all of the other things that are so widely known publicly.”*

The DCI, Mr. William Casey, also present for the DIA 25th anniversary celebration, added:

*“The other issue that promises to draw more and more of our attention and resources is, of course, international terrorism—a scourge that is increasingly coming to dominate our lives*

*and times. As a nation and as an international community, we have no realistic choice but to meet the terrorist challenge, and that means head on. Nothing else will work. First and foremost, we and our allies have to cooperate to isolate terrorist gangs and the states who sponsor them. In this regard, last April’s strike against Libya was a real success. Terrorist organizations and their state sponsors must now factor into their equation the certainty of swift and painful retaliation. This has had an inhibiting effect on international terrorism and a galvanizing effect on the resolve of our friends and on their willingness to act in concert with us. There is no getting around it. A credible threat of force must be one effort of a successful counterterrorist policy.”*



Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger awards DIA's first JMUA in October 1986.

GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA, a retired Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, served as a special envoy to Hanoi for POW/MIA affairs. He relied heavily on the efforts of DIA for support during this mission.



## POW AND MIA

Early in General Perroots' tenure, he met with Ann Mills Griffith, the Executive Director of the National League of Families, and with a number of the families of those listed as missing in action (MIA). These families still held hopes that there could be American POWs in Southeast Asia and that further definitive information was available in Vietnam or other countries regarding MIAs. The meeting was emotionally charged, and General Perroots felt the families' heartaches and tension. He pledged that he would do all he could as Director of DIA to resolve remaining Southeast Asia MIA issues.

His first action in December 1985 was to request from the DCI the authority for DIA to be designated as the lead agency for the collection of intelligence required to resolve the status of Americans still missing. DIA was so designated. He then tasked DIA's Director of Attachés and Operations (DO) (the author at that time) to develop a fresh concept for the proactive collection of POW/MIA-related information. Finally, he significantly enhanced the number of analysts working on POW/MIA. These efforts were all in coordination with OSD, Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Armitage, and CIA, NSA, and the State Department, through a new intelligence interagency committee to focus a community-wide effort on POW/MIA.

In looking back to the 1970s after the Vietnamese said they had returned all American prisoners in custody in 1973, there were only two exceptions. One was Arlo Gay, who had worked in a private fishing venture in South Vietnam and had been arrested by the Communists in May 1975 when they took over the country. Held in North Vietnam, he was eventually released in 1976 and returned to the United States. The other exception was Private First Class (PFC) Robert Garwood, who had worked with the

Viet Cong after his capture in Danang in 1965. PFC Garwood, at his own request, was returned to the United States in March 1979, court-martialed, and discharged from the U.S. Marine Corps.

From 1979 until the early 1980s, the U.S. Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC) and DIA had been interviewing refugees in the various camps in Southeast Asia. The camps arose from the refugee flow from Vietnam in the postwar years. In May 1979 alone, 64,000 fled Vietnam. Roughly 400 information reports were generated in 1979. By 1985, and in the following years, more than 1,000 reports were written. The reports ranged from first-hand knowledge of burial locations or sightings of Americans to the vaguest of rumors of downed aircraft casualties. DIA and its POW/MIA analysts attempted to correlate the reports, trying to piece together more than 2,000 picture puzzles that represented the complete story of the missing Americans.

During 1986 and 1987, DO developed and coordinated a plan to deploy a team of specially trained individuals to Southeast Asia to conduct a full range of HUMINT collection operations to gather the information required to help resolve the POW/MIA issue. The concept was approved following an exchange of memos between the Secretaries of Defense and State on the topic and extensive negotiations with the Country Teams involved.

In May 1987, DIA established a new POW/MIA team, headquartered in the Pacific area. Its primary mission until 1993-1994 was the screening and debriefing of selected Indochinese refugees and other sources in Southeast Asia for information and followup and exploitation on missing American servicemen.

The early planning and concept for the POW/MIA operation was done primarily by two DIA headquarters individuals—Colonel Peter Klein, USAF, and Mr. John Kiehm. John Kiehm would later be selected for SES promotion and is now DIA's Chief of Staff. Some of the key members of the POW/MIA team were Colonel John Cole, USA; Dr. Timothy Castle; George Scearce; Robert Sheetz; and Robert Whitsett. In Washington, at DIA headquarters, the DIA analytical efforts involving more than 50 analysts were headed by Chuck Trowbridge.

By the end of 1986 in Washington, the Reagan administration and the Congress were looking for ways to increase the tempo on POW/MIA resolution. President Reagan decided to appoint a special POW/MIA emissary to Hanoi and, in February 1987, selected General John W. Vessey, Jr., for that position. In his first meeting with the President, the President said to General Vessey, "John, I want you to take on a very important job for me. I think you can accomplish it in about 3 months." General Vessey accepted the Presidential Emissary job from President Reagan, but would spend almost 6 years working toward resolution of the POW/MIA matter.

General Vessey had retired as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs in 1985. He was intimately familiar with Southeast Asia and the Vietnam conflict, having served in the theater in various roles, to include Commander of the Joint U.S. Support Activities Group, which was responsible for Joint Casualty Resolution activities. He had a reputation for impeccable integrity and forthrightness in dealing with others. He also was intimately familiar with the POW/MIA efforts of DIA and its analysts. In my interview with General Vessey, he told me that, over the next 6 years, he worked closely with the DIA people in the field and the analysts at the Pentagon and DIAC, as well as with PACOM, the U&S Command responsible, the State Department, and CIA.

General Vessey made his first trip to Hanoi in August 1987 for 3 days of talks with Vietnamese Foreign Minister Nguyen Co Thach. Thach agreed to resume joint efforts toward resolving the MIA issue, with

initial efforts directed toward those cases that the Americans considered the most urgent. General Vessey presented 220 such cases, ones wherein the missing individual was last known by the United States to be alive, but who did not return during Operation HOMECOMING. Also on Vessey's agenda was the need to recover the remains of those Americans whom Vietnam had listed as having died while in captivity in the south.

From the first Vessey meeting in Hanoi in 1987, over the next 4 years, progress toward resolution would be made, but the pace was painfully slow. The entire matter was complicated by the time and effort spent by all concerned, particularly DIA, in investigating inaccurate and false reports made by thousands of individuals, hundreds of supposedly well-meaning groups, and even some fraudulent fundraising groups. Much of this activity that had to be investigated, unfortunately, did not result in any real evidence of POWs or any live American captives.


A breakthrough finally occurred when General Vessey made a trip to Hanoi in April 1991 and reached agreement with Foreign Minister Thach to open a casualty resolution office manned by U.S. personnel. The office opened in May and was manned by two U.S. officials, one from the Joint Casualty Resolution Center (JCRC), the other from DIA. The primary task of the DIA person was to research the various office records and archival materials which might throw additional light on the fate and disposition of Americans still missing. With a limited degree of cooperation with Vietnamese officials, the DIA member of the Hanoi office was able to gain access to a number of very useful documents including records of wartime artifacts stored or on display at the Vietnam military museum. Among the items found were ID cards, pilots' helmets, and other flight gear—many with names still attached, weapons, and aircraft wreckage with traceable serial numbers. The real value, beyond the items themselves, was the Vietnamese documentation that accompanied them, which described the circumstances leading to the acquisition of the items by the museum. Other archival collections would lead to

even more useful information. General Vessey was very complimentary of the role played by DIA and many DIA individuals. Eventually, all but 43 of the most difficult MIA cases would be resolved. DIA's role, at the Pentagon and DIAC, and the POW/MIA

project efforts in the field, would continue well into 1993. At that time, DIA's POW/MIA mission, ongoing for almost 30 years, would be transferred to the Defense POW/MIA (DPMO) office in the Pentagon.



From the early stages of the Vietnam War through 1993, DIA had responsibility for the POW/MIA mission.



# The Defense Attaché System

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U.S. military and naval attachés have served all over the world fulfilling a variety of complex and delicate missions for 120 years.

# THE DEFENSE ATTACHÉS

During the 1980s, Defense Secretaries Weinberger and Carlucci and their staff, as well as the JCS, were all strong supporters of the Defense Attaché System (DAS). Secretary Carlucci said,:

*"The role of the attaché in foreign and defense policy formulation is not only critical, it is one that cannot effectively be provided by any other organization . . . The people we select for assignment to the attaché system are, and must continue to be, the very finest that the military services can provide. It is essential that we select and train to a high level of competence personnel who possess foreign language skills, foreign area expertise, and a facility for collecting and reporting critical military intelligence."*

The role of U.S. military attachés was spelled out in the following Army general order in 1880:

GENERAL ORDERS  
HEADQUARTERS OF THE ARMY  
No. 64  
ADJUTANT GENERAL'S OFFICE  
WASHINGTON, August 25, 1880

Hereafter, officers of the Army traveling or stopping in foreign countries, whether on duty or leave of absence, will be required to avail themselves of all opportunities, properly within their reach, for obtaining information of value to the military service of the United States, especially that pertaining to their own arm or branch of service. They will report fully in writing the result of their observation to the Adjutant General of the Army on their return to duty in the United States, if unable to do so at an earlier date.

By COMMAND OF GENERAL SHERMAN:

Then, in 1917, *U.S. Military Officers Manual*, 6th Edition, revised in May 1917, in its instruction for military attachés, defined:

*"Requisites: Good address, intelligence, tact and industry; knowledge of the country where he is stationed, especially a speaking knowledge, and a sufficient income to live in a fitting manner and associate with his fellows of the Diplomatic Corps."*

*"Duties: Consist in collecting whatever information would be useful, directly or indirectly to our government, concerning the country where he is stationed; organization, improvements in weapons, intentions, all new ideas and old ones not yet familiar to us. Some of his reports are in answer to questions from his chief, but his most useful ones will be original."*

*"Guidance: A military attaché represents on every occasion his country and his military; he must not do or appear to do anything that can lower their prestige. He can afford to go only with the best company; frequent only the best places of amusement, hotels, etc. and present the appearance of a man of rank and dignity."*

Through the WWI and WWII periods, and into the 1960s, each Military Service was responsible for its own attaché system. While this arrangement pleased the individual Services, duplication existed at the attaché posts abroad and in information reporting, management, and budget processes. Recognizing these shortcomings, in 1964, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara made the decision to designate a senior defense attaché in each

foreign country to support the U.S. Ambassador and to supervise the work of all U.S. attachés assigned to that country.

The Defense Attaché was charged with reporting to the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff. To further consolidate control over the military attachés, McNamara gave the newly established Defense Intelligence Agency, operational, management and budget responsibilities for the new Defense Attaché System. The DAS was established in 1965 with approximately 2,000 personnel and attaché offices in nearly 100 countries.

Robert McNamara had the wisdom and foresight to align the military attachés under DIA in order to give centralized control, joint and prioritized direction and focus to the attachés. No Secretary of Defense or Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff since that time has regretted McNamara's decision. On the contrary, they have, without exception, commended the work and contribution to defense made by the Defense Attaché Corps.

From 1986 to 1990, the author had the honor and good fortune of being the Director of Attachés and Operations (DO) for DIA. As a senior in military intelligence coming to the DO job, I initially thought I knew all there was to know about attachés. Was I ever mistaken! Like many other busy senior officers, I had significantly underestimated the crucial roles that attachés played for the United States in more than 100 foreign countries. In times of crisis, their presence and observations were simply indispensable and, often, the only information available.

I quickly also learned that their duties were extremely demanding, often dangerous, and nothing like the popular misconception that had the attachés attending and enjoying an endless number of social events.

As I traveled around the world of attachés, my respect for their linguistic abilities, understanding

of the culture and countries in which they were serving, and the rapport they established with the host military and nation, continually grew. I believe this was also true of the two directors I was privileged to serve—Generals Lenny Perroots and Ed Soyster.

Many of our attachés were prime targets of terrorists. In 1987, when Navy Captain Bill Nordeen, our Defense Attaché in Athens, Greece, was brutally murdered in a car bomb attack by the 17 November terrorist group just days before he was scheduled to return to the United States and retire, I did some soul searching about the way we honored and recognized our attachés. At DIA, we did a good job of recognizing and rewarding outstanding performances of attaché duty with great feedback and recommendations from OSD, CINCs, ambassadors, and the attachés' foreign counterparts. But we had not come upon a way in which to honor them as a group. It was then that I conceived the idea of an "Attaché Hall of Fame." This idea appealed to me because it was not only a way to recognize and honor contemporary attachés but also a vehicle for honoring those attachés from earlier times and the attaché of the future who would make extraordinary contributions. I put the DO staff to work on fleshing out this idea and persuaded DIA historians to lend us a hand. It didn't take much convincing for my boss, General Perroots, to approve. He liked the idea immediately.

We enjoined the Military Services Chiefs, the JCS, the Secretaries of Defense and State, and DIA to provide the initial nominations. We selected 37 individuals and held an inaugural ceremony on 15 December 1988 at the DAS headquarters. General Perroots inducted the first 37 Defense Attaché Hall of Fame members. Lieutenant General Wilson—a former Defense Attaché to the Soviet Union and former DIA Director—was the guest speaker.

Today, there are 99 members of the Defense Attaché Hall of Fame. A complete list is shown in

the appendices of this book. Nominees must have served, or currently be serving, in the DAS and must have served with great distinction or made unique contributions to the nation while serving in a Defense Attaché Office. Personnel serving as Defense, Military, Naval or Air Attachés, Operations Coordinators (OPSCOs), or Support Staff Members are eligible for nomination. Flag officers must be retired from active duty. Individuals cannot be nominated for service in their current DAS assignment, but may be nominated for service in previous DAS assignments. Nominations must be strictly based on accomplishments while in service in the DAS and not based on other military assignments. Nominations come from Defense, the Department of State, DIA and CIA, the U&S Combatant Commands, and the Military Services.

The Director, DIA, is the approval authority for induction of nominees in the DAS Hall of Fame. Nominations are considered by a six-person review committee. The committee is chaired by the Deputy Director, Defense HUMINT Service. Membership is composed of one representative from each of the following: Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence; Director of Naval Intelligence; Air Force Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; Director of Marine Corps Intelligence; and Chief of the Intelligence Division, Coast Guard Headquarters.

The DAS Hall of Fame membership includes the following “firsts”:

**Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., USA**, was the first African-American general officer in the U.S. Army. He served as an attaché in Liberia from 1910-1911.

**Major Florence C. Jepson, USA**, was the first American woman to hold the position of military attaché. She served in Great Britain in 1944.

**Major General Bernard Loeffke, USA**, was the first U.S. Army general officer assigned as Defense Attaché in China (1981-1983). He was the first Western military paratrooper to make a parachute jump with the Chinese People’s Liberation Army.

**Captain Robert Moffat Losey, USA**, was the first American serviceman killed in World War II, during reconnaissance at Dombaas, Norway, on 21 April 1940. Captain Losey was serving as the Assistant Military Attaché for Air to Finland, Norway, and Sweden.

**Colonel Bernard E. McDaniel, USA**, served as an attaché in Germany in 1981-1985 and 1990-1994. He was the first foreign attaché to receive the German Presidential Award, which was presented by the German Chief of Defense.

**Brigadier General Jon A. Reynolds, USAF**, was the first U.S. Attaché to visit Mongolia and the first to fly and evaluate Chinese jet fighter aircraft. He served in China from 1984 to 1988.

**Colonel Charles Young, USA**, was the first black American attaché and the highest-ranking officer of his race prior to World War I. He graduated from West Point and served in three conflicts. Colonel Young was an attaché in Haiti (1904-1907) and twice in Liberia (1912-1915, 1919-1922), relieving Brigadier General Benjamin O. Davis, Sr., in January 1912.



ADM William Crowe, CJCS (left), escorts Soviet Marshal Sergei Akhromeyev during a review at the Pentagon in 1988.

## THE COLD WAR WINDS DOWN

In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev, a new kind of leader, became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Gorbachev wanted to open Soviet society politically to stimulate things economically. The seeds that would grow massive, unprecedented change in the Soviet Union were thus planted.

Joe Kerr, DIA's most senior analyst in Arms Control and Treaty Verification matters, recalled some of those changes vis-à-vis the Soviet Union and DIA's role in them.

According to Joe Kerr, a major breakthrough in the implementation of arms treaties was negotiated in Stockholm in the summer of 1986, when, for the first time, provisions for mandatory onsite inspections were incorporated into an agreement. The Stockholm Document dealt with confidence- and security-building measures in Europe and was not a formal treaty, so it was politically, but not legally, binding. Nevertheless, all 35 participants agreed to the following measures—to provide advance notification of military exercises involving more than 13,000 troops (or 300 tanks), to invite observers from all CSCE states to all notified exercises, and to allow inspections with no right of refusal to observe and monitor for compliance all agreed measures. Throughout the process of negotiating the agreement, DIA played an active role in supporting Joint Staff and OSD members of the delegation. To implement the inspection provisions of the Stockholm Document, the United States created and trained a team of military officers, under the operational control of CINCUSCOM. Most, if not all, of these inspectors/observers had foreign area expertise and knowledge of Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces, and they began to prepare and conduct inspections and observation visits. DIA was involved in preparing the inspectors for their duties.

Only a year later (1987), the Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed. The INF Treaty eliminated the entire class of intermediate-range nuclear missiles held by both the United States and the Soviet Union. Under INF Treaty provisions, the United States and Soviet Union exchanged detailed information on the number and location of all INF-type missiles, and DIA soon found itself heavily involved in JCS efforts to evaluate Soviet data. The United States also was required to observe the destruction of all INF missiles, to establish continuous perimeter and portal monitoring at the Soviet missile production center at Votkinsk, and to conduct visits to INF missile bases to ensure that no operational units retained INF-type missiles. The United States decided that this demanding set of tasks could no longer be managed by an ad hoc arrangement, and so the Department of Defense was directed to create an organization dedicated to treaty monitoring. The On-Site Inspection Agency (OSIA) drew from a large pool of military and civilian candidates to create a cadre of inspectors. It then sought technical and training assistance from the Defense Intelligence College to familiarize its inspectors with treaty-limited items and equipment. Although OSIA later organized its own inspector training programs, the pattern for excellence had been established, and DIA had left its mark on the process.

Following relatively soon after entry into force of the INF Treaty, NATO and Warsaw Pact states agreed to a major reduction of conventional military forces in Europe. Negotiations between NATO and the Warsaw Pact of the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE) replaced MBFR talks in 1989 in Vienna. In the case of CFE, DIA became involved on several fronts because it provided information on Soviet and Warsaw Pact forces to U.S. policymakers. DIA also played a key role by providing defense intelligence and advice on treaty monitoring requirements

The Soviets' SS-20 intermediate-range missile, one of the major systems eliminated by the Soviets under the INF Treaty. DIA evaluated Soviet data on the number and location of these and other weapon systems covered by the treaty.



to NATO, and through the Alliance to the capitals of other NATO participants.

The 1988 edition of *Soviet Military Power* noted a change in the climate. ". . . (T)he Soviets are now projecting a much different international image, giving rise to hopes for fundamental changes in Soviet behavior." But DIA analysts remained vigilant, and the 1988 edition also noted the continued fielding of highly advanced, ever-newer Soviet weapons systems, including a rail-mobile ICBM, a sea-launched cruise missile, new aircraft carriers, attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines, a new type of strategic bomber, and an airborne warning and control system aircraft.

But by late 1988, Gorbachev could see that part of the Soviet empire was crumbling. The war in Afghanistan had become for the Soviet Union a dilemma similar to what the United States had experienced in Vietnam. Casualties in the 9-year war were approaching 500,000, and the Soviets knew they couldn't win. Gorbachev announced a complete pullout of Soviet forces from Afghanistan.

As part of ongoing change between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1988/89, agree-

ment was reached to exchange visits between the Russian and American Secretaries of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS and his counterpart, the Chief of the Russian General Staff. Marshal Akhromeyev visited the Pentagon and Admiral William Crowe in 1988. During Admiral Crowe's return visit to Russia, the first-ever of a Chairman of the JCS, an event took place that reinforced the evidence of change.

Rear Admiral Ted Sheaffer was the J2, DIA, at that time and shared the following with the author:

*"Sometime in early 1989, Admiral Crowe became the first-ever Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to visit the Soviet Union. He and his counterpart, a Russian Army Marshal, spent about 10 days going across the country. After a couple of days flying around together, they got very friendly, and the Marshal said to Crowe, 'Don't you notice by our exercising how we have changed?' Admiral Crowe said, 'I don't know what you are talking about.' The Marshal said, 'Well, I'm sure your analysts back in America have reviewed our last exercise, and you have seen that it was more defensive in orientation than it was defensive going to offensive invading NATO.' Crowe said, 'Well, OK, fine. I'll*

*check it out.' Crowe sent a message back to the United States to the DIA JCS/J2 saying, 'What is your evaluation of the last ground-based military exercise the Soviet Union conducted in 1988 or 1989 as to the nature of it, and is that different than what they were before?' The folks that I had in JS were wonderfully responsive, very upbeat, and very open-minded. We got the message through the Chairman's office and we answered it within 48 hours. The Chairman got the JS response while he was still in the Soviet Union. Our answer was, "Yes, there is a difference in the nature of this Soviet exercise from everything they've done before. It was principally defensive. The Marshal was trying to point out verbally to the Chairman that things have changed, that they were not going over to the offensive."*

The 1989 edition of *Soviet Military Power*, entitled *Soviet Military Power: Prospects for Change 1989*, featured prominently on its front and back covers color photos of Soviet soldiers on armored personnel carriers as they departed Afghanistan. Although encouraged by this hopeful sign, DIA analysts continued to see much to concern them about Soviet capabilities.

*"The most striking feature of Soviet Military Power today is the extraordinary momentum of its offensive strategic nuclear force modernization," Secretary of Defense Cheney wrote in the Preface. "The Soviets are deploying new silo-based heavy ICBMs, the SS-18, with at least 10 nuclear warheads each, and greater accuracy... It is therefore clear that despite dramatic changes occurring in the Soviet Union and the Soviet leadership's declaration of benign intentions toward the Western democracies, Soviet military capabilities continue to constitute a major threat to our society." The Secretary concluded, "The greatly improved East-West political climate offers prospects for a stable and lasting peace, but experience teaches us that we must remain prepared."*

But change continued and the pace even accelerated. In the second half of 1989, the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe, and the Communist ideology that built it, disintegrated. Once Gorbachev made clear to the

Communist bosses of Hungary, Poland, and East Germany they could not rely on him to support their hard measures against the reformers, the whole system collapsed under popular pressure with amazing speed and very little violence.

In East Germany, the decisive event was a government announcement that East Germans were free to travel abroad. The point was almost moot. Many of the best and the brightest young East Germans had already fled the country through Hungary. Happy Germans from both East and West Berlin soon helped knock down the Berlin Wall with everything from sledgehammers to their bare fists.

In Czechoslovakia, half of the population was soon in the streets demanding that the Communists resign. They did. In Bulgaria, with Todor Zhivkov, as the longest serving Communist boss in Europe, Bulgarians had to wait longer, but Zhivkov, too, had to resign after an adverse vote in the party central committee.

Soon, it was time for Gorbachev himself to resign as Communist party secretary in the Soviet Union. On 24 August 1991, he was out. He had lost his gamble that the Soviet Union could both compete militarily with the West and revive the Soviet economy at home.

On the cold, snowy evening of 25 December 1991, the Soviet Union's blood-red banner with the yellow hammer and sickle was lowered from its place of honor above the Kremlin and replaced by the tricolored flag of the new Russian republic. The fearsome Soviet Union of Vladimir Lenin, Josef Stalin, and Nikita Khrushchev had ceased to exist.

In Washington, nobody declared victory, but it was a tremendous victory nonetheless for the West and Western values. It was a victory made possible by the sacrifices of millions of men and women who served in the armed forces of the Western nations during the long, Cold War years.

It was also a victory for the DIA team providing the intelligence that told the world about the Soviet military buildup. The Soviets could never achieve their goals as long as the West could show the world what the Soviets were doing.



Jay Sloan (left) and Barbara Duckworth enjoy a working luncheon in 1996. Sloan was the DIO for East Asia and the Pacific during the Philippine crisis in 1988 and later became the Deputy Director for Policy Support. Duckworth, who started out as a bilingual research technician (BLRT) in DIA, rose through the ranks to become the Agency's Chief of Staff.

## A DAY IN THE LIFE OF AN ANALYST

Before my service at DIA, I had spent most of my intelligence career as an operator involved in the collection of intelligence information. During my time at DIA, particularly the first year when I was involved in the National and Defense Estimates process, I came away with a fresh understanding of the importance of analysis in the intelligence process. No matter how good the source of intelligence or the quality or accuracy of the intelligence information collected is, the bottom line becomes—what does it mean? Gaining information on an adversary's capabilities is fundamental to intelligence collection, but answering the questions—what is the adversary going to do with his capabilities? What are his intentions? And most important, what impact does that have for us, the United States—that is the challenge for a successful intelligence agency, military or civilian. Sound, rigorous analysis that will stand up to the close examination and critical review—that, I found, was the heart of the matter at DIA. Day in and day out, DIA regularly stakes its professional reputation on the quality and accuracy of its analysis.

Analysis in DIA takes place around the clock, ranging from that produced daily in the current intelligence cubicles of the J2; to those analysts in the DIAC who have more time in the research areas of DI; to the DIOs in the Pentagon who are expected to have the longer, indepth assessments; to those who must do the forecasting, the estimating of the future, the over-the-horizon looks. I thought it would be of interest to the readers of this book to have a sample of how some DIA analysts spend their time. The example I have chosen took place in the past, but I believe the intellectual process is still the same. I asked a distinguished analyst who I have known and respected for many years to share with me how some of his time, and

that of other analysts, was spent. The following was given to me by Jay Sloan, a former analyst, DIO, and Director for Policy Support, DIA.

*"On a late Sunday afternoon, I (DIO) am in the NMIC tracking events in Manila as the various units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP) splinter with divided loyalties between Marcos and the rebels. The troops, with tanks, are on the move. The story there is unfolding by the minute. It is "showdown" time in Manila. Our DAO is deployed citywide keeping pace with events up to the minute by reporting directly into the NMIC via cell phones and other open lines.*

*"I was taking some of those calls and relaying them to DIA's premier Philippine analyst, Ms. Mary Tighe, who was deployed at the White House Situation Room. There I was with one phone in my left ear receiving from Manila and one phone in my right ear transmitting to Mary. I was the transfer point. The DAO's mission was to report to DIA/NMIC. It just so happened that Mary was at the White House; hence, this unusual hookup.*

*"Suddenly, Mary said, 'OK, Jay, tell Colonel Halley to make this good, here comes the President.' Within a minute, President Reagan was standing over Mary's desk as she repeated out loud what I relayed to her from the DATT in the field. This went on for nearly 10 minutes ... an up-to-date briefing for the President at a critical moment in that crisis. We conveyed all useful information. We couldn't have been more timely. In that short period, we provided additional credibility of DIA's capabilities and ability to pull together a "team" during a crisis. For me personally, it was one of many moments in my career in DIA when I felt a*

*sense of pride and accomplishment that cannot be surpassed. It was in moments like this that I knew why I had entered the intelligence profession in the first place and why I believed in DIA as an institution.*

*“Why I believed in DIA as an institution mainly has to do with the commitment of its people. DIA had (has) good people who believed in their missions. For the most part, they knew why they were in DIA and what they were supposed to be doing. They wanted to do the best job possible to assist in planning, decisionmaking, or warfighting processes, whether in the collection, analysis, or dissemination realms. These people made DIA what it was and helped shape what it is today.*

*“I’m talking about people like Mary Tighe and those in the DAO Manila during the end of the Marcos/beginning of Aquino eras. Although many others made valuable contributions, they, in particular, were the heroes within DIA during this extended crisis period. Indeed, the superlative nature of their work qualified them, in my opinion, as heroes within the broader Intelligence Community.*

*“Mary was a young DIA analyst with a brilliant mind and a flair for intelligence collection and analysis. She had spent a rotational tour (analyst-support-to-attaché program) in Manila and “clicked” with the team there. By helping out with her on-the-spot analytical insights and provision of guidance, the attachés accomplished more and pursued new potentials. This analyst-attaché teamwork and outstanding communication pattern continued after Mary’s return to Washington, DC, where she served on the J2 desk. As a result of that teamwork and the trust established between the DAO and the Washington-based all-source desk, Mary was able to write timely, insightful reports for key Pentagon decisionmakers. Mr. Rich Armitage, ISA, almost always asked for Mary’s intelligence assessment prior to finalizing a decision on any major Philippine issue.*

*“I became especially aware of this in-house strength when Mr. Armitage asked me to spend some time in the Philippines to survey the situation and report back to him. This was in the waning years of the Marcos regime, but before the rebels within the AFP launched their attack and turned the situation into a major crisis. During that week’s stay in country, the DAO arranged to take me to visit and interact with people from a broad spectrum of society … from the elite to the lowest strata. I visited opinionmakers and elements of the security and national defense infrastructure, sometimes unannounced just to witness the real state of affairs. I met with religious leaders and others who had an accurate sense of the daily lives of people and the workings of society. I met people barely surviving and who had to demean themselves in order to do so.*

*“I came away with a deep respect for the DAO’s intelligent, comprehensive view of society, its politics, and the military’s role and capabilities within a national setting (major efforts against Communist and Islamic insurgents were also underway at the time). I was impressed by its determination to mingle with all elements of society that had a bearing on what the military was doing or thinking. Throughout all of this, it was clear that the attachés were guided by the assessments and dialogue with DIA’s Washington-based analysts, especially Mary Tighe.*

*“As a result, the DAO had its finger on the pulse of the brewing insurgency within the AFP. It forecast the potential for a coup attempt well before the actual event. A special, sensitive collection-analysis team effort between the DAO and Mary culminated in accurate assessments of impending coup action that indeed provided the early warning necessary for prudent defense planning and policy decisionmaking. This teamwork prevailed throughout the crisis period and well beyond. The ‘White House moment’ depicted above was just one brief example of DIA’s relevance, key role, and contributions.*

*“Within the DAO, particular credit should be cited on behalf of Lieutenant Colonel Larry Schneider who, as Assistant Army Attaché, accomplished major inroads into understanding what was brewing beneath the surface within the military, in response to overall deterioration of society. He spoke fluent Tagalog. He was an intelligence professional par excellence.*

*“His replacement, Lieutenant Colonel Vic Raphael, served during the heat of the crisis period, making heavy sacrifices, risking his life, reputation, and family well-being in dedicated service to DIA and the nation. I also credit the DATT, Colonel Halley, who forged a “team effort” and empowered his people to be creative and bold at a time of considerable political sensitivity surrounding the Philippine domestic scene*

*within the Embassy. He fostered a strong link between the DAO and DIA analysts.”*

Following the above account, from Jay Sloan, I spoke with Richard Armitage, now the Deputy Secretary of State, who recalled his time as the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA) and his hours of working closely with many DIA analysts and Defense Attachés. He cited, in particular, the DIA support during the Philippines crisis by analysts Jay Sloan, Mary Tighe, Don Berlin, and Jim Eden.

Secretary Armitage, with whom I worked, told me of his continuing respect and admiration for DIA, the Defense Attaché System, and the work done for our country by analysts and attachés.



LTG Ed Soyster welcomes Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney during a visit to the DIAC.

## ED SOYSTER OUT FRONT



Lieutenant General Harry E. "Ed" Soyster

Lieutenant General Harry E. "Ed" Soyster was appointed the Director of DIA on 19 December 1988. General Soyster grew up in Pennsylvania and graduated from the U.S. Military Academy at West Point, New York. He began his career as an Army field artillery officer, but also gained an early grounding in intelligence when he served in the Reconnaissance Center of the J3, JCS, in the Pentagon as a lieutenant colonel. In his Army career, he attended the National War College, earned two master's degrees, commanded battalion and brigade-level artillery units, and served as the Deputy Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence for the Army and as Commander of the Army Intelligence and Security Command.

When General Soyster arrived at DIA, the Agency was at a high tempo of operations, providing intelligence concerning a number of "hotspots" throughout the Middle East, Africa, and Asia while still analyzing the impact of changes in the Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and elsewhere in Asia. During the first year that Ed Soyster led DIA, defense decisionmakers needed DIA intelligence support on the final Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, events surrounding the downing of two Libyan jets, the civil war in Liberia, and the Pan Am Flight 103 investigation at Lockerbie, Scotland. Weapons acquisition issues, counternarcotics, and counterterrorism rounded out the already full plate of DIA at the end of 1988.

The end of the Cold War resulted in a reevaluation of the intelligence mission throughout DoD. The relationship of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence, and DIA was enhanced with new authority, direction, and control prerogatives, causing the Agency leadership to reexamine DIA's own roles and missions.

Fresh international surprises would face the United States and DIA in 1989, in the form of the Tiananmen Square incident in China and the successful U.S. Operation JUST CAUSE in Panama. The events between April and June 1989 in Beijing, as the students there began to challenge their leaders, caused DIA analysts to focus on the strategic and political considerations and China's approach to crisis management. This came as equally important situations were taking place in the Koreas, the Philippines, Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Vietnam. The Panama crisis, while in its planning stage, would once again call for large numbers of DIA analysts working side-by-side with their operational counterparts under the strictest of operational security. The decisive results achieved by the U.S. forces would make it all worthwhile.



President George Bush and the Chairman of the JCS, GEN Colin Powell (right), being briefed by the J2, RADM Ted Shearer, and the J3, LTG Tom Kelly, during Operation JUST CAUSE.

## PANAMA AND JUST CAUSE

Several key events during the late 1980s in Panama led to the decision to deploy U.S. troops to that small but strategic country. Planning in the JCS and Pentagon for a Panama contingency began in February 1988 because of growing tensions between the United States and the Noriega regime. The planning was very closely held and included a series of orders that addressed the defense of the Panama Canal Zone; noncombatant evacuation of U.S. personnel; and neutralization of Panama's military, the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF), and civil military operations. The operation plan for Panama operations became Operation JUST CAUSE.

On 14 March 1988, the U.S. forces in Panama were augmented by Military Police (MP) units and an aviation task force. In June 1988, the Commander in Chief, United States Southern Command (USCINCSOUTH), designated XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, as the base for the Joint Task Force (JTF) headquarters responsible for planning and executing joint operations in Panama.

After the May 1989 elections, tensions increased further when election results were voided and opposition leaders were physically beaten by Noriega's Dignity Battalions. Concurrently with ongoing contingency planning, U.S. forces in Panama were reinforced with a brigade headquarters and an infantry battalion task force from the 7th Infantry Division, a battalion from the 5th Infantry Division, and a U.S. Marine Corps light armored infantry company. Augmentation continued with units rotating from both of these divisions; at the same time, military dependents began returning to the United States.

One day in September, at the Pentagon, U.S. Army Vice Chief of Staff, General Max Thurman, USA, visited his longtime friend, DIA Director General Soyster. He told Soyster in confidence that he (Thurman) might be going to Panama as the next CINC. "If so," Thurman said, "I'll be needing a lot of intelligence support from DIA."

General Thurman was right. He was named CINC SOUTHCOM on 30 September and, shortly thereafter, met with JCS Chairman Colin Powell, in his office in the Pentagon. Also at that meeting were the Commander of the XVIII Airborne Corps, Lieutenant General Carl Steiner; the J3, JCS, Lieutenant General Tom Kelly; the J2, JCS, DIA, Rear Admiral Ted Shearer; and the Commanding General of the Joint Special Operations Command. The Chairman then said in words to the effect, "I want you four to work with General Thurman. . . . I want an attack plan for Panama that will deliver the maximum amount of force in the least time."

The JUST CAUSE OPLAN was quickly modified and approved.

DIA became a part of a joint team within the JCS, consisting of about 30 J3 and 20 J2/DIA people. These individuals would, for the next 3 months, practice all the procedures, plans, communications, and missions that would be used in the actual invasion. Because of General Powell's insistence that there be strict operational security, access to the JUST CAUSE OPLAN was limited to the Director, Deputy Director, and J2 DIA, and the DIA people selected to work on the joint team.

In October, a coup attempt against the Noriega government in Panama caused JUST CAUSE to

U.S. forces moving through Panama during JUST CAUSE.



be updated again as the PDF displayed the capabilities to quickly reinforce units in Panama City. The revised OPLAN called for the requirement for U.S. forces to neutralize simultaneously 27 PDF objectives.

On 15 December 1989, the National Assembly of Panama declared that a state of war existed with the United States and adopted measures to confront foreign aggression. In the days that followed, U.S. servicemembers and dependents were harassed, and a Marine lieutenant was killed. On 17 December, the National Command Authorities (NCA) directed the Joint Chiefs of Staff to execute the JUST CAUSE OPLAN. The JTF at Fort Bragg received the JCS execute order on 18 December with a D-Day and H-Hour of 0100 local, 20 December.

Rear Admiral Ted Shearer, the most involved member at DIA, had a problem. This is how he described it to me:

*"We knew that once the invasion began, we quickly had to stand up a major crisis support organization in DIA Pentagon spaces. We were*

*going to have to have about 50 people from the DIAC available in the Pentagon the night of the invasion . . . beyond people in the JS. The question was, how do I get these people to the Pentagon in the middle of the night without giving away D-Day to all their bosses in the DIAC? We had identified each of the people we needed from the DIAC, by name. General Powell was incredibly security-conscious. If we wanted to clear somebody for the invasion plan, we had to personally go justify it to him. So there weren't many people outside of JS that were cleared for it. I wrestled, unsatisfactorily, trying to figure out how could I get these people to the Ops Center in the Pentagon from the DIAC without alerting everybody in DIA as to when the invasion was. Finally, one of my Navy 06s at our daily Panama planning morning staff meeting, came up with a brilliant idea. And that was, I should call each of these 50 people personally, on a secure phone, 2 days before the invasion, swear them to secrecy, then order each of them to call in sick to the DIAC the day before the invasion, and report to the Pentagon at 2200 that night for the 0100 invasion. It worked. Each of these 50 people called in sick. No one in DIAC caught on to the ruse and the folks*



U.S. law enforcement officers move deposed General Manuel Noriega onto a U.S. Air Force transport. Noriega was brought to the U.S. and convicted of drug trafficking.

*were on station at 0100 when the invasion began. But the next morning, I got some incredibly irate phone calls from some of the SESSs in DIA, castigating me because I didn't have the authority to order their people to do things. And that was certainly true, but this was, in my estimation, a perfectly acceptable exception.”*

Within hours of the launch of JUST CAUSE, President George Bush, Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney, and JCS Chairman Colin Powell were on nationwide television describing to the American public both the objectives and the success of the operation. The operation was con-

ducted as a campaign with limited military objectives. JTF objectives were to:

#### **Operation JUST CAUSE**

1. Protect U.S. lives and key sites and facilities.
2. Capture and deliver Noriega to competent authority.
3. Neutralize PDF forces.
4. Neutralize PDF command and control.

## Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY

1. Support establishment of a U.S.-recognized Panamanian government.
2. Restructure the PDF to support the new Panamanian government.

The combat operations of JUST CAUSE were executed flawlessly with minimal U.S. casualties. All objectives were met with the exception that the wily de facto ruler of Panama, General Noriega, managed to hide from his U.S. military pursuers for several days.

DIA's attachés, particularly Colonels Allan Cornel and Jerry Dunbar, USA; Lieutenant Colonel Dan McGuire, USA; and Mr. Kevin O'Neill would play important roles in the post-JUST CAUSE Operation PROMOTE LIBERTY. In addition, DIA's Research Directorate (DB) was asked to pull together a national (not just intelligence) interagency team to go to Panama to collect, translate, and assimilate the documents that were captured. DIA had been asked by the NSC Staff to do this in anticipation of legal action against Noriega and other important issues. The job fell to DIA to pull the team together, assemble the equipment, man the operation (along with as many volunteers from the other agencies as possible), preserve the evidentiary base, and get some useful strategic intelligence out of the masses of papers. Jerry Margoules and Phil Ferguson were the key DIA leaders for this project.

JUST CAUSE was not a crisis response, but the execution of a deliberate planning effort and response to the death of a Marine Corps officer and the unacceptable detainment and assault of a naval officer and his wife at the hands of an out-of-control PDF.

What the United States, JCS, and DIA did not know at that time was that JUST CAUSE was probably a perfect dress rehearsal for a much big-

ger event looming just over the horizon . . . DESERT STORM.

As more than a postscript to DIA's role in JUST CAUSE, Admiral Ted Sheaffer and the J2, JCS, and DIA people made two other contributions during the timeframe of the late 1980s.

Until spring 1988, the JCS, J3, joint operations center, and the NMIC were collocated in the JCS area in the Pentagon, but were actually in separate facilities operating at different levels of security. The J3 at that time, Lieutenant General Tom Kelly, had a good appreciation for intelligence, and he and Ted Sheaffer worked well together. J3 and J2 each had some programmed funds for renovating and modernizing their operational spaces. Sheaffer and Kelly were able to reach agreement on a new command center in which they could operate together.

It took approximately one year for the renovation to be completed. The result was that the J3 and J2 workspaces were in a common area and at a common TS/SCI security level. And there was no differentiation between what was in each of the computer databases; hence, there was no "green door" between the J2 and J3. This new togetherness between the J2 and J3 was completed just in time for JUST CAUSE.

Parallel to the J2/J3 operations center actions, early in Ted Sheaffer's time as the J2, JCS, DIA, he was briefing Marty Hurwitz, the General Defense Intelligence Program Staff Director on DIA's indications and warning capabilities. Hurwitz asked, "What's wrong with indications and warning?" Sheaffer replied, "We have spent most of our money on the 'indications' piece and virtually nothing on 'warning.' We send warning messages by high-baud-rate telecommunications, but we have no television capability. Defense intelligence needs to be in the television business."

Admiral Sheaffer suggested a name for the system he had in mind: The Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS).

Marty Hurwitz found \$250,000 in defense intelligence funds to prove the concept.

The concept was workable, but Sheaffer had no luck in selling his idea within DIA or throughout the Pentagon. No more money was available. Then a rare opportunity came along. A close-hold, high-level Defense Department operation involving military special forces had been compromised and leaked to the media prior to its execution. Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney was very angry. According to Admiral Sheaffer:

*"We were called up to the SECDEF's office, and present were the Chairman, General Kelly, myself, Under Secretary Wolfowitz, and Secretary Cheney.*

*"The Secretary informed Admiral Crowe, General Kelly, and myself that somehow the information about this operation had leaked to the press, or a little bit of it had. Since there had been no written communications about this, everything had been verbal, Cheney was understandably exercised. He turned to the Chairman and he said, 'I want to fix this. I want to make sure that if we do something, or when we do something like this again, that nothing ever leaks . . . .' This was a Friday afternoon and he said, 'I want you to come back here Monday and tell me how to fix this so that things like this will never leak again . . . and oh, by the way, you can't talk to anybody else; I want the three of you to figure it out.' So, the Chairman turned to General Kelly and myself and said, 'Come back Monday morning and tell us how you are gonna fix it. But, you can't talk to anybody else.' So the following Monday, we went to the Secretary's office and he turned to General*

*Kelly and said, 'OK, what's your answer?' And General Kelly simply said, 'We need to get any and all planning of something like this out of Washington.' And then he turned to me and said, 'OK, Sheaffer, what's your input?' And I said, 'I have the means to do that.' Then I basically explained what JWICS was without calling it JWICS, and said that we needed to set up an interactive communications node with video and voice for both the JTF Commander at Fort Bragg and in Tampa where the Special Operations Command (SOCOM) is located. 'When we have another crisis like this, you can get on the video/conferencing encrypted link, and you can brief both the commander and the executing force on what needs to be done. For this, we will build a mini-TV studio in the NMIC. The forces can go ahead and do all the planning, and then, when they are done with the planning, they can get back and they can brief you on it and show you their charts, their ingress routes, their egress routes, and all the other things that go along with planning. If necessary, it can also go to the White House and no one else will know.' And then, the Secretary turned to me and said, 'OK, Sheaffer, how much will it cost and how long will it take to do this?' And I had no idea. But, also, I was not about to pass up the opportunity to implement what would be the first nodes of JWICS. So, I turned to the Secretary and said, 'Mr. Secretary, give me \$1 million and give me 6 weeks and I'll get it done.' And he did. And thanks to Harris Corporation and the wonderful 7th Air Force Communications Squadron in the Pentagon, we accomplished all of that in less than 6 weeks. And, once people actually saw what JWICS could be in operation, they fell in love with it, and suddenly there were 1,000 fathers of JWICS. I don't really care who takes credit, but today I am proud that there are about 150 nodes of JWICS set up around the world, including mobile units."*

MG Jack Leide, USA,  
speaking in the  
Tighe Auditorium.  
MG Leide was the  
Defense Attaché in  
Beijing at the time of  
Tiananmen Square  
incident.



## TIANANMEN SQUARE

**DIA** had been watching China closely from the first day of its origins at Arlington Hall Station, Virginia. The original small branch contained within it a cadre of civilian analysts who understood China in a broader context, possessing knowledge of politics, history, economics, and foreign policy. During the period of the Cultural Revolution, this unit, headed by Army Colonel Briethaupt, spearheaded DoD's understanding of the role and overall capabilities of the People's Liberation Army (PLA) as it assumed increasing direction over China. Navy Commander Lee Houchins directed DIA's broad-based and essential analytical effort during the most turbulent years of the cultural revolution.

By 1970, significant changes on the international scene impacted heavily on DIA's China Branch. The Sino-Soviet split had broken into the open. China gave signs of concluding its Cultural Revolution and once again looked outward. China's strategic missile force was expanding giving rise to increased analytical focus and debate.

As a result, the Branch's strategic missile analytical element was significantly expanded and assumed the priority status it deserved. It has played a leadership role in the Intelligence Community ever since, accomplishing many cutting-edge analytical assessments and never failing to challenge prevailing Community views.

During the mid-1970s through the late 1980s, DIA's China analytical force possessed strength and diversity found in four separate directorates—current, basic, estimates, and scientific and technical. This arrangement was cumbersome and required intense and effective communication and coordination to fulfill its potential.

Its overriding benefit was to ensure that all aspects of the analytical process were covered and that there was accountability. The role of integrating and balancing this substantive analytical process on critical policy issues fell to the newly established (in 1975), Defense Intelligence Officers, who stood apart from—and senior to—branch and section-level managers. In the Asia and Pacific arena, however, DIA from the outset had an activist role. DIO's role was set from the start by its first incumbent, Charles Desaulniers, who, incidentally, mentored and inspired an active generation of Asia analysts in DIA.

As a result, by the late 1970s and throughout the 1980s and 1990s, DIA's China analytical force captured the market or developed a unique niche for itself in several areas, attesting to its leadership role in the Intelligence Community and its respect within the policy and planning arenas. One directorate or another assumed the lead on a variety of issues and became "mini-centers of excellence" relied upon by both communities. National Intelligence Estimates (NIE) drafters of military estimates often were headed by, or included, DIA assets. Most significantly, DIA accomplished a number of highly sensitive, highly praised studies in support of OSD for the NSC and White House during this period on a wide variety of major policy issues. The DIO played a critical role in this evolution to the extent he could work in cooperation, as opposed to competition, with the managers of these analytical centers of excellence and create the sense of "one DIA team."

From the late 1960s and early 1970s, a new generation of Military Capabilities Analysts devel-

oped in the China Branch under the first-line mentorship of DIA's "first wave" of civilian analysts brought in from the Service staffs. One of these mentors was Eva Watkins. Eva was Chief of DIA's China Order of Battle Section.

Many young analysts benefited from such mentors and went on to assume leadership positions in DIA, the Intelligence Community, policy offices and academic circles. They included (current DIA Director) Tom Wilson (Navy), (Professor) Nicolas Lardy (Pol-Mil/Economics), (Professor) Harvey Nelson (History), (current INR Director) Carl Ford (Ground Forces), Pat Deucy (Navy), Jack Nixon (Pol-Mil and Missiles), and Jay Sloan (Ground Forces). They, in turn, mentored later additions to DIA's workforce, some of whom currently serve as DIA managers and seniors and, as such, are the present-day mentors of DIA's future analytical corps.

From day one, the PLA, was at the center of DIA's analysis. Then, beginning in April 1989, a unique opportunity presented itself to DIA, the U.S. intelligence and diplomatic community, and the rest of the world to observe the PLA in a new role that threatened to fundamentally change the existing leadership and power base in China.

Mourning the sudden death of former Chinese Communist Party chief Hu Yaobang, tens of thousands of students took to Beijing's streets. When the marches turned into political protests, they sparked some of the most dramatic weeks of upheaval in Communist China's recent history. Calling for democracy, an end to corruption, and nepotism, and citing other grievances against the central leadership, the protests became an unprecedented challenge to the Party's authority.

With the internal security forces apparently overwhelmed, China seemed on the edge of a people's revolution. There were calls for the removal from power of senior patriarch Deng Xiaoping,

conservative Premier Li Peng, and military strongman Yang Shangkun. As so often in China's violent history, the country's fate hinged on the army. Would it support the prodemocracy movement and the demands for sweeping reforms? What were the generals' positions in the power struggle rocking the top leadership? Did the army oppose the use of force to restore order? Was the army itself united?

Back in Washington, during April-June time-frame, DIA's China analysts had a two-pronged focus. One was painting a strategic assessment of evolving Sino-Soviet relations and their implications for U.S. policy. The future of the Soviet Union was undergoing intense debate within DIA. Gorbachev's visit to Beijing during this period and its outcome required close attention. The second focus was on China's internal security situation and political-military dynamics. Throughout the 1980s, DIA and DAO were in a unique position to witness the internal struggle between conservatives and reformers in all realms of society. As events unfolded in Shanghai and Beijing during this period, everyone expected dramatic outcomes, perhaps even crisis and lingering disorder, but no one foresaw the actual bloody turn of events that occurred and its long-term negative effects.

As DIA quickly transitioned into a support-to-crisis management mode, the DAO's performance and on-the-spot reporting were heroic and vital to Washington's understanding. Once again, the value of investing in a strong Defense Attaché system paid off when needed most. Major General Jack Leide, USA (Retired), DIA's Defense Attaché in China, provided this account:

*"Students' protests began shortly after Hu Yaobang's death on 15 April 1989. These protests continued and grew by Hu Yaobang's memorial service on 22 April. The leadership debated action, ordered the 38th Group Army to readiness, and by 19 May had begun to ring Beijing with what would eventually total between 150,000 and 200,000"*

*troops. Yet, no direct action was taken. On 13 May, the Soviet Prime Minister Gorbachev arrived in China. On the same day, the hunger strike began in Tiananmen Square. By the 17th of May, Gorbachev left China. On the 18th, Li Peng went to the square, where he was publicly criticized by Wuer Kaixi for being late in coming to see the students. On the 19th of May, Zhao Ziyang went to see the students crying, and told them he could no longer protect them. Martial law was declared, and Zhao was relieved of his office. The students countered by calling for general strikes, which were supported by some party organizations. The leadership, which was in the throes of political struggle, was essentially stalemated until Zhao's ouster. Even after that, they were unable to reach a consensus on using force to restore order forcibly. Thus, although close to 200,000 troops ringed Beijing, the senior leadership could not reach consensus on the degree of force to be used.*

*"Our attaché office became actively involved on 19 May as the BBC reported on the troop movements to the north and west of Beijing. As we secured the streets, we found troops moving on the periphery. Between 19 and 22 May, the troops tried to enter the streets of Beijing. They were stopped by masses of people. After this, the forces withdrew into camps around Beijing's periphery; the real action began on the 2nd of June. Ironically, much of what happened was the result of an accident the day before. On that day, in the Mushidi section west of Beijing, a People's Armed Police (PAP) vehicle lost control and swerved into a crowd, killing three cyclists and wounding a fourth. From what we can tell, the PRC leadership tried one last desperate attempt to clear the square peacefully. At 10:00 p.m., a column of foot soldiers followed by buses and vans tried to enter the city. Unfortunately, due to lack of information, they chose the Western route, where a large crowd of people had gathered for a memorial service for the three slain cyclists. Had they entered from the East, they probably would have made it to the square and cleared it peacefully, since, at that early hour, there were less than a thousand*

*people out. They would also have been joined by forces which emerged from the Great Hall of the People. However, the column of soldiers was stopped by the crowds and eventually forced to retreat. They circled around the city and tried to enter the city from the east an hour or so later; however, by then crowds had thickened to over 100,000 due to word of mouth and the regular increase of demonstrators. Once again, the peaceful effort was stymied and the troops were in retreat. They tried to regroup at the train station and went into the underground metro tunnels to retreat, but were trapped in the tunnels by demonstrators. They did not escape the tunnels until 3:00 on the morning of 3 June.*

*"By 7-8:00 on the evening of the 3d, the PLA once again began to move its forces into the square. Out in the west at the Mushidi area, the first units of a long column were stopped at the sight of the vigil for the cyclists. These units were the 38th Group Army. Their rate of advance was about 100 meters an hour. Behind them, stalled, were a second and third unit, elements of the 65th and the 27th Group Armies. As the 38th bogged down, the 65th tried to get through and was also stopped. Elements of the 27th, bringing up the rear, were given orders to get through at all costs. They were led by about 20 APCs, which went around the other forces, over the sidewalks and people. In the dark and confusion, they went right over elements of the 38th Group Army, which led to bad feelings. The 27th was able to break through and reached the square around 3:00 a.m., 4 June. They joined with forces which emerged from the Great Hall of the People. (Those forces) had probably come in through the underground tunnels from the south. Together, by 4:00 a.m., they had cleared the square. The tanks which attempted to enter from the east began at 9:00 p.m. the previous night, but did not reach the square until 5:00 a.m. This was several hours after the square had been cleared by the forces. The 38th and 65th Group Armies were still bogged down at Mushidi, and, between 6:00 and 9:00 on the morning of the 4th, they began to*

*abandon their APCs and trucks, which were torched by the population. In some cases, the soldiers helped the civilians torch them.*

*“As for the death toll, we know that the Chinese Red Cross estimated that 2,600 had died by the morning of the 4th. Sporadic firing throughout the 5th may have raised the toll slightly higher. However, many people had the mistaken impression that the killing fields were in Tiananmen Square. In fact, they were largely on ingress routes. When Ken Allen went through the Mushidi area after Tiananmen, the walls at shoulder height were a near-continuous area of bullet holes. Estimates are that between 1,000 and 1,500 died in the Mushidi area. Another 500 probably died south of the city at the bridge where the soldiers had to force their way through with bayonets. Another 500 probably died in the area of Tiananmen Square. We know that about 11 were squashed by tanks in the Yubeikou area as they peacefully departed the square. After the square was cleared, the first aid post on the square was abandoned, and it’s likely that a few injured people were left at the post and crushed by the APCs, which came into the town to tear down the statues.*

*“Following the clearing of the square, there was sporadic gunfire for another day. There were also persistent reports of small unit engagements between the 38th and 27th Group Armies. These rumors were probably engendered by the crushing of 38th Group Army soldiers by 27th Army APCs breaking through the impasse at Mushidi. Despite these rumors, we in the DAO were never able to find evidence that they occurred. The city was eventually divided into thirds, with Beijing units patrolling roughly the west and northwest, Shenyang forces patrolling the east and northeast and Jinan forces monitoring the area south of Changan Boulevard.*

*“Between the 5th and 7th, bodies were removed to the crematoriums. By the 7th, the leadership was in enough control to realize the damage their international image had received. Someone decided to remove the diplomats from the equation. On the morning of the 7th, someone shot directly into the Jinguomenwei diplomatic compound. The wife of our OPSCO still tells stories of lying on the floor covering her children while bullets fired in through her windows. We counted 32 bullet holes in the balcony of our new Assistant Naval Attaché. More importantly, most of the bullets entered in a straight line and not an angle which would be associated with someone firing carelessly or randomly from the street below, which was originally thought. Instead, someone was carefully placed in a building directly across the street from our housing, and he shot directly into our apartments. Anyway, this was the event which triggered the decision to evacuate families and U.S. citizens from Beijing. Colonel Wortzel was responsible for this effort, and, at one point, he led a convoy to Tianjin to bring back U.S. citizens. The stories just about getting our people out could make another briefing.*

*“By the 19th of June, we saw the beginnings of the ‘Big Lie’. While it had less effect in Beijing, where people lived through the events, it had a gradual and inevitable effect in the provinces, introducing doubt. I was in the PLA museum watching the faces of the people who watched the PRC’s video version of the Big Lie. There, I could see the anger and ridicule of the film. For months afterward, the PRC also broadcast its video version of the events to foreign visitors in local hotels.”*

The U.S. Embassy was safely evacuated, and all personnel returned shortly after order was restored. Washington-based analysts throughout the intelligence and policy communities had been provided a best set of data.

Ambassador James Lilley, while receiving a post-Tiananmen briefing in the Pentagon on the state of the PLA, praised DIA analysts and the DAO for maintaining a balanced and realistic perspective

on the PLA throughout his tenure as Ambassador. He challenged DIA to stay focused on military capabilities and intentions.



The DIAC, Bolling Air Force Base, at night.

# PART: 5



A U.S. armored column advances through the Iraqi desert during Operation DESERT STORM.

## FROM THE DESERT TO THE BALKANS—THE 1990s

With the end of the Cold War, Defense intelligence began a period of reevaluation following the fall of communism in many of the East European countries, the reunification of Germany, and ongoing economic reforms in the region. During this phase, DIA emphasized improved management of intelligence production DoD-wide as resource reductions once again threatened to negatively impact Agency missions and manpower. Organizationally, DIA adopted the concept of functional management to better address U&S Command intelligence issues. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) was given expanded authority, direction, and control over DIA.

In response to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, DIA set up an extensive, 24-hour crisis management cell designed to tailor national-level intelligence support to the coalition forces assembled to expel Iraq from Kuwait. By the time Operation DESERT STORM began, some 2,000 Agency personnel were involved in the intelligence support effort. Most of them were associated with the national-level Joint Intelligence Center (JIC), which DIA established in the Pentagon to integrate the intelligence produced throughout the Community. DIA sent more than 100 members into the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations to provide intelligence support, and deployed 11 National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMISTs) overseas.

After-action reports later confirmed that no combat commander had ever benefited from as full and complete a view of an adversary as U.S. and Coalition commanders did prior to, and during, DESERT STORM. This DIA-led effort remains one of the greatest examples of intelligence sup-

port to operational forces in modern times. For its achievements during the crisis and conflict, DIA earned a second DoD Joint Meritorious Unit Award. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin L. Powell, attached the streamer to the DIA flag in a special outdoor ceremony at the DIAC on 26 June 1991.

DIA improved crisis management and support to the decisionmaker and warfighter based on experience gained during the Gulf War. The Agency created the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC), replacing the NMIC and retaining many of the positive attributes of the wartime national-level JIC. DIA also significantly expanded its support to the Joint Staff. The Gulf War experience prompted the Agency to improve on its NMIST concept by adding members from other Intelligence Community organizations to the DIA element and redesignating them National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs). The Joint Military Intelligence Board, chaired by the DIA Director, continued its important role after the war, coordinating national intelligence support.

The Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), associated with the Army for over 30 and 50 years respectively, became elements of DIA in January 1992. This was part of the continuing effort to consolidate intelligence production and make it more efficient.

The most fundamental reexamination of U.S. national security policy since the 1940s—precipitated by the end of the Cold War—compelled a widespread review of DIA's role as the Intelligence Community confronted the twin challenges

of a new era of regional conflict and simultaneous reductions in U.S. defense spending.

With intelligence requirements escalating sharply, DIA undertook one of the most profound reorganizations in its history in 1993. This restructuring essentially rebuilt the Agency from the bottom up. In the process, DIA enhanced flexibility, improved cooperation with the Service intelligence organizations, severely reduced management overhead, and refocused on the common intelligence functional areas of collection, production, and infrastructure.

The restructuring brought about an unprecedented level of integration among DIA, the Military Services, and the Combatant Commands. This served the Community well as it surged to provide intelligence support to U.S. and U.N. forces involved in places such as Somalia, the former Yugoslavia, and Haiti. In 1994, DIA received an unprecedented third Joint Meritorious Unit Award for intelligence support during these crises, as well as support to operations in Iraq and Korea.

The newly formed Defense HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Service (DHS) achieved initial operating capability on 1 October 1995. DHS consolidated the HUMINT activities of all the Services under the umbrella of DIA. This new organization reflected the driving need to consolidate and focus downsized resources to maximize the effectiveness of reduced assets. DIA was also designated as the Intelligence Community's executive agent for Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

Once again, DIA lived up to its motto of "***Committed to Excellence in Defense of the Nation.***"

In November 1995, Secretary of Defense William Perry, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Shalikashvili, and Director of Central Intelligence Dr. John Deutsch agreed to consolidate all imagery and mapping functions of DoD and the Intelligence Community into a new Defense

Combat Support Agency to be called the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). It incorporated all of the Central Imagery Office and the Defense Mapping Agency, as well as portions of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, and the imagery personnel and services in DIA. Provisional operations began the following May, and NIMA was formally established on 1 October 1996.

On 25 June 1996, terrorists bombed the U.S. barracks at Khobar Towers, leaving 24 dead and 500 wounded.

In July 1996, DIA analyst Judith Goldenberg was slain in Cairo, Egypt, while on official travel. Her name was added to the Patriots' Memorial, and a special award was created in her honor.

DIA opened seven new Defense Attaché Offices in 1996—Cambodia, Vietnam, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Latvia, Rwanda, and Slovenia.

Under Lieutenant General Hughes, DIA published its first annual Purple Book (A Primer on the Future Threat), a look at the emerging post-Cold War environment. The graphic document was designed to highlight to decisionmakers what may emerge in the next decades of the emerging post-Cold War-techno-info era. It was an effort to facilitate anticipation and to provide a basis upon which to better understand the future.

Secretary of Defense William Perry gave a Joint Meritorious Unit Award to the Defense Intelligence Agency for exceptional service during the period of 2 June 1994 to 30 September 1996. During this period, DIA "significantly increased the efficiency and effectiveness of military intelligence at a time of dramatically declining resources by leading, centrally managing, and integrating the spectrum of Department of Defense Intelligence resources and activities." These improvements in efficiency resulted in major successes, ranging from providing critical

medical intelligence support to the United States and coalition forces participating in numerous joint operations throughout the world to providing battle damage assessments and structural analysis.

On 20 November 1997, President Clinton signed the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 into law, authorizing the Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) to award the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) degree. The college administered the BSI as a senior, fourth-year, degree-completion program for noncommissioned officers and civilian intelligence technicians who had acquired 3 years of college credits, but did not yet have an undergraduate degree. This problem became more important at a time of drawdowns, when NCOs and technicians were being called on to fill positions formerly held by officers and more senior civilians. The Commission on Higher Education began accreditation of the BSI in December 1997.

The Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center (DEFSMAC), an all-source intelligence center jointly operated by DIA and the National Security Agency, after 33 years in one location, moved into a new facility at Fort Meade, Maryland. The organization went from 1960s-vintage watch spaces to a state-of-the-art facility optimized for worldwide instantaneous connectivity. DEFSMAC is DoD's focal point for real-time missile operations, analysis, and reporting of specialized, worldwide, all-source, intelligence data. It provides time-sensitive alerts, initial-event assessments, and mission support to national agencies, national command authorities, Unified Commands, and field-deployed sensor platforms and stations.

On 18 February 1997, Deputy Secretary of Defense White signed DoD Directive 5105.21, the revised "DIA Charter," which updated the responsibilities, functions, relationships, and authorities of the DIA, including responsibilities of the Military Intelligence Board (MIB). This was the first update to the DIA Charter in 20 years. The formal

mission of the Agency, according to the Directive, is to "satisfy, or ensure the satisfaction of, military-related intelligence requirements of the Secretary and Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, other Department of Defense Components, and, as appropriate, non-Department of Defense agencies of the federal government; and provide the military intelligence contribution to national foreign intelligence and counterintelligence."

*"DIA is to support military operations' plans and organizations, humanitarian missions and the full spectrum of intelligence; support national policymaking with the defense intelligence perspective and in the areas of arms control; and provide support to weapons acquisition by threat assessments and weapons exploitation. This support is provided across the full spectrum of conditions—peace, crisis, and wartime."*

SHEPHERD VENTURE, EAGLE VISTA, NOBLE RESPONSE, SHADOW EXPRESS, AUTUMN SHELTER, RESOLUTE RESPONSE, and SAFE DEPARTURE military force deployments to Sub-Saharan Africa made for a busy 1998. They were all supported by the 17 U.S. Defense Attaché Offices responsible for covering the 47 countries of the region.

Terrorists detonated bombs at the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, killing more than 250 people. Twelve of the dead were Americans. Islamic fundamentalists under the leadership of Usama bin Laden were suspected in the attack. Sergeant Kenneth R. Hobson II, Operations Non-Commissioned Officer, USDAO Nairobi, was one of the dead in this terrorist attack. On 13 August, Hobson was posthumously promoted to the honorary rank of Staff Sergeant, effective 7 August, during a ceremony held in the Director's office. Brigadier General Robert A. Harding, Director for Intelligence Operations (DO), attended memorial services in Lamar, Missouri, on 19 August 1998. At the services, Brigadier General Harding presented to Sergeant

Hobson's family the Defense Meritorious Service Medal for service in the Defense Attaché System, the Legion of Merit for career service, and the Purple Heart. DIA held a memorial service on 29 September during the 1998 Defense HUMINT Conference at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center. In Staff Sergeant Hobson's honor, Lieutenant General Hughes redesignated the Joint Military Attaché School Silver Pen Award, which is awarded to the Attaché Staff Operations Course (ASOC) student who prepares the most outstanding research paper. Staff Sergeant Hobson had

been a recipient of that award. The primary ASOC classroom was also dedicated in his honor.

Staff Sergeant Hobson's name was added to the Patriots' Memorial Wall on 29 September 1998.

On 20 August 1998, the U.S. launched cruise missile strikes against "terrorist-related" bases in Afghanistan and a factory in Sudan, saying they were linked to the bombings of U.S. embassies in East Africa.

The BSI program was signed into law in November 1997 and accredited in June 1998. The JMIC



The Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) is a vital link in providing intelligence support to operational forces and policymakers. In 1994, the OICC concurrently supported operations in Haiti and monitoring the Balkan conflicts.

conferred its first 13 BSI degrees at its graduation ceremony in September 1998.

DESERT FOX took place during 16-19 December 1998. It was a 74-hour campaign to punish Iraq for barring weapons inspectors. DoD officials insisted this was a setback for Iraq's ballistic missile programs by 1 to 2 years. It degraded the infrastructure used to conceal WMD programs and reduced the Iraqi regime's ability to exercise command and control over its forces.

The Iraq Intelligence Task Force implemented a 24-hour operational center comprised of Middle East experts in air, ground, naval, and political-military operations from the J2 Intelligence Staff and the Defense Intelligence Agency. Activation of the task force expanded the existing core team of Iraqi experts, allowing developing events in Iraq to be monitored, analyzed, and reported around the clock. The task force supplied timely intelligence that was critical to policymakers and warfighters. It briefed members of the Joint Staff,

Services, Pentagon, and Congress. Task force analysts also prepared special briefings, background papers, and reports on intelligence issues for a varied audience in support of the operation.

In 1999, DIA supported the ALLIED FORCE: NATO air campaign against Serbian forces in Kosovo and Serbia proper. DIA provided targeting and bomb-damage-assessment support for strikes in Serbia and Kosovo (and in Iraq).

During ALLIED FORCE airstrikes, U.S. B-2 bombers mistakenly destroyed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade because Pentagon databases had not been adequately maintained. While the Central Intelligence Agency had been responsible for the incorrect identification of the target, DIA was responsible for maintaining the database that showed—or, in this case, failed to show—that the Chinese Embassy had moved across town 3 years earlier. As a result, the new Director of DIA, Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, made fixing the databases one of his four major thrusts.

General Norman Schwarzkopf, Commander in Chief, Central Command, accepted DIA's assessment that Iraq was about to invade Kuwait and ordered CENTCOM to WATCHCON 1 on 1 August 1990, prior to the start of hostilities. This was the first time a command went to such a level of alert in advance of a conflict.



## DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM

At the beginning of the summer of 1990, Lieutenant General Ed Soyster, the Director of DIA, was still basking in the pride of DIA's intelligence support to JUST CAUSE. He was enjoying how well DIA's role as a Combat Support Agency was working under the Goldwater-Nichols Act of Joint Doctrine vis-à-vis DIA support to U&S Commands.

DIA had a large turnover of people that summer. General Soyster had retired his Deputy Rear Admiral, Ron Marryott, and promoted the J2, JCS, Rear Admiral Ted Sheaffer, to that job. A newly selected Rear Admiral James M. "Mike" McConnell had come to DIA from Hawaii and gone into the J2, JCS—JS job as it was known. In addition, the Director was retiring DIA's most senior civilian, Executive Director Gordon Negus. Many considered Gordon Negus the premier defense intelligence analyst. General Soyster had selected Dennis Nagy, also a brilliant analyst and leader, to take Negus' place as Executive Director.

In the midst of these key personnel turnovers, Soyster did not realize that, in just a few short months, the United States would be heavily involved in the first major conflict since the end of the Cold War, and that DIA, once again, would be called upon to play an important supporting role.

A year earlier, in August 1988, DIA analysts had disseminated an Iraqi invasion of Kuwait scenario to CENTCOM, the U.S. Command responsible for that part of the world. CENTCOM concurred with the analysis. CENTCOM had, in April 1989, assessed that Iraq would be the next likely regional threat in the wake of the Iran-Iraq war. And then, in April 1990, CENTCOM increased its warning level and collection priorities for Iraq. In July, CENTCOM, monitoring the propaganda and dip-

lomatic campaign against Kuwait, again increased its warning status on Iraq.

On 12 July, Kuwaiti leaders were surprised at a speech given by Saddam Hussein accusing Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates in being in complicity with the U.S. and Israel in a plot to cheat Iraq out of billions of dollars in oil revenues.

By 19 July, DIA received its first reports of two Iraqi divisions near the Kuwaiti border.

On 22 July, DIA activated the Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group (IZKUWG) at the Pentagon. As previously mentioned, both DIA and CENTCOM had established the Iraq regional warning problem and assumed watch condition (WATCHCON) level IV in April 1990. DIA raised its WATCHCON to level III on 21 July and to level II on 24 July based on the concentration of Iraqi troops on the Kuwaiti border and the failure of diplomatic initiatives. On 23 July, DIA began twice-daily production of defense special assessments on the developing situation.

Throughout the latter part of July, DIA continued to augment the Operational Intelligence Crisis Center (OICC) at the DIAC to handle the developing crisis. The OICC began providing targeting support to CENTCOM.

The U.S. Defense Intelligence Community followed Iraq's dispute with Kuwait with increasing alarm. DIA tracked Iraq's military buildup along the border with Kuwait and the mediation efforts in the region. During the second half of July, U.S. Defense Intelligence officials began to warn policy officials of the possibility of an Iraqi attack on Kuwait.

On 27 July, DoD approved the Defense Intelligence Officer for the Middle East and South Asia and analysts for the Middle East/Africa Division Directorate of Research to meet with the Kuwaiti Ambassador at the Pentagon and tell him unequivocally that "Iraq is going to invade Kuwait."

On 1 August, DIA analysts confirmed the movement to forward assembly areas of Iraqi artillery units required for offensive operations. Iraqi forces between Al-Basrah and the Kuwaiti border included 8 Republican Guard Divisions, 10 artillery battalions, a force of 150,000 men, and 1,000 tanks.

DIA declared WATCHCON level I on 1 August, the first time any command or agency had assumed this highest level watch condition in advance of a conflict.

On 1 August 1990, coinciding with the release of its formal warning notice, DIA established the Iraqi Regional Intelligence Task Force (ITF) by expanding the IZKUWG. The expanded task force moved into the ITF spaces in the NMIC at the Pentagon. DIA also established a 24-hour all-source crisis collection team to aid the ITF. The OICC was subordinate to the ITF. The DIA Deputy Director for JCS Support (JS), Admiral McConnell, ran the ITF.

At 1:00 a.m., Kuwait time, 2 August, three Iraqi Republican Guard Forces Command (RGFC) divisions attacked across the Kuwaiti frontier. A mechanized infantry division and an armored division conducted the main attack on the south into Kuwait along the Safwan' Abdally axis, driving for the Al-Jahra pass. Another armored division conducted a supporting attack farther west. Almost simultaneously, at 1:30 a.m., a special operations force conducted the first attack on Kuwait City—a heliborne assault against key government facilities. Meanwhile, commando teams made amphibious assaults against the Amir's palace and other key facilities. The Amir was able to

escape into Saudi Arabia, but his brother was killed in the Iraqi assault on the Dasman Palace.

DIA analysts evaluated the Iraqi force in or near Kuwait as sufficient to conduct a successful follow-on attack to Saudi Arabia's oil-rich eastern province.

The invasion occurred overnight in U.S. East Coast time from a Thursday to a Friday morning. General Schwarzkopf, back at his Tampa, Florida, headquarters, got the word from General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Schwarzkopf went to his command center for the latest reports. The Iraqi forces had bypassed the first available oilfield and were striking much deeper into Kuwait. General Schwarzkopf consulted his new intelligence chief, Brigadier General Jack Leide, who had just completed a tour of duty as DIA's U.S. Defense Attaché to China, including the Tiananmen Square incident.

In Kuwait City, the Kuwaiti capital, a member of the CENTCOM staff was awakened in his hotel room earlier that day by the sound of explosions. He ran across the street to the U.S. Embassy and located a radio communications link back to CENTCOM headquarters in Florida. He was quickly on the line with General Leide. "The Iraqis are in Kuwait City," was the message relayed to General Schwarzkopf.

The U.S. Embassy in Kuwait City was less than a mile from many of the most prominent Kuwait government facilities. For the next several hours, from the Embassy roof, Embassy personnel provided full commentary on everything happening around them. They described the tanks, the fighter planes, the helicopters—all were attacking. Then, Iraqi special forces arrived by helicopter at strategic locations throughout the city.

DIA's ground forces analysts were not surprised. The actual Iraqi invasion was strikingly similar to their forecast.

DIA watched the situation deteriorate sharply after Saddam Hussein's 17 July speech. DIA concluded on 27 July—when the Republican Guards logistics convoy was spotted—that an invasion must be imminent.

Much of what DIA knew about events in Iraq and Kuwait after 2 August 1990—when Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait—came from U.S. Defense Attachés still serving in Baghdad and Kuwait City. Other Americans—military and civilian—who happened to be there when the Iraqis arrived became excellent sources of information for DIA. Staff officers assigned to CENTCOM, but temporarily in Kuwait providing logistic assistance to the Kuwaiti military, established phone contact with the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. They gave detailed reports on Iraqi military personnel and weapons that they saw in Kuwait City, their movements, and other activities. There was not an accredited military attaché, so their reports entailed special risk. Some were so valuable they were brought to the attention of the Secretary of Defense and White House. They became an assistant of sorts to gather information and anything else of value before all official Americans in Kuwait City were evacuated to Baghdad.

The U.S. government planned to evacuate the Embassy by road convoy from Baghdad to the Jordanian border. The U.S. Embassy made arrangements with Iraqi authorities permitting small groups—four or five people at a time—to leave the country. Last to leave on 27 September 1990 were staff members of the U.S. Defense Attaché Office in Baghdad and other Embassy officials. Iraq could have taken them prisoner as they attempted to leave the country; it would have been a real blow to the United States. But the Iraqis let them go.

Upon his return to Washington, DC, the Embassy's Defense Attaché briefed the Chairman of the JCS, General Colin Powell, and congressional leaders on his recent firsthand experience with Iraq and the Iraqi Army. A lively debate commenced on Capitol

Hill that mirrored the one inside the Pentagon and the White House. How tall is Saddam Hussein? How tall are those battle-hardened soldiers in Saddam's million-man army?

Many government officials thought a bloody, protracted war would be needed to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait.

*"Without warrant or warning, Iraq has struck brutally at a tiny Kuwait, a brazen challenge to world law. Iraq stands condemned by a unanimous U.N. Security Council ... President Bush's taste for bluntness stands him in good stead: 'Naked Aggression!' is the correct term for President Saddam Hussein's grab at a vulnerable, oil-rich neighbor."*

*New York Times*  
3 August 1990

On 4 August, the DIA Deputy Director for Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) support, Rear Admiral Mike McConnell, accompanied the Secretary of Defense; the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and the Commander-in-Chief, Central Command (CINCCENT) to Camp David, Maryland, to brief President Bush on the situation in Kuwait and the potential threat to Saudi Arabia. On 5 August, the President sent the Secretary of Defense to Saudi Arabia to brief King Fahd on U.S. perceptions and to offer American forces to help defend the Kingdom. The next day, King Fahd invited U.S. forces to Saudi Arabia, marking the start of Operation DESERT SHIELD.

Thus began one of the larger efforts in the history of the U.S. Intelligence Community. The subsequent effort reflected the investment of billions of dollars in technology and training and the contributions of thousands of intelligence professionals, both military and civilian, from a variety of agencies and staffs. These quality people were often the key. When systems or procedures proved inadequate or too cumbersome, the problems were remedied by innovative solutions and hard work.

DIA analysts working on the vast amount of material to support operations in Iraq. In addition to the elements in the Washington, DC, area, DIA sent 100 people to the Joint Intelligence Center in Riyadh.



Operation DESERT SHIELD began on 7 August, when the President ordered the deployment of U.S. Forces to Saudi Arabia.

Even before the beginning of DESERT SHIELD, DIA began outfitting National Military Intelligence Support Teams (NMISTs) to deploy with operational forces and to allied nations. NMISTs provided rapid response and the capacity for deployed forces to request time-sensitive intelligence from the national level. Through their secure-voice, text, and imagery transmission capabilities, the NMISTs played a critical support role in the early phase of the Gulf War by coordinating intelligence activities.

DIA constituted and trained eight new NMISTs to extend the three teams already in existence. Of the 11, DIA deployed 9 to corps and component level in the theater of operations. In a clear acknowledgement of their importance, CENTCOM included NMIST as part of the first contingent of U.S. units to arrive in the region. These self-con-

tained teams provided the first secure-voice link to the Gulf.

NMIST had self-contained satellite communications equipment providing direct connectivity to DIA for the submission of Request for Information (RFI) and the direct dissemination of intelligence information and imagery to the theatre. The NMIST network was to prove crucial to the CENTCOM J2, the component and subunified command intelligence staffs, and the national Intelligence Community. These teams were vital sources of timely information, to include imagery, especially when the existing communications circuits between the United States and the theater became saturated with operational message traffic.

The OICC provided DIA augmentees to the first NMIST on 5 August. This team deployed with the Central Air Force (CENTAF) to Riyadh on 7 August. DIA sent out additional NMISTs to the XVIII Airborne Corps, Marine Central Command (MARCENT), and Navy Central Command

(NAVCENT) on 8 August. Seven more teams deployed during DESERT SHIELD and played a critical role in the early phase by coordinating intelligence activities.

On 10 August, the DIA representative to CENTCOM deployed with the headquarters elements to Riyadh, one of only two civilians General Schwarzkopf allowed to permanently deploy with him.

In late August, Secretary Cheney tasked DIA to provide him a background paper on what was going on in Baghdad and on Saddam's likely future action. A paper was prepared by the DIO for the Middle East. When the Secretary read the paper, he scheduled a meeting with General Soyster and his "experts" to discuss the information contained in the DIA paper. Secretary Cheney's staff informed General Soyster that the Chairman, General Powell, and the National Security Adviser, General Brent Scowcroft, would also be present. General Soyster, the DIA DIO for the Middle East, an analyst from the National Defense University, a former Defense Attaché to Baghdad, and the DIA Assistant DIO for the Middle East were in attendance. The meeting, scheduled for 30 minutes, lasted two-and-a-half hours.

DIA's foreign area experts on Iraq were able to impart to the three key government officials their best thinking on Saddam's future actions. All present would play important roles in the upcoming war. The youngest member of the group would soon have the opportunity of an important, up-close-and-personal role in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM.

As the scope and size of its support to DESERT SHIELD grew, DIA established a Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center (DoDJIC) in the Pentagon at the request of the CJCS. It became fully operational with DIA, Army, and Navy personnel on 2 September. The Air Force added their manning on 6 September, and NSA joined later.

The DoDJIC provided a single, integrated DoD intelligence position to national decisionmakers

and the theater commander. The DoDJIC was a landmark effort; for the first time, analysts from DIA and the Intelligence Community were organized in one location in one chain-of-command and focused on one DoD, all-source intelligence position.

During the early months of Operation DESERT SHIELD and throughout Operation DESERT STORM, CENTCOM and DIA collection managers, working in close coordination with other Intelligence Community elements, optimized U.S. national collection systems against CENTCOM intelligence requirements.

By 2 September, the ITF consisted of 62 DIA personnel from the Directorate for JCS Support (JS) and Directorate for Foreign Intelligence (VP) providing order of battle, briefing maps, information for the Defense Special Assessments (DSAs), and responses to written and telephonic inquiries. The organization had an analytical cell that focused on analyzing and reporting Iraqi political-military issues, provided three DSAs and an order of battle message daily, and conducted briefings for the OSD/JCS staffs and senior DIA personnel. By this time, the OICC manning levels had increased from 6 to 125 people around the clock.

Subordinate to the ITF, DIA charged the DoDJIC with the mission of fusing current multidiscipline information from all national-service intelligence agencies and organizations. This short-suspense intelligence was tailored for both theater and Washington consumers. DIA activated the DoDJIC to complement the indepth research and analysis, targeting and operational support, and strategic intelligence provided by the OICC.

The DoDJIC provided analysis on current Iraqi OB within the Kuwaiti Theater of Operations (KTO), satisfying requests for information from CENTCOM and Washington policymakers. DIA further defined the DoDJIC's area of responsibility as air, air defense, ground, and naval OB information on Iraqi forces in the KTO south of 31 degrees North.

After DIA established the DoDJIC, the OICC picked up responsibility for Iraqi current OB outside the KTO north of 31 degrees North, in addition to information on the Coalition forces, and indepth research requirements previously discussed. The DoDJIC's focus was current and short-fuse, while that of the OICC was long-range and indepth.

The Intelligence Community initially had difficulty with the volume of intelligence requirements to support the large scale of Operation DESERT SHIELD/STORM. During the early stages of Operation DESERT SHIELD, national agencies produced a large amount of duplicative, even contradictory, intelligence. Both the JCS and CENTCOM recognized the need for some order in a Defense Intelligence Community consisting

of more than 30 producers. DIA assumed this new wartime role of military intelligence production guidance and deconfliction—addressing order of battle, targeting, imagery exploitation, estimates, and battle damage assessment (BDA) issues. The Military Intelligence Board assisted DIA in this task of sorting out intelligence support.

Under DIA guidance, Service intelligence staffs and organizations refocused ongoing production to complement the national agencies' efforts. The Army Intelligence Agency produced detailed analysis of Iraqi doctrine and tactics, drawing on the lessons of the Iran-Iraq war. The Army Intelligence Agency, in cooperation with DIA, produced thousands of copies of an unclassified "How They Fight" booklet for distribution to deploying US forces. This booklet contained Iraqi equipment



A B-52G Stratofortress bomber aircraft of the 1708th Bomb Wing takes off on a mission during Operation DESERT STORM.

descriptions, Iraqi tactics, and drawings of typical Iraqi defensive positions. The Army Intelligence Agency also produced map overlays of actual defensive positions of Iraqi divisions in the KTO. These templates were valuable tools for unit-level intelligence officers during the ground campaign. Often, these products were of greater detail and accuracy than captured Iraqi overlays of the same positions. Templates were distributed to all Coalition forces involved in the ground campaign.

The Navy Operational Intelligence Center (NOIC) supported the maritime campaign by providing merchant shipping analyses directly to maritime interdiction forces. This was supported by a major Intelligence Community effort to provide information about ship movements to assist in maritime interdiction operations. NOIC's Crises Action Team, working with the Marine Corps Intelligence Center, developed special support projects for amphibious warfare planning in the I Marine Expeditionary Force (MEF) area. The Navy Technical Intelligence Center produced two versions of a "Persian Gulf Fact Book" on the characteristics of Iraqi and Iranian naval systems, and provided quick-reaction exploitation of Iraqi mines encountered in the Persian Gulf.

The Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence produced an "Iraqi Threat Reference Guide," and the Air Force Foreign Technology Division provided indepth studies on the characteristics, capabilities, and weakness of top-line Iraqi fighter aircraft, such as the MiG-29 and F-1.

The Military Intelligence Board (MIB) was an advisory and decisionmaking body chaired by the Director, DIA, and made up of Service Intelligence Chiefs and the Director, NSA. During its support of DESERT SHIELD, the MIB also included nonvoting representatives of the Joint Staff Directorate of Command, Control, and Communications (J-6) and the Defense Support Project Office. The MIB convened weekly to coordinate intelligence support and assign scarce resources. It addressed theater shortfalls as identi-

fied by the CENTCOM J2 and coordinated the deployment of needed personnel, equipment, and systems to support operations in the Gulf. The MIB also played a key role during the early stages of the Gulf Crisis in coordinating UN sanctions enforcement.

It was now October 1990. General Norman Schwarzkopf at CENTCOM had two big jobs: defend Saudi Arabia from Iraqi forces now digging in along the Saudi-Kuwaiti border, and—very soon—develop an offensive plan that could eject the Iraqis from Kuwait. A defense could be mounted at relatively low risk. But going on the offensive would be much more expensive and tricky. It also meant the United States had to know which Iraqis would fight, how hard they would fight—and for how long?

General Schwarzkopf, now at his CENTCOM-Forward headquarters in Riyadh, capital of Saudi Arabia, needed an Arabic-language interpreter and adviser on Arab military planning. Major General Leide, General Schwarzkopf's intelligence director, suggested a military one. General Soyster at DIA knew the perfect candidate, Captain Rick Francona, USAF, an Arab linguist and foreign-area expert on his staff.

Francona was on the Air Force promotion list for future promotion to major, but his promotion (frocked) date was made effective immediately.

Major Francona, had recent and unique experience in Iraq that would be of great value to General Schwarzkopf and CENTCOM intelligence. In 1987 and 1988, the officer, fluent in Arabic, participated in a rare cooperative effort between the U.S. Department of Defense and Iraqi military intelligence. He was permitted almost free run of the battlefields of the Iran-Iraq war. Just before the final victorious Iraqi offensive, he examined Iraqi fortifications in Iraq's Al-Faw Peninsula—including how the Iraqis laid out obstacles and minefields, how they dug their trenches, and how they placed their artillery.



An M-1A1 Abrams main battle tank of the 3rd Brigade, 1st Armored Division, VII Corps moves across the desert in northern Kuwait during Operation DESERT STORM.

Before the invasion of Kuwait in 1990, Major Francona was one of a handful of American officers who had actually been in an Iraqi trench during combat operations. But, more important, he was personally acquainted with many top Iraqi military intelligence leaders and familiar with the strengths and weaknesses of their units. He knew above all that most Iraqi Army units could not stand up against a combined arms attack with the full weight of American military power behind it.

The question was whether the full weight of American military power would ever be used against Iraq. Only President George W. Bush could balance the risks and potential costs. General Schwarzkopf's plans promised success

against Iraq—but only if substantial U.S. reinforcements from the Continental United States and Europe were provided.

The plan—as it evolved—called for two U.S. Marine divisions to thrust directly into Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Simultaneously, a joint Saudi-Muslim force would attack north up the Kuwait coast. Out to the west, the U.S. XVIII Airborne Corps, with the French 6th Division, would attack north toward the Euphrates River. The main thrust—by the tank-heavy U.S. VII Corps from Germany, the U.S. 1st Infantry Division, and the British 7th Armored Division—would swing far to the west and envelop all of Kuwait. This was to be known as Operation DESERT STORM.

But in early October 1990, many of these forces were still on the way to the region from all over the world. It might be December before all the forces were in place. The decision to deploy others had not yet been made. General Powell asked General Schwarzkopf to send a team back to Washington to brief the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and perhaps the President about this high-risk offensive plan.

General Schwarzkopf selected his briefing team: his chief of staff, Army Major General Bob Johnston; Air Force Brigadier General Buster Glosson (who was building the air-attack plan for DESERT STORM); his chief of Schwarzkopf's ground forces planning team at CENTCOM-Forward; and Major Francona, the expert on Iraqi military affairs. Schwarzkopf said he couldn't go to Washington because it wouldn't look right to the Saudis to leave at that time.

General Schwarzkopf also bluntly told Major Francona and others to present President Bush the CENTCOM briefing: to tell him about the Iraqi positions on the map, to explain Iraqi capabilities, and to give General Schwarzkopf's views on the Iraqis' willingness to fight. If he heard that any of them had ventured their own opinions to the President, he would have them thrown out of their particular service. The general laughed. Now that he had their attention, were there any questions? There were none.

Major Francona and the others closely reviewed the briefing to make sure they could voice exactly the points General Schwarzkopf wanted to make to the President. The general could liberate Kuwait with what he had in Saudi Arabia (as of early October) but it would be very costly in American lives. General Schwarzkopf wanted President Bush to send the U.S. Army's tank-heavy VII Corps from Germany to Saudi Arabia. The VII Corps had been based in Europe since the end of World War II and was modernized with the Army's latest high-tech warfighting equipment. Moving it would be logistically difficult and expensive, and would have global strategic conse-

quences for the United States. But providing it for Operation DESERT STORM was the only way General Schwarzkopf could apply overwhelming force against Iraq.

After arriving in Washington, the team briefed the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before briefing the President. Major Francona presented the intelligence overview and covered the Iraqi forces in Kuwait. Though the 50 Iraqi divisions in Kuwait presented a formidable force, they were not all manned at 100-percent levels. Some were manned at only 65 percent. Although this still presented a formidable foe, a coordinated force of U.S. airpower and the "air-land-battle" strategy developed in the 1970s by the U.S. Army to defeat the Soviets in Europe could destroy, outflank, or outmaneuver the Iraqi formations.

The following morning, the team was driven to the White House, where they met General Powell and Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney. The President and Vice President Dan Quayle were ready to hear what General Schwarzkopf's representatives had to say. Major Francona briefed the Iraqi positions in Kuwait as they had done the previous day, noting that he had seen evidence of similar trenches in the Al-Faw Peninsula of Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war.

President Bush asked several questions about the Iraqi defense lines and about Iraqi troop morale in Kuwait. Major Francona answered that Iraqi morale appeared to be low, based on information of the few deserters that was available. The President then asked Major Francona whether he thought the Iraqis in Kuwait would fight if attacked, or whether we could bring enough destruction down on them from the air that they would surrender?

Major Francona was on the spot. General Schwarzkopf had ordered them to refrain from expressing personal opinions. So Major Francona said General Schwarzkopf's opinion was that the Iraqis would fight if attacked. But President Bush

wasn't satisfied with that answer. You've been to Iraq, the President asked, what do you think?

Major Francona looked over at General Schwarzkopf's Chief of Staff, Major General Johnston for guidance. He is the President, General Johnston said quietly. General Powell, the Chairman, leaned into Major Francona's field of view and nodded affirmatively. Major Francona decided he would speak freely and take his chances with General Schwarzkopf later.

Major Francona told President Bush that the average Iraqi soldier in those Kuwaiti trenches had been in trenches like that for more than 8 years, including the Iran-Iraq war. That soldier would fight if we attacked him, but he would not fight very hard to defend Kuwait. If Coalition forces

did enough damage by air attack before they entered Kuwait on the ground, many of those Iraqi soldiers would surrender.

But there was another kind of Iraqi soldier—those in Saddam Hussein's Republican Guard—many of whom were now deployed from northern Kuwait protecting the Iraqi border. These were elite forces with the most modern tanks, the best training and morale. They would definitely fight hard. They would fight even harder as Coalition forces reached Iraq and entered it.

President Bush listened to the entire briefing team—including Brigadier General Glosson and others—and then asked the key question. Were the limited American ground forces now scheduled to go to the region sufficient to liberate



Iraqi tanks, armored personnel carriers, and trucks destroyed in a Coalition air attack litter a road in the Euphrates Valley near the end of Operation DESERT STORM.

Kuwait? After some discussion with General Powell and Secretary Cheney, the President came to understand that a direct ground attack might be the best available option, but it might cost significant American casualties.

The President looked thoughtful. What you're telling me is that Schwarzkopf needs more forces, right? Powell assured the President that General Schwarzkopf could execute the plan as briefed, but the arrival of additional U.S. forces would assure Kuwait would be liberated with far fewer casualties. An additional Army corps with up to four more divisions would handle it. President Bush said he had some decisions to make and he excused himself.

Major Francona and the rest of the briefing team returned to Riyadh, where General Schwarzkopf threw nobody out of the service for venturing a personal opinion to the President of the United States.

On 8 November, the President announced the deployment of additional U.S. forces into the theater. Forces moved during this phase included more than 400 U.S. Air Force aircraft; 3 additional U.S. Navy aircraft carriers; the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized), plus an armored brigade from the United States; and the VII Corps from Germany, which included 2 armored divisions and an armored cavalry regiment.

Once CENTCOM established itself in-theater and its mission changed (in November) to one of preparing for offensive operations, the arrangements for providing operational and tactical intelligence changed as well. The MIB concluded that General Schwarzkopf needed an in-theater intelligence organization responsive to his warfighter needs. They felt he needed his own joint intelligence center to produce current intelligence from national and theater assets.

Once the MIB decided CENTCOM needed its own JIC, it sent high-level teams of intelligence

and communications experts to examine CENTCOM's in-theater needs and make recommendations on wartime organization. Those teams had to be careful not to give CENTCOM the impression that they were telling the theater commander how to run his operation. In the end, they provided recommendations for an effective theater intelligence architecture. And the MIB designated the personnel, equipment, and systems necessary to support these recommendations.

The value of the MIB was in coordinating actions and focusing the military intelligence community. Since all the Military Departments and NSA were voting members, once the MIB made a decision, the Services considered it binding. The pressure and sense of urgency during the Gulf War caused the system to get focused on what was important. Because the MIB stepped up and became a dynamic, coordinated, and demanding organization concerned with resolving problems, it secured a more significant role for the future.


By 26 December, DIA had deployed 100 personnel to the CENTCOM-Forward JIC in Riyadh. And, within the JIC, DIA established a Joint Intelligence Production Center.

The 15 January U.N. deadline for the Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait passed, and, on 17 January, the DESERT STORM Coalition Air Campaign commenced. Late that same month, DIA established a POW/MIA Operations Center to track Coalition POW/MIA and captured journalists and to provide information to U.S. Rescue Forces.

On 24 February, the Coalition ground campaign began. And by 28 February, the Iraqis had been routed and the Coalition forces were victorious. At the cessation of hostilities, the DIA ITF consisted of 634 personnel, with 394 working in the Pentagon and 240 working in the OICC at the DIAC.

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM provided a significant challenge to DIA

U.S. Forces march triumphantly through New York City following Operation DESERT STORM.



and to the defense intelligence community. During the early stages of DESERT SHIELD, the United States and its allies faced a significant threat with only a limited infrastructure and minimal command, control, communications, and intelligence assets in the region. During DESERT STORM, Coalition forces swiftly liberated Kuwait and defeated the fifth largest army in the world without suffering significant losses.

The United States and its allies benefited tremendously from superior national and theater intelli-

gence during the war. Intelligence was recognized as a significant force multiplier and contributed directly to the Coalition victory and the speed with which it was achieved.

Literally thousands of DIA members across the entire Agency served tirelessly, selflessly, and successfully, the warfighters in the desert. Their most meaningful reward was from the words of those they served:

As DIA Director LTG Ed Soyster looks on, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, GEN Colin Powell, USA, places the streamer for DIA's second Joint Meritorious Unit Award on the colors at an award ceremony in 1991. DIA received this award for its outstanding performance in Operations DESERT SHIELD/STORM.



*“No combat commander has ever had as full and complete a view of his adversary as did our field commander. Intelligence support to Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM was a success story.”*

*General Colin Powell, USA  
Chairman  
Joint Chiefs of Staff*

*“The great military victory we achieved in DESERT STORM and the minimal losses sustained by U.S. and Coalition forces can be directly attributed to the excellent intelligence picture we had on the Iraqis.”*

*General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA  
Commander in Chief  
Central Command*



The J2 provides critical analysis to the JCS, the Secretary of Defense, and other policymakers. President Clinton meets with Secretary of Defense William Perry, the CJCS GEN John Shalikashvili, and other senior leaders in the JCS spaces in the Pentagon in the mid-1990s.

## DIRECTOR, J2, MIB ROLES

When DIA began operating on 1 October 1961 with 25 members, the DIA charter stated that the agency was to fill a critical need for a central producer and manager of intelligence for the Defense Department. In doing that, the charter said that DIA supported the Secretary of Defense . . . and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). The J2, JCS organization at the time was officially eliminated, and DIA assumed the new and combined responsibility for the support of the JCS and the Secretariat. The question immediately arose whether the Director of DIA was also the J2, JCS; or whether the J2 was a one- or two-star officer who performed the JCS or JS mission for DIA as the function was known over the years.

The second Director of DIA, General Don Bennett, was the first to recognize the dilemma of supporting equally the Secretary of Defense and his staff and the Chairman and the Joint Staff when he said, "This was my several hats challenge . . . that is working for two different people at the same time." General Bennett's answer was to make sure that he "spoke the truth, and nothing but the truth, all of the time to both." Each of the DIA Directors leading up to the time of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM handled the Director DIA/J2 responsibilities differently. However, in the main, they felt that the DIA Director needed to also be the JCS J2 and be recognized as such. The problem(s) came when the Director was carrying out his head of agency responsibilities. He could be out of the country visiting a foreign counterpart when a crisis came along and he was needed by the JCS or Chairman in Washington. In those cases, the full-time JS or J2 function flag officer sitting in the DIA spaces within the JCS became the de facto J2 for the JCS; or, in some

cases over the years, the Deputy Director, DIA, filled in for the absent Director.

During the first half of General Soyster's tenure, it was normal for the DIA Director (when in town) to sit at the table as the J2, JCS, with the Chiefs of the Joint Staff and the Chairman during the morning intelligence briefing at the Pentagon in the JCS "tank" or briefing conference room. The JS, DIA officer would sit in the back of the room with a limited number of key JCS staff. When the Director, DIA, was absent, the JS, DIA officer would move forward to the Chairman's table. This method was functional, but always raised the question of whether the Chairman was comfortable dealing with two officers carrying out the important J2 role via a single point of contact.

During the crisis-management, high-operational tempo of DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, General Soyster immediately recognized that, for the sake of continuity, a better arrangement for supporting the Chairman at the JCS would be to have Admiral Mike McConnell act fully as the J2, JCS. The admiral would take the DIA seat at the Chairman's morning briefings, and would be the DIA flag officer available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week, to the Chairman of the JCS. That approach gave JCS full-time, dedicated, uninterrupted intelligence support and allowed the Director to devote more of his time to running DIA and orchestrating the larger defense, U&S Command, and Military Services support mission.

Ed Soyster sought and received the approval of JCS Chairman General Colin Powell for the change in Director/J2 DIA roles. This shift also allowed General Soyster to reinforce an important role that the Director, DIA, had had since DIA's

inception—as Chairman of the MIB. Under General Soyster's leadership, the MIB, as the senior Military Intelligence coordinating body, probably achieved its highest effectiveness during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. Prior to the Gulf War, the MIB generally met and acted on monthly routine matters. Often, the MIB proceedings were characterized by the differing Service positions and difficulty in reaching consensus decisions. The pressure and sense of urgency during the Gulf War—along with the DIA Director and his dynamic J2, Admiral McConnell—caused the system to focus on what was needed and important to support the war effort. The man who signed the letter directing the establishment of the MIB in the 1960s, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gilpatrick, would be proud of the MIB's accomplishments.

In the aftermath of DESERT STORM, the wartime actions of General Soyster and DIA regarding the Director/J2 role were reexamined in the larger DIA organizational context.

Some in the JCS suggested breaking away the J2 function from DIA and making it a separate, three-star, flag officer billet. The DIA leadership, and the senior leadership in both the JCS and Defense Department realized that it would be foolish to break away the J2 from DIA in that DIA was the primary source of intelligence information, analysis, and resources. More importantly, DIA, backing up the J2 function, made possible the surge capability demonstrated during DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and, for example, the CAJIT before it.

However, from the perspective of Ed Soyster and the DIA leadership, it made sense to further strengthen the J2. The end result was an action that, in November 1991, the JS was redesignated and given a significantly wider mission. The J2 billet was increased from one-star to two-star rank. Some billets were added to the J2 and the NMIC and the NMIC was converted to the

National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC).

In another initiative aimed at more efficient intelligence support to the CINCs, DIA folded the functions of Command Support into the J2. Admiral McConnell championed this move. Command Support's programs in support of the CINCs had been very effective, but Admiral McConnell felt they could be run more efficiently by the J2. The J2 was in touch with the daily substance of intelligence support to the CINCs. It made sense to combine this with the programmatic and institutional aspects of support to the commands.

DIA retained both the OICC and ITF as crisis support organizations. Both proved of great value and benefited from structural improvements based on experience gained during the Gulf War.

In yet another initiative coming out of the Gulf War, General Soyster elected not to replace his departing Deputy, Rear Admiral Ted Shearer, with a military officer, but to promote his Executive Director, Dennis Nagy, to the second-ranking position in DIA. He made this a permanent change to the DIA organization and at the same time, changed the Executive Director position to become the DIA Chief of Staff. Thus, the opportunity for upward mobility and key leadership positions for civilians in DIA was further strengthened. Mr. A. Denis Clift, of *Soviet Military Power* fame, was selected to be DIA's first civilian Chief of Staff. Denis Clift brought 13 years of White House and 10 years of DIA executive experience to DIA's third-ranking position.

Admiral Mike McConnell, DIA, and other Agency people in the surge-expanded JS/J2 were certainly among the heroes of DESERT STORM. In his always modest way, McConnell mentioned one of the unsung heroes:

*"My view is the Military Intelligence Board came of age in the DESERT SHIELD/STORM effort. . . . The pressure and the heat of the Gulf*

*War caused the system to become really focused on what we are going to do. . . . Because the MIB stepped up and became a dynamic, coordinated, demanding group of people to resolve problems, I think it all came of age. It would have been a big mistake not to capitalize on that. I think when we went from DESERT SHIELD to DESERT STORM, we got more utility out of the MIB. General Soyster [Director, DIA] grabbed hold of it and I think it really established itself as a viable, useful part of the structure—a useful decisionmaking body that could get things done. Its future is assured if it keeps doing what it achieved in DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM.”*

DESERT STORM remains one of the greatest examples of intelligence support to operational commanders in modern times. DIA led all the efforts which resulted in the largest and most effective intelligence force fielded since Vietnam. DIA-led teams developed the architecture for the theater, went to the theater to develop the implementation plans, and arranged through the JCS for the deployment of assets to implement the plan. DIA assumed tasking control of all national collection assets to the CINC CENTCOM and provided intelligence analysis for the National Command Authority, the CINC, and tactical formations. DIA deployed numerous NMIST teams, which served as connectivity to Washington down to the division level.

DESERT STORM was in many ways a milestone for military intelligence. The United States went into the conflict with its traditional allies, UK and Australia, but then added new wartime allies such as the Saudis, the Syrians, and the newly independent Czechs.

As a management concept, the MIB became the de facto board of directors for all of the national and DoD efforts to support the war.

When General Soyster retired from DIA in September 1991, he left with the pride and knowledge that, during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, more than 2,000 DIA members had directly supported the Gulf War, and that every element of DIA and its workforce had been involved. General Soyster was the crisis manager—Director of DIA. His legacy was a simple one: Support to the warfighter!

*The relationship between intelligence on the one hand, and policy and decisionmaking on the other, are of course of crucial importance, and deserve special mention. The purpose of intelligence is to make the best possible information available to those who make policy. In time of war, this task is clear and accepted by all concerned; the main criterion for the selection of items of intelligence is obvious—relevance to the conduct of war.*

*Sir Kenneth Strong in Intelligence at the Top*



The Defense Intelligence Analysis Center, Bolling Air Force Base. Dennis Nagy led the Directorate of Research from the DIAC in the 1980s and would serve as DIA's only civilian Director.

## DENNIS NAGY ACTING



Mr. Dennis Nagy

When Lieutenant General Ed Soyster retired from DIA in September 1991, Mr. Dennis Nagy was appointed Acting Director for the interim period from September through November 1991, the only civilian to be so named. In this capacity, he provided continuity during a critical time when decrements against Agency resources caused reconsideration of many managerial issues and review of traditional threat priorities throughout the Defense Intelligence Community. He served until Lieutenant James R. Clapper, Jr., assumed the directorship.

Dennis Nagy was an obvious choice for Deputy Director and Acting Director of DIA based on his

professional expertise and demonstrated leadership abilities in his many years of service. He began his career with DIA in 1969 as an intelligence analyst. He was one of Danny Graham's early standout estimators in the newly re-formed Directorate for Estimates (DE). He was the principal drafter of numerous Departmental and National Estimates. His service with DE culminated in being twice selected as manager of the annual National Intelligence Estimate on Soviet strategic nuclear forces. In late 1980, Mr. Nagy became a DIA executive. In 1981, Mr. Nagy personally directed the development of the first issue of *Soviet Military Power*, the Department of Defense annual publication on Soviet military policies and forces. In 1985, Dennis Nagy held the position of Chief of the Directorate for Research (DB), DIA's largest single military intelligence production organization. He also served as the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) Functional Manager for General Military Intelligence and as Chairman of the Council of Defense Intelligence Producers and the Military Targeting Committee.

On 24 May 1990, Dennis Nagy was appointed DIA Executive Director, elevating him to the Agency's Command Element and ranking him as the Agency's senior civilian.

Awards which Mr. Nagy received over the years include the Director's Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service, the National Intelligence Medal for Achievement, and the Presidential Rank Award for Executive Service.

A United States Air Force Academy graduate and former USAF pilot, Dennis Nagy was one of several outstanding DIA civilians who, over the

years, tirelessly worked to better DIA's professional capabilities and reputation and to strengthen the bond and partnership between the uniformed military and the professional intelligence civilians serving at DIA. Dennis Nagy led by example and was inspirational to others in his work ethic. He followed in the footsteps of two other outstanding DIA senior civilians—John Hughes and Gordon Negus. Intelligence analysis

was their forte, and Dennis Nagy, in the many important positions he held in DIA, continued to raise the bar for professional intelligence standards of excellence.

After General Clapper became the Director of DIA, Mr. Nagy continued to serve with distinction as Deputy Director until 1994.



Dennis Nagy (right) and Gordon Negus share a light moment at the DIAC. Both Nagy and Negus rose through the ranks of the Agency to positions of authority.



Following the appointment of Lt Gen James Clapper as the Director of DIA in late 1991, Dennis Nagy continued to serve as Deputy Director until 1994. Lt Gen Clapper stands at left with Mike Munson, the former Deputy Director for Resources; Nagy; and Emmett Paige, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence.



Lt Gen James Clapper (left) with Ted Picott, a distinguished visitor, and Erv Logan at the DIAC. Clapper worked hard to improve diversity and increase opportunities throughout the Agency.

## JIM CLAPPER AND THE MANAGEMENT OF CHANGE



Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF

Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, served as Director of DIA from 18 November 1991 until 1 September 1995. Jim Clapper was born into a military family and graduated from the American High School in Nuremberg, Germany. He later received degrees from the University of Maryland, the Air and National War College, and Harvard. He began his own military career in the Marine Corps Reserve, later transferred to Air Force ROTC, and was commissioned in the U.S. Air Force as a lieutenant in 1963.

In his early career, General Clapper had extensive experience in the Signals Intelligence field and, as a senior in both Service and joint assignments, his

career expanded into the full field of all-source collection and analysis intelligence. Before coming to DIA, Jim Clapper had served as the J2, U.S. Forces, Korea; Director of Intelligence at the Pacific Command in Hawaii; and as the Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence, Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.

General Clapper came to DIA following both the collapse of the Soviet Union as the predominant focus of U.S. intelligence and Operation DESERT STORM. The end of the Cold War led to the most fundamental reexamination of U.S. national security policy since the 1940s. This climate of systemic change also compelled a review of DIA roles and organization to meet a new era of regional challenges and dramatic reductions in resources. General Clapper restructured DIA to improve flexibility and cooperation with Service intelligence organizations. By focusing on the missions of military intelligence and working within the common functional areas of collection, production, and infrastructure, General Clapper continued the cooperation and the integration of effort among DIA, the Military Services, and the Combatant Commands. DIA provided intelligence support to postwar U.S. operations in Iraq, covered the internal conflicts taking place within Russia and the former Yugoslavia, and supported the U.S. forces involved in Somalia and Haiti.

When Jim Clapper began his directorship of DIA, “timing” would play a major role on the objectives and operations of DIA. The timing at which he arrived was one of conclusions of major conflicts in which the United States had long been involved—the Cold War and DESERT STORM. The federal government and the Congress had to ask themselves again, what should we stop doing?

What can we do without? What do we need to change? A large part of Jim Clapper's time and that of his senior leadership would be spent answering those questions. And the assumption was built in that there would be savings.

The first major action that General Clapper faced was a congressional mandate to reduce DIA by 20 percent, as a Cold War peace dividend. These are always painful exercises. For example, DIA had no choice but to amalgamate Scientific and Technical Intelligence (S&TI) resources with those of General Military Intelligence (GMI) resources, which, in time, would predictably lead to a decline in DIA capabilities for S&TI.

In another painful action, DIA, which had been instrumental in providing resources and dollars to the U&S Commands in building their own intelligence architectures—in particular their Joint Intelligence Centers (JICs)—was directed by OSD and the JCS to study and reallocate billet distribution among the JICs. DIA's job was essentially to determine which billets in the “have” commands could be redistributed to the “have not” commands to improve their intelligence capabilities. Fortunately, the JCS Chairman, General Powell, recognized the difficult task that had fallen to DIA and supported the DIA recommendations for the redistribution of U&S Command billets that were briefed to a CINCs conference in Washington at the National Defense College.

Also during his tenure, General Clapper, DIA, and the rest of the U.S. government went through, once again, a detailed scrutiny of POW/MIA activities by a special Senate committee co-chaired by Senators Smith and Kerry. DIA set up a special redaction office with 70 people. The year-long, exhaustive investigation required much congressional testimony and many congressional appearances. DIA's record and efforts fared well, but when it was all over, Jim Clapper decided it was time for DIA to conclude its POW/MIA work. His rationale was that it was no longer an intelligence function. He presented his case to

OSD, and they agreed. It was past time to get POW/MIA out of the intelligence secrecy and into the open—particularly for the families. With the standup of Joint Task Force Full Accounting, in Hawaii, the baton was appropriately passed to them and OSD.

On 16 July 1993, a DoD Directive formally established a Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office, known as DPMO. The 197 personnel assigned to this organization included 56 DIA analysts. The DIA billets were transferred to OSD. General Clapper told the author that the POW/MIA issue was one of the most emotionally and politically charged issues that he had dealt with in his career. DIA then, according to General Clapper, reverted to its rightful place—in support, rather than the visible, public lead role.

The end of the Cold War broke some fresh ground for Jim Clapper that had not been experienced by his predecessors. He was invited and accepted a visit to the Russian counterpart military intelligence organization in July 1992. In addition, he was invited to visit a number of other Russian intelligence facilities as a U.S. Air Force officer. In a reciprocal visit to the United States, General Clapper invited GRU Chief Ladygin to visit the DIAC and address the MIB. Such an occasion, just a few years earlier, would have been inconceivable. Lieutenant General Clapper also visited his new counterpart in newly independent Ukraine in May 1993, where he visited the former Soviet airfield in Priluki.

General Clapper was a caring Director who devoted major time, effort, and resources, whenever possible, to strengthening DIA equal opportunity employment and organizational diversity—particularly for minorities and women. DIA had always been one of the best places in the military intelligence career field for opportunities for advancement to dedicated and talented professionals, but General Clapper worked tirelessly and successfully toward improvement.

During General Clapper's time at DIA, he was able to fulfill a concept for human intelligence operations under controversial development since the early 1980s—the Defense HUMINT Service, or DHS as it would become known. DHS, like the other DIA additions—the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), both of which came to DIA during General Clapper's time—represented more responsibility and growth for DIA, ironically as DIA was drawing down. This preceded a real leadership challenge.

And, like each of his predecessors, Jim Clapper and DIA experienced their share of contingency crises—Somalia, Haiti, and the U.N. actions in

the former Yugoslavia being the main ones. These three were prime examples of a government cutting resources while reestablishing national priorities. The amount of intelligence coverage before the crisis was probably below the affordability line and well below the established priority line. Change was probably Jim Clapper's biggest challenge, and his legacy would be the need to proactively manage change.

Despite declining resources, once again, DIA, now led by Jim Clapper, would be recognized by the Secretary of Defense—for exceptionally meritorious service to the Defense Department and the United States in responding to a number of crises between 1992 and 1994.



The Director of the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC) briefs the Commander in Chief, Special Operations Command, 1996.



Joan Dempsey, the first Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) Staff, played a key role in developing the role of DMI.

## DIRECTOR OF MILITARY INTELLIGENCE

General Clapper, when he became Director of DIA, was impressed with the work that his predecessor, Ed Soyster, had done with the MIB during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM. Clapper was the Air Force Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence and a regular member of the MIB. He considered the MIB as a collegial problemsolving body and intended to continue to use it in the same spirit as it was used during the war. Also, he viewed the MIB as an instrument that would assist him in carrying out his Director of Military Intelligence (DMI) responsibilities.

Certainly one of the DIA Director's most important responsibilities at that time was as Program Manager for the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP).

As part of the congressional inclination to take savings from the Defense Department and the intelligence establishment, the intelligence committees, in 1991, directed the disestablishment of what had been the GDIP staff. The GDIP staff was, at one time, comprised of about 50 people. The disestablishment called for downsizing the GDIP staff to less than 20 and redistributing the billets. This action occurred at the same time that DIA had to take an OSD-directed review of intelligence resources within defense intelligence, the Military Services, and the Unified Commands—to determine where to take difficult cuts. Jim Clapper had two large problems: how to be ecumenical in his review of intelligence resources across the community where all had important equities, and how to carry out his GDIP program manager responsibilities without a supporting staff and organization.

A reasonable solution to both problems was worked and recommended to General Clapper by then-Production Chief Pat Deucy and a talented former member of the GDIP staff, Ms. Joan Dempsey. Ms. Dempsey had been transferred to the DIA production element and, with her resource background, was the logical person to take on the all-important "JIC-JAC" study. This informal name of the review came about because almost 25 percent of the GDIP resources were located in the nine U&S Commands and carried programmatically under the category of production resources.

In 1992, representatives of all the defense intelligence GDIP resource holders were summoned to DIA to see if consensus could be reached on which Command and activities needed to give up resources and which needed more resources. No consensus was reached.

Joan Dempsey then recommended that the resource question (i.e., the distribution of resources and the necessary savings) be laid out over the 5-year programming and that any restructuring to be done would be accomplished over time (i.e., the outyears). She further recommended that the DIA Director present the Agency's solution to the MIB to gain Military Service support and agreement, and that the Director seek support from JCS Chairman General Powell to gain acceptance from the CINCs. General Clapper was successful on both counts. The MIB continued to be collegial and supportive, and the Chairman ultimately signed a letter to the U&S Commands calling the DIA action a "trailblazing effort" to restructure intelligence resources. Hundreds of billets were moved between Commands over the course of the 5-year

defense plan, but the immediate pain had been deferred.

Joan Dempsey's recommended solution to General Clapper's second problem was for him to create a capability similar to that practiced by the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI). DCI is the title the head of the Central Intelligence Agency uses when he speaks for all the components of the National Foreign Intelligence Program. He has the statutory responsibility to review and approve budgets. He also sets policy and ensures compliance for the 13 organizations that report to him. The GDIP is a unique organization. The other 12 organizations are exactly equivalent to their programs; that is, the

CIA Program is the CIA, the National Reconnaissance Program is the NRO, and so on. But, the GDIP is DIA, the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and nine Commands. Joan Dempsey's solution was to use General Clapper's position as the Program Manager for these disparate components to assert an authority within the Defense Department that was analogous to that of the DCI in the Intelligence Community. It was not a claim based on statute. Rather, it was recognition of his *de facto* authority as the Chairman of the MIB, the Program Manager of the money and resources. She proposed to General Clapper that he create a new, small organization that would manage the problem, manage the schedule, orchestrate the MIB agenda,



Tish Long (right) succeeded Joan Dempsey as the Director of the DMI Staff. Long later became the Deputy Director for Information Systems and Services (DS) and she stands with her deputy, Dennis Clem, who now directs DS.

and work all the military intelligence issues for him. It would take DIA out of the middle of the brawl over resources. It would give the Director a mantle of impartiality he required to impose change. It would enable unorthodox decisionmaking. General Clapper approved, and the Director of Military Intelligence Staff was created. Joan Dempsey also offered to head up the DMI Staff for him, provided that he would allow her to select her cadre staff. He agreed, and her choices were Paul Ingholt, Jennifer Carrano, and Navy Captain J.R. Reddig.

Joan Dempsey was the first DMI Staff Director (1991-1993). She was succeeded by Tish Long (1993-1995). Ed Trexler was an interim director (1995), and he was replaced by Caryn Wagner, who came to government from the House Intelligence Committee Staff (1996-2000). The current Director is Kathy Turner. The DMI Staff today resides in DIA but is focused on the military intelligence community. It supports the Director of DIA as de facto Director of Military Intelligence.



The DIAC at night.

During operations in Haiti, soldiers cover each other while descending stairs. The building was suspected to contain a cache of weapons. National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) provide critical local intelligence support to forward-deployed and operating forces.



## NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TEAMS

Following the Gulf War, DIA continued to review lessons learned with an aim toward refining and improving future support. As described earlier in this book, DIA employed 11 National Military Intelligence Support Systems or teams in support of the U&S Commands and Joint Forces. General Schwarzkopf reported to Congress that each national-level agency (i.e., DIA and other agencies) had its own deployable intelligence support team, and that information often was redundant and conflicting. General Schwarzkopf wanted a fused national perspective to eliminate the problem.

In August 1992, General Clapper, as the MIB Chairman, tasked DIA's J2, Joint Staff, to formulate a Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for a National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) to be a single point of contact providing national-level, all-source intelligence support from the entire Intelligence Community to deployed commanders during crisis or contingency operations. The CONOPS was developed by J2 as the Executive Manager of the program and briefed and approved at the MIB in December 1992. The NISTs would normally be composed of DIA and other Intelligence Community representatives, but each team would be tailored to meet the needs of the commander or task force concerned. NIST would deploy 13 times in the 1990s, including in support of U.S. involvement in Bosnia (1992-1995) for Operation PROVIDE PROMISE, Somalia (1992-1994) for Operation RESTORE HOPE, and Haiti (1994-1995) for Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.

The impending breakup of the former Yugoslavia in 1990 placed considerable pressure on DIA and the Defense Attaché System to answer questions

of decisionmakers throughout the U.S. government. Disgusted with the Belgrade central government's inability to control the Milosevic-controlled Serbian government, Slovenia and Croatia threatened to declare independence and destabilize southeast Europe. The political need to understand the role of the Yugoslav National Army in a country in dissolution, with subsequent questions concerning Yugoslav military plans and intentions, placed the DIA's regional attaché at the forefront to address these issues.

The initial responsibility fell to DAO Belgrade and the Defense Attachés. DAO Belgrade covered the initial Serb road blockades in the Serb-populated regions of Croatia and the international transfer of arms to the newly formed Croatian Army. In the spring of 1991, DAO Belgrade covered protest riots in Belgrade and was on the street reporting on Yugoslav Army tanks used to quell those riots.

In June 1991, attachés from Belgrade covered the 10-day war in Slovenia. They were the only foreign military observers of the war providing objective reporting of events, as Slovenia confronted the Yugoslav National Army and took the first steps leading to its independence. The DIA attachés observed the initial development of Yugoslav Army units based in Serbia to put down opposition forces in Croatia. USDAO Belgrade continued to report on events in the ethnic conflict between Croatia and Serbia and was able to support the development of U.S. policy toward the region. Firsthand observations from the frontlines were provided on a timely basis to Washington, to visiting government officials, and to peacemakers such as Secretary Cyrus Vance.



The U.S. Embassy in Mogadishu, Somalia, during Operation RESTORE HOPE in 1992. A tent city has already started taking shape in the compound.

USDAO Belgrade continued with its crisis reporting after the signing of the Vance Peace Plan, as U.N. peacekeepers prepared to deploy to Croatia and violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina replaced the violence in Croatia. U.S. attachés continued reporting from the frontlines in Bosnia as they had in Croatia. They were on the ground to observe the mustering of separatist ethnic militias to fight the Yugoslav Army, the general breakdown of civil order, the deployment of U.N. peacekeepers, and the attacks on U.N. peacekeepers. Colonel Whisnant was also called upon to coordinate the first international humanitarian aid flight into Bosnia on Easter weekend 1992, as U.S. Air Force C-130s flew into Sarajevo International Airport to deliver needed food and medical supplies.

While USDAO Belgrade provided reporting from the crisis region, other [DIA] DAOs around the

world reported from their capitals on international support for, and involvement in, U.N. peacekeeping efforts for the former Yugoslavia. More than 20 countries provided soldiers to the peacekeeping efforts, and DIA's worldwide DAS presence made it possible, through its reporting, for Washington policymakers to understand the degree of support for the mission.

In the summer of 1992, DIA expanded the DAS by opening a DAO in the new Embassy in Zagreb, Croatia. The Defense Attachés in Zagreb and Belgrade independently traveled through the frontlines of Bosnia to provide detailed descriptions of the land routes used to bring humanitarian supplies into Bosnia. This was the first U.S. reporting from the region and was used by the Chairman of the Joint Staff to brief the Congress on U.S. military options in Bosnia. The United States decided

to continue humanitarian shipments by U.S. military air, but not to engage in ground operations.

Operation PROVIDE PROMISE was the U.S. portion of the U.N. Bosnian humanitarian relief operation in which the U.S. airdropped supplies to enclaves surrounded by warring factions. A NIST was deployed to Naples, Italy, from July 1992 to December 1995 to support the U.S. section of the J2 for the CINC Allied Forces Southern European Command. The NIST provided message retrieval, imagery, HUMINT, SIGINT, and military-capability databases. It also initially deployed with national subject matter experts (SMEs). Through

the NIST, the CINC was provided with fused national intelligence products.

U.S. peace initiatives continued throughout this period, and DAOs were asked by the various U.S. Special Envoys to assist them in their efforts. In 1994, retired Army General John Galvin, as Special Envoy for Military Issues working with Ambassador Richard Holbrooke asked the DAO to join his team to work with the military leaders of the Bosnia Croat and Bosnia Muslim armies to achieve a cease-fire proposal. Under General Galvin's direction, the DAO drafted and negotiated the agreement, which became the Bosnian federated army agreement. Because of General



U.S. Air Force serviceman with the 37th Airlift Squadron, Ramstein Air Base, Germany, prepares pallets of sacks of wheat flour. The sacks were loaded onto a U.S. Air Force C-130 Hercules aircraft and flown into Sarajevo, Bosnia, on an Operation PROVIDE PROMISE relief mission.

Galvin's efforts, the two Bosnian armies, which had been bitter enemies, agreed to a cease-fire and paved the way for the signing of the March 1994 Washington Agreement.

When DIA was called upon in 1992 to cover and support Joint U.N. and, later, U.S. efforts in Somalia, there was very little information in DIA's databases other than its own Defense Attachés' reporting. Somalia was not on anyone's priority list. This demonstrated that defense intel-

ligence is often called upon to quickly develop and produce information on areas or subjects for which no resources have been allocated or planned. It is a problem and challenge that intelligence professionals encounter often.

Operation PROVIDE RELIEF was the U.S. support to the U.N.'s relief effort to Somalia. A NIST was located in Mombassa, Kenya, from August to December 1992 to support the Humanitarian Assistance Team, which became a JTF after the

President Jean Bertrand Aristide returns triumphantly to the National Palace at Port-Au-Prince, Haiti, during Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY.



first month of deployment. The NIST provided reachback to national SMEs and databases. The primary support to the JTF was reporting from HUMINT collection.

Operation RESTORE HOPE evolved from Operation PROVIDE RELIEF when the U.S. expanded its relief operations into a humanitarian assistance operation in Somalia. The NIST in Kenya closed, while a NIST deployed to Mogadishu, Somalia, from December 1992 to May 1994 in support of the CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element (CISE). The NIST provided access to message retrieval, imagery, HUMINT, SIGINT, and military capability databases. It also deployed with national SMEs.

On 30 September 1991, in Haiti, President Aristide was overthrown in a violent military coup after only 7 months in office. Three years later, after the United States and the international community attempted to negotiate Aristide's return to power, the military junta remained intransigent and refused to step aside. On 8 September 1994, DIA established the Haiti ITF to provide intelligence support to Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. The operation followed passage of a resolution by the U.N. Security Council which

authorized the use of "all necessary means" to restore Aristide to office and authorized the creation of a multinational force for that purpose. The Haiti ITF consisted of 104 personnel drawn from the Intelligence Community, the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), the office of the Secretary of Defense, and the Services. The ITF provided 24-hour all-source intelligence support, including briefing executive highlights and papers to the White House, Secretary of Defense, JCS Chairman, Congress, and the operational commander in Haiti.

Operation UPHOLD DEMOCRACY began with U.S. military forces landing at Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to restore public order and reinstate President Aristide. The second phase of the operation was a large-scale peacekeeping mission. The NIST initially deployed aboard the USS *Wasp*, then moved ashore as the operation progressed. The Defense Intelligence Network (DIN) provided live broadcasts to the Joint Task Force in Haiti; DIN personnel in Haiti broadcast JTF-J2 assessments via JWICS to USACOM and the DIN. Live inputs from the ITF were disestablished on 16 December 1994, 3 months after the U.S.-led Multinational Force entered Haiti and 2 months after President Aristide returned to office.



Secretary of Defense Dr. William J. Perry (center) during a visit to the Director, DIA, spaces in the Pentagon in 1996.

## SUPPORT TO THE SECRETARY

Dr. William J. Perry served as the 17th Secretary of Defense from 3 February 1994 until 23 January 1997. He had served in a number of other Defense Department roles and was well familiar with DIA. The author met with Dr. Perry and asked him to share his views on intelligence and DIA support during his time as Secretary of Defense.

Intelligence, according to Dr. Perry, was essential to the performance of his job as Secretary of Defense. An intelligence officer from DIA accompanied him in his car each morning during the drive in to the Pentagon to update him on overnight, worldwide intelligence developments. When he arrived at the Pentagon, his first meeting took place at 7:30. He, the Deputy Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the JCS, and the Vice Chairman of the JCS received a complete worldwide intelligence update covering the last 24 hours. This was given by the J2, DIA—at that time, Major General Patrick Hughes, USA. The 30-minute briefing allowed the Secretary and other officials to coordinate their day and determine if intelligence events would call for their involvement. The meeting also allowed the Secretary and Chairman to task the J2, DIA system for any necessary actions resulting from their meetings.

Secretary Perry recalled a day in October 1994 on which the J2, Major General Hughes, briefed him on a disturbing development in Iraq. Two Iraqi divisions were detected moving toward the Kuwaiti border. As hard to believe as it was that Saddam would be foolish enough to return to Kuwait after the beating Iraq received in DESERT STORM, the intelligence information and analysis was thorough and convincing. Secretary Perry was confident that the Iraqi threat to Kuwait was again genuine and was sufficient for Defense

Department response. He then walked across the room to a direct secure line to the White House, asked to speak to the President. When President Clinton came on the line, Perry told him of his concern and that he intended to move elements of an Army division back into Kuwait to counter Saddam's threat. The President concurred. Later that day, JCS Chairman General John Shalikashvili, flew to CENTCOM Headquarters in Florida, to confer with the CINC, General Binford Peay, on the U.S. response in the CENTCOM theater of operations. The White House made an official announcement, and the Army division selected already had pre-positioned equipment standing by in Kuwait so that the troop movement back to the Gulf began almost immediately and reinforcement to Kuwait was underway.

Secretary Perry then dispatched the Director of DIA, Lieutenant General Clapper, to Saudi Arabia and Egypt to personally brief officials there on a new Iraqi threat to Kuwait. Iraq got the U.S. message and, shortly thereafter, withdrew its divisions from the Kuwaiti border. Secretary Perry indicated that this action to deter Iraq illustrated how an important intelligence report can trigger time-sensitive preemptive action by the United States that may have prevented a second invasion of Kuwait and further loss of lives.

Dr. Perry offered a second example of his confidence in DIA intelligence analysis as he recalled a time in 1996 when China initiated several threatening actions toward Taiwan. Prior to initiating a U.S. military response, Secretary Perry asked DIA for an assessment of the situation. DIA's Assistant DIO for East Asia provided an assessment of the motivations behind, and the meaning of, China's action. This assessment was timely

Secretary of Defense William Cohen (left) stands next to GEN Hugh Shelton as the Director, LTG Pat Hughes (right), gives a toast at an Armed Forces Day celebration.



and complete—a prime example of thorough strategic analysis.

Dr. Perry's confidence in the DIA estimate was instrumental in his obtaining Presidential approval for movement of two U.S. Navy carrier battle groups into the vicinity of the Taiwan Straits.

Secretary Perry explained that his confidence in the intelligence work of DIA grew over the years as he met frequently with many of DIA's intelligence professionals. For example, he spent numerous hours with intelligence officers in preparation for his frequent trips abroad. Sometimes, he would spend a half-day going through detailed intelligence assessments of places he would be visiting. He found the DIA work "damn good." He particularly liked the mix of military and civilians in DIA—the long-term civilian professionals for continuity and the military for the ever-changing methods and

approaches to modern military defense and warfare.

Dr. Perry was also very complimentary toward DIA's Defense Attaché System (DAS). He said that the DAS was a "great source of satisfaction." In his many trips abroad, he discovered that the attachés' understanding of the country, the culture, the language, and the country's military was an indispensable tool. Dr. Perry learned the attachés were always highly regarded by the U.S. Ambassador, the U.S. country team, and the host nation. And he said, "Sometimes the attaché was the only source of information on which I could fully depend, particularly in times of crisis."

Secretary Perry's views regarding DIA and attaché support were reinforced by then CENTCOM CINC General Binford Peay. He told the author that the DIA representative to CENTCOM

and the DIA intelligence products were “superb.” And key to his efforts was the advance work done by the theater defense attachés. General Peay considered them “the developers and implementers of national security and military policy.” Peay’s J2 at the time, Lieutenant General Jim King (later J2 DIA and Director of NIMA), said the DIA

defense attachés were “all heroes, most reliable and consistent sources of information.”

For its support to the Defense Department, the JCS, the U&S Commands, and tactical commanders during the period of July 1992 to 1 June 1994, DIA received the Joint Meritorious Unit Award.



In a Pentagon ceremony, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch presents Lt Gen Jim Clapper, Director, DIA, with the citation for the Agency's third Joint Meritorious Unit Award in 1994. This award was in recognition of DIA's performance during crises and operations from 1992 to 1994 including Haiti, Somalia, and the former Yugoslavia.



A desk officer during a regional orientation trip. HUMINT personnel, both in the field and in Washington, must be knowledgeable of their areas of responsibility.

## DEFENSE HUMINT SERVICE

In October 1983, terrorists bombed the U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon, and claimed the lives of 242 Marines. Following that tragedy, a group of prominent Americans was commissioned to review the incident. The group was led by retired Navy Admiral Long, and its report was known as the Long Commission Report. The report contained several recommendations for strengthening U.S. security abroad. Among its points, no military human intelligence (HUMINT) information was available to warn the Marines of the attack. The Long Commission suggested that the Defense Department and the U.S. military review its HUMINT capabilities.

Reviewing this report, DoD and DIA had to consider a fundamental question: Was CIA HUMINT support to military operations inadequate? And, if so, should DoD create its own full range of HUMINT operations and capabilities?

DIA was directed by then-Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger to investigate DoD's HUMINT capabilities and strengthen them. Then-Director of DIA Lieutenant General Williams appointed a study group of eight people led by the DIA Deputy Director for Operations (VO), Brigadier General James Schufelt, USA. The members of the group of eight, as it became known, were selected for their backgrounds and knowledge of Military Service HUMINT. Only one of the eight, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel John Kiehm, is still in DIA today, serving as DIA Chief of Staff.

At that time, DoD's only HUMINT operational capability was in the Military Services. From what the group called the "Weinberger Plan," they developed a concept of operations that left the HUMINT resources in place but gave DIA a new,

more viable management role. They called it the DoD HUMINT Manager concept. Under this concept, DIA became the functional manager for the DoD HUMINT resources, the central tasking and approval authority for all DoD HUMINT Operations (under the DCI rules for HUMINT Operations), and the central authority for processing the evaluations of HUMINT reports. It was called a "Centralized Management—Decentralized Execution Concept."

In 1985, then-Director of DIA Lieutenant General Perroots approved a new management structure for HUMINT in DIA. It was located in Rosslyn, Virginia, and designated the Directorate for Attachés and Operations (DA). The first officer selected for this position was the author, who, at that time, was the Assistant Deputy Director of Estimates (DE) but brought an extensive background in HUMINT to the new job.

The centralized management and decentralized execution with an enhanced role for DIA was accepted by the Military Services. DIA was looked to by the Services to be the HUMINT champion in marketing the value of HUMINT with Congress and the DoD. DIA was also viewed as the spokesman for DoD-wide HUMINT needs, in terms of resources, technology, and training requirements of the military HUMINT professionals.

The leadership within the U.S. government supported an enhanced DoD HUMINT capability, to include some specialized HUMINT capabilities within the various U&S Commands and theaters. Beginning in 1985, an interagency team traveled to many U.S. embassies abroad to personally explain to U.S. ambassadors and country teams the objectives, methods, and particular needs of DoD

HUMINT to solicit support. The team was known informally as the troika.

Between 1986 and 1990, DIA worked with the Military Services intelligence components and the U&S Command J2 to focus DoD HUMINT efforts on their priority requirements. Additional resources to meet increasing HUMINT requirements were sought and received from the congressional intelligence committees and DoD. Intelligence Community members, around the world and at the national level, were supportive of DoD HUMINT requirements and operations. DoD HUMINT capabilities worldwide were enhanced, and interagency HUMINT training was improved. The Defense Attaché System and the Military Services HUMINT reporting improved dramatically in both quality and quantity. Analyst evaluations at the national and U&S Command levels were at an all-time high and spurred HUMINT operators on to increased reporting.

In the formative first years after the attaché and HUMINT functions were combined in DIA, many talented people in DIA's Directorate for Attachés and Operations worked tirelessly to make the new organization operate smoothly while giving DoD-wide HUMINT a new identity.

During DESERT STORM, HUMINT, like the other intelligence disciplines, surged to support the Gulf War effort. Early in the air campaign, HUMINT sources provided valuable target information regarding Baghdad and other Iraqi military targets.

HUMINT provided its value to tactical commanders during Operation DESERT STORM. For units at the brigade level and lower, it often was the primary source of intelligence on enemy capabilities and intentions. ARCENT, NAVCENT, MARCENT, and CENTAF attached interrogators to frontline units to extract perishable information of immediate tactical significance, some of which was used immediately to target enemy forces.

Once the ground offensive began and American units began capturing large numbers of Iraqi enemy prisoners, U.S. interrogators had access to a variety of Iraqi military personnel. Iraqi officers and soldiers proved quite willing to divulge details of tactical dispositions and plans.

One captured Iraqi division commander said it all about the value of intelligence. "It's no surprise we are losing the war. You (the Americans) knew everything about us. If we talked, you monitored our communications and fired upon us. If we came out of our positions, your surveillance detected us and you fired upon us. If we stayed in place, your photography (air) located us and you fired on us. We, on the other hand, knew nothing about what you were doing . . . . We could do nothing."

Following the Gulf War, Duane Andrews, the Assistant Secretary of Defense for C3I, anticipated that intelligence budgets would be reduced. In his 15 March 1991 Plan for Restructuring Defense Intelligence, Andrews directed the Director of DIA to undertake a number of actions relating to HUMINT, its management structure, and its operational control. Between 1991 and 1993, DIA and the Military Services debated a number of options impacting on the HUMINT resources in the Services and the degree of operational control exercised by DIA. After many disagreements, the Military Services and DIA agreed to new rules codified in an 18 December 1992 DoD Directive, "Centralized Management of DoD Human Intelligence Operations." At that time, the Service HUMINT resources were essentially left under the control of their parent Services, but the DIA Operational Control had been further strengthened. However, in June 1993, as a result of discussions with DCI James Woosley during the annual Joint Review of Intelligence Programs, then-Deputy Secretary of Defense William Perry requested that the ASD (C3I) develop a plan to consolidate DoD's separate HUMINT components into one organization.

General Clapper recalls that there was “tremendous pressure to cut manpower,” and it was “hard to justify four military [HUMINT] structures.” Consolidation was, he believed, “a logical thing to do,” and would hopefully allow a reduction in “management tail in favor of operational tooth.” Naturally, the services were “not enthralled at giving up operational control,” particularly the Army, which, Clapper notes, had “the most mature capability . . . and . . . the most equity (85 percent of DoD HUMINT resources) at stake.”

The office of the ASD (C3I), in response to Dr. Perry’s mandate, requested that the Director of DIA, as DoD HUMINT manager, provide detailed recommendations to the ASD (C3I) concerning the “creation of a viable consolidated HUMINT joint field operating activity.” The Director, in turn, established a series of working groups that included representatives from the military departments and the Joint Staff. The resulting Plan for Consolidation of Defense HUMINT noted that its purpose was to “preserve the Department’s ability to manage HUMINT under the constraints of diminishing resources, while more rapidly and efficiently focusing the HUMINT elements of the Department on targets worldwide.” Those diminishing resources were a result of a decision during the annual joint review that—while protecting certain portions of GDIP HUMINT from the budget axe—called for a reduction of 20 percent in the remaining areas by fiscal year 1996. The cuts translated into a loss of at least 350 personnel and supporting funds.

The plan instructed the Director, DIA, to establish a Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) as a provisional organization during the 1994 fiscal year and transfer all of DIA’s GDIP HUMINT elements into the DHS. The Secretaries of the Military Departments were similarly instructed to transfer, in accordance with a specified schedule, their GDIP HUMINT activities into the DHS.

The transfer of the Service resources was to be unequivocal in the sense that the plan specified that the “sub-elements of the DHS will not retain an affiliation with the Military Departments requiring separate command relationships.” But the plan did allow the Services to make a “small investment” in creating a HUMINT element within their TIARA programs, although they were required to coordinate their activities with the DHS to avoid duplication of effort.

Deputy Secretary Perry approved the plan, which he formally noted in a memorandum to the Military Department Secretaries on 2 November 1993. By that time, a DHS Transition Team had been operating for a month.

The DHS was established as a field operating agency of the DIA, subordinate to the DIA’s National Military Intelligence Collection Center. The head of the center, Major General Jack Leide, became the first director of the DHS when it was provisionally established on 1 April 1994.

Under Leide’s direction, the DHS began the protracted process of absorbing the Defense Attaché System, as well as DIA and Service HUMINT elements.

Outside Washington, a key component of DHS operations would be HUMINT Support Elements (HSEs) at the headquarters of the commanders-in-chief of the Atlantic, Southern, Pacific, European, and Central Commands and at headquarters of the subunified commands, which seek to “improve support to warfighters.” Today, the HSEs “help commands develop and process HUMINT collection requirements and facilitate planning and coordination of DoD HUMINT support to operational commands.” Other DHS elements overseas now include a large number of operating bases. By October 1995, the DHS had “over 2,000 personnel stationed in over 100 locations including Washington, DC.”



The Defense Intelligence School (DIS) at its original home at Anacostia Naval Air Station. The school later became the Joint Military Intelligence College and moved to the DIAC in 1984.

## THE COLLEGE

In June 1998, with the accreditation of the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI) degree, the Joint Military Intelligence College opened a new chapter of expanded service to the defense, intelligence, and broader national security communities. As the nation's only accredited academic institution offering the BSI degree and the Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI) degree, the College is preparing the next generation of intelligence leaders in a joint service academic environment for the roles and the responsibilities that are part of the JCS Joint Vision 2010.

"To educate in intelligence in today's world," according to College President A. Denis Clift, "is to examine the machinery of leadership and decisionmaking—national, theater, and tactical—that intelligence fuels and to examine the prospecting, the drilling, the refining, the distribution, and the performance of that fuel in the cyber era."

The roots of the Joint Military Intelligence College go back to DIA's origins. On 27 February 1962, some 6 months after the creation of DIA, Deputy Secretary of Defense Roswell Gilpatric issued a memorandum, "Establishment of a Defense Intelligence School." This memo required the Director of DIA to develop a plan, by 1 July 1962, for the establishment of such a school in the Washington, DC, area. The essence of the Secretary's direction was for DIA to combine the Naval Intelligence School and the Army Strategic Intelligence School into one Defense Intelligence School (DIS). DIA developed the plan with the help of the two existing school commandants—Navy Captain Bruce Wiggin and Army Colonel Lee Wallace. The plan was submitted to Secretary Gilpatric, and he approved it

on 2 November 1962. A significant exception to the DIA/JCS-coordinated version was that Gilpatric's Directive called for "a general or flag officer of brigadier general or equivalent rank" as DIS Commandant. And that was not supported by the JCS. The first flag-rank equivalent Commandant of the DIS was not named until 1988.

On 14 December 1962, General Carroll named Captain Bruce E. Wiggin of NIS as Acting Commandant of the newly created school, with Colonel Lee Wallace and Colonel August Kuraar as Deputy Commandants. The DIS was formally activated on 1 January 1963.

The First Charter for the DIS was approved by the JCS on 29 March 1963. It briefly described the initial courses: the Defense Intelligence Course (based on the old NIS Postgraduate Course), the Strategic Intelligence Course, the Attaché and Attaché Staff Courses, and a Strategic Intelligence Officer Refresher Course for reservists.

For the next 10 years, the DIS and DIA were unsuccessful in their efforts with the JCS to be recognized as a college.

At the Board of Visitors meeting in 1972, the new DIA Director, Vice Admiral Vincent P. de Poix, told the Board one of the most important things it could accomplish at that time was to review and approve an implementation schedule for a degree program. The board was briefed on the school's research and recommendations, proposing two alternatives which DIS had developed after lengthy discussions with graduate school deans. A program was developed for a Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence (MSSI).

The pilot program for the MSSI went smoothly forward. Admiral de Poix gave his approval to the degree program concept on 24 April 1973; Dr. Hall, the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence), concurred on 31 May and requested the DoD General Counsel to draft the legislation through which Congress would give DIS degree-granting authority. Dr. Hall also asked the U.S. Commissioner of Education to form a review committee of distinguished educators to evaluate the pilot MSSI program.

The pilot MSSI program actually began on 10 September 1973, with 30 officers and civilians representing DIA, NSA, CIA, and all the Military Services. All were members of the current Post-Graduate Intelligence Course (PGIC) class. The three modules of the PGIC had been merged into a single, integrated curriculum (though one module, the Defense Intelligence Management course, survived as an independent course). The PGIC itself had been lengthened from 34 to 38 weeks to provide more time for student research and study and to permit the inclusion of an electives program.

The next major hurdle for the DIS would be congressional approval. Legislation was introduced in 1975 but was not approved until years later despite superlative efforts by DIS Commandants and faculty.

In 1979, the first Air Force DIS Commandant, Colonel Charles R. Fox, with the backing of DIA Director Tighe, took action to get the MSSI legislation before Congress again. On 30 September 1980, Congress passed and forwarded to the President an Intelligence Authorization act which authorized the DIS Commandant to award the MSSI. On 16 October, President Carter signed the legislation into law.

On 26 June 1981, DIA awarded its first 18 MSSI degrees.

The degree was accredited by the Commission on Higher Education of the Middle State Association of Colleges and Schools in 1982.

A revised charter for the DIS was submitted to DoD, and on 28 January 1983, Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer signed the new DoD Directive 3305.1. The school was rechartered as the Defense Intelligence College. The charter identified the college as a “professional educational and research institution,” responsible for conducting programs of instruction “to enhance the professional competence of intelligence personnel” and “undertake intelligence research in support of its postgraduate educational programs.” It would operate under the Director of DIA and be administratively attached to DIA, but its mission continued to reach out to the entire Intelligence Community.

The major College event of 1984 was the move, at last, to a permanent home in the newly completed DIAC on Bolling Air Force Base. Until then, the “College” had been subsisting in the World War II temporary buildings in Anacostia, in what one outside evaluator had termed “a rather isolated and scruffy part of town,” a neighborhood not particularly safe after dark, on ill-tended grounds replete with weeds, muddy potholes, and ragged parking lots.

On 15 June, the first Combined Graduation took place in the new DIAC Auditorium. The speaker was Senator Daniel Patrick Moynihan of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence; he described intelligence integrity—the “call ‘em as you see ‘em approach”—as “the highest form of service to the nation.”

A decade later, in the era of joint doctrine, the College adopted its current name, the Joint Military Intelligence College. In 1997, Congress authorized the College to award a second degree, the Bachelor of Science in Intelligence (BSI). The college’s accreditation was reaffirmed by the



Lt Gen Clapper awards a degree to a Marine NCO during the JMIC graduation ceremony in 1995.

Commission on Higher Education in June 1998 to include the new BSI degree.

The College's main campus is still housed in the DIAC, Bolling Air Force Base, Washington, DC, with a satellite campus at NSA. The student body averages between 430 and 450 a year, including full-time students in the postgraduate and undergraduate programs and part-time students in the weekend and evening programs, the master's program for reserves, and the postgraduate program at the NSA campus.

"National Security Structure and Policy" is 1 of the 9 core courses in the Joint Military Intelli-

gence College's 14-course postgraduate curriculum. The curriculum also requires the research and writing of a master's thesis for award of the MSSI degree. Other core courses include 21st Century Intelligence, National Military Strategy, 21st Century Intelligence: The Emerging International Security Environment, Strategic Warning and Threat Management, Intelligence Collection: Evidence for Analysis, Intelligence Research and Analytic Methods; Intelligence Analysis: Continuity and Change, Information Technologies in the Cyber Era, and MSSI Thesis Seminar.

To meet the requirements of the sponsoring Services, departments, and agencies, the College is

educating future intelligence, defense, and national security leaders. These graduates will be full partners with their policy, planning, and operations counterparts; graduates prepared to anticipate and tailor the intelligence required at the national, theater, and tactical levels.

In preparing its graduates to provide the commander a high-confidence view of both friend and foe, the College draws on the teaching tools of case methodology, gaming, and simulation. Wargame elective courses are designed within the context of the settings of major wargames. These games are hosted by the several military staff and war colleges with whom the Joint Military Intelligence College has a working relationship—the National Defense University’s National War College, the Air University, and the U.S. Marine Corps Command and Staff College.

In future gaming and exercises, the College is planning to expand the capability of its students to participate not only onscene, but also from remote locations, replicating the growing, information-age, real-world demands on the flow of intelligence in crisis and conflict.

In part, to facilitate cyber-era participation in gaming and exercises, the College has fitted out and is now operating a technology laboratory. Also, as a result of a curriculum review completed in 1997, the College has added the new core course, Information Technologies in the Cyber Era. Students work in a computer/software environment mirroring state-of-the-art environments throughout the Intelligence Community. The College is exploring with students the interlocking architectures and how they facilitate worldwide collaboration in collection, analysis, and dissemination. Further, exploring the opening world of computer deception, the College is encouraging critiques of system strengths, weaknesses, and vulnerabilities. Each year’s new students bring greater cyberspace knowledge and skills to their studies and research.

Teaching and research at the College are conducted up to the highest levels of security classification—one of the College’s great strengths—with all students, faculty, and staff holding the appropriate clearances. Academic freedom is central to the life of the College. Classified and unclassified research, produced by both students and faculty, is directly contributing to U.S. national security and to the theory, doctrine, and methodology of intelligence.

While graduate students have choice in their selection of subject for their master’s theses, they have for their consideration a growing menu of recommended topics from the Services, Commands, and agencies of the Intelligence Community. When master’s theses have been written and approved and the degree has been awarded, title and summaries of the works are posted on Intelink for information and accessing by the user community.

The BSI is a fourth-year, senior-year, degree-completion program. It is a demanding program, beginning with admissions. Applicants must have completed 3 undergraduate years of college work a minimum of 80 semester hours of undergraduate studies, with at least 20 credits in upper-division classes. A minimum of 30 of those credits must have been earned in the classrooms of a regionally accredited college. Also, the applicant must meet sufficient General Education Requirements in such fields as math and science. A minimum of 2.5 cumulative grade point average is required, and a writing sample is part of the application process. During the four-quarter academic year leading to the degree, the BSI students take 19 courses ranging across the spectrum of intelligence studies, including a culminating senior seminar in intelligence with its requirements of a major research paper.

The April 1998 Commission on Higher Education Evaluation Team’s report, which would lead to the College’s reaffirmation of accreditation to include

the bachelor's degree, opened with the following words:

***"The Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) exhibits the principles and practices the Middle States Association (MSA) considers characteristics of excellence in institutions of higher education. Particularly noteworthy is the clear sense of mission and purpose which permeates the College and the dedication of its faculty, administra-***

***tion, and staff. It has been recognized that the 'Joint Military Intelligence College is a national asset performing a national service.' The team concurs."***

Over the years, the College has had many distinguished graduates, including current DIA Director Vice Admiral Tom Wilson and his NSA counterpart, Lieutenant General Michael Hayden.



A. Denis Clift, the President of the Joint Military Intelligence College, also served in DIA as the Deputy Director for Intelligence and External Relations and the Agency Chief of Staff.



An armored recovery vehicle of the U.S. 1st Armored Division crosses the Sava River into Bosnia, December 1995, as part of the Implementation Force (IFOR).

## THE MINIHAN MONTHS



Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan, USAF

On 1 September 1995, Lieutenant General Kenneth A. Minihan was appointed the 11th Director of DIA. As the senior uniformed intelligence officer in the DoD, he was also the Director of the General Defense Intelligence Program, responsible for managing significant numbers of resources for DIA and the Military Services as part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.

Ken Minihan was a native of Texas and a graduate of Florida State University. He received his commission in the U.S. Air Force through the Reserve Officers Training Corps program at Florida State.

His military education included the Air Command and Staff College, the Naval Post-Graduate School, the Air War College, and a Program for Senior Executives at Harvard University.

General Minihan had served in combat in Vietnam and had commanded several U.S. Air Force squadrons and groups in the United States and overseas. He had extensive experience in signals intelligence and was the commanding general of the Air Force Electronic Security Command. Prior to coming to DIA, he was the Air Force's Senior Intelligence Officer, the Assistant Chief of Staff, Intelligence Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, Washington, DC.

Ken Minihan came to DIA in the midst of critical events in the Balkans. In summer 1995, the Croatian Army launched several successful offensives in the Krajina region, NATO launched airstrikes against targets in Bosnian Serb territory, and Bosnian Serb forces overran Srebrenica, a U.N.-declared "safe area." In fall 1995, the major players in the Yugoslav crisis agreed in Geneva on the basic principles for peace in Bosnia. The agreement led to the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement in November. DIA supported the NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) commitment to Bosnia with three National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTS) and the Pentagon-based Yugoslav Intelligence Task Force (ITF).

The newly formed Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) achieved its initial operating capability on 1 October 1995. DHS consolidated the HUMINT activities of all the Services under the umbrella of DIA. This new organization reflected the continuing need to consolidate resources to maximize the effectiveness of reduced assets. DIA was also des-

gnated as the Intelligence Community's executive agent for Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT).

In November 1995, the DoD consolidated imagery and mapping functions of the National Imagery Office and the Defense Mapping Agency, as well as portions of the National Photographic Interpretation Center, the National Reconnaissance Office, the Defense Airborne Reconnaissance Office, and the imagery personnel and

services in DIA. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA) was formally established on 1 October 1996.

General Minihan's time at DIA was limited. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the JCS had agreed that the general would serve at DIA only until February 1996, at which time he would move to Fort Meade, Maryland, to become the Director of the NSA.

The National Intelligence Support Team (NIST) at Tuzla, Bosnia, 1996.





LTG Pat Hughes (right) relieved Lt Gen Ken Minihan as Director, DIA. Minihan went on to serve as Director of the National Security Agency.

Naval Reserve Unit DIA 0466 was the co-winner of the O'Connell Award as the best large unit in the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command for FY 2000.



## DIA RESERVIST

Over the years, the reservists of all of the Military Services have made an extraordinary contribution to DIA and the nation in their dedicated and selfless service. Reservists serve in every element of DIA, at the headquarters, and in the field. Reservists often have brought to DIA skills that were not available in the active-duty military or in the civilian workforce.

No book about DIA would be complete without mentioning the work of the reservists and expressing both appreciation and commendation for their contribution. The large number of reservists at DIA at any given time preclude thanking each by name here. However, I have chosen a single reservist that I believe is representative of the caliber of the individuals who so ably aide DIA in its

mission each year. Now I want to tell you about Master Sergeant Daniel J. Snell, USAFR.

Daniel Snell, USAFR, arrived at the DIA/J2 as an E-4 in summer 1989. He came highly motivated to apply to current intelligence problems the electronics intelligence (ELINT) analysis experience he acquired during 4 years of active duty at SAC HQ in the mid-1970s.

After Iraq invaded Kuwait, and it appeared likely that Operation DESERT SHIELD would transition into Operation DESERT STORM, Snell volunteered for an extended tour of active duty. He identified the baseline operating schedules of the Iraqi air defense air surveillance radars. While this analysis had not been previously accomplished by

Reservists during weekend training. Reserves are key to DIA being able to carry out its mission.





Members of the JMIC's Senior Officers Advisory Panel, all senior reserve officers, meet twice a year at the DIAC.

either in-theater or national-level intelligence organizations, Snell felt it could serve as a basis upon which to perform Phase III BDA of the Iraqi Integrated Air Defense System (IADS), since it provided insight into Iraq's objective capabilities. Snell's product was widely accepted and, following Operation DESERT STORM, he was awarded a Joint Service Commendation medal for his efforts.

After Operation DESERT STORM, Snell set his sights on analyzing air defense forces of the former Yugoslavia. He found as incorrect the widely accepted Intelligence Community view that the Serbs no longer had an IADS. Snell focused on SAM threats in the former Yugoslavia and, as a result, generated what is probably his single most noteworthy product. Master Sergeant Snell discovered the operating locations of the Yugoslavian SA-6 regiments. This work was disseminated widely throughout the Intelligence Community in 1994 and was even briefed to the Secretary of the Air Force. Prior to the start of Operation ALLIED FORCE, Snell's SA-6

deployment "templates" were used to drive a SAM hunting collection plan. Most significantly, ELINT collected during the conflict confirmed his findings.

Master Sergeant Snell followed the SA-6 templating effort in 1994 with a detailed analysis of the Bosnian Serb air defense force at the beginning of 1995. He identified the launch position used by the Serbs to shoot down a USAF F-16 in June that year. Snell was awarded his second Joint Service Commendation medal for his efforts during this period.

In 1998, tensions between NATO and Yugoslavia again heightened over the deteriorating situation in Kosovo. Snell volunteered to provide training for augmentees who were to serve as fulltime air defense analysts. As the possibility of a NATO air campaign against Yugoslavia changed to a certainty, Snell was again able to contribute to the ongoing effort. With his expertise in ELINT/air defense analysis and BDA, his contacts and reputation within EUCOM and USAFE HQ, his links

to NIMA and other national intelligence organizations, and his knowledge of the Yugoslavian IADS and SAM threat, Snell nominated and monitored air defense targets for attack (via daily email exchanges with the EUCOM JAC). Snell's well-honed skills allowed him to discern the microsurvivability movement practices of the adversarial air defense forces that were going undetected by others. In one notable case, he tracked a high-

value target through the use of his unique analysis techniques for 3 weeks. This ultimately allowed U.S. forces to successfully attack it with precision-guided munitions. This was the culmination of his 10 years at the DIA/J2. For his many achievements during Operation ALLIED FORCE, Master Sergeant Snell was awarded his third Joint Service Commendation medal.



The cruiser USS *Shiloh* fires a Tomahawk missile against selected air defense targets south of the 33rd parallel in Iraq on 3 September 1996 as part of Operation DESERT STRIKE.

## PAT HUGHES AND THE TRANSNATIONAL THREATS



Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes, USA

Lieutenant General Patrick M. Hughes served as the Director of DIA from February 1996 until July 1999. Pat Hughes was born in Manhattan, Montana. He graduated from Montana State University in 1968 after serving for 3 years in the U.S. Army as a Combat Medic. He received his commission as a lieutenant of infantry from the Reserve Officers Training Corps program. He served as an infantry platoon leader in combat in Vietnam with the 9th Infantry Division and later as the Phoenix Program Adviser for Long Khanh Province.

As a captain, he transferred from infantry to Military Intelligence (MI) in 1970. In his MI career in

the Army, he commanded at the detachment, battalion, and brigade level and served as G2 for the 9th Infantry Division. He commanded the U.S. Army Intelligence Agency and, later, served as the Director of Intelligence, J2, at the U.S. Central Command. In that assignment, Hughes traveled throughout the Middle East and East Africa, becoming familiar with the most troubled regions of the world. He orchestrated intelligence support for continuing conflict with Iraq, U.S. operations in Somalia, and counterterrorism activities in the CENTCOM region.

In June 1994, then—Major General Hughes was assigned as the Director of Intelligence, J2, JCS, DIA, responsible for current and crisis intelligence and indications and warning in the Pentagon.

In February 1996, Hughes was promoted to lieutenant general and became the 12th Director of DIA. He was the first DIA J2 to become Director. Like his predecessors, he would face more than a full set of challenges over the next 3-1/2 years.

General Hughes chose Mr. Jeremy Clark as the new DIA Deputy Director. Clark, a retired Navy captain, had been serving at ASD, C3I. Then, sometime later, Hughes chose Ms. Barbara Duckworth to replace John Berbrich as DIA Chief of Staff. Ms. Duckworth began her career with DIA in the field as a bilingual translation technician (BLRT). She was the first female to be selected for the third-ranking position in DIA.

During the Cold War and through the period of DESERT STORM, defense and national intelligence capabilities were designed and deployed to collect against known Soviet and Warsaw Pact capabilities. Intelligence professionals were



Marge Munson (center) and Kathy Turner (right) both served as Deputy Directors of Administration in the 1990s, and went on to other key positions in the Agency and the Intelligence Community.

trained to predict enemy maneuver, courses of action, and objectives. The national intelligence system was organized, staffed, and equipped for sensor-to-shooter targeting with go-to-war, mobile, tactical assets.

The end of the Cold War brought a change in the types of operations the U.S. military forces and our allies were planning for, training for, and being asked to support. The old threat that we knew so well was gone. It was replaced by what Pat Hughes and others called a “transnational threat.” That threat took many forms across many regions and countries—terrorism, civil

wars, insurgencies, counterdrug operations, peacekeeping operations, and even humanitarian relief operations. During the second half of the 1990s, DIA spent as much time supporting peacekeeping operations as it did wartime operations. The support to military forces in Bosnia that began the decade for DIA would continue for the rest of the decade. And, just as warfighting and peacekeeping operations require different skills, a concurrent change was required in intelligence support activities.

DIA support to U.S., U.N., and NATO forces in the Balkans ranged from Intelligence Preparation

DIA supported many humanitarian missions throughout the world in the late 1990s.



of the Battlefield (IPB) for military operations, to targeting for airstrikes, to support rescue operations for downed flyers. DIA also supported a wide range of operations and interests around the world. General Hughes faced critical challenges in the area of terrorism in his first year as Director. In the wake of a terrorist bombing of the U.S. barracks at Khobar Towers on 25 June 1996 that left 24 dead and 500 wounded, DIA provided counterterrorism support to CENTCOM that ultimately would lead to U.S. strikes against the terrorists.

The Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) became fully operational in September 1996 and proved

highly effective, particularly while deployed on operations in the Balkans. DIA also supported operations that included Kosovo, Iraq, Liberia, Rwanda, and Korea, as well as counterdrug, counterterrorism, and counterproliferation efforts. NISTS were sent to Bosnia, Hungary, Italy, Kuwait, and Saudi Arabia.

In October 1996, DIA celebrated its 35th anniversary of providing integrated and unified military intelligence to warfighters, policymakers, and force planners. The Agency also received a fourth Joint Meritorious Unit Award, and Secretary of Defense William

Perry proclaimed 1 October as Defense Intelligence Day in perpetuity.

DIA started 1997 with the groundbreaking ceremony for the new Missile and Space Intelligence Command facility on 26 January at Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Mission enlargement and operational support defined the year as DIA provided analysis and information around the clock to military operations in Albania, Bosnia, and the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and to a surge in operations against Iraq. Other crises

existed in the Balkans, Congo, Burundi, and the Central African Republic.

In an historic event, NATO took in three new members from the former Warsaw Pact military alliance in 1998—Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic. Terrorists detonated bombs at the U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania on 7 August 1998, killing more than 250 people. Twelve of the dead were Americans, and one Staff Sergeant Kenneth Hobson, was from DAO Nairobi. Islamic fundamentalists under the leader-



David O. "Doc" Cooke, Director of Administration and Management for the Office of the Secretary of Defense and one of the Pentagon managers who helped organize DIA at its inception, places the streamer for the Agency's fourth Joint Meritorious Unit Award on the colors. Chief Master Sergeant Terry Henrion, USAF, DIA's first female Senior Enlisted Adviser, holds the colors during a DIAC ceremony in 1996.

ship of Usama bin Laden were suspected in the attack. In response, the United States launched cruise missile strikes against “terrorist-related” bases in Afghanistan and Sudan on 20 August 1998. Operation DESERT FOX was undertaken in December 1998, a 70-hour air campaign to punish Iraq for barring weapons inspectors. The Agency suffered another casualty in 1998 when DIA analyst Judith Goldenberg was killed in the line of duty in Cairo, Egypt.

To support DIA’s primary mission of providing intelligence to the warfighter, the Agency emphasized the use of information technology (IT) and the development of military intelligence informa-

tion systems. *Joint Vision 2010—America’s Military: Preparing for Tomorrow*, the joint warfighting strategic plan, recognized information superiority as the basis for joint warfighting doctrine and concepts. To that end, DIA led the initiative for a Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA), an automation-based operating architecture capable of providing a virtual, collaborative, and seamless connection between national, theater, and tactical elements. Measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), defined as technically derived data other than imagery or SIGINT, also emerged as an important discipline in the area of intelligence collection.



The DIA Alumni Association held its first meeting during LTG Hughes' tour at DIA.



The J2 provides crisis and targeting support as well as current intelligence to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the CINCs, and policymakers.

## A TYPICAL INTELLIGENCE DAY AT DIA

At the time the author interviewed Lieutenant General Pat Hughes, USA (Retired), I asked if he recalled that day in October 1994—when he was the J2 at DIA—that Secretary Perry had told me about concerning Iraq. Hughes said he “most certainly did,” and shared with me an account that he had written earlier:

*“The young analyst was bleary-eyed and yawned as he glanced at the clock. He was tired but he was also alert and looking at his computer screen intently. He was looking at a photo of southern Iraq and thinking about the photos from yesterday and the days before that and how different this photo was from the two previous days. How important is this, he thought? Damned important! He picked up the phone and called his colleague at DIA.*

*“The DIA analyst answered with what sounded like a yawn. It was 0234, the middle of the night. His friend, although the two had never met, was talking fast and giving him instructions to enter a database and look at a file. The DIA analyst had been at his job for 5 years, since before DESERT SHIELD, and nothing much surprised him. He trusted the analyst who was calling, even though they had never met face-to-face. They had talked many times on the phone and had exchanged email. The trust was there because they had worked together through many events regarding the actions of Saddam and his military. They knew what might be possible, they knew the warning signs, and recognized a feint or a demonstration, probably mounted just to keep them on their toes. They were kindred spirits, connecting more by mind and professional experience than by a communications system. They were proud of their title—analyst—and all*

*the baggage that went with it. They knew they were the bread and butter of their organizations, and they also knew that what they thought and what they said, like the old E.F. Hutton commercial, had impact. People listened.*

*“The file opened and the photo came on the screen. The DIA analyst saw immediately what his colleague had mentioned on the phone. Vehicles, activity, change. And so close to the Kuwait border. Excitement surged through him. He looked as closely as he could, and then transferred the file to a different computer, one that allowed him to enhance the image and to ensure that it was overlaid on a geographically accurate grid. As he was doing that, he also yelled for his workmates on the other side of the cubicle to come over. They, too, looked at the original photo, and another analyst spoke on the phone, asking questions as fast as he could spit them out. Everyone started to take notes. Everyone noted the time: 0250. Where did the time go? Everyone was intently focused on the new imagery display, on the enhanced photo, and on the senior analyst. He looked up from the screen and calmly said, ‘John, call the colonel. Now!’*

*“The first priority was to develop more information. Their working group was dedicated to the mission of watching the Iraqis so they had an SOP—a standard operating procedure—that they turned to immediately. They had done this before. Each analyst, expert in their own way, followed up with every sensor and source at their disposal, using the methods they relied upon each day to provide all-source fused intelligence. Their goal was to prove the information in the photo, or to disprove it and, if it was found to be accurate, then decide what it meant. Either way,*

*they knew how important it was to move rapidly. They began to communicate with their colleagues at every agency in the area and spoke directly to their fellow analysts at U.S. Central Command and those at the forward station in theater. They held a VTC—a video teleconference—with CENTCOM and SOCOM, and then included other Commands that would have a stake in the outcome. The colonel arrived and was quickly briefed. Data was slow to arrive, even though, in most cases, it took only minutes to get what was a very large amount of electromagnetic and physical/visual information. A computer failed and maintenance was called. The morning briefers started arriving and demanded information the colonel forbade the working group to give them. Everyone was mad, but everyone was working hard to find intelligence truth. Everyone was acting like the analysts they were.*

*“Finally, after pushing the deadline to the limit, at 0525, the J2 arrived. He was ready for his morning briefing to prepare himself to then brief the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and other senior officials. He did this often, although not every day, since schedules and agendas changed frequently, but today was a scheduled standard briefing day and both the CJCS and the SECDEF were present for duty at the Pentagon. The J2 was used to the drill, but he was keenly aware of any anomaly, any difference from the norm, in the analysts and in the information. He had one rule: Tell me exactly what you think. As soon as he entered the small briefing room and saw the papers on the floor, the harried looks, and saw that both the night crew and the morning crew were present, as soon as he saw the colonel’s face, he knew this was not going to be just another day.*

*“They gave it to him straight. It was very simple. Sometime during the previous day, small elements of Iraqi Republican Guard forces had infiltrated into southern Iraq and had dispersed at sites that had been assessed to be marshalling areas. They*

*had gone to great lengths to spread themselves out and had done the best they could to camouflage themselves, but the telltale signs were there. Other intelligence had also provided clues to the fact of the Republican Guards movement and staging near the border, and, when the garrisons and roadways had been looked at, it seemed clear that regular Iraqi Army units were also on the move. It was too soon to say that they were moving just south. But the key movement was proven in intelligence terms. The signatures were present, there was a key piece of information that seemed to compromise the Iraqi intent, and the analysts believed everything they presented.*

*“One analyst was especially dependable. He had been studying Iraq—and nothing but Iraq—for years, well before DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. He had visited Iraq on several occasions and had studied the country, its culture and history, and its people, including President Hussein. He was also clever in his analytic judgements, sometimes taking a ‘contrarian’ view just to generate thought and questions in his fellow analysts. But, when the chips were down, he could be relied on to give a clever and decisive account of his knowledge and opinions on a given event. He had served many senior intelligence officers over the years and was not in the least intimidated by rank. He respected intellect and knowledge, and he respected decisions.*

*“As the J2 listened and became convinced of the story, he was thinking about several different issues. He had planned to run some errands but had set that thought aside. He had planned to catch up on some paperwork, efficiency reports that were overdue. He set that aside. As he had so many times before, the J2 began to immerse himself in the analysts’ words and pictures, their graphics and their ideas, and finally he knew that what they told him was right. They had done all they could, they had done it all correctly, and they had reached the right conclusion. He turned in his chair, looking at the ‘expert,’ the*

older analyst who had proven himself. ‘Sergeant, what do you think?’ the J2 asked. ‘What do you think?’

“The master sergeant did not hesitate. He provided a brief, dispassionate, but clear and concise statement, almost as if he had rehearsed it. The Iraqis were clearly—counterintuitively and foolishly but nevertheless clearly—moving forces and staging near the Kuwaiti border, and doing it as fast as they could while trying to conceal what they were doing from us. They apparently intended to invade again. Again! After having their forces partly destroyed in DESERT STORM, after having international sanctions that had sent most of their nation into an economic and societal tailspin, after losing some of their key infrastructure, and after suffering the indignity of having U.N. monitors roving around their country looking into their military and industrial infrastructure for prohibited activities. After all that, here they were again. Period. The master sergeant left unspoken the final thought that he and almost everyone in the room had, but it hung in the warm air of the room like a miniature blinking neon sign floating like a cloud. **WHAT ARE YOU GOING TO DO ABOUT IT?** The question was blinking directly at the J2.

“The J2 reflected for a moment. He had been directly involved in DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and had been himself focused on Iraq ever since. He had been the J2 at Central Command and had experienced several intelligence and operational events with Iraq since the short desert war in 1991. Now it was 1994, and here he was again, having to explain in believable terms something that seemed almost unbelievable. Could they actually be trying to invade Kuwait again? He answered his question. Yes, they were. The analysts knew at the same time he knew. They could read his face. They read his body language and, before orders could be given, they were dispersing and gearing up for war . . . the kind of war that is fought in

the intelligence foxhole, where knowledge is power and where insight is greater power. Where forewarned is forearmed and where intelligence judgments have life-and-death impact for those serving in the field, even though the intelligence judgments and subsequent operational decisions are made in windowless rooms in the most enclosed parts of the Pentagon.

“The J2 briefed the Chairman at 0730, on schedule, but there was only one topic. The Chairman had heard many such briefings before, and he trusted the J2. He and the J2 had formed a bond long ago, and nothing had weakened it over time. The Chairman listened quietly, looked at the photos and graphics, asked his usual penetrating questions that only experienced warfighters could ask, and paused from time to time as if he, too, could not believe it. But the information was there. The Chairman stood up and told the J2 to come with him . . . to the Secretary of Defense’s office. As they arrived, the Secretary’s Senior Executive Officer appeared and began to indicate that perhaps the briefing could be given later in the day . . . but as he spoke and saw that the Chairman was there, too, and saw the somber looks, he quickly grasped the fact that this was not the time to delay the briefing. He indicated he would be right back and entered the Secretary’s office. Momentarily, the Secretary came to the door and invited the Chairman and the J2 in. They sat around a small, round table just inside the door, and the Senior Exec also took a seat. He knew this was one intelligence update he did not want to miss.

“The SECDEF listened intently, as was his practice. When the entire briefing had been given, he asked questions, addressing some to the J2 but most to the Chairman. He, too, trusted both the Chairman and the J2, having chosen them personally for their jobs and having worked with them for some time. He also asked two questions of the Senior Exec: ‘Has the President arrived yet?’ and ‘What does my schedule look like?’

*"After hearing the answers to these and all other questions, and ascertaining that the President was in his office at the White House, the Secretary reflected for the moment, stood up, and walked to his desk. He picked up the hotline and immediately said, 'Mr. President?' He explained the entire matter in very good detail. There were periods of silence when the President spoke, but finally the Secretary had clearly made his case and the President had clearly understood. The decision was clear. The Secretary hung up the phone, turned, and said simply, 'We will act.'*

*(Postscript)*

*"In October 1994, Iraq once again threatened Kuwait by moving ground forces near the border and posturing for offensive action. The immediate crisis passed relatively quickly, but the United States engaged in a substantial military buildup of forces in the region as a statement of commitment and as a message to Saddam. In December 1994, U.S. forces began withdrawing after having proven the viability of forward-deployed units; pre-positioned equipment, forward-basing arrangements, and numerous other command, control, logistics, and support mechanisms. This came about because U.S. Intelligence Community analysts, working in the middle of the night in windowless rooms in*



LTG Hughes presents the Director's Award to GEN Shalikashvili, CJCS, August 1997.

*Washington, DC, noted small-but-important changes in conditions in southern Iraq.” DIA led the way.*

As a follow up to this story from former DIA Director Lieutenant General Pat Hughes, the author contacted and spoke with former JCS Chairman General John Shalikashvili, USA (Retired). He, too, remembered that time in 1994

when DIA and its intelligence analysis played a key role in decisive U.S. action that may have prevented further aggression by Iraq. I also asked General Shali (as he was known to those who had served with him) to comment on the importance of intelligence support during his tenure as Chairman. He graciously provided me several comments, but I think the following was the most compelling:

***“Intelligence was an indispensable part of my responsibilities as Chairman of the JCS. The intelligence people (DIA) were almost always the first people I saw each morning and, more times than not, the last ones at the end of the day.”***

***General John Shalikashvili, USA (Retired)***

The EMASS automated media library system, installed in 1995, can hold over 13 billion pages of text.



## THE MARCH OF TECHNOLOGY

Earlier in this book, the author addressed the importance of sound analysis to the intelligence process. Perhaps equally important are the tools the analysts have to facilitate the conduct of analysis. There are still a number of people in DIA from the 1960s—like Norman Davis and Ed Gibson from DI, and Ronald Walker, Frederica Weaver, and Daniel Lieman from DS—who remember DIA without email. They also remember DIA before the days of desktop computers with access to a variety of databases and the ability to coordinate a huge variety of things online. In short, they remember when it was not possible to do things in DIA with sometimes astonishing speed.

Technology and its advancements have been a boon to DIA from the top to the bottom of the intelligence process. The collector of intelligence can do a better job because of the ability to digitally transmit, the analyst has better access to multiple databases and sources for his or her analysis, and the producers and distributors of intelligence now have many more forms in which to display and transmit intelligence. The evolution of the intelligence process in DIA is closely tied to the evolution of technology in DIA. Sound analysis will always be indebted to those in DIA who have worked to improve support to analysis and to apply technology to the intelligence process.

As DIA has addressed the advancement of technology and its applications to intelligence, it has always had two major responsibilities—one to its own internal workforce, and the second to the rest of the defense intelligence community.

The earlier application of systems in DIA in the 1960s and 1970s was addressed in Part 3 of this book. DIA's modernization of information

systems began in the late 1970s with the start of the joint Support for the Analyst's File Environment (SAFE) program. This effort was to culminate in a system that would allow an analyst to receive message traffic tailored to his or her interest profiles, to create reports, to search all messages that have ever entered the system, and, in the case of DIA, to provide a much more powerful Order of Battle and Facilities Database, called the Integrated Database (IDB). Concurrent with the SAFE development, the rules governing Delegated Production of Order of Battle intelligence were being strengthened, and the DIA leadership recognized that a network connecting the various intelligence producers among the Services, Commands, DIA, and others would be essential to maintain and manage the National Order of Battle Databases. This spawned the development of a top secret network called DSNET3, but referred to as the Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DoDIIS) Network. The DoDIIS Network allowed information-sharing among the various subscribers and automated update of the order of battle databases and spawned a management effort that allowed the sharing of common applications.

In the mid-to-late 1980s, the use of desktop personal computers (PCs) was spreading rapidly. Software industry developments were allowing these machines to be tied together into local area networks (LANs). The LANs allowed users to communicate and share files and data with one another throughout an organization. In 1987, DIA began an aggressive program to implement LANs for all Agency personnel with the goal of putting a computer on every desktop with services such as email, access to SAFE, and other applications available from the desktop. The



A technical officer oversees maintenance of the local area network (LAN) in the mid-1990s.

implementation of LANs was one part of a larger strategy to upgrade the ADP services supporting the entire DIA organization and DoDIIS and formed the basic network structure DIA uses today.

Other components of this strategy included performance management of all of DIA's computer systems to improve the level of service being provided. This effort led to the consolidation of 11 large mainframe systems into 3. The resultant savings paid for the PC/LAN strategy and yet returned a significant amount of money to the Agency. The second effort was to upgrade the capabilities of the staff within the Directorate of

Information Systems and Services (DS) by establishing a career ladder program with heavy emphasis on technical education and training. While these activities mostly impacted upon internal DIA developments, a DoDIIS Management Board (DMB) was established to ensure interoperability among the Information Technology (IT) organizations across the defense intelligence DoDIIS community.

The DMB implemented a mechanism that allowed executive agents to manage the development and deployment of other common applications. It also fostered a process of sharing various "best of breed" efforts within the community.

One of these efforts was a technique developed at the Strategic Air Command to implement networked applications across an organization. Another successful and widely deployed community program was the Joint Deployable Intelligence Information System (JDISS) that was developed by the Navy at the Atlantic Command. Still a growing success today, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS), was implemented in the early 1990s to link defense intelligence sites worldwide, with secure video teleconferencing one of its most popular features. Using JWICS as the communications medium, the Defense Intelligence Network (DIN) soon became a major source of intelligence dissemination. The DIN was the implementation of a classified intelligence news network/broadcast using J2 current intelligence analysts as DIN anchorpersons. Broadcasts became so popular that newscasts were scheduled up to 18 hours a day. The DIN was very popular because it gave military commanders worldwide up-to-date intelligence coverage scheduled to coincide with time zones worldwide.

Intelink, which also uses JWICS as a communications medium, was the defense intelligence community's implementation of a classified Internet. Intelink more than JWICS was to become the biggest single action advancing production, storage, retrieval, dissemination, and sharing of intelligence. Intelligence products literally would be available to the desktop of the decisionmaker in a classified, Internet-like, point-and-click environment.

JWICS also provides a major data communications capability not only for defense intelligence, but the entire national Intelligence Community. JWICS has grown to become the Intelligence Community's classified Internet. Intelligence sites worldwide only need point and click to gain access to the latest posted intelligence products at any intelligence site worldwide. Today, more than 160 sites have access to global intelligence databases within fractions of a second. Ten of

these are mobile units, called Joint Mobile Intelligence Communications Systems (JMICS). A JMICS unit can be moved in, set up, and transmitting intelligence in just 4 hours. A JMICS unit consists of two HMMVs that provide mobility for the equipment, which includes a satellite dish, and three generators used to provide heat, air conditioning, and electric power. All equipment is housed in two tents, consisting of a dozen workstations, classified phones, fax machines, and a video teleconferencing suite. Personnel to man and operate the equipment come from each of the national intelligence agencies, forming what is called a joint National Intelligence Support Team (NIST). The NIST enables each Intelligence Community agency to be represented and to participate in the preparation of joint intelligence assessments from remote locations. The JMICS has proved to be invaluable in collecting and transmitting intelligence to remote locations prior to the installation of a permanent communications capability.

The DIA leadership for technology in the late 1990s—the Directorate for Information Systems and Services (DS), headed by Mr. Dennis Clem—was also charged with ensuring interoperable solutions across all defense intelligence sites. As a result, intelligence analysts have an Internet-based, Web-enabled environment with state-of-the-art technology tools available. The DIA LAN is now almost exclusively Microsoft-based and is being expanded throughout all defense intelligence sites.

DIA has led the way in technology with implementation of the latest in collaborative tools and portal technology. DIA's Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) Program is now in the implementation phase of a several-year effort on behalf of the entire defense intelligence community. JIVA was conceived under DIA Directors Clapper and Minihan and implemented by DIA Director Hughes. IT implements collaborative tools at the desktop, provides audio and video desktop-to-desktop teleconferencing, white boarding, and



Digital photographic equipment being demonstrated with a laptop in 1996. Digital photography allows imagery to be transmitted in near real time, and systems have become more compact in the past 5 years.

even virtual chat rooms where analysts can meet on topics of interest. And the JIVA portals being implemented provide the first information technology tool set capable of radically changing the analytic work environment and intelligence business processes. Using the JIVA portal software and the tool set being implemented, analysts can arrive at work and already have hours of painstaking research completed and analyzed by automated information technology tools. These tools run around the clock amalgamizing and analyzing raw data as specified by the analysts. A major advantage of this technology is the excellent capability to do background research on countries for which manpower is unavailable for daily monitor-

ing and analysis. When a crisis occurs involving one of these countries, all that need be done is to click on an already customized intelligence portal for that country, which has been running for months, and collecting the latest information, day in and day out. Using this technology in the background, requiring virtually no manpower on a day-to-day basis, the intelligence analysts have an effective capability to virtually cover the world. The portals do not analyze data, they simply continue to analyze intelligence data as programmed. When a crisis occurs, the routine questions which flood the analysts can be answered quickly, as the research will already have been completed via the portal and associated background tools. This gives

the analyst a major jumpstart, with technology the key enabler.

DIA has been blessed over the years with many talented and dedicated professionals who worked to harness technology and support for DIA and the defense intelligence community. To name just a very few of the standouts: Carl Norton, Richard

B. Walker, Steven Schanzer, Dennis Clem, Walter Jablonski, Barry Atkison, and David Lee. Others will follow in their footsteps.

DIA clearly identified technology and data communications as key enablers to its longer-term success and to its ability to acquire, process, report, and disseminate intelligence.



A major technology milestone with significant environmental impact was the elimination of the heavy metal, cadmium, from U-2 aerial reconnaissance film. DIA employees include (l-r) Col Ron McCallum, Chief of the Services Group (SV), LTG Patrick Hughes, Director, DIA (DR), Dr. Kathleen Morrish, Chief of the Office of Technical Services (SVT), and Dennis Clem, Deputy Director for Information Systems and Services (DS), in the 1998 U-2 film "ribbon" cutting ceremony with industry mission partners.

DIA was awarded the prestigious Collier Trophy, given for America's greatest achievement in aeronautics, for its 37-year use of the U-2 aircraft. The U-2 imagery collection and the processing of U-2 film revolutionized American intelligence analysis of the Soviet threat during the Cold War, and is one of America's best-known intelligence achievements.



The late John Berbrich (right), Director of the National Military Intelligence Production Center, 1993-1995, was instrumental in standing up the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP).

## FEDERATED INTELLIGENCE PRODUCTION

The world changed dramatically for DIA during the 1990s. In many ways, the strategic environment was almost completely remade. The collapse of the Cold War international structure and the emergence of new threats, opportunities, and challenges changed the nature and pace of U.S. military doctrine, structure, interest, and operations. The changes in strategy—codified in the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy—and in doctrine, and operational planning all called for different, more detailed, precise, and actionable intelligence simultaneously relevant to tactical, operational, and strategic commanders. At the same time, technological advances resulted in an enormous amount of intelligence and open-source information available to DIA. These changes significantly altered DIA's role as the all-source analytic organization for DoD. A new term and role for the DIA effort emerged—federation.

DIA's mission as a Combat Support Agency evolved during DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM and, as a result, its increased focus on support to military operations has eclipsed many other traditional missions. DIA's all-source analysts are more directly engaged in support to operations—from planning to execution—than ever before. Its counterterrorism, counterproliferation, information warfare, and infrastructure warfare programs, and regional military and counterdrug analysts are heavily focused on support to operations. Its two scientific and technical centers—the Missile and Space Intelligence Center in Huntsville, Alabama, and the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center at Fort Detrick, Maryland—have strong operational support missions that have only intensified over time. The U.S. military's new generation of kinetic and antikinetic

precision weapons has led DIA to shift more of its analytic effort to support to targeting. This support includes analysis and production of very precise, indepth, all-source intelligence to support sophisticated targeting, solid no-strike calculation, battle damage assessment, and campaign planning.

Events in the early 1990s also created substantial pressure to change DIA's relationships with its Intelligence Community counterparts. There were intelligence reforms in defense, especially the creation of Joint Intelligence Centers at each of the Unified Commands. There was a 30-percent manpower reduction across the defense community. There were increasing demands for detailed analysis in countries and regions not traditionally covered (e.g., Rwanda and Somalia). And there was pressure from Capitol Hill and elsewhere to eliminate unnecessary duplication in intelligence. All of these factors forced DIA to look for new ways of doing business with its counterparts.

In 1993, DIA's core analytic organization, the National Military Intelligence Production Center (NMIPC), took the lead in creating an integrated defense intelligence community. It would be a federation of U.S. and allied intelligence producers that would reduce duplication of intelligence efforts and better coordinate and collaborate on products. Prior to 1993, most DoD intelligence providers were highly autonomous, meeting regularly to inform each other of initiatives, challenges, and planned production, but not seriously engaged in avoiding overlap and duplication. However, as the implications of the Cold War's end began to sink in, DoD agencies and the Military Services grew to realize that they could not

separately meet the growing demands before them and would have to work together.

The resulting federation, formally known as the Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program (DoDIPP), took several years to establish. Its early champions included Mr. John Berbrich, chief of the NMIPC from 1993 to 1995, and Ms. Joan Dempsey, NMIPC chief from 1995 to 1997. John Berbrich, as Production Functional Manager in charge of the DoDIPP, faced a unique challenge in getting 14 DoD producers and 3 Commonwealth allies to identify unique production responsibilities, forge common policies and procedures, streamline intelligence production, and meet regularly to lead the Community in new directions. Berbrich's vehicle for getting the leadership together became the Defense Intelligence Production Council (DIPC), which included the National Ground Intelligence Center, the National Air Intelligence Center, the National Maritime Intelligence Center (which included the Navy and Marine intelligence organizations), the nine Unified Command JICs, and the Commonwealth nations.

Over 2 years, interagency committees reporting to the Production Functional Manager drafted the "the constitution" for the DoDIPP, a series of documents defining roles, missions, and procedures for the DoD Intelligence Community. Key to the DoDIPP was the creation of a division of labor, or "lanes in the road," that clearly identified the intelligence responsibilities of each entity. One of the more difficult decisions coming out of the process was the relocation from DIA to the JICs of foreign order of battle intelligence. Many viewed this move as the Agency abandoning one of its core responsibilities; however, DIA has been able to move more assets into other critical intelligence areas such as information operations, counterproliferation, and infrastructure analysis as a result.

The DoDIPP was declared operational in fall 1994. Since then, it has been codified in key Joint Staff publications, particularly those related to

national support to joint operations. One of the keys to its success was technology.

The revolution in communications technology began to occur at about the same time DIA initiated the DoDIPP. Just as collaboration became more important, the Intelligence Community was developing tools to ease the flow of information across secure video links and networks. Community coordination and decisionmaking sessions for DoDIPP management requirements took place via video teleconferences (VTCs). Suddenly, DoD leadership could meet anytime to work issues. More important, the VTC provided early opportunities for the DoDIPP federation to work substantive issues together in real time. By the mid-1990s, the Intelligence Community could, and did, regularly hold substantive analytical sessions on the VTC. In these sessions, intelligence production efforts were developed and coordinated in support of operations in the Balkans, Korea, and other hotspots. When a crisis occurs today, analysts working the problem, wherever they are geographically, meet routinely via the JWICS VTC. These "virtual analytical efforts" are almost second nature to analysts. Technology continues to progress in the area with the advent of the Joint Collaborative Environment that, among other tools, allows analysts to conduct collaborative video sessions from their desktop.

The most significant facet of the communications revolution affecting the DoDIPP was the creation of a secure Internet or, as it is known in the Intelligence Community, Intelink. Intelink represents a complete paradigm shift in the way DIA and other DoD intelligence organizations provide intelligence to customers. With Intelink, any member of the defense federation can post intelligence products, imagery, and database information to its homepage. Any other member and, most important, any military customer, can gain access to the information. In a crisis, important intelligence is now more readily available to the consumer who often needs it in a hurry.

The DoDIPP continues to evolve in membership, focus, and procedures, but its success in creating a more closely knit defense community is unquestioned. Key leadership in the defense community clearly looks to the Production Functional Manager and DoDIPP members to tackle emerging intelligence issues, such as asymmetric threats and homeland defense.


Has anything remained the same? The answer, of course, is yes. DIA remains committed to excellence in its all-source analysis role. Many of its analysts are the best in the world at what

they do. DIA still takes advantage of the unique combination of its analytic workforce: long-serving civilian analysts who develop great in-depth expertise, complemented by active-duty and reserve military officers and NCOs from all Services who bring operational and functional expertise, fresh insights, and dedication. DIA's analysts demonstrate a continued interest in solving complex analytical problems and in pressing the analytic envelope with innovative research, and they willingly take risks to provide warning of problems and events in order to make a difference.



A conference at the National Ground Intelligence Center in 1992 where the concept of the DoDIPP was launched. DIA participants included the Director, Lt Gen Clapper, the Deputy, Dennis Nagy, as well as John Berbrich, William Grundmann, Joe Lamoglia, John Lee, and Joe Romano. Also in the picture (fourth from right, second row) is then-CAPT Lowell Jacoby, USN, now the J2.

LTG Hughes instituted the first "Purple Book" in 1996 to provide well-defined review and analysis of the future threat.



## RED CELLS AND PURPLE BOOKS

In 1996, when Lieutenant General Pat Hughes became the Director of DIA and the senior intelligence officer for the Defense Department, he knew that the primary responsibility that would fall to him and DIA would be defining the changed threat to the nation, U.S. interests, and the U.S. military. He had lived through the past 10 years marked by dynamic change and great uncertainty, and he believed that the next 10 years were likely to be equally so because the basic engines of turmoil remained largely in place. The volatile mix of global political, economic, social, technological, and military conditions would continue to bring great stress to the international order.

He also knew that the dynamic changes had spurred a dramatic increase in the operations tempo of the U.S. and allied forces. The increased daily global engagement posture, consequently, limited the forces and resources available to respond immediately to other, potentially more demanding regional warfare contingencies. The same was true for defense intelligence resources. The analytic challenge of assessing the future threat had never been greater, as a multitude of emerging trends impacted the global security environment. One of the most challenging trends was the increasing criticality of information, its rapid dissemination and integration, and its subsequent management. Proper use of information could aid in the creation of a more benign and stable security environment, while improper use could exacerbate stressful conditions.

Having just come from the J2, DIA job, Hughes more so than anyone else, knew that the Director and the J2 would need to work as a team to provide support to the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of

the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Unified Commands and Services. Accordingly, he supported the selection of Major General James King, USA, to be the J2. Jim King was the J2 at CENTCOM, and he and General Hughes had a mutual understanding of a part of the world that had long been a threat to U.S. interests.

One of the earlier techniques that was used by the team of Hughes and King and DIA's analysts in conveying the "threat" to senior defense and U.S. officials was the use of "Red Teams." A technique used in DIA during the Cold War but now applied to the current threat (e.g., Iraq), the DIA "Red Team" would present to decisionmakers what was happening through the eyes of the opponent. The "Red Team" would look at every facet of an opponent and then tell U.S. officials what influenced them and how they viewed the U.S. actions.

Pat Hughes believed that, during the next two decades, there was little likelihood that the United States would be confronted by a Soviet-like global military peer, but that the combined impact of numerous local, regional, and transnational challenges presented a formidable obstacle to our strategic vision.

General Hughes was convinced that, during the next two decades, a new security paradigm would evolve—one in which the United States faced a generalized global set of competitors and potential adversaries, the troubling proliferation of "negative" technologies, and the existence and—at times, rapid—emergence of numerous persistent small-conflict conditions and situations. The new global conditions, he believed, would affect every aspect of military action,

including the planning and execution of current operations and development of the strategy, organization, and equipment that would shape and define future forces.

In defining the future threat, General Hughes, in July 1996, published for DIA the first of four “Purple Books.” He called the Purple Book “A Primer on the Future Threat 1996-2010.” In his introduction to the first Purple Book, he wrote,

*“I am pleased to provide my perspective on the future threat and some of the more specific challenges to U.S. interests that we are likely to encounter now and over the next 15 years. We are currently in a state of transition, and it is difficult to determine what sort of global security environment is emerging. We will face challenges which will shape the course of events at the start of the new millennium. We will also have to deal with increasingly blurred distinctions—transnational vs. national (regional), war vs. conflict short of war, and deterrence vs. defense vs. offense.*

*“Beyond the turn of the century, we can expect to see a continued redefinition of what constitutes state power, especially military power. The military component of state power may be reduced in size, but may also become more lethal and more threatening to stability than in the past. ‘Threat,’ like ‘interest,’ is no longer a self-evident term. The Defense Intelligence Community has traditionally focused on a primary element of the threat—enemy forces and weapons systems; clearly that aspect remains. However, as military activity extends to missions involving the use of military forces in non-traditional roles, we must adapt our intelligence focus to meet new requirements.”*

The fourth edition of the Purple Book was published by DIA on 4 July 1999. In his preface, General Hughes stated:

*“This is the fourth edition of the Primer on the Future Threat and my final as the Director of DIA. My intent remains to provide a thought-provoking document that highlights for decisionmakers and long-range planners those threats and challenges that may emerge in the period 1999-2020 and beyond. Over the past 5 years, the Department of Defense has grown increasingly concerned with the future global security environment, in part because of the ambiguity and uncertainty that we all expect will continue to characterize the global condition. Lacking the central threat focus of the Cold War, we must anticipate a much broader set of challenging circumstances and conditions. This primer endeavors to help decisionmakers and planners by illuminating key trends that will impact the world of the 21st century, identifying critical uncertainties, and addressing potential implications for the nature of conflict and warfare.*

*“The primer is organized into five main sections: global issues, regional assessments, forces and science trends, the nature of future warfare, and an outlook section. Each individual section is designed to ‘stand alone’; collectively, these ‘chapters’ provide a comprehensive depiction of the spectrum of diverse threats and challenges confronting our nation over the next two decades. While the message is sobering, my intent in preparing this primer is not to instill fear or foreboding. Rather, I hope that by identifying and discussing in realistic terms the emerging threat environment, such knowledge will help leadership better understand and prepare for it.”*

The persistent ethnic tensions in the Balkans projected by DIA means that U.S. forces will continue to be involved in the region. DIA Allied Military Intelligence Battalion (AMIB) member, Gregory R. Innocent, shown inside the Forward Operation Base (FOB) near Zvornik in the Serb Republic, Bosnia, December 1999.



General Hughes told the author:

*“DIA’s intent was to produce a high-quality ‘analytic’ product that would take our message out of the U.S. Intelligence Community and into the Military Departments, into the Joint Staff, and into the larger Department of Defense. This effort succeeded because of many superb analysts and contributors, one of the better graphic artists DIA has ever had, USAF Master Sergeant Walter Rhamehild,*

*spearheaded by the Director’s Briefing Team and the many fine officers and NCOs who served there, all of whom worked together to make it a coherent, reasoned presentation of the conditions we will face in the future. The Purple Book ended up being a bestseller and served to not only inform, but to convince key people of the nature of the trends that will affect the United States and our allies. It was a good effort with a real purpose, and it succeeded.”*

Under General Hughes' leadership, DIA continued to focus on improved communications and support to the warfighter by supporting and building the prototype and some fielded versions of the Joint All-Source Analytic Workstation (JAS-AWS), nicknamed MERLIN. One of the key tenets of the Joint All-Source Virtual Architecture (JIVA) was the need for a Joint All-Source Analytic Workstation. General Hughes gave the job to Mr. David Lee, who gathered key technologies and approaches and integrated them into a single "workstation." This "workstation" could interact in all elements of the digital information domain,

including a text algorithmic data; quantities expressed as functions, icons, images, and imagery of all kinds; graphics and graphics user interfaces; assembly mechanisms; geolocation data; maps, charts and geodesy; and other forms of information. The goal was to put something in the field that users—real analysts at the DIAC, the J2, and the CINC J2s—could use, and from which DIA could incorporate.

Under General Hughes' leadership, DIA continued its record of excellence in defense of the nation. DIA received a number of awards for its



Deputy Secretary of Defense John Hamre places the streamer for the Agency's fifth Joint Meritorious Unit Award on the colors during the Agency change-of-command ceremony at the DIAC in July 1999. To the right of the Deputy Secretary is the DCI, George Tenet, LTG Patrick Hughes (behind colors), and the incoming Director, DIA, VADM Thomas Wilson.

service—some for specialized work that can't be discussed in this unclassified format. Two of these particularly prestigious awards were the 1998 Collier Award for Excellence in Support Operations for the U-2 and the Killian Award (a first for DIA) for Excellence in Intelligence Operations for DIA's work concerning North Korea.

When the time came for the 12th Director to give up his steerage of DIA, all who knew him knew that he departed and went on to retirement

bursting with pride in all that the Agency and its people had accomplished together. As for his own legacy, he was the Director who once again brought the future “threat” into the thoughts and minds of those officials charged with making America's national security decisions.

On 23 July 1999, DIA once again was awarded the Joint Meritorious Unit Award for exceptionally meritorious service for October 1996 to 20 March 1999.

*“Today's military leaders cannot have scientific knowledge alone. They must be students of warfare with an imagination capable of projecting forward the principles of the past to the specific requirement of the future.”*

*General Maxwell D. Taylor*

*“I skate to where the puck is going to be, not to where it has been.”*

*Wayne Gretzky*

# Part 6



Medium-range ballistic missiles now pose one of the most serious threats to both regional and international stability. An Iranian SHAHAB-3 on its transporter-erector-launcher is shown in Tehran. The SHAHAB is based on the North Korean NO DONG 1, upgraded with Russian technology.

## THE NEW MILLENNIUM

In December 2000, the Director of Central Intelligence, George T. Tenet, introduced *Global Trends 2015*. The publication took a look over the next 15 years from the perspective of the national security policymaker. *Global Trends 2015* was not a classified intelligence assessment. Rather, it reflected on the Intelligence Community exchanging views with outside government experts in a constructive dialog about the future.

The National Intelligence Council gave overall direction to the year-long effort, assisted by colleagues from DIA and other intelligence agencies and offices. Mr. Ken Knight and Mr. Pat Neary were the principal DIA representatives.

*Global Trends 2015* identified seven drivers and trends that will shape the future world. The key drivers and trends are demographics, natural resources and environment, science and technology, the global economy and globalization, national and international governance, and future conflict and the role of the United States.

In the area of future conflicts, the Global Trends group assessed that the United States would maintain a strong technological edge in information technology (IT)-driven “battlefield awareness” and in precision-guided weaponry. The United States would likely face three types of threats:

- Asymmetric threats, in which state and nonstate adversaries avoid direct engagements with the U.S. military but devise strategies, tactics, and weapons—some improved by “sidewise” technology—to minimize U.S. strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses;
- Strategic weapons of mass destruction (WMD) threats, including nuclear missile threats—in which

(barring significant political or economic changes) Russia, China, most likely North Korea, probably Iran, and possibly Iraq have the capability to strike the United States—and potential unconventional delivery of WMD by both state and nonstate actors will grow; and

- Regional military threats, in which a few countries maintain large military forces with a mix of Cold War and post-Cold War concepts and technologies.

The risk of war among developed countries, the group believed, will be low. However, the international community will continue to face conflicts around the world, ranging from relatively frequent small-scale internal upheavals to less frequent regional interstate wars. The potential for conflict will arise from rivalries in Asia, ranging from India-Pakistan to China-Taiwan, as well as among the antagonists in the Middle East. Their potential lethality will grow, driven by the availability of WMD, longer-range missile delivery systems, and other technologies.

In examining the future roles of the United States, they held, in part, that both allies and adversaries will factor continued U.S. military preeminence in their calculations of national security interests and ambitions. In looking at key uncertainties, the conferees believed that uncertainties such as advances in science and technology will pose national security challenges of uncertain scale and character. For example:

- Increasing reliance on computer networks is making critical U.S. infrastructures more attractive as targets. Computer network operations today offer new options for attacking the United States within its traditional continental sanctuary—potentially anonymously and with selective effects. Nevertheless, we do not know how quickly or effectively

such adversaries as terrorists or disaffected states will develop the tradecraft to use cyberwarfare tools and technology, or, in fact, whether cyberwarfare will ever evolve into a decisive combat arm.

- Rapid advances and diffusion of biotechnology, nanotechnology, and the material sciences will add to the capabilities of our adversaries to engage in biological warfare or bioterrorism.

*Global Trends* also suggested that most adversaries will recognize the information advantage and military superiority of the United States in 2015. Rather than acquiesce to any potential U.S. military domination, they will try to circumvent or minimize U.S. strengths and exploit perceived weaknesses. IT-driven globalization will significantly increase interaction among terrorists, narcotics traffickers, weapons proliferators, and organized criminals. In a networked world, they will all have greater access to information, technology, finance, sophisticated deception-and-denial techniques, and each other. Such asymmetric approaches—whether undertaken by state or nonstate actors—will become the dominant characteristic of most threats to the U.S. homeland. They will be a defining challenge for U.S. strategy, operations, and force development. They will require that strategy maintain focus on traditional, low-technology threats, as well as the capacity of potential adversaries to harness elements of proliferating advanced technologies. At the same time, the group did not know the extent to which adversaries, state and nonstate, might be influenced or deterred by other geopolitical, economic, technological, or diplomatic factors by 2015.

Vice Admiral Wilson and DIA—in both participating and benefiting from the formulation of national security dialog contained in *Global Trends 2015*—must ultimately reduce information about the future global security environment and its threatening implications to more specific military threats and challenges.

In his current unclassified threat briefings given to defense and intelligence committees in Congress

and other audiences, Admiral Wilson emphasizes the following:

*“The dynamic global change and turmoil that characterized much of the 1990s will continue through 2015. The basic conditions that are stressing international stability remain largely in place. Defense and the U.S. military should anticipate a future security environment in which numerous situations that will demand military involvement—from large-scale contingencies through a number of ‘lesser’ operations that occur simultaneously. While global engagement is critical to shaping the future*

*... the consequences and implications of a high peacetime engagement posture are not trivial for military and intelligence services.*

*“For instance, engagement contingencies will frequently occur in less-developed nations and regions . . . requiring U.S. forces to operate in challenging ‘asymmetric environments.’ These will present unique deployment, operational, and intelligence problems that may limit many of our ‘information age’ force advantages. Similarly . . . such contingencies will . . . more often than not . . . pit the U.S. against adversaries who are likely to employ a variety of asymmetric approaches—such as terrorism, information operations, the threat or use of mass casualty weapons, or other similar means—to offset our general military superiority.*

*“In fact, the Asymmetric Threat remains one of DIA’s primary concerns . . . not only from the ‘engagement’ perspective . . . but across the board. Our adversaries recognize the U.S.’ overall military superiority and will generally be smart and adaptive enough to avoid engaging us ‘on our terms.’ They will opt instead to pursue capabilities that we are either unwilling or unable to counter . . . in an effort to render our military power irrelevant or indecisive to their operations and objectives. Specific adversaries,*

*objectives, targets, and means of attack will vary widely from situation to situation.”*

Admiral Wilson and DIA believe that, when examined in the context of the U.S. military mission, most asymmetric approaches will fit generally into five broad, overlapping categories.

*“The first would be counter-will operations . . . which will be designed to deter the United States from becoming involved . . . or make us disengage short of our objectives . . . by severing the ‘continuity of will’ between the U.S. national leadership, the military, the people, our allied and coalition partners, and world public opinion.*

*“A second likely asymmetrical approach—counter-access operations—would attempt to deny U.S. and allied forces easy access to key theaters, ports, bases, and facilities . . . and important air, land, and maritime approaches. These could involve both technological efforts . . . for instance, the use of advanced antiship cruise missiles to attack approaching forces outside the theater . . . and other means . . . such as subverting friendly governments . . . or pressuring them to deny U.S. access.*

*“A third approach would focus on employing a host of technological and operational measures to defeat or degrade our precision intelligence and attack capabilities.*

*“Asymmetric adversaries may also attempt to develop counterprotection capabilities . . . designed to increase U.S. and allied military and civilian casualties . . . including . . . in some cases . . . carrying out direct attacks against our homeland.*

*“Finally, we can expect most adversaries to conduct counterinformation operations . . . for example, hiding key information from us . . . distorting or manipulating information we do collect . . . degrading, damaging, destroying, or corrupting our databases . . . and attacking key elements of our information system. The goal of*

*these operations is to prevent us from attaining information and decision superiority.*

*“The engagement and asymmetric challenges outlined above represent the ‘new wave’ of threats and challenges the United States is likely to encounter in the coming years. We will continue to face more traditional military threats . . . both strategic and regional . . . well into the future.*

*“Russia, for instance, continues to prioritize strategic force elements and will rely increasingly on nuclear weapons to offset its diminished conventional force capabilities. Moscow has begun deployment of the new SS-27 ICBM and has upgrades to this missile and several other systems under development. But even strategic forces have not been immune to the problems plaguing the rest of the Russian military. System aging, underfunding, and arms control agreements will drive Russian strategic warhead totals down even further—from 5,000 today to perhaps fewer than 1,500 during the next decade or so.*

*“One additional concern, which will remain with us so long as Russia remains in some turmoil, is the potential for a Russian nuclear weapon . . . or, more likely, nuclear material . . . to be stolen by or otherwise diverted to a country of concern, a terrorist group, or other criminal element.*

*“China will also remain a strategic threat. One of Beijing’s top military priorities is to strengthen and modernize its dated strategic nuclear deterrent. China currently has a small force of some 20 CSS-4 ICBMs with a range of over 13,000-kilometers . . . but has several modernization programs underway . . . including 2 new, road-mobile, solid-propellant ICBMs. One of these, the 8,000-kilometer DF-31, was successfully flight-tested in 1999 and 2000. Another, longer-range, mobile ICBM will likely be tested within the next several years. China is also developing a new strategic submarine and an*

*associated missile . . . the 8,000-plus-kilometer JL-2. These systems will likely be tested and deployed later this decade.*

*“While the pace and extent of China’s strategic modernization indicates deterrent, rather than first-strike, intentions . . . the number, reliability, survivability, and accuracy of Chinese strategic missiles capable of hitting the U.S. will increase during the coming years.*

*“Beyond China and Russia . . . North Korea and, later on, perhaps Iran . . . and even Iraq . . . could also field small numbers of long-range, WMD-equipped missiles capable of striking the United States. As these trends unfold, the strategic threat picture will become more complex, diverse, and complicated, leaving our homeland potentially more vulnerable to a wider array of strategic challenges.*

*“Beyond these strategic threats, we can expect several regional powers—to include China and Russia at the high end, followed by North Korea, Iran, and Iraq—to maintain large military forces featuring a mix of ‘industrial age’ and 21st century technologies and concepts. While less advanced overall than the U.S. military, these forces will still be potent by regional standards, and in many cases, be fully capable of accomplishing significant regional objectives. Under the right conditions, their large numbers, combined with other ‘situational advantages’—such as initiative, limited objectives, short lines of communications, familiar terrain, time to deploy and prepare combat positions, and the skillful use of asymmetric approaches—could present significant challenges to U.S. mission success.”*

Admiral Wilson expects that the security challenges the United States will confront during the first decades of this century will vary widely, from more traditional “recognizable” threats, to a host of asymmetric and other challenges. The exact form and significance each threat ultimately poses

will depend on the strengths and weaknesses of individual adversaries, their means and objectives, their success at collecting intelligence against us, and the unique situational, environmental, and other characteristics of the specific operating environment.

He thinks the ability to handle this wide spectrum of challenges will depend on Intelligence Community success at reshaping and revitalizing traditional intelligence disciplines and methods, while simultaneously adopting new approaches. From his perspective, the most critical aspects of this intelligence transformation include how we (DIA) interface with our customers, the structure and content of our databases, the responsiveness and adaptability of our collection and analytic tools, and, most important, the professionalism of the intelligence (DIA) workforce.

From the larger national perspective, President Bush’s administration began a top-to-bottom review of the nation’s intelligence capabilities on 3 July 2001. Retired Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft convened a panel of outside experts to start the work of review.

A review panel of internal experts was also convened shortly thereafter, with Joan Dempsey, Deputy Director of Central Intelligence for Community Management, serving as chairwoman. Both panels were mandated by President Bush when he issued a directive in May which charged CIA Director George Tenet with conducting “a comprehensive review of U.S. intelligence.” The process is expected to be completed by the end of September.

The internal panel will have 8 to 10 members, including DIA Deputy Director Mark Ewing, the Joint Staff J2, and the Deputy Directors of the National Security Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Imagery and Mapping Agency.

Under the May directive, the two panels are directed to conduct “independent, but parallel, reviews” of four areas: 21st century intelligence challenges, current capabilities, new and “highly advanced” technologies for intelligence collection

and analysis; and possible reorganization of the community.

Emphasis on intelligence in the new millennium is well underway.



North Korea remains an isolated Stalinist state that continues to develop advanced weaponry.

VADM Tom Wilson (center) had a lot on his mind when he assumed command of DIA from LTG Pat Hughes (left) in July 1999. CSM Richard Brolly, DIA's Senior Enlisted Advisor, holds the Agency colors during the ceremony.



## DIA TODAY—THE CHALLENGE CONTINUES

On that hot day in July 1999 when Vice Admiral Tom Wilson was assuming command of DIA, he listened carefully to the words of Deputy Secretary of Defense Dr. John Hamre, who was presiding over the ceremony. Focusing on DIA's mission, Dr. Hamre said, "America cannot go to war without solid intelligence." Tom Wilson, having just served as DIA's J2 for JCS, knew in no uncertain terms that what the Secretary said was true. To provide the best possible intelligence to warfighters had always been a challenge. He also knew that challenge would continue. He reflected on the decade that was in its final months. The past 10 years had seen both the Gulf War and the end of the Soviet Union, and these two watershed events had changed the nature of the military and its intelligence needs. As the 1990s progressed, the military intelligence community found itself involved in many unforeseen assignments, including operations in Iraq, Somalia, Rwanda, Burundi, Bosnia, Haiti, and Kosovo.

The new concerns plaguing the military and national intelligence communities included international terrorism, information operations, and the worldwide proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

Compounding these problems was a situation in which post-Cold War military intelligence was being asked to do more with less—both in funding and in personnel. Budgetary constraints limited DIA's ability to recruit and retain valuable people from the booming U.S. economy. The defense intelligence community, flush with new collection and dissemination technologies, now faced a crisis in its human elements. Years of improving technological capability had left a seri-

ous gap in human intelligence collection as well as in analysis. This challenge to the community was emerging just as its missions were increasing. The monolithic Communist threat had given way to uncertain threats from varied sources in vaguely defined mission areas. Instead of easing the burden on defense intelligence assets, the lessening of the focus on Russia has been more than offset by the need to monitor many new threats and to answer more calls for supporting new types of national security operations.

Admiral Wilson knew that the multifaceted threat world that DIA now lived in would continue. He knew that it was going to be his job to secure the necessary money, people, and equipment that would sustain the important roles, missions, and functions of DIA and the defense intelligence community in meeting the changing global threats. Countering these threats wasn't going to be easy, but he knew the demands for defense intelligence analysis and production, collection, and other capabilities would continue unabated. Most important, Tom Wilson knew that DIA needed to stay the course, and that he and the Agency were up to the task. Yes, the challenge would continue.

Coinciding with its activation on 1 October 1961, Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara transferred to DIA 500 manpower authorizations—250 military and 250 civilians.

The DIA of today is a DoD combat support agency and an important member of the U.S. Intelligence Community. With more than 7,000 military and civilian employees worldwide, DIA is a major producer of, and manager for, foreign military intelligence production. DIA provides

military intelligence to warfighters, defense policymakers, and force planners in the DoD and the Intelligence Community in support of U.S. military planning and operations and weapon systems acquisition.

The Director of DIA serves as principal adviser to the Secretary of Defense and to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on matters of military intelligence. The Director also chairs the Military Intelligence Board, which coordinates activities of the defense intelligence community.

DIA is headquartered at the Pentagon in Washington, DC, with major operational activities at the DIAC, Defense HUMINT Service (DHS), and

Defense Attaché System (DAS), Washington, DC; the Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center (AFMIC), Frederick, Maryland; and the Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC), Huntsville, Alabama.

The DIA workforce is as diverse as its missions. DIA possess a workforce skilled in the areas of military operations and intelligence, military history and doctrine, economics, physics, chemistry, world history, political science, bio-sciences, and computer sciences, to name a few.

The DIA mission is dynamic. DIA responds to the needs of its customers—from the President of the United States to the soldiers, sailors, airmen, and



The NMJIC is vital in supporting warfighters and policymakers.

marines in the field. DIA covers all aspects of military intelligence requirements—from highly complex missile trajectory data to biographical information on foreign military leaders.

In the area of defense planning, DIA is fundamental in establishing baseline threat assessments for all operational plans and advocates for continuous improvement of intelligence support to the delib-

erate planning process. DIA directs the joint Requirements Oversight Council's Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance (ISR) program, focusing on future ISR capabilities to provide joint operating forces with dominant battlespace awareness and knowledge. Working with operational forces, DIA's collection managers organize collection support for military and humanitarian operations.

***“There is no question but that what the Intelligence Community is doing is of the utmost importance to our country and to peace and stability in the world.”***

***Donald Rumsfeld  
Secretary of Defense  
22 March 2001***



The *USS Dwight D. Eisenhower* transits the Straits of Messina while moving to support operations in the Balkans. U.S. forces have to deal with multiple hot spots, and DIA provides vital intelligence support to the JCS and policymakers so that operating forces can be moved to meet the most critical situations.

## WILSON AT THE WHEEL



Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN

Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, USN, became the 13th Director of DIA on 27 July 1999. Tom Wilson is a Buckeye. He graduated from Ohio State University in 1968 with a B.S. in agriculture and later earned a master's degree in management and human relations from Webster College. He was commissioned in 1969 in the U.S. Navy after attending Officer Candidate School in Newport, Rhode Island.

Admiral Wilson became an intelligence officer by happenstance. Fresh out of Officer Candidate School, the young ensign from Columbus, Ohio, was assigned to a military intelligence unit in Taiwan working the China account.

According to Admiral Wilson, "My training for intelligence consisted of 15 days of leave."

Intending to go to law school after his 3-year hitch was up, Tom Wilson was assigned to the DIA for his final year of service. His arrival was unheralded.

"I was immediately assigned to run the Xerox machine in the basement," Wilson said. "After 3 or 4 weeks of that, I started wandering around the building looking to see if there was somebody who could use my skills a little bit better, and ended up in the China shop at DIA." Soon enough, he got hooked on intelligence. "I liked to come to work not knowing what problem you are going to have to solve today, but you know it's going to have to be solved by the end of the day," Wilson said. "I loved being at sea and working the kind of issues that we had to do during the Cold War in the Navy—we were essentially at war with the Soviet Navy—everything but the shoot. And we really became acutely attuned to how important intelligence was to the warfighters."

Admiral Wilson's early career included assignments in USS *Kitty Hawk*, as the operational intelligence officer with the Iceland Antisubmarine Warfare (ASW) Group; duty with Carrier Air Wing Three embarked in the USS *Saratoga*; and Force Intelligence Officer, Commander Patrol Wings Atlantic, Brunswick, Maine. Wilson then served as Commander Task Group 168.3 in Naples, Italy. From June 1987 to July 1989, he served as the Fleet Intelligence Officer and Assistant Chief of Staff for Intelligence U.S. Seventh Fleet embarked in the USS *Blue Ridge*.

Returning to Washington, DC, Wilson served as the Special Assistant for Intelligence to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations for Naval Warfare. He was then assigned as Director of Fleet Intelligence, United States Atlantic Fleet, in April 1991. He subsequently served as the Director of Intelligence, U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), from April 1992 until November 1994. He was promoted to flag rank during that assignment. Subsequent flag assignments included Vice Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff; Associate Director of Central Intelligence for Military Support; and, until July 1999, Director for Intelligence, the Joint Staff, DIA.

Admiral Tom Wilson is only the second Director of DIA who previously served as the J2, JCS; the second naval officer; and certainly the first Director to have moved from the basement of DIA to the top floor. When Admiral Wilson moved from J2 to the Director job during summer 1999, DIA was supporting several joint task forces, deploying more than 100 DIA augmentees, and providing more than 600 personnel to other intelligence task forces, to an allied military intelligence battalion in Bosnia, and to National Intelligence Support Teams (NISTs) in Riyadh, Tuzla, and Sarajevo.

Then-Secretary of Defense William Cohen stated that Y2K was his number-one priority for 1999. Congress mandated a series of Y2K systems testing and contingency plans. The transition from 1999 to 2000 went flawlessly for DIA.

In his early leadership of DIA and the military intelligence community, Admiral Wilson and the Military Intelligence Board (MIB) set out "Four Thrusts." The Four Thrusts were: (1) Shaping to Meet the Asymmetrical Threat, (2) Attacking the Database Problem, (3) Achieving Integration and Interoperability for the Common Operating Picture, and (4) Revitalizing and Reshaping the Workforce. In August 1999, a MIB meeting chaired by Admiral Wilson established a target list of goals and objectives. He later added a "fifth

thrust" for the DIA workforce focusing on "The Future of Our People and the People of Our Future."

Admiral Wilson presided at the December 1999 formal dedication of DIA's new Missile and Space Intelligence Center (MSIC) complex on Redstone Arsenal, Alabama. Attending were George Bush, 41st President of the United States, and George Tenet, the DCI. In January 2000, the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA) program achieved operating capability. JIVA is an information technology program that identifies, acquires, and provides automated tools to support the modernization of analytical and production centers.

In October 2000, the destroyer USS *Cole* was damaged by terrorists who steered an explosive-laden boat alongside the ship during a refueling operation in the Yemeni port of Aden. Seventeen U.S. sailors were killed, and 39 more were injured. Islamic fundamentalists under the leadership of Usama bin Laden were suspected in the attack.

In early March 2001, a new war threatened to erupt in the Balkans as Albanian extremists in the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia attacked government police and military troops around Tetevo, just across the border from Kosovo.

And across the world, on 31 March, a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance aircraft on a routine surveillance mission over the South China Sea was struck in midair by a Chinese F-8 fighter jet. The U.S. aircraft was forced to make an emergency landing at a Chinese Air Force base on Hainan Island. The crew and aircraft were detained. A 13-day diplomatic crisis ensued between the United States and China before the crew was released. DIA's DATT in China, Brigadier General Neal Sealock, played a key role in ensuring the welfare of the crew and in the diplomatic negotiations for their release.

A contract for the design of the DIAC completion at Bolling Air Force Base was awarded in April

2001. Work began on 17 April. The design is scheduled to take 16 months. Construction on the DIAC expansion is expected to begin in FY 2003.

The DIAC's completion has been a challenge for the DIA leadership for some time. The existing DIAC, as pointed out earlier, cannot accommodate all of DIA. DIA Directors Clapper and Minihan first worked toward a solution. The issue was then picked up by General Hughes and now by Vice Admiral Wilson. Progress has been made.

While maintaining a Command Element presence at the Pentagon will always be required, consolidating other DIA activities at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base became an overtly stated goal of DIA early in Lieutenant General Hughes' tenure. It had actually been an unofficial goal of many in the Agency for quite some time, and when Lieutenant General Hughes raised the issue, Kathleen Turner, the Deputy Director for Administration, was ready with cost estimates and design concepts. The DIAC had been built in an expandible,

Former President George H. W. Bush speaks at the dedication of the new Richard Shelby Center for Missile and Space Intelligence, MSIC.





CHAIRMAN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF  
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20318-0001

5 September 2001

MG Charles F. Scanlon, USA (Ret)  
Post Office Box 372884  
Satellite Beach, FL 32937

~~Charles~~  
Dear General Scanlon,

Thank you for your recent letter requesting a short statement regarding the importance of the support provided by the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As you well know, there is much that can be said about the vital role DIA plays in the defense of our Nation.

From my perspective, that role is best captured in two key contributions. The first is day-to-day operational intelligence. Throughout my tenure as Chairman, DIA's timely, high-quality intelligence products have been essential in fulfilling my duties to provide military advice to the President, National Security Council and Secretary of Defense. The second, and even more important contribution, is DIA's role as a bulwark against strategic surprise. The Nation requires intelligence assessments of new military capabilities, adversary intentions, and diplomatic initiatives that are as accurate as possible. Such assessments by DIA allow decision makers to formulate policies and strategies that anticipate threats and best serve our national security objectives.

I hope these brief thoughts are of use to you. Good luck with your book!

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

*all the best.  
Hugh*

HENRY H. SHELTON  
Chairman  
of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

modular fashion, and was originally intended to be much larger. Funding constraints had resulted in a reduction in the modules actually build. The addition of space to the DIAC was thus represented as fulfilling the original for the building and it came to be called the DIAC Completion Project.

The problem then became how to pay for an addition to the DIAC estimated to cost in the millions. The ability of the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) to fund large construction projects "out of hide" had vanished with the Cold War. Caryn Wagner, at that time the Director of the Military Intelligence Staff responsible for programming and budgeting for the GDIP, approached the DCI's Community Management Staff (CMS) for assistance. The National Foreign Intelligence Program was facing daunting resource challenges in several core business areas. Unexpectedly, however, at the end of the fiscal year (FY) 1999 programming cycle, the CMS earmarked \$24 million of the GDIP inflation adjustment in FY 2003 for a new building for DIA. This was the first real cash programmed for the building. Now DIA and the GDIP had to figure out how to find the rest. DIA could not foot the entire bill from its projected out-year funding. Because of this, knowing that reallocating the required amounts of money in the near years would be highly contentious and virtually impossible, the

DMI staff looked instead to the furthest out-years of the FYDP. By restructuring certain programs and reexamining some long-term research and development program lines, additional monies were carved out of the program in three consecutive chunks, beginning in FY 2003. As this funding has survived and gotten closer with each passing year, it has achieved a certain aura of inevitability. With the support of Vice Admiral Wilson, it has been protected thus far both within the GDIP and from CMS and Congress. The formal design work for the building commenced in FY 2001 and continues in 2002; actual construction begins in 2003 and is completed in 2005. What seemed such a long way off in 1998, when the funds were first programmed, is now right around the corner. Although some hurdles remain, mostly with Congress because the building is in the District of Columbia and thus has no real congressional advocate, it looks like the long-term approach is going to pay off. In 2006, with the exception of the Command Element, all Washington-area DIA employees will work in the DIAC, resulting in an improved synergy between collection and analysis and increased operational efficiency. The challenge continues.

Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, the 13th Director of DIA, will proudly preside over DIA's 40th birthday commemoration in September 2001.



U.S. forces must carry out varied missions in many parts of the world, all of which require rapid, high-grade support from DIA. Asymmetric threats present a challenge to both intelligence providers and operators.

# THE FOUR THRUSTS

In August 1999, shortly after becoming the Director of DIA, Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, in plotting a leadership course for the DIA and the military intelligence community, knew that the community could not effectively concentrate on everything. He decided to focus on the fundamentals of intelligence and to pick a few, very important issues on which DIA and the community could make measurable progress during his tenure.

To assist in developing these issues, Admiral Wilson hosted a principals-only Military Intelligence Board (MIB) meeting—consisting of the Command J2s, Joint Chiefs of Staff J2, and Service intelligence chiefs—to determine the most pressing challenges the military intelligence community would face during the coming decade. They settled on “Four Thrusts” that refocus community efforts on the fundamentals of intelligence to meet the challenges of the future:

- Shaping to Meet the Asymmetric Threat
- Attacking the Database Problem
- Achieving Integration and Interoperability for the Common Operating Picture
- Revitalizing and Reshaping the Workforce.

The plan of attack included formulation of a small senior steering group for each thrust, chaired by a different member of the defense intelligence community. Each senior steering group formulated plans of action to meet the overarching goals of the Four Thrusts, gaining endorsement by the MIB before moving forward.

## SHAPING TO MEET THE ASYMMETRIC THREAT

### ASYMMETRY IN WARFARE

One of the key challenges of this thrust is to identify and define asymmetry. In this context, asymmetry is the use of power in unanticipated or nontraditional ways. For decades, the United States maintained a traditional mindset on the nature of its foe, developing “force multipliers” for ensuring the advantage over projected threats. This strategy led to the emergence and recognition of the United States as an overwhelming conventional military power. To challenge this resultant tenable power, state and nonstate actors developed means of avoiding traditional confrontations with the United States. The intent of these “asymmetric” means is to project unexpected or unbalanced capability for reducing the conventional military superiority of the United States, render it irrelevant, or exploit perceived weaknesses. The asymmetric thrust challenges the military intelligence community not only to identify unanticipated threats, but also to develop a new mindset for assessing potential asymmetric threats and developing effective measures for combating them. The Asymmetric Threat Senior Steering Group, chaired by the Marine Corps, is developing a community approach to address the disparate nature of the asymmetric threat.

## THE CHALLENGE

The Intelligence Community’s overarching challenge in shaping to meet this emerging threat is to develop an approach to the problem within the current system and its capabilities. There has not been a coherent plan for addressing the disparate nature of the asymmetric threat. DIA’s strategy has been more reactive—allocating resources to

meet individual, immediate issues. Whether it was drugs in the late 1980s, terrorism in the early 1990s, or, most recently, information warfare, new organizations, products, and systems were created to deal with the mission at hand. This approach no longer is expedient. The coordinated strategy of this thrust includes building the right skills mix, collection and analytic methods, and organizational linkages to deal with the intangible and “soft” data that characterize asymmetric issues and to provide new indications and warning (I&W) methodologies and concepts of operations. Resources will be allocated more effectively with this coherent approach.

## ATTACKING THE DATABASE PROBLEM

Databases are key resources in military intelligence, playing a role in the success or failure of military operations. Although historically considered less than glamorous, database work is important, and database knowledge is the very foundation of all-source analysis—this account cannot continue to be “short changed.” The senior steering group appointed to deal with the strategic challenges associated with databases is chaired by the J2, U.S. Pacific Command. The group is engaged in phased efforts to improve the collective and collaborative ability of defense intelligence to support a broad range of modern military operations.



DIA maintains a wide variety of databases that provide vital information to numerous consumers.

## THE CHALLENGE

The database thrust is near, mid-, and long term. It is about improving the aged databases of the defense intelligence community; about expanding the level of effort in updating them and

changing from a "Cold War" fixed-fill database to a new millennium Web-enabled knowledge base for the future.

Key to the entire Database Thrust is its linkage to the Interoperability Thrust. Even the best, most



Providing timely, accurate intelligence in a common system to operating forces is a key goal of DIA's efforts.

up-to-date database is useless if it cannot be accessed by those who need it—the warfighters. These two thrusts must be closely aligned to allow the defense intelligence database and the future knowledge base to be used on the collateral-level Global Command and Control System (GCCS), where it will provide the key threat data for the common operating picture.

### **ACHIEVING INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY FOR THE COMMON OPERATING PICTURE**

For years, intelligence systems have worked separately from operator systems. Because of classification levels, the intelligence officer has operated in an environment laced with sensitive compartmented information, while the operator has worked at the collateral level. Intelligence systems and applications have not been as closely linked to operational systems as they should.

We have all seen the Tom Clancy–style movies in which an intelligence analyst or a military operator brings up a screen, points and clicks a few times, and magically produces a real-time picture of the “battlefield.” Whether zeroing in on a terrorist training camp or following a fugitive running across Washington rooftops, these movies paint a high-tech picture of capabilities that currently does not exist.

### **THE CHALLENGE**

However, the U.S. military’s operational plan for the future, Joint Vision 2020, envisions just this kind of “battlespace visualization,” and an intelligence senior steering group, chaired by the U.S. Central Command J2, is leading the way to its realization.

This battlespace visualization capability, which will provide a “common operating picture (COP),” no doubt will be hard to achieve. Some of the biggest obstacles that must be overcome are shortfalls in interoperability and collection system synchronization.

All of these shortfalls are being worked, with the bottom-line objective being to make “our stuff”—intelligence products and services—“plug and play” in their stuff—the operational tactical systems used by our joint force and Service commanders.

### **REVITALIZING AND RESHAPING THE WORKFORCE**

Today’s defense intelligence community is composed of some of the brightest, best educated, and most highly skilled military and civilian personnel that have ever served our nation. In meeting the challenges of a changing world order, this workforce must remain agile and knowledgeable and represent the diversity that will ensure success in our intelligence mission. The Senior Steering Group for Revitalizing and Reshaping the Workforce, chaired by the Army’s Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, is spearheading efforts in this arena.

Based on the lessons of DESERT STORM, the previous decade saw a focus on information movement—ensuring and maintaining the infrastructure, computer support, and systems necessary for accomplishing the mission and delivering intelligence to the customer. We may have been almost too successful, providing our customers with too much information to digest. The thrust to reshape the workforce is, in part, an effort to rebalance our focus from a heavy emphasis on information movement to satisfying our customer needs for information interpretation. What they need from us is fine-grained, high-quality, tailored intelligence analysis that provides a detailed picture of foreign capabilities and, more important, is predictive. This requires a cadre of highly trained intelligence analysts assisted by all types of specialized support personnel, and also increased emphasis on HUMINT collection. Unfortunately, most of our largely fixed budget is already being spent on personnel costs, so we are not in a position to bring on more people. We will have to make better use of the human resources we have

by shaping a workforce to meet future challenges and by improving our proficiency and efficiency.

Substantial progress has been made in each of the thrusts.

- Several ongoing initiatives will increase intelligence capabilities to better anticipate and prepare U.S. forces for the complex challenges the asymmetric threats pose.
- Changes to the database have improved currency content and utility.
- A series of proof-of-concept evaluations and exercises has been designed to enhance intelligence integration and interoperability.

- Communitywide actions are underway that will lead to a revitalized workforce prepared to take on the challenges of the 21st century.

Admiral Wilson believes, and the military intelligence community concurs, that these thrusts are interconnected. Progress is synchronized to build on the progress of each; they will lead to a defense intelligence community well positioned to support the military today and tomorrow.

The challenge continues.



Improved development of DIA employees is fostered by activities such as mentoring programs.



DIA seeks to develop a cohesive, flexible, diverse and professional workforce to accomplish its mission.

## THE FIFTH THRUST

Shortly after I had reached agreement with the DIA leadership—in the form of DIA Director Admiral Wilson and his Chief of Staff, Mr. John Kiehm—on the timing of writing this book about DIA, I met with the admiral in his Pentagon office. My first impression of Tom Wilson was that he is a fiercely proud man. He is proud to be the Director of DIA, proud to be the second naval officer to serve as the Director, and particularly

proud of the DIA workforce and its accomplishments. Not surprisingly, this pride in the DIA workforce was a characteristic shared by all former DIA Directors I had known and served with over the years of my own military service. However, when Admiral Wilson described to me the Four Thrusts program he had brought to the defense intelligence community, his pride and enthusiasm about the team effort were clearly evi-



All new employees at DIA go through an Agency orientation course. These are the graduates of the first class in 1999.



VADM Wilson and other senior DIA leaders listen to a speaker during the annual Martin Luther King Day Program at the DIAC.

dent. Definitely not to be overlooked was his fervor for the Four Thrusts within DIA and, in particular, the “Fourth Thrust,” “Revitalize and Reshape the Workforce.” He told me that, because of its importance, he had decided to call it his Fifth Thrust and focus on that particular thrust within DIA. Admiral Wilson told me:

*“The Fifth Thrust Program is about ‘The Future of Our People and the People of Our Future.’ It is about who they are and how we hire them, train them, mentor them, and most important, take care of them. It is about establishing tangible goals to revitalize and reshape our workforce. Our new civilian appraisal sys-*

*tem and its emphasis on mentoring and accountability is one component of this goal-oriented revitalization. Others, such as the DIA 101 orientation program and the developmental DIA 201 and DIA 301 programs, are contributing to the goal of enhancing a cohesive, professional workforce to accomplish our mission.*

*“Supporting diversity is also an important element in the Fifth Thrust. Everyone expects fair and equal treatment regardless of their personal circumstances. We cannot operate effectively if our employees lack trust in their colleagues, in management, or in the senior leadership. Furthermore, if diversity is not well reflected and*

DIA personnel also contribute to the local community through a variety of programs, including support for local schools and responding to needs in other parts of the country.



*embraced at all levels and up the chain of command, it may lead talented people to doubt that their voices will be heard, that their perspectives will be considered, and that their contributions will be genuinely recognized and rewarded on the basis of their merits. Most important, we will have a better chance to collect on and analyze a diverse world if our workforce and its leaders reflect the diversity of America."*

On 11 July 2001, Admiral Wilson and DIA were honored to receive the NAACP Meritorious Service Award. The award citation read in part:

*"Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson, United States Navy, has distinguished himself by his extraordinary management and leadership in the areas of human resources, equal opportunity, affirmative employment, workforce diversity, manage-*

*ment accountability, and public service. As the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency and the senior military intelligence official within the Department of Defense, Vice Admiral Wilson has committed his own personal leadership—and that of all his subordinate managers and leaders—to his vision of 'The Future of Our People . . . The People of Our Future.'*

*"His aggressive and untiring work to revitalize and reshape the military and civilian workforce within the Defense Intelligence Agency and the Defense Intelligence Community as a whole has been unprecedented. While directing a comprehensive and exhaustive review of that community's human resource policies, programs, and processes, he has repeatedly emphasized the sound business case for diversity, and for maxi-*

*mizing the capabilities of the human intellectual capital that makes the Defense Community work. . . ."*

In his acceptance of the award, Admiral Wilson responded:

*"The Defense Intelligence Agency and the Intelligence Community continue to strive to attain a workforce that reflects our society by improving minority recruitment, granting direct hiring authority to managers, and instituting an Employee Referral Program. Our long-range challenges include increasing diversity amongst the Agency's senior grades and attracting larger pools of diverse candidates. DIA is fortunate to have many diverse cultures, including foreign-born personnel and those raised in foreign cul-*



DIA's military personnel also play a key role in the Agency work force, and many have been decorated or otherwise recognized for their superior service.

tures, represented within our workforce. This diversity allows us to tap the range of expertise of those who can think and communicate like our foreign intelligence targets and pierce their human and technical networks. Our work doesn't end there; we must also continue to provide an environment that recognizes achievements and fosters retention. This incredible award recognizes all that we've done thus far, and serves as a reminder for the challenges ahead. Thank you."

In answer to the question—how well is DIA doing?—Admiral Wilson responded:

*"One measure of how well we are doing with regard to effective human resource management is workforce retention. Retention of a trained, quality workforce is vital to the success of our Agency and its mission. I am happy to report that our retention is good and has improved over the past few years. Overall, for the past decade, DIA's attrition rate has averaged 7.8 percent, which is much lower than the private sector. Amongst our information technology staff, our attrition rate is significantly less than private industry's 12-percent norm. These low attrition rates suggest that everyone is working harder to make DIA the place to build a career, and we appreciate the efforts of our people."*

*"Since some attrition is unavoidable, hiring is the other side of that coin," he told me. "DIA has the demanding task of selecting the best candidates from the thousands of applications received each year. Since 1996, DIA has hired 1,200 new employees. By joining DIA, a person becomes part of a highly select workforce and can take pride in our many accomplishments."*

*"Building a select workforce for DIA's future also requires seeking out exceptional student candidates. I have asked our DIA professionals to please spend some time with our summer interns who have already distinguished themselves by their selection to spend a summer with us. By providing them with a meaningful experience here, we encourage their interest in our organization for their future career search."*

*"Creating a positive and safe work environment is essential. I am committed to the quality of life improvements for the entire workforce. For example, I am accelerating employee consolidation as part of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center completion at Bolling Air Force Base, improving our security and force protection posture, repairing our facilities to address safety and health concerns, and increasing the number of employee assistance counselors."*

*"DIA is already a great place to work and to develop a career among some of the best and brightest people our nation has to offer. Together, with the rest of the DIA leadership, we will continue to make DIA a place that is a positive example for the rest of the government. Working together as a team and taking care of our people is critical if we expect to successfully accomplish our mission."*

It was clear to the author that Tom Wilson was equally proud of DIA's success in mission accomplishment and intended to continue that success. "The bottom line," he said, "is that we all need to refocus on the fundamentals of our business—providing timely, objective, and cogent intelligence to our customers. Our country depends on us to do these things well, and this Agency and our community will be judged by our results."



Vice President Cheney receives a second standing ovation after thanking the DIA workforce for its "often unheralded" efforts.

## THE VICE PRESIDENT AT DIA

VIP visits to DIA are more the norm than rare. A steady stream of U.S. and foreign VIP visitors are on tap visiting DIA in both the Pentagon and the DIAC most everyday. However, 14 March 2001, was an exception. That springlike day, all of DIA was looking forward to a historic visit by Vice President Richard B. Cheney to the DIAC. And he wasn't coming alone. He would be accompanied by Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, and a distinguished DIA alumnus, Ms. Joan Dempsey, Deputy DCI for Community Management.

Vice President Cheney was visiting DIA less than 2 months after taking office. His visit marked the first time in Agency history that a Vice President visited the DIAC and the first Vice Presidential visit to a DIA location since 1994.

The Vice President was welcomed by DIA Director Admiral Wilson. He began his visit by receiving briefings on the General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) and the consolidation and realignment that had taken place within the GDIP over the past 10 years. The Director hosted a briefing that illustrated GDIP capabilities with "vignettes": intelligence support to military, non-combatant evacuation, and peacekeeping operations. The presentation included topics such as federated production, targeting, and collection approaches to critical threats. These "vignettes" were presented by both military and civilian members of DIA.

The Director also featured priority intelligence projects, including information operations, and the defense intelligence community's "Four Thrusts"—shaping to meet the asymmetric threat,

Vice President Cheney and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld listen as Deputy Director for Information Systems and Services Dennis Clem explains how JWICS supports military operations.



Vice President Cheney speaks to the DIA workforce in the Tighe Auditorium during his visit.



attacking the database problem, intelligence integration and interoperability, and revitalizing and reshaping the workforce.

Participating in the Vice President's orientation were DIA's senior leadership and the Military Service intelligence chiefs: Lieutenant General Robert Noonan, Deputy Chief of Staff for Intelligence, U.S. Army; Major General Glen Shaffer, Director of Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, U.S. Air Force; Rear Admiral Richard Porterfield, Director of Naval Intelligence; and Brigadier General (Sel) Michael Ennis, Director of Intelligence, Marine Corps Headquarters.

A highlight of the Vice President's visit was a video teleconference with senior intelligence officers of headquarters and deployed forces of U.S. Central Command, based in Tampa, Florida, via the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). The Vice President spoke with Brigadier General Jeff Kimmons, USCENTCOM J2; the intelligence officer aboard the carrier *USS Harry S. Truman*, Naval Forces Central

(NAVCENT); and Joint Task Force–Southwest Asia (JTF-SWA).

He also received a briefing on the National Intelligence Support Team (NIST), a communications/analytical reachback capability that provides tailored intelligence to deployed forces. The JWICS and NIST displays were set up in a tent outside the front plaza of the DIAC and were the first stops during the Vice President's visit.

Inside the DIAC, Dennis Clem, Deputy Director for Information Systems and Services, guided the Vice President and his party on a tour of the Automated Data Processing (ADP) Command Center. There, the Vice President was impressed with the JWICS, Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA), and Human Intelligence Communications Net (HOCNET) enterprise management.

The final stop on the Vice President's tour was an address to the workforce in the DIAC's Tighe Auditorium. As he introduced the Vice President to the audience, Vice Admiral Wilson remarked that Vice President Cheney's visit was "a real

treat" and "a great privilege" for DIA and all of defense intelligence. The military and civilian members of DIA and the Intelligence Community gathered in the crowded auditorium and welcomed the Vice President with a standing ovation.

The Vice President said he "appreciated the opportunity to be brought up to date on defense intelligence capabilities after an 8-year absence." Recalling his tenure as Secretary of Defense and his association with General Colin Powell, former Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Vice President Cheney said, "During Operation DESERT STORM, we witnessed some of the best work ever seen. But now, it looks like the community is working together to an even greater extent."

The Vice President also underscored the value that the Bush Administration places on intelligence and said he starts his day with an intelligence briefing. More important, Vice President Cheney reaffirmed the administration's commitment to the future of intelligence.

Referring to the Bush Administration's unfolding position on national security affairs and bud-

get priorities, he said, "There is a temptation to believe that we can do with fewer resources now that the Cold War is over. But the President and I believe that the threats are greater than ever and the security of the nation rests on accurate intelligence."

In an appeal to everyone in the Intelligence Community, he said, "We have the obligation to make the case that an intelligence advantage is as important as a weapons advantage. President Bush and I will do everything in our power to press this case," he affirmed.

In closing, Vice President Cheney thanked the DIA workforce for its "often unheralded" labor. He assured all that, "Your work is not taken for granted, and neither are you." Vice Admiral Wilson concluded the event by thanking Vice President Cheney and Secretary Rumsfeld for their visit and presenting both of them a DIA plaque to commemorate the occasion. The DIA audience enthusiastically demonstrated its appreciation and bid farewell to the Vice President and Secretary of Defense and their party with a second standing ovation.

***"We have the obligation to make the case that an intelligence advantage is as important as a weapons advantage. President Bush and I will do everything in our power to press this case."***

***Vice President Cheney***  
***14 March 2001***



The U.S. Navy's damaged EP-3 Aries II surveillance plane sits at Lingshui Airfield, Hainan Island, China, 18 June 2001. During the 1 April 2001 collision with a Chinese J-8-II, the aircraft sustained damage to its port wing tip and under-wing skin, serious damage to both number one and two engines, and severe damage to the nose.

## THE EP-3 CHINA INCIDENT, MARCH-APRIL 2001

At about noon on 31 March 2001, a U.S. Navy aircraft and crew of 24 men and women took off from a U.S. base in Okinawa, Japan, for what was thought to be a routine reconnaissance flight over the South China Sea. The aircraft was an EP-3E Aries II turboprop reconnaissance and surveillance plane commanded by Navy Lieutenant Shane Osborn. The flight continued without event until almost 10 hours later when, near mission end, two Chinese F-8 fighter jets began harassing the EP-3 by flying within a few feet of the American aircraft. This form of aerial harassment was not new. Chinese naval pilots had employed these dangerous techniques a number of times against U.S. surveillance flights.

Suddenly, one of the F-8s swerved toward the U.S. aircraft. This was a fatal mistake, as the Chinese plane slid into the EP-3's port outside propeller. Immediately breaking up, the F-8 then sliced off the nose cone of the U.S. aircraft, burst into flames, and fell into the sea. The EP-3 instantly began an 8,000-foot freefall. Lieutenant Osborn's first thought was, "This guy just killed us!" It took all his strength to control the EP-3. He ordered the crew to put on their parachutes and to destroy classified information and equipment. He then began screaming, "MAYDAY-MAYDAY!" into his radio microphone. Lieutenant Osborn next considered ditching the EP-3 into the ocean, but worried that the crew could be killed on



A pair of Chinese J-8-II/FINBACK fighters fly close formation with a U.S. Navy EP-3. A similar aircraft to this Mach 2.2-capable fighter collided with the U.S. Navy EP-3 south of Hainan Island, precipitating a crisis between the United States and China.

impact. Instead, he headed for China's Lingshui Airbase on nearby Hainan Island, hoping to make an emergency landing there.

While Lieutenant Osborn and his crew were struggling for their lives in the air off the China coast, it had been a relatively quiet, pleasant spring day in Washington, DC. Like most weekends, the majority of the Pentagon workforce was off and enjoying precious time with families. The parking lots that Saturday morning were less than one-third full and, by nightfall, were even more empty.

The staffs in DIA's Alert Center in the National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) and in the JCS National Military Command Center (NMCC) were, as always, on their round-the-clock watches. Even there, this Saturday had been peaceful. The only crisis in the world being closely watched was the Israeli-Palestinian situation.

Suddenly, at 8:16 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, the Alert Center received a report of a MAYDAY from an EP-3 aircraft heading toward Lingshui, China.

Within minutes, the senior officer in the Alert Center, Air Force Lieutenant Colonel Christiansen, had passed the report to his counterpart in the NMCC, a one-star officer. By 8:30 p.m., a national operations and intelligence watch officers network (NOIWON) conference call was convened over secure telephone lines to pass the information to other Washington agencies. It was then known that the aircraft had landed safely on Hainan Island, that no members of the crew were injured, and that the crew was departing the aircraft.

At 8:31 p.m., the Alert Center began notifying the other key people and essential elements within DIA: the Director of Intelligence, J2, Rear Admiral Jake Jacoby; the Director of Operations, Army Major General Rod Isler; the Operational Intelligence Coordination Center at the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC), Bolling Air Force

Base; the DIA Executive Support Office that provides support to the Secretary of Defense and OSD; and the DIA Deputy Director, Mr. Mark Ewing, DIA's Senior Executive Service civilian in the absence of Vice Admiral Thomas Wilson, who was on official travel.

During the same time, Alert Center watch officers were in contact with the J2 staff at the Pacific Command (PACOM) Headquarters in Hawaii. At 8:57 p.m., additional reports indicated that the EP-3 had issued a distress call on the international distress frequency and, upon landing, was boarded by Chinese personnel. It could not be determined if all classified information and equipment aboard the EP-3 aircraft had been destroyed. The Chinese also had begun search-and-rescue efforts for the missing F-8 and its pilot.

By 9:00 p.m., the Alert Center began notifying the Defense Attaché Office (DAO) in Beijing, China and U.S. Defense Attaché Brigadier General Neal Sealock. This report of the incident was the first the DAO received.

Brigadier General Sealock departed his quarters in Beijing early on the morning of Sunday, 1 April and went immediately into the DAO at the Embassy and received a briefing from DIA in Washington on a secure phone. He spent most of the morning trying to reach a Chinese counterpart to discuss the situation, but the counterpart did not return the calls.

Neal Sealock is a U.S. Army-trained Foreign Area Officer (FAO) for China. Beijing is his third FAO tour. In 1989, he had served at DIA Headquarters as a China desk officer during the Tiananmen Square uprising. He had also served as an Assistant Army Liaison Officer in Hong Kong during its reversion to China. In addition, he had done a tour on the Joint Staff in the Pentagon as the J5 China desk officer. His training, background, and experience made him exceptionally well qualified to speak to, and negotiate with, the Chinese. Neal Sealock was also an Army aviator and instructor

pilot. He could relate to the Chinese descriptions of what had taken place and, when necessary, clarify any misinterpretations.

In Washington, between 9:00 and midnight, the J2, Admiral Jacoby, and the key staff members in the Alert Center and NMJIC—in coordination with the J3, Lieutenant General Gregory Newbold, USMC; the Joint Staff Augmentation Cell; and the PACOM Crisis Support Cell—mapped out and implemented the follow-on actions in support of the about-to-be full-blown crisis. PACOM determined that the collision between the Chinese and American aircraft occurred in international airspace over 50 nautical miles from the Chinese landmass. The J3 Reconnaissance Center reported that the EP-3 aircraft had not veered in flight from the scheduled reconnaissance track and that the mission was routine. The DIA Defense Collection Coordination Center reviewed current all-source collection requirements of the area of the incident and set new priority requirements designed to provide additional information. J2 and DIA analysts reviewed their holdings on Chinese air defense capabilities and estimates on Chinese probable responses to the incident.

At 11:46 p.m., the DoD Public Affairs Office determined that DoD would go public with news of the incident in an announcement from PACOM Headquarters in Hawaii and acknowledge that the aircraft was an EP-3. Diplomatic inquiries were initiated with the Chinese Embassy in Washington and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Beijing.

Early on the morning of 1 April, there was still no further information on the status of the crew, but national imagery revealed that the EP-3 was intact on the runway of the Chinese Air Force Base at Lingshui on Hainan Island under Chinese guard.

After consultations with U.S. Ambassador Joseph Prueher and the State Department in Washington, General Sealock was dispatched to Hainan to head a combined State-DoD team consisting of himself, Guang Zhou consular officer Ted Gong,

U.S. Naval Attaché Captain Brad Kaplan, Guang Zhou American Citizen Services officer Jim Herman, Guang Zhou public affairs officer Mark Canning, Assistant U.S. Naval Attaché Commander Brad Murphy, Assistant U.S. Air Attaché Captain Cole Shepherd, Master Sergeant Barry Lausman, and Technical Sergeant Rob Mittersen to act as the DAO operations coordinator (OPSCO Forward). The initial objectives of the team, according to General Sealock, were to (1) gain immediate, unfettered access to the entire crew, (2) validate their condition and state of health, and (3) make an initial determination of the level of compromise of the equipment and information aboard the EP-3.

At 6:10 and 6:11 a.m. on 1 April, the first public media releases began with announcements by *Reuters News Service* and *CNN*'s coverage of a U.S. Pacific Command spokesman in Hawaii providing news of the collision between an EP-3 and a Chinese fighter.

At 6:55 a.m., the U.S. Embassy in Beijing issued its first situation report, saying that China had declared the accident the fault of the United States and expressed a reluctance to work with the U.S. Embassy on the issue. Chinese public response had not been extreme, but was expected to increase when the apparent death of the F-8 fighter pilot was confirmed.

At 12:20 p.m., the DAO in Beijing advised that a meeting would take place at 9:00 p.m. with the Chinese Foreign Ministry to seek crew status and immediate access. The Chinese finally agreed to allow American officials access on Tuesday, 3 April.

Defense Attaché Brigadier General Sealock and Naval Attaché Captain Kaplan traveled to Sanya on the southern end of Hainan Island on 2 April. Sanya was the closest location to the Lingshui Air Force Base. They were quickly moved, on 3 April, to Haikou in the north by direction of the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There, they were

joined by Ted Gong and, soon after, by the rest of the team. They determined that the EP-3 crew had also been relocated to Haikou. The U.S. team assembled in Haikou and was met by Hainan Provincial Foreign Affairs officials, who further delayed access to the aircrew. The team established an operating location at a local hotel. The initial negotiations for access to the crew proved fruitless.

In Washington, at the Defense Attaché headquarters, the staff began an around-the-clock vigil to support the defense attaché coordination and logistical needs. The DIA Directorate for Operations Situation Room and the Asia Pacific Division operations staff provided con-

tinuous assistance to the DAO Beijing, ranging from needed equipment to day-to-day guidance. They worked as an interface for analyst dialog while working closely with the PACOM J2/J5 and the other commands in Asia to ensure smooth support.

Two days later, the Chinese permitted General Sealock to meet with the aircrew.

In the first meeting, Sealock told the assembled crew, "My name is Neal Sealock, and I'm here to get you home." During that initial session, the Chinese sat in on the crew meeting and attempted to restrict the American officials' inquiries to health matters. Sealock, having been told by the



Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and CJCS GEN Hugh Shelton decorate members of the EP-3 crew that was struck by a Chinese interceptor on 1 April 2001.

Chinese that the meeting could last only 40 minutes, and frustrated by the Chinese interruptions, looked at his watch, and in his best diplomatic, but firm voice said, “I want my 60 seconds back!”

Over the next 11 days, and until the release of the 24 EP-3 crew members, DIA Defense Attaché office members in China and Alert Center teams in the NMJIC played critical roles for DoD in following every development in the situation, making sure that the President, Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs and his staff, and

the supported U.S. Commands and the Military Services were regularly updated as the EP-3 events unfolded. The Defense Attaché, Brigadier General Sealock, personally spoke to the President on four occasions, as well as to a number of other senior U.S. officials. Most Americans and millions of other people worldwide followed those events in the media with rapt attention and suspense. After a series of negotiation meetings, the U.S. Navy crew was released on 12 April 2001.

***“General Sealock is an outstanding defense attaché. His performance . . . representing the United States as a primary interlocutor with the People’s Liberation Army, and . . . serving as our ‘eyes and ears’ in China has been stellar.***

***“His talents came to the fore during the EP-3 incident. General Sealock made invaluable contributions to the USG effort to secure release of our service men and women. His timely reports from Hainan Island—in some cases, reporting directly to the President—on the status of the U.S. aircREW and on his interactions with the local PLA provided crucial information to USG decisionmakers. His meetings with the detained aircREW were also key in helping our service men and women sustain their high morale in a very stressful situation. General Sealock’s performance during the incident was nothing short of brilliant.”***

***Richard L. Armitage  
Deputy Secretary of State  
August 2001***

# EPILOGUE



The Patriots' Memorial in the DIAC.

# PATRIOTS' MEMORIAL

The Patriots' Memorial honors DIA members who were killed in the service of the United States. The memorial occupies a prominent position in the lobby of the Defense Intelligence Analysis Center (DIAC) at Bolling Air Force Base. For Agency members and visitors to the DIAC, this memorial is a daily reminder of these brave individuals and their ultimate sacrifice.

On 14 December 1988, then DIA Director Lieutenant General Leonard Perroots, USAF, dedicated the memorial. Deputy Secretary of Defense William H. Taft, III, spoke at the ceremony and noted the service of those being honored. General Perroots then presented each of the families present with a replica of the plaque in memory of their lost loved one.

It reads as follows:

## ***A GRATEFUL NATION RECOGNIZES THOSE WHO HAVE MADE THE SUPREME SACRIFICE WHILE PROTECTING OUR FREEDOM***

- **Major Robert P. Perry, USA**  
*Assistant Army Attaché, Jordan*  
*10 June 1970*
- **Celeste M. Brown**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Saigon*  
*4 April 1975*
- **Vivienne A. Clark**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Saigon*  
*4 April 1975*
- **Dorothy M. Curtiss**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Saigon*  
*4 April 1975*
- **Joan K. Prey**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Saigon*  
*4 April 1975*
- **Doris J. Watkins**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Saigon*  
*4 April 1975*
- **Colonel Charles R. Ray, USA**  
*Assistant Army Attaché, Paris*  
*18 January 1982*
- **Chief Warrant Officer Robert W. Prescott, USA**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Guatemala*  
*21 January 1984*
- **Chief Warrant Officer Kenneth D. Welch, USA**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Beirut*  
*20 September 1984*
- **Petty Officer First Class Michael R. Wagner, USN**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Beirut*  
*20 September 1984*
- **Captain William E. Nordeen, USN**  
*Defense and Naval Attaché, Greece*  
*28 June 1988*
- **Judith Goldenberg**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Cairo*  
*15 July 1996*
- **Staff Sergeant Kenneth R. Hobson II, USA**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Nairobi*  
*7 August 1998*
- **Master Sergeant William W. Bultmeier, USA (Ret)**  
*Defense Attaché Office, Niamey*  
*23 December 2000*

Any list of those who have given their lives for their country is too long, especially for their families. The willingness of individuals and their families to consider the cost of preserving America's freedom and pay that price helps make this nation great. The DIA honor roll represents a true cross-section of our population, people who came from diverse places throughout the land and gave their lives in peacetime and in war. They include both women and men, civilian and military, enlisted and officer. They were intelligence professionals, patriots who lost their lives contributing to our national security.

Among those listed are five civilian women who served in the Defense Attaché Office in Saigon at the end of the Vietnam War. During the evacuation of the city in spring 1975, a U.S. Air Force C-5 took off carrying 250 Vietnamese orphans and 50 workers or dependents from the U.S. Embassy in the besieged capital. The C-5 crashed shortly after takeoff, killing 11 of the 29 crew members and 144 passengers, including most of the all-female Mission secretarial staff. The sixth woman, Judith Goldenberg, an intelligence analyst at the DIAC,

was killed in Egypt while on temporary duty with the Defense Attaché Office in Cairo.

Of the eight men, three served as defense or assistant defense attaches and five were assigned to defense attaché offices as operations coordinators or operations sergeants. Terrorist actions killed six of these men. Palestinian guerrillas gunned down Major Perry in his home. A Lebanese terrorist shot Colonel Ray outside his Paris apartment. A car bomb killed Captain Nordeen. The bombing of the U.S. Embassy Annex in Beirut killed Chief Warrant Officer Welch and Petty Officer Wagner. The truck bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killed Staff Sergeant Hobson. Accidents and acts of crime resulted in the deaths of the others. The crash of a Guatemalan Air Force plane on a routine mission caused the death of Chief Warrant Officer Prescott. A random carjacking resulted in the death of William Bultmeier.

The sacrifice of these women and men brings honor to their country, to their colleagues, and to themselves. Their names will be forever listed with those of our nation's greatest patriots.

***No greater sacrifice can be made for your country.***





# APPENDICES

*Directors of DIA*

*Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff*

*Secretaries of Defense*

*DIA Organization*

*Defense Attaché Hall of Fame*

*Meritorious Unit Citations*

*Acknowledgments*

*The Author*

## DIRECTORS OF DIA



**VADM Wilson, USN  
(July 1999-Present)**

On 27 July 1999, Vice Admiral (VADM) Thomas R. Wilson became the 13th Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). As Director, he manages the General Defense Intelligence Program, overseeing selected intelligence resources for all Services as part of the National Foreign Intelligence Program.



**LTG Hughes, USA  
(February 1996-July 1999)**

In his change of command address, LTG Hughes focused his remarks on the need for “defense intelligence as a decisive factor in battlefield awareness . . . building a strong defense intelligence team . . . and to grow DIA in order to provide, along with NSA, the DoD support possible into the next century. . . .”



**Lt Gen Minihan, USAF  
(August 1995-February 1996)**

The newly formed Defense HUMINT (Human Intelligence) Service (DHS) achieved its initial operating capability on 1 October 1995. DHS consolidated the HUMINT activities of all the Services under the umbrella of DIA. This new organization reflected the driving need to consolidate and focus downsized resources to maximize the effectiveness of reduced assets. DIA was also designated as the Intelligence Community’s executive agent for measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT).



**Lt Gen Clapper, USAF  
(November 1991-August 1995)**

General Clapper came to DIA following the collapse of the Soviet Union as the predominant focus of U.S. intelligence and in the aftermath of Operation DESERT STORM. DIA improved crisis management and support to the decisionmaker and warfighter based on the experience gained during the Gulf War.



**Mr. Nagy  
(September 1991-November 1991)**

The Secretary of Defense appointed Mr. Nagy as Acting Director for the interim period from September through November 1991, the only civilian to be so named. In this capacity, he provided continuity during a critical time when decrements against Agency resources caused reconsideration of many managerial issues and review of traditional threat priorities throughout the Defense Intelligence Community. He served until Lieutenant General James R. Clapper, Jr., USAF, assumed the directorship.



**LTG Soyster, USA  
(December 1988-September 1991)**

General Soyster oversaw the defense intelligence effort in support of the successful U.S. operation in Panama, which demonstrated the benefits of increased cooperation and planning that had been achieved between DIA and operational force planners, in comparison to the 1983 Grenada incursion.



### **Lt Gen Perroots, USAF (October 1985-December 1988)**

During the general's tenure, the Agency focused on the shifting national security environment and other key issues, including changes within the Soviet Union, counternarcotics, warfighting capabilities and sustainability, and low-intensity conflict. Steps were taken to improve DoD-wide automated databases and to apply additional resources monitoring terrorist groups, illegal arms shipments, and narcotics trafficking.



### **LTG Williams, USA (September 1981-September 1985)**

General Williams focused the Agency on enhancing support to tactical and theater commanders, improving capabilities to meet major wartime intelligence requirements, and strengthening indications and warning assets. In December 1981, President Reagan signed Executive Order 12333, giving the Intelligence Community a mandate for the years ahead.



### **Lt Gen Tighe, USAF (September 1977-August 1981)**

General Tighe reorganized DIA in 1979, establishing five major directorates: production, operations, resources, external affairs, and J-2 support. He sought to improve the flow of intelligence to the Secretary of Defense and other principal consumers. However, the loss of intelligence resources throughout the 1970s limited the Intelligence Community's ability to collect and produce timely intelligence and, ultimately, contributed to intelligence shortcomings in Iran, Afghanistan, and other strategic areas.



### **LTG Wilson, USA (May 1976-August 1977)**

As DoD sought to centralize its activities to cope with pressures to reduce resources, DIA adjusted to the changed environment. The ASD/I was designated Director of Defense Intelligence, and a Defense Intelligence Board was established. The President also set up a National Foreign Intelligence Board. DIA strengthened intelligence support to consumers in OSD, JCS, and the U&S Commands and completed modernization of the National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC).



### **LTG Graham, USA (September 1974-December 1975)**

In October 1974, General Graham began a comprehensive overhaul of DIA production functions, organization, and management. The Defense Intelligence Officer positions were established in December 1974 to act as the Director's personal senior staff representatives on substantive intelligence matters. General Graham was faced with the need for intelligence on coups in Ethiopia and Portugal and independence movements in Angola, Mozambique, and Guinea-Bissau.



### **VADM de Poix, USN (August 1972-September 1974)**

In September 1972, Secretary of State William Rogers said that the United States and the Soviet Union were moving away from a world of containment to one of engagement. Yet, even though relations warmed into a period of détente, the need for defense intelligence did not diminish.



**LTG Bennett, USA**  
**(September 1969-August 1972)**

With General Bennett's assumption of command, there was a change in the style but not the substance of the organization's leadership; in other words, DIA had another strong, dedicated director to lead it through some very interesting times. During Bennett's tenure there were transformations both within and outside the Agency. The former was marked by administrative reorganization and analytical refocusing, the latter by shifting alliances and policies in foreign and military affairs.



**Lt Gen Carroll, USAF**  
**(October 1961-September 1969)**

As the founding director of DIA, General Carroll faced the profound challenge of creating a new centralized intelligence organization in the face of the Military Services' opposition and at a time of increased Cold War tensions. General Carroll not only initiated DIA operations, he established precedents and procedures that would allow it to carry out its mission: to produce and manage foreign military intelligence for the Department of Defense.

# CHAIRMEN OF THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF (DIA ERA)

Name	From	To
GEN Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA*	1 Oct 60	30 Sep 62
GEN Maxwell D. Taylor, USA*	1 Oct 62	1 Jul 64
GEN Earle G. Wheeler, USA*	3 Jul 64	2 Jul 70
ADM Thomas M. Moorer, USN	2 Jul 70	1 Jul 74
Gen George S. Brown, USAF*	1 Jul 74	20 Jun 78
Gen David C. Jones, USAF	21 Jun 78	18 Jun 82
GEN John W. Vessey, Jr., USA	18 Jun 82	30 Sep 85
ADM William J. Crowe, Jr., USN	1 Oct 85	30 Sep 89
GEN Colin L. Powell, USA	1 Oct 89	30 Sep 93
ADM David E. Jeremiah, USN (acting)	1 Oct 93	24 Oct 93
GEN John M. Shalikashvili, USA	25 Oct 93	30 Sep 97
GEN Henry H. Shelton, USA	1 Oct 97	Present

The position of Chairman was created by the 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act of 1947, approved 10 August 1949. The Chairman is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate. Originally, the Chairman served a 2-year term with eligibility for a second 2-year term, except in time of war, when there would have been no limit on the number of reappointments. Since 1 October 1986, the Chairman is appointed for a 2-year term beginning on 1 October of odd-number years. The Chairman may be reappointed for two additional terms, except in time of war, when there is no limit on the number of reappointments. An officer may not serve as Chairman or Vice Chairman if combined service in such positions exceeds 6 years.

\* Deceased

General Henry H.  
Shelton, USA,  
Chairman of the  
Joint Chiefs of Staff.





Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.

## SECRETARIES OF DEFENSE (DIA ERA)

Name	From	To
Robert S. McNamara	21 Jan 61	29 Feb 68
Clark M. Clifford*	1 Mar 68	20 Jan 69
Melvin R. Laird	22 Jan 69	29 Jan 73
Elliot L. Richardson	30 Jan 73	24 May 73
James R. Schlesinger	2 Jul 73	19 Nov 75
Donald H. Rumsfeld	20 Nov 75	20 Jan 77
Harold Brown	21 Jan 77	20 Jan 81
Casper W. Weinberger	21 Jan 81	23 Nov 87
Frank C. Carlucci	23 Nov 87	20 Jan 89
Richard B. Cheney	21 Mar 89	20 Jan 93
Les Aspin*	21 Jan 93	3 Feb 94
William J. Perry	3 Feb 94	23 Jan 97
William S. Cohen	24 Jan 97	20 Jan 01
Donald H. Rumsfeld	20 Jan 01	Present

\* Deceased



VADM Wilson escorts Vice President Cheney through the DIAC.

# DIA ORGANIZATION

DIA is organized along functional lines, reflecting the intelligence cycle of planning, collection, processing, production, dissemination, and evaluation. For instance, in planning, DIA develops baseline threat assessments for all military operational plans. Furthermore, DIA, through the Joint Staff's Directorate for Intelligence (J2), helps focus future intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities to provide the joint operations forces with dominant battlespace intelligence.

At the heart of the DIA mission are three major functional areas: current intelligence, analysis and production, and intelligence operations. These functions take place in a number of directorates within DIA led by senior officers and civilians who act as Deputy Directors for the Director of DIA in carrying out the Agency's mission.

## **The Directorate for Intelligence, Joint Staff (J2), supports the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified Commands.**

It is the national-level focal point for current and crisis intelligence support to military operations, indications and warning intelligence within the DoD, and Unified Command intelligence requirements. During crisis and contingency, the J2 stands up intelligence task forces in the Pentagon, leveraging the intelligence resources necessary for critical real-time support to operational commanders. The J2 coordinates joint intelligence doctrine and architecture and manages intelligence for joint warfighting assessments. The National Military Joint Intelligence Center (NMJIC) provides the J2 with crisis and targeting support and produces immediate current intelligence on rapidly unfolding events to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, military commanders, and policymakers.

**The Directorate for Analysis and Production provides rapid and responsive all-source intelligence to the U.S. military, the world's most capable armed forces, ensuring military information dominance in the 21st century.**

The directorate manages the production of military intelligence throughout the DoD. Products respond to intelligence needs of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Military Services, other government agencies, and the commanders in the field.

It fulfills DIA's role as manager of the DoD Intelligence Production Program, which integrates general military intelligence and scientific and technical intelligence analysis conducted at DIA, Service centers (Army, Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force), and the Unified Commands.

Analysis and Production manages and produces all-source military intelligence on regional, transnational, scientific and technical, missile, and medical topics.

## **The Directorate for Policy Support**

The directorate ensures the timeliness and quality of military intelligence support to defense policymakers, especially those in the Office of the Secretary of Defense. While the focus is on serving defense policymakers, the directorate supports the military intelligence needs of other U.S. government policymakers at the National Security Council and the State Department.

## **The Directorate for Intelligence Operations directs and manages DoD all-source collection**

## **requirements and conducts DoD HUMINT operations.**

The directorate also develops specialized tools to help manage collection activities. To achieve this mission, the focus is on providing peacetime, exercise, crisis, contingency, and combat intelligence collection support to operational military forces and policy and planning activities of the DoD; providing all-source collection management to the Joint Staff, the Military Services, Unified Commands, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and Intelligence Community members; and managing and operating the Defense HUMINT Service, to include the Defense Attaché System.

## **The Central MASINT Organization (CMO) manages measurement and signature intelligence.**

MASINT is intelligence from specialized technical sources that detect, locate, track, identify, and describe the unique scientific characteristics of targets. Threat characteristics and performance information collected and produced by MASINT is very precise and is essential to warfighters, policymakers, and force modernizers. The information is used in planning and developing weapons, weapons countermeasures, tactics, targeting, and battle-damage-assessment capabilities. MASINT target signatures are converted into threat recognition and identification profiles that guide smart weapons. Policymakers depend on this same information to understand foreign weapon technologies and to monitor treaties and arms control agreements. Civil applications include timely warning of forest fires and volcanic ash clouds, detection of pollution sources, and provision of data on natural phenomena to support environmental studies. The CMO conducts MASINT oversight and management on behalf of DoD and the Intelligence Community.

No intelligence organization could function without support—technological and administrative.

The following are the directorates in today's DIA that provide that all-important support.

## **The Directorate for Information Systems and Services is DIA's primary intelligence information services support center.**

It provides customer support and oversight of information technology acquisition across the entire defense intelligence structure. Using the latest information technologies, this directorate monitors, maintains, and supports DIA network operations around the world with 24-hour, 7-day support year-round. It carries out the management and accreditation of Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems (DoDIIS). The directorate manages and maintains one of the world's most robust communications systems, the Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System (JWICS). JWICS is a secure, high-bandwidth system providing full-motion video teleconferencing and data exchange among major intelligence nodes. It also engineers and integrates technological initiatives, such as the Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture (JIVA). JIVA is a virtual environment permitting interoperable and integrated intelligence analysis through advanced computer systems and modern database applications. JIVA enables analysts to work collaboratively regardless of where they are based or deployed in the world.

## **The Directorate for Administration provides a wide range of administrative support to DIA through its subelements.**

- The Counterintelligence and Security Activity oversees security-related policy and functions focused primarily on countering the threat from foreign intelligence activities. It also develops doctrine on how the counterintelligence elements of the Services work together in support of joint military operations.
- The Office for Human Resources develops and implements human resource policy for DIA, manages and administers a variety of human resource programs, provides human resource advisory services to senior DIA management, and represents

DIA at human resource forums throughout the Intelligence Community. The office carries out all aspects of employee career management to include: developing employment opportunities; recruiting candidates; hiring, processing, establishing, and maintaining programs of career development; encouraging rotational assignments; training; evaluation; maintaining incentive awards; promotion; and retirement and transition programs.

- The Office for Engineering and Logistics Services and the Office for Procurement provide a variety of support and business functions. These include minor building construction, repair and maintenance, energy conservation, environmental protection, custodial services, acquisition of goods and services, and contracting.
- The Joint Military Intelligence Training Center (JMITC) provides strategic and joint intelligence training in resident, nonresident, and online modes. Its students include DoD military and civilians, other government and federal employees, and international officers. JMITC launched an online Virtual University in 2001. This innovation was developed to train Intelligence Community personnel wherever they are deployed in the new skills they will need to master the intelligence challenges of the 21st century.

It is important to remember that the Director of DIA acts as Director of Military Intelligence (DMI), coordinating the efforts of a community

that includes the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and Coast Guard intelligence offices, as well as DIA. The DMI staff serves as the focal point for a diverse array of activities across the full spectrum of military intelligence.

### **Joint Military Intelligence College**

- The Joint Military Intelligence College (JMIC) is a center of excellence for the education of intelligence professionals. The JMIC is accredited and congressionally authorized to award Bachelor of Science in Intelligence and Master of Science in Strategic Intelligence degrees.

### **The Military Intelligence Board (MIB) is the primary advisory committee to the DIA Director on all military intelligence matters.**

The MIB meets several times a month to discuss community intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance issues, and intelligence analysis; develop community positions; and make resource and programming decisions. The Director of DIA chairs the MIB, whose members include: the chiefs of the intelligence components of each of the Military Services and the Unified Commands, the heads of the defense intelligence agencies, and the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence (DASD(I)).



# DEFENSE ATTACHE HALL OF FAME

## DEFENSE ATTACHE SYSTEM HALL OF FAME MEMBERS

1988

Admiral Worth H. Bagley USN	Fleet Admiral William B. Halsey USN	Brigadier General Martin F. Scanlon USAF
Lieutenant General James C. Breckenridge USMC	Colonel Leland J. Holland USA	Colonel Thomas E. Schaefer USAF
Rear Admiral French Ensor Chadwick USN	Admiral Bobby R. Inman USN	Lieutenant General Brent Scowcroft USAF
Lieutenant General Joseph C. Fegan USMC	Major Florence C. Jepson USA	Rear Admiral Sumner Shapiro USN
Lieutenant General Alva R. Fitch USA	General William A. Knowlton USA	Admiral William S. Sims USN
Major General Bill B. Forsman USAF	Major General Frank P. Lahm USA	Colonel Truman Smith USA
Major General Benjamin D. Foulois USAAC	Major General George C. McDonald USA	General Carl Spaatz USAF
Rear Admiral Samuel B. Frankel USN	General of the Armies John J. Pershing USA	General Joseph W. Stilwell USA
Lieutenant (Junior Grade) Duane L. Gillette USN	Major George E.A. Reinburg USAAC	General Maxwell D. Taylor USA
Major General Francis V. Greene USA	Colonel David M. Roeder USAF	Lieutenant General Vernon A. Walters USA
Chief Warrant Officer Joseph M. Hall USA	General Felix M. Rogers USAF	Brigadier General William B. Webb USAF

General  
Thomas D. White  
USAF

Lieutenant General  
James A. Williams  
USA

### 1990

Colonel  
George C. Benson  
USA

Major General  
Schuyler Bissell  
USAF

Lieutenant General  
Edward J. Bronars  
USMC

### 1992

Colonel  
Ruth Anderson  
USAF

Colonel  
William A. Eddy  
USMC

Colonel  
David G. Foulds  
USA

Major General  
Bernard Loeffke  
USA

### 1995

Colonel  
Henry D. Chiu  
USAF

Colonel  
John F. Concannon III  
USA

Colonel  
Layton G. Dunbar  
USA

Lieutenant General  
Samuel V. Wilson  
USA

Colonel  
Charles Young  
USA

General  
Richard E. Cavazos  
USA

Lieutenant General  
Leo J. Dulacki  
USMC

Colonel  
William D. Halloran II  
USA

Brigadier General  
Arthur S. Moura  
USA

Lieutenant General  
William E. Odom  
USA

Colonel  
Stephen M. Perry  
USA

Rear Admiral  
Philip A. Dur  
USN

Major  
Richard H. Fritz  
USA

Brigadier General  
Sam A. Gray  
USA

Captain  
Robert Moffat Losey  
USAAC

Colonel  
William B. May  
USAF

Vice Admiral  
Newton Alexander McCully, Jr.  
USN

Brigadier General  
Jon A. Reynolds  
USAF

Captain  
Henri H. Smith-Hutton  
USN

Rear Admiral  
Kemp Tolley  
USN

Rear Admiral  
Ronald J. Kurth  
USN

Colonel  
Bernard E. McDaniel  
USA

Colonel  
James C. Ritchey  
USA

Colonel  
William F. Scott  
USAF

**1997**

Major  
Kenneth W. Allen  
USAF

Lieutenant Colonel  
Mary A. Becka  
USA

Rear Admiral  
Thomas A. Brooks  
USN

Colonel  
Michael M. Ferguson  
USA

**1999**

Commander  
Laurence McK. Bearse  
USN

Chief Warrant Officer Four  
George F. Carr  
USA

Brigadier General  
Benjamin O. Davis, Sr.  
USA

Colonel  
Samuel M. (Mark) Jones  
USAF

Admiral  
Alan G. Kirk  
USN

**2001**

Colonel  
Ernest W. Fischer  
USA

Brigadier General  
Gregory G. Govan  
USA

Colonel  
Thomas F. Young  
USA

Lieutenant Colonel  
Richard C. Herrick  
USA

Major General  
Roland LaJoie  
USA

Colonel  
Charles D. Lane  
USA

Major General  
John A. Leide  
USA

Colonel  
George Kolt  
USAF

Colonel  
John B. Longenecker  
USAF

Colonel  
Eugene M. Mensch II  
USA

Colonel  
Marc B. Powe  
USA

Colonel  
Alfred B. Prados  
USA

Chief Warrant Officer Five  
Randall L. Hess  
USA

Colonel  
Morrill E. Marston  
USAF

Colonel  
Samuel D. McCormick  
USAF

Colonel  
Gary W. Nelson  
USA

Chief Warrant Officer Four  
Thomas D. Sparks  
USA

Brigadier General  
John C. Reppert  
USA

Colonel  
William L. Roche  
USAF

Lieutenant General  
Ervin J. Rokke  
USAF

Brigadier General  
Gary M. Rubus  
USAF

Commander  
John P. Seifert  
USN

Colonel  
Daniel W. Pike  
USA

Ms. Gail N. Pugh



## **MERITORIOUS UNIT CITATIONS**

The Defense Intelligence Agency and subordinate organizations within the Agency have been awarded numerous Joint Meritorious Unit Awards (JMUs). These are awarded in the name of the Secretary of Defense to joint activities for meritorious achievement or service in war, during crises, or under extraordinary circumstances that involve national interests. The awards reflect the distinctive accomplishments of the personnel assigned to the Defense Intelligence Agency.

**■ JMUA Awarded 1986**

**■ JMUA Awarded 1991**

**■ JMUA Awarded 1994**

**■ JMUA Awarded 1996**

**■ JMUA Awarded 1999**



**Citation**  
*to accompany the award of the*  
**Joint Meritorious Unit Award**  
*to the*  
**Defense Intelligence Agency**

The Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service from 1 June 1985 to 1 June 1986. The Agency provided unparalleled intelligence support, encompassing the broadest range of intelligence analysis, technical services, photographic processing, and reconnaissance imagery to meet the real-time requirements of national decision makers. Responding directly to immediate requirements, the Agency provided vital intelligence to policy makers during the tense periods of the TWA Flight 847 hijacking incident, to on-site operational units during the Achille Lauro hijacking, to the White House staff during the Philippine crisis, and to Naval and Air Force component commanders during the Libyan counterterrorist operations. Never faltering in its commitment, the Agency provided the critical information demanded by the tactical commanders, without which success could not have been achieved, and national objectives would not have been realized. The distinctive accomplishments of the personnel assigned to the United States Defense Intelligence Agency reflect great credit upon themselves and the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 31st day of October, 1986.

Secretary of Defense



# Citation

*to accompany the award of the*  
**Joint Meritorious Unit Award**  
*to the*

## **Defense Intelligence Agency**

The Defense Intelligence Agency distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious achievement from 1 August 1990 to 1 March 1991. During this period, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), analyzed force capabilities, movements and intentions prior to Iraq's invasion of Kuwait, and provided consistently outstanding, dedicated intelligence to the National Command Authority and field commanders throughout Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM. At the outset, DIA National Military Intelligence Support Teams deployed with the Commander-in-Chief United States Central Command and his component commanders, ensuring the immediate flow of timely intelligence responsive to theater requirements. To meet the unique challenges of the crisis and conflict, DIA shaped the military intelligence structures and systems required for the critical collection, analysis and reporting of threat assessments, evolving order of battle, targeting and battle damage; and for swift dissemination to the theater commander and coalition partners. The sustained, vital role played by the personnel of the Defense Intelligence Agency contributed with great distinction to the coalition victory. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of the Defense Intelligence Agency have brought great credit to themselves and to the Department of Defense.

Given, under my hand this 22ND DAY OF JULY 1991

*Dick Cheney*  
Secretary of Defense



# Citation

*to accompany the award of the*

## Joint Meritorious Unit Award

*to the*

### Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service from 1 July 1992 to 1 June 1994. During this period, the Defense Intelligence Agency provided an unprecedented level of intelligence support encompassing the full range of intelligence analyses, technical services, photographic exploitation and dissemination, and intelligence communications to meet the real-time requirements of national decision makers and joint and coalition military commanders. Responding directly to immediate contingency requirements, the Agency provided vital intelligence to the White House and senior officials during operations in Iraq, to policymakers and on-site operational units in Somalia, offshore Haiti and supporting United Nations Forces in the former Yugoslavia, and to decision makers during tense periods in Russia and on the Korean Peninsula. Implementing revolutionary advances in crisis management the Agency demonstrated its commitment by providing the critical information required by tactical commanders, without which success may not have been achieved and national objectives would not have been realized. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of the Defense Intelligence Agency have brought great credit to themselves and to the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 29th day of August 1994

William J. Perry  
Secretary of Defense



## *Citation*

*to accompany the award of the*

### *Joint Meritorious Unit Award*

*to the*

*Defense Intelligence Agency*

*The Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service, from 2 June 1994 to 30 September 1996. During this period, DIA significantly increased the efficiency and effectiveness of military intelligence at a time of dramatically declining resources by leading, centrally managing, and integrating the spectrum of Department of Defense intelligence resources and activities. These improvements in efficiency resulted in major successes. From providing critical medical intelligence support to United States and Coalition forces participating in numerous joint operations throughout the world to providing battle damage assessments and structural analysis, DIA consistently provided vital intelligence required by Senior officials and the White House to achieve National objectives. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of the Defense Intelligence Agency brought great credit to themselves, their Services and to the Department of Defense.*

*Given under my hand this 9th day of October 1996*

*William J. Perry  
Secretary of Defense*



## Citation

TO ACCOMPANY THE AWARD OF THE

### Joint Meritorious Unit Award

TO THE

# Defense Intelligence Agency

The Defense Intelligence Agency distinguished itself by exceptionally meritorious service, from 1 October 1996 to 20 March 1999. During this period the Defense Intelligence Agency led the Defense Intelligence Community in the modernization and improvement of collection operations, analysis and production, and dissemination in order to achieve dominant battlefield intelligence in response to customer requirements during peace, crisis and war. By providing analytical depth and technical expertise, the Agency provided world-class sustained, focused intelligence support across a broad range of crises. Whether providing targeting and battle damage assessments, finished intelligence on regional military capabilities, or analytical and infrastructure support to counter current and emerging transnational threats, the Defense Intelligence Agency consistently provided timely, objective, and cogent intelligence required by the National Command Authority and combatant commanders to achieve national objectives. By their exemplary performance of duty, the members of the Defense Intelligence Agency have brought great credit to themselves and to the Department of Defense.

Given under my hand this 23rd day of July 1999

Secretary of Defense

## *List of JMUs Awarded to DIA and Subordinate Organizations*

- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*San Salvador, El Salvador*  
*01 Oct 79 – 30 Apr 81*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Nicosia, Cyprus*  
*01 Jun 82 – 31 Dec 83*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Tel Aviv, Israel*  
*01 Jun 82 – 31 Mar 85*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Beirut, Lebanon*  
*08 Jun 82 – 30 Sep 84*
- **Central America Joint Intelligence Team**  
*DIA, Washington, DC*  
*27 May 83 – 01 Jun 86*
- **Foreign Acquisition Team, DIA**  
*Grenada*  
*30 Oct 83 – 16 Nov 83*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Islamabad, Pakistan*  
*01 Apr 84 – 01 Apr 86*
- **Defense Intelligence Agency**  
*Washington, DC*  
*01 Jun 85 – 01 Jun 86*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Tunis, Tunisia*  
*01 Aug 85 – 01 Dec 86*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Manila, Philippines*  
*31 Jan – 26 Feb 86*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Managua, Nicaragua*  
*01 Aug 86 – 31 Mar 89*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Moscow, USSR*  
*22 Oct 86 – 01 Mar 87*
- **Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center**  
*Ft. Detrick, Maryland*  
*01 Jan 87 – 31 Mar 90*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Panama City, Panama*  
*21 Jun 87 – 01 Jan 90*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Bogota, Colombia*  
*01 Oct 87 – 30 Sep 90*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Rangoon, Burma*  
*01 Mar 88 – 15 Oct 89*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Beijing, China*  
*19 May 89 – 10 Jun 89*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Monrovia, Liberia*  
*26 Dec 89 – 12 Oct 90*
- **Defense Intelligence Agency**  
*Washington, DC*  
*01 Aug 90 – 01 Mar 91*
- **Defense Intelligence Agency**  
*Washington, DC*  
*01 Jul 92 – 01 Jun 94*
- **The Joint Staff (to include DIA/J2)**  
*Washington, DC*  
*01 Jun 94 – 01 Jan 95*
- **Defense Intelligence Agency**  
*Washington, DC*  
*02 Jun 94 – 30 Sep 96*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Lima, Peru*  
*01 Oct 96 – 15 Sep 97*
- **U.S. Defense Attaché Office**  
*Tirana, Albania*  
*16 Jan 97 – 23 Apr 97*
- **Defense Intelligence Agency**  
*Washington, DC*  
*01 Oct 96 – 20 Mar 99*



## ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am especially grateful to Vice Admiral Tom Wilson, the Defense Intelligence Agency Director, for giving me the opportunity to write about DIA and its people. And to John Kiehm, the DIA Chief of Staff, for facilitating my access to the Agency and the cooperation and assistance of its leaders and members. I am grateful also to their staffs, particularly the Director's secretary, Wanda Mikovch, a fount of helpful information and the epitome of courtesy, and Mary Kasmierski, the Chief's secretary, who could always find a way to put me in touch with her boss in spite of his killer schedule.

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As I began my research for the book, the first place I turned was the DIA historians, who have the best institutional memory in DIA. Without their support and counsel, the book would not have been possible. At the beginning, I also sought the advice of Denis Clift, the Defense Intelligence College President. Denis is a successful author. His advice to me, based on his own experience at DIA and in government, was most helpful in my selection of subjects. He was kind enough to let me draw from his own writings concerning DIA and defense intelligence education and obtained permission for me from Mrs. John T. Hughes to draw from the history of the Cuban Missile Crisis written by John Hughes and A. Denis Clift.

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—Chuck Scanlon

## THE AUTHOR



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Chuck Scanlon is an honored soldier. He is President of SCANTEC, Ltd. During his 35-year military career in intelligence, he served in combat with the 101st Airborne Division in Vietnam; at posts in Europe, the Far East, and the Pentagon; and 4 years at the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA). At DIA, he served first as the Assistant Deputy Director for Estimates (DE). In that capacity, he served as the Defense Department's senior officer for developing U.S. and Defense National Intelligence Estimates used by the National Security Council and the President for the formulation of U.S. foreign policy. Later, he was DIA's first Deputy Director for Attachés and Operations (DO). He conceived and implemented the idea of a Defense Attaché Hall of Fame. Throughout his military career, Major General Scanlon served in numerous key leadership, management, and operational intelligence and security positions working with the Army, DIA, NSA, CIA, FBI, DEA, DoD, the State Department, and many foreign military and government officials. He is the recipient of Defense and Army Distinguished Service Medals and the National Intelligence Distinguished Service Medal.

In his last post with the U.S. Army, Major General Scanlon was the Commanding General of the Intelligence and Security Command. He was elected to the Military Intelligence Hall of Fame in 1995. Chuck Scanlon holds a B.A. in Political Science from the University of Florida; an M.A. in American and Asian Studies from the University of Hawaii; and is a graduate of the Command and General Staff College and the Naval War College. He also holds certificates from Penn State University and the Harvard School of Government and is listed in *Who's Who in America, 1992-2001*.



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# **GLOSSARY**

AA	Deputy Director for Attaché Affairs
ABM	Antiballistic Missile Treaty
ADP	Automated Data Processing
AFB	Air Force Base
AFMIC	Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
APC	Armored Personnel Carrier
ARCENT	Army Central Command
ASD/I	Assistant Secretary of Defense (Intelligence)
ASOC	Attaché Staff Operations Course
ASW	Antisubmarine Warfare
AUTODIN	Automated Digital Network
BDA	Battle Damage Assessment
BLRT	Bilingual Translation Technician
BSI	Bachelor of Science in Intelligence
C <sup>3</sup> I	Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence
CAJIT	Central American Joint Intelligence Team
CENTAF	Central Air Force Command
CENTCOM	Central Command
CFE	Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty
CG	Commanding General
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency
CIIC	Current Intelligence and Indications Center
CINC	Commander-in-Chief
CINCCENT	Commander-in-Chief, Central Command
CINCSEU	Commander-in-Chief, European Command
CISE	CENTCOM Intelligence Support Element
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CMO	Central MASINT Organization
CMS	Community Management Staff
CONOPS	Concept of Operations
COP	Common Operating Picture
CSCE	Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe
CSP	Command Support and Plans
CSP	Unified and Specified Command Support

CSP	Communications Support Processor
CTJTF	Counterterrorist Joint Task Force
CW	Chief Warrant Officer
DA	Directorate for Attachés and Operations
DAO	Defense Attaché Office
DAS	Defense Attaché System
DASD(I)	Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Intelligence
DATT	Defense Attaché
DB	Research Directorate/Directorate for Research
DCI	Director of Central Intelligence
DE	Defense Intelligence Estimates
DE	Defense Estimates
DE	Directorate for Estimates
DE	Assistant Deputy Director for Estimates
DEA	Drug Enforcement Agency
DEFSMAC	Defense Special Missile and Astronautics Center
DHS	Defense HUMINT Service
DI	Directorate for Intelligence
DIA	Defense Intelligence Agency
DIAC	Defense Intelligence Analysis Center
DIAOLS	DIA Online System
DIN	Defense Intelligence Network
DIO	Defense Intelligence Office/Officer
DIOs	Defense Intelligence Officers
DIPC	Defense Intelligence Production Council
DIRES	Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System
DIS	Defense Intelligence School
DISES	Defense Intelligence Senior Executive Service
DMB	DODIIS Management Board
DMI	Directorate for Military Intelligence
DMI	Director of Military Intelligence
DO	Director of Attachés and Operations
DO	Director for Intelligence Operations
DO	Deputy Director for Attachés and Operations
DoD	Department of Defense
DoDIIS	Department of Defense Intelligence Information Systems
DoDIPP	Department of Defense Intelligence Production Program
DoDJIC	Department of Defense Joint Intelligence Center
DPMO	Defense Prisoner of War/Missing in Action Office
DS	Directorate of Information Systems and Services

DSA	Defense Special Assessment
DSG	Defense Steering Group
DT	Directorate for Technology
ELINT	Electronic Intelligence
EUCOM	U.S. European Command
EUCOM JAC	European Command Joint Analysis Center
EXCOMM	Executive Committee of the National Security Council
FAO	Foreign Area Officer
FBI	Federal Bureau of Investigation
FSLN	Sandinista National Liberation Front
FY	Fiscal Year
FYDP	Fiscal Year Defense Program
GCCS	Global Command and Control System
GDIP	General Defense Intelligence Program
GMI	General Military Intelligence
GRU	Soviet General Staff Intelligence Organization
HOCNET	Human Intelligence Communications Net
HSE	HUMINT Support Element
HUMINT	Human Intelligence
I&W	Indications and Warning
IADS	Integrated Air Defense System
IC	Intelligence Community
ICBM	Intercontinental Ballistic Missile
IDB	Integrated Database
IFOR	(NATO-led) Implementation Force
IIRs	Imagery Interpretation Reports
INCA	Intelligence Communications
INF	Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
Intel	Intelligence
Intelink	Secure Internet
IOC	Initial Operating Capability
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
ISA	International Security Affairs
ISR	Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
IT	Information Technology
ITF	Intelligence Task Force
IZKUWG	Iraq/Kuwait Regional Working Group
J2	Director of Intelligence, Joint Staff, JCS
J2T	Deputy Director for Targeting
J-6	Joint Staff Directorate of Command, Control, and Communications

JASAWS	Joint All-Source Analytic Workstation, also known as MERLIN
JCRC	Joint Casualty Resolution Center
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff
JDIIS	Joint Deployable Intelligence Information System
JIC	Joint Intelligence Center
JIVA	Joint Intelligence Virtual Architecture
JMIC	Joint Military Intelligence College
JMICS	Joint Mobile Intelligence Communications System
JMITC	Joint Military Intelligence Training Center
JMUA	Joint Meritorious Unit Award
JS	JCS Liaison Division
JS	J2 Support Office
JS	Directorate for JCS Support
JSIPS	Joint Strategic Targeting Planning Staff
JSOC	Joint Special Operations Command
JTF	Joint Task Force
JTF-SWA	Joint Task Force–Southwest Asia
JTFSO	Joint Task Force South
JTIC	Joint Tactical Intelligence Center
JWICS	Joint Worldwide Intelligence Communications System
KTO	Kuwaiti Theater of Operations
LAN	Local Area Networks
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam
MARCENT	Marine Central Command
MASINT	Measurement and Signature Intelligence
MBFR	Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions
MCSF	Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility
MEF	Marine Expeditionary Force
MERLIN	Joint All-Source Analytic Workstation, also known as JASAWS
MI	Military Intelligence
MIA	Missing in Action
MIB	Military Intelligence Board
MIC	Missile Intelligence Center
MOD	Ministry of Defense
MSA	Middle States Association
MSIC	Missile and Space Intelligence Center
MSSI	Master of Science of Strategic Intelligence
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NAVCENT	Naval Forces Central Command
NCA	National Command Authority


NCO	Non-Commissioned Officer
NEO	Non-Combatant Evacuation Operation
NFIP	National Foreign Intelligence Program
NIC	National Intelligence Council
NIE	National Intelligence Estimative/Estimate
NIMA	National Imagery and Mapping Agency
NIST	National Intelligence Support Team
NMCC	National Military Command Center
NMIC	National Military Intelligence Center
NMIPC	National Military Intelligence Production Center
NMIST	National Military Intelligence Support Team
NMJIC	National Military Joint Intelligence Center
NOIC	Navy Operational Intelligence Center
NOIWON	National Operations and Intelligence Watch Officers Network
NPIC	National Photographic Interpretation Center
NSA	National Security Agency
NTM	National Technical Means
OB	Order of Battle
OICC	Operational Intelligence Coordination Center
OPLAN	Operation Plan
OPSCO	Operations Coordinator
OSD	Office of the Secretary of Defense
OSIA	On-Site Inspection Agency
OSS	Office of Strategic Services
PACAF	U.S. Pacific Air Force
PACOM	U.S. Pacific Command
PAP	People's Armed Police
PC	Personal Computer
PD	Presidential Directive
PDF	Panamanian Defense Forces
PFC	Private First Class
PGIC	Post-Graduate Intelligence Course
PGWG	Persian Gulf Working Group
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PLO	Palestine Liberation Organization
POW	Prisoner of War
PPBS	Planning, Programming, and Budget System
RCSC	Regional Crisis Support Center
RDJTF	Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
RFI	Request for Information

RGFC	(Iraqi) Republican Guard Forces Command
ROTC	Reserve Officers Training Program
S&TI	Scientific and Technical Intelligence
SAB	Scientific Advisory Board
SAC	Strategic Air Command
SAFE	Support for the Analyst's File Environment
SALT	Strategic Arms Limitations Talks
SAM	Surface-to-Air Missile
SECDEF	Secretary of Defense
SES	Senior Executive Service
SIGINT	Signals Intelligence
SIOP	Single Integrated Operational Plan
SME	Subject Matter Expert
SMIOC	Senior Military Intelligence Officers Conference
SNIE	Special National Intelligence Estimate
SOCOM	Special Operations Command
SOUTHCOM	U.S. Southern Command
SSG	Staff Sergeant
TAT	Tactical Assistance Team
TENCAP	Tactical Exploitation of National Capabilities Program
TWA	Trans World Airways
UN	United Nations
USA	United States Army
USACOM	U.S. Atlantic Command
USAFE	U.S. Air Force, Europe
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USCENTCOM	U.S. Central Command
USCINCSOUTH	U.S. Commander in Chief, Southern Command
USIB	U.S. Intelligence Board
USMC	U.S. Marine Corps
USN	U.S. Navy
VIP	Very Important Person
VP	Deputy Director for Production
VP	Vice Deputy Director for Foreign Intelligence
VP	Directorate for Foreign Intelligence

VTC	Video Teleconference
WATCHCON	Watch Condition
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
JIWO	Joint Indications and Warning Office
U&S	Unified and Specified Commands



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